I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Belz...]

Yours is an interesting statement. . . both materialism and idealism begin with the activity of observation, that is, being aware of something. Our experience is that the 'substance' of our experience occurs in awareness (perhaps as a computation). Now materialism makes an additional assumption, that the something of experience is different than the observation, the something is not in awareness as observed, but physical or external and independent of awareness.

Larry, it would be really nice if you integrated knowledge gained by discussing this with people here. Stop pretending like previous discussions didn't happen.

Materialism doesn't add anything. In fact it assumes that what we observed is what is, that what you see is what you get, basically. Idealism instead assumes that either there is an underlying mind-stuff behind all this, or that mind generates the world. It's nonsense, and unevidenced nonsense to boot.

Where does the assumption that matter is independent from awareness come from?

Simple: stuff continues to exist when no one is around to be aware of it.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Science and observation. Some people _have_ had their brains split, as your link mentions, and their behaviour doesn't mesh at all with the idea of a soul or of a single consciousness in these cases.

Oh no Belz! Guess you didn't read the link even after you said you did:

After surgery, the split-brain patients are often given extensive neuropsychological assessments. An interesting finding among split-brain patients is many of them claim to feel normal after the surgery and do not feel that their brains are “split”.[8

So like, their brains were actually split and yet they still had one unified field of consciousness. Which is the complete opposite of what you said previously.

 

[Nonpareil]

the split-brain resulting in two consciousnesses is a myth:

http://www.brain-mind-institute.org/ICBM-2012/proceedings-html/full paper/paper 16.pdf

or as Nagel once described it, cutting a pair of hand cuffs in two does not result in two sets of restraining devices.

This is actually quite interesting. Thank you.

The source of the claim was a video posted earlier in the thread - I believe it was by PixyMisa, though I'm not certain of that - which went over the issues experienced by a man who had undergone surgery to deliberately sever the connections between the left and right hemispheres of his brain.

Specifically, he couldn't consciously register images presented to one eye - I forget if it was the right or the left - but, if a pen was left in the hand corresponding to that hemisphere's control, he was capable of drawing the image. Again, this apparently happened without conscious knowledge or decision on his part.

This leads to a number of neurologists, Koch and Tononi included, to conclude that a single instance of consciousness can be split into multiple (albeit reduced) instances through similar procedures. Like integrated information theory itself, this is not yet one hundred percent confirmed, but it seems to fit the evidence in hand. You can read one of Koch's lectures on the subject here.

Meanwhile, the paper linked in your post is written by Gonzalo Munevar, who is not a neuroscientist. His doctorate is in philosophy, not biology or any other relevant field. Even his staff page at Lawrence Technological openly admits that his involvement in the field is limited to "Research Interest". This doesn't necessarily mean that he's wrong, but it does mean that we should not necessarily take his word over that of trained, leading neuroscientists like Koch and Tononi.

In addition to this, Munevar's objections are not a definitive rebuttal. He says only that there are other explanations for "alien hand syndrome", which is true enough, but he acts as though the presence of alien hand syndrome is the only evidence which Koch and Tononi take into account. In reality, Koch and Tononi are operating both from evidence collected by previous researchers, including Nobel Prize winner Roger Sperry, and their system of consciousness put forth in integrated information theory. This is the behavior that integrated information theory predicts.

So. One hundred percent conclusive? Not necessarily. But it is certainly possible and fits all the evidence in hand according to several leading figures in the field of neuroscience.

 

[Nonpareil]

Now materialism makes an additional assumption, that the something of experience is different than the observation, the something is not in awareness as observed, but physical or external and independent of awareness.

Conclusion. Definition. Whatever you want to call it, it's not an assumption.

To say that the external universe is not really an external universe is just the garage dragon argument all over again.

I am also curious why Nonpareil believes Tononi's integrated information of consciousness supports a materialist philosophy. Especially considering both he and Koch explicitly support a type of panpsychism. Which is kinda like the complete opposite of materialism.

This is at least the fourth time that I've responded to this over the course of this thread alone.

Koch and Tononi are not panpsychists. It annoys me that they used the word, because it's very obviously one of those sound bites that people are going to pick up and run with and will only cause headaches in the future, but whatever.

Koch has clarified this on several occasions. He is not a panpsychist. He does not believe that everything is conscious, or that there is some sort of "universal consciousness" that we are all just "expressions" of, or whatever other nonsense you want to call it. What he says is that more things may be conscious, to one extent or another, than most people would readily predict, as consciousness exists in degrees rather than as an off/on switch.

