Well if I was interpreting your earlier posts correctly you suggested that the information of an object was not the object itself. If I can draw a parallel, a cogent model is developed from experimental data collection of an object, but the model is not necessarily the object itself because it's an abstraction. I would have interpreted you and nonpariel discussing observation data and modelling.
Well, actually the example I used was a property of an object (electrical charge) since information has historically been a property of material either in and of itself or as a media for encoding information. Though the parallel you draw is, well, parallel. That information about something, even in an informational universe, doesn’t nesseraly have to be the information that is that something.
The data is the information of an object, the model is an independent abstraction developed from the data. It sounds weird to parse "independent" and "from the data" however good models should be able to function with each other. If you were to model from the information of many object's information and the models all function with each other they're still abstractions and independent of the data; their dependency with each other is all that matters)
Right, but again just describing those dependencies need not be having those dependencies. We can know how to process the information but until we actually do process it in the manor required we don’t get the same result.
Now, the wrinkle from the Mathematical Universe proposal is that if we did model all information in the universe and we suppose that this information is "reality" then the models being abstract seems semantic. That wrinkle is what I am interpreting leads you to say that materialism seems moving towards idealism.
No not really, it is more that in idealism material was already essentially information.
I would say however that if we were still moving materialism somewhere, it wouldn't be towards idealism. Let me say right about here that everything about information and modelling that I've said above is not really influential to either materialism or idealism since both can interpret information equally well. Materialism suggests no distinction between reality and experience; even "consciousness", whatever it is, is not abstract. Idealism (I'll stick with the monastic concept as Bernardo Kastrup suggests instead of dualistic) suggests that conscious experience is reality which necessitates that data requires consciousness (again, whatever it is).
And if consciousness is just a particular form of self-referential data processing? Of course that goes back to the indictment of naive philosophy for the mind you mentioned before.
Materialism with regards to information do not move towards this monastic idealism; that kind of monastic idealism has no ability to interpret or discriminate information to establish itself as conscious, much less reality. Deepak Chopra has this problem in his monastic idealism philosophy (one that Bernardo shares).
Well, of course it would be monastic infomationalism in the case of an informational universe. Materialism already had the mind there and idealism fundamentally already had material there. While I haven’t seen the idealistic concept of mind shift all that much (again your indictment before and of course could be that I just wasn’t looking all that much) we do see the concept of material shifting that way.
But there may be a funny issue that goes back to the mathematical universe wrinkle. If the abstract mathematics are no longer abstract since they model all information then "abstract" is semantic. One may wonder if monastic idealism also becomes a semantic philosophy.
I think that was kind of PixyMisa’s point before about interpretations and names, and a point I tried to make before. If everything is just information it tends to put things on a more even keel and the only differences are organizational, structural, syntactic or even semantic (what that information represents) if you will.
