I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

That doesn't make any sense. How can a belief in the non-existent be justified ?

I thought my hippo example was good, but I'll offer some others.

Let us say I find a small bag of money. It's not richie-rich money, but it's significant. I should like to keep (and spend) the money, but I realize the rightful owner might step forward and claim it, leaving me with a substantial problem.

So, I put flyers out about finding the money, I put an ad in the paper, I inform the police about what I've found... ad nauseam. A few years go by and there is no response. As the time passes, my belief that there is no rightful owner for the money begins to grow. At some point, my belief in the non-existence of an owner (and remember, abandoned money also lacks an owner). Surely, by whatever exhaustive method I use, I eventually have a justified belief that there is no owner at all and I can keep the money?

Now, accepting that I have a justified belief in the non-existence of a rightful owner, I spend the money. Not only do I act on my belief, but the non-existent thing directly influences my actions. If an owner exists, I'm screwed. There are direct consequences of something that doesn't exist on me, and by extension, the world at large.
 
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I thought my hippo example was good, but I'll offer some others.

Let us say I find a small bag of money. It's not richie-rich money, but it's significant. I should like to keep (and spend) the money, but I realize the rightful owner might step forward and claim it, leaving me with a substantial problem.

So, I put flyers out about finding the money, I put an ad in the paper, I inform the police about what I've found... ad nauseam. A few years go by and there is no response. As the time passes, my belief that there is no rightful owner for the money begins to grow. At some point, my belief in the non-existence of an owner (and remember, abandoned money also lacks an owner). Surely, by whatever exhaustive method I use, I eventually have a justified belief that there is no owner at all and I can keep the money?

Now, accepting that I have a justified belief in the non-existence of a rightful owner, I spend the money. Not only do I act on my belief, but the non-existent thing directly influences my actions. If an owner exists, I'm screwed. There are direct consequences of something that doesn't exist on me, and by extension, the world at large.

Again: what does this have to do with anything that I've said ? Beliefs are processes in the brain and as such they exist. The thing you believe in may not. What's your point ?
 
Again: what does this have to do with anything that I've said ? Beliefs are processes in the brain and as such they exist. The thing you believe in may not. What's your point ?

The question at hand was how the immaterial could ever affect the material, as if they were two different, mutually disconnected realms. So I was trying to show how the one might reach the other.

If beliefs are material things, then I'm proposing that beliefs can be about immaterial, non-existent things - and those beliefs can be both justified and have consequences. This offers a bridge between the immaterial (things that don't exist) and the material (my beliefs about those things).
 
The question at hand was how the immaterial could ever affect the material, as if they were two different, mutually disconnected realms. So I was trying to show how the one might reach the other.

If beliefs are material things, then I'm proposing that beliefs can be about immaterial, non-existent things - and those beliefs can be both justified and have consequences. This offers a bridge between the immaterial (things that don't exist) and the material (my beliefs about those things).

Mathematicians struggle with the same thing:

Mathematical realism, like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same. In this point of view, there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered; triangles, for example, are real entities, not the creations of the human mind.

Many working mathematicians have been mathematical realists; they see themselves as discoverers of naturally occurring objects. Examples include Paul Erdős and Kurt Gödel. Gödel believed in an objective mathematical reality that could be perceived in a manner analogous to sense perception. Certain principles (e.g., for any two objects, there is a collection of objects consisting of precisely those two objects) could be directly seen to be true, but the continuum hypothesis conjecture might prove undecidable just on the basis of such principles. Gödel suggested that quasi-empirical methodology could be used to provide sufficient evidence to be able to reasonably assume such a conjecture.

Within realism, there are distinctions depending on what sort of existence one takes mathematical entities to have, and how we know about them. Major forms of mathematical realism include Platonism and empiricism.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Major_themes

If a triangle (or any mathematical entity) exists outside the mind, how does it exist? Do numbers exist in the material world? In what sense?
 
(much good stuff snipped)

If a triangle (or any mathematical entity) exists outside the mind, how does it exist? Do numbers exist in the material world? In what sense?

Excellent post. I was holding this card back to play later.
 
The question at hand was how the immaterial could ever affect the material, as if they were two different, mutually disconnected realms. So I was trying to show how the one might reach the other.

If beliefs are material things, then I'm proposing that beliefs can be about immaterial, non-existent things - and those beliefs can be both justified and have consequences. This offers a bridge between the immaterial (things that don't exist) and the material (my beliefs about those things).

