The post you quoted said the word is used in many different ways. That’s it. Then you suggested Barehl provide his definition.
Why should Barehl provide his definition when you have insisted that yours is the definitive one?
The discussion so far.
I have said (repeatedly) that there is no consensus on the definition of consciousness. You (eventually) responded with this:
You explicitly stated that there IS an extremely simple and coherent definition… and then you provided it.
Are you saying your words represent the scientific consensus (or any kind of consensus)….or not?
You’ve also insisted that insects are conscious. Does that include this thing:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dicopomorpha_echmepterygis
It’s slightly bigger than the thickness of a human hair.
Are you claiming that you know when something is conscious… or not?
What are the specific conditions that determine whether or not an organism is conscious?
How does science empirically adjudicate the condition you refer to as ‘experience’?
How does science empirically adjudicate the condition you refer to as ‘feeling’?
IOW…how does science empirically determine when something has either experience or feeling?
Are both necessary for a determination of consciousness? Why…why not?
Since insects are conscious (according to you)…are micro-organisms conscious? What about bacteria, viruses, and protazoa? What about macro-organisms such as tapeworms? What, precisely, is the threshold for consciousness? You’re the one who keeps insisting that this whole thing is resolved…
…so prove it.
I’m going to go out on a limb and flat out guarantee that despite your insistence that you know what consciousness is and that you know what variety of phenomena are / are not conscious…
…you will not answer a single one of these questions.
There is much that occurs at the forefront of science that is entirely theoretical. String theory comes to mind. Some very prominent physicists (John Wheeler, Anton Zeilinger) have argued for an informational ontology. That doesn’t make it remotely ‘core’, but string theory is a very popular part of physics and there is no empirical evidence to support it!
I can categorically assure you that he has no idea what his definition means. Try and ask him, You will get nothing and go nowhere (as you have already discovered).
Those are reasonable questions. Perhaps you should ask Nonpareil as that is his definition of consciousness, not mine. I’ve been trying to get him to unpack it ever since he posted it.
Exactly…and has been pointed out ad nauseum…the only ontologies with anything like absolute status are perception and the abstract mind. We simply do not have any idea what anything else actually is (3-D holographs or 10-D strings…don’t know) and we don’t actually experience anything else (except ourself).
Not to mention…that current directions in physics are pointing to some very weird possibilities (as if the current batch isn’t weird enough). That what we currently experience as a 3 dimensional condition is actually nothing more than a projection of 2 dimension information (
http://www.fnal.gov/pub/presspass/press_releases/2014/2-D-Hologram-20140826.html ). That, at the atomic level reality does not exist until it is measured (
http://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/experiment-confirms-quantum-theory-weirdness ).
He won’t answer cause he doesn’t know (nobody knows). According to Nonpareils very own useless definition of consciousness (experience / feeling), consciousness is NOT exclusively a function of the brain by virtue of the phenomenon known as embodied intelligence. Meaning… the entire body experiences feeling (
http://www.pnas.org/content/111/2/646 ). Hardly the first time Nonpareil has contradicted himself.
Someday you will realize just how incoherent this is.