No it doesn't. The thing that does the affecting is physical, entirely.
 
Mathematical realism, like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same. In this point of view, there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered; triangles, for example, are real entities, not the creations of the human mind.

Triangles are real entities. "Triangle" is a descriptor we give to a shape that fits a certain definition.

Mathematical realism does not hold that there is some mystic "true circle" that exists independently of all other matter. It's just the rather straightforward position that mathematics is constant.

Which it is, because mathematics is a description of the real world, which is constant.

Abstract representations are not a problem for materialism.
 
Certainly.
The desk I am using holds my computer, a keyboard and monitor, and various ephemera on it. There is no hippo on my desk. If there were a hippo on my desk, there would be no room for any of that other stuff.

I claim that I am justified in believing there is no hippo on my desk and that, in fact, the lack of a hippo is a necessary condition for me to be typing this.

The very non-existence of that hippo is not only justified, but critical - my desk could not function with a hippo on it, I am depending on there not being a hippo, and the non-existence of the hippo is required for me to use the desk.

Why to you use the word belief, there? Obviously, you know there is no hippo on your desk, and you can prove it. (You cannot prove a negative, but you CAN prove absence)

Hans
 
If a triangle (or any mathematical entity) exists outside the mind, how does it exist? Do numbers exist in the material world? In what sense?

Nonpareil already answered this nicely.

But to be very direct: A triangle exists as some triangular object or as the relative positions of three objects. Otherwise it doesn't exist. The matemathical rules for a triagle are simply invariant rules that have been found to apply to all triangles. Same with numbers, obviously.

Sure, it is interesting that sets of invariant rules exist and govern the universe. This might also be relevant in the other thread, about fine tuning.

In a universe without triangles, and nobody to know the rules, do the rules still exist? ;)

Hans
 
Abstract representations are not a problem for materialism.
They do affect the physical world though, such as the abstraction God. Any gods which exist out there may, or may not utilise abstraction to affect the world(via the human mind).
 
Easy: if minds are not material, they cannot interact with the material world. If they DO interact, they are either material, or logic is wrong.
Minds have an interaction with the material world all the time.

This line of reasoning does not preclude other materials(other than the one we know) interacting with the (known) material world and appearing to be immaterial influences.
 
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Minds have an interaction with the material world all the time.

Yes, and minds are also material, so there is no contradiction.

This line of reasoning does not preclude other materials(other than the one we know) interacting with the (known) material world and appearing to be immaterial influences.

Those materials would be material and physical. Again, no contradiction.
 
They do affect the physical world though, such as the abstraction God. Any gods which exist out there may, or may not utilise abstraction to affect the world(via the human mind).

I never said they didn't.

Please suppoert your claim by detailed replies to http://www.sciencechatforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=51&t=27823 and http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10364025&postcount=277.

If you can't do that it will be clear to any poster here that your "I fully understand" does not hold water.

I already did.

Your "theorem" is that both physical and mental phenomena - which you claim are fundamentally different without any actual evidence to support that - have a root in a third, "true" reality. You present no evidence for this claim.

You then claim that mental phenomena have their root in "Consciousness", which is always capitalized because you have a Fixation with this type of thing, and that it is consciousness' "meta aspect" that you are concerned with, despite the fact that you've already claimed that mental phenomena have the same root as physical ones and are now adding a whole new level of abstraction.

At no point are any of your terms defined or is evidence given to support any of your claims, and what follows is a nonsensical stream of pseudomath that doesn't support your claims and is only relevant if they can be shown to be true, and is thus ignored (except in that we can safely assume it's wrong, because you are demonstrably bad at math, and the system you are expounding upon has never actually been defined).

Essentially, you try to invoke Take A Third Option when asked to choose between materialism and idealism. What you fail to realize is that this still leaves you with all the problems idealism has, plus a slew of your own.

And we're still waiting on evidence.
 
Not necessarily.

Yes necessarily because it's the definition of the word.

If multiple things can interact, whether they are of the same type or not, it simply means that both of them are different aspects of a common source.

There's that word salad again.

Your logic is simply the particular case of a common source among multiple things of the same type.

It's not "my logic". It's LOGIC. Something you seem totally unfamilliar with.

My neutral monist logic is not restricted to your particular case.

I'll say. It appears that it means whatever you want it to mean at that particular moment.
 

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