It still relies on the presence of an integrated computational system. Random handfuls of dust, sand dunes, and the like are not conscious.

Please, do some research before just dredging up one-line throwaways from Wikipedia.

I think it would probably good to hear some type of summary from the theory's proponent, and why it explicitly supports materialism. Seems that part tends to get glossed over in these type of debates. I've always wondered why.

I've already given you the article which explicitly defines the theory. You can read that if you want further information.

And it doesn't "support materialism". It makes no mention of materialism, in the same way that the theory of general relativity makes no mention of materialism. Materialism, in case you didn't know, is sort of assumed in all branches of science, because assuming idealism would be stupid.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

So it looks like this is a semantic issue: as expected we're now using the word "consciousness" to refer to different things.

When the corpus callosum is severed the brain can no longer use these nerves to communicate information between hemispheres of the brain. Therefore, it is entirely expected that each side could no longer "see" what the other side sees, as it has an information deficiency. It would be like putting a nerve block in your back where you can no longer feel your legs. You can no longer perceive your legs because the nerves can not transmit the information. This does not mean your legs are conscious.

The astonishing thing is that these patients still perceive a single unitary consciousness. Their brain is quite literally cut in half, yet they still feel they are one person. The only thing that is different is their information processing capabilities -- as you would expect if a bundle of nerves is "cut". This pretty much refutes materialism, as if materialism were true a brain that was split in half and could no longer communicate with each other would develop two distinct conscious fields.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Koch and Tononi are not panpsychists. It annoys me that they used the word

So they call themselves panpsychists but they aren't really panpsychists because if they were then that would annoy you?

Koch has clarified this on several occasions. He is not a panpsychist. He does not believe that everything is conscious, or that there is some sort of "universal consciousness" that we are all just "expressions" of, or whatever other nonsense you want to call it. What he says is that more things may be conscious, to one extent or another, than most people would readily predict, as consciousness exists in degrees rather than as an off/on switch.

Hate to break it to you, but this is a type of panpsychism. Modified from traditional panpsychism, sure, but still panpsychism at its core.

Please, do some research before just dredging up one-line throwaways from Wikipedia.

Yeah, I know all about his theory. It's not what you say/think it is.

I've already given you the article which explicitly defines the theory. You can read that if you want further information.

Already read it. Way (way) before you ever mentioned it.

And it doesn't "support materialism". It makes no mention of materialism, in the same way that the theory of general relativity makes no mention of materialism. Materialism, in case you didn't know, is sort of assumed in all branches of science, because assuming idealism would be stupid.

So materialism is true because you think everyone assumes it is true? And you just mentioned IIT in this thread (about materialism) just for the funsies? That's some deep philosophizing there, Nonpareil.

And if you honestly think all branches of science "assume" materialism is the nature of reality (rather than a useful assumption because science deals with physical systems exclusively), you honestly have no idea about anything with respect to science and philosophy.

 

[Nonpareil]

So it looks like this is a semantic issue: as expected we're now using the word "consciousness" to refer to different things.

We're actually not.

When the corpus callosum is severed the brain can no longer use these nerves to communicate information between hemispheres of the brain. Therefore, it is entirely expected that each side could no longer "see" what the other side sees, as it has an information deficiency. It would be like putting a nerve block in your back where you can no longer feel your legs. You can no longer perceive your legs because the nerves can not transmit the information. This does not mean your legs are conscious.

Of course not. Your legs are not your brain.

The astonishing thing is that these patients still perceive a single unitary consciousness. Their brain is quite literally cut in half, yet they still feel they are one person.

This is quite true. This is astonishing. However, it is also exactly what integrated information theory predicts.

In Tononi's model, consciousness is compositional. That is, a conscious system is constructed out of distinct parts. If these parts are separated, it is possible - but not always necessarily the case - that the two resulting halves may each still be an integrated computational system. They would each still be conscious halves, though they may experience a number of problems related to losing access to whatever is kept in the other half of the system (such as not being capable of seeing out of that eye).

The other part of integrated information theory that is important here is that consciousness is exclusive. It only exists within the bounds of a single system, and does not interact with whatever consciousness is present in other systems. Unless the two halves are joined up again - that is, unless they become a single integrated system - their consciousnesses are entirely separate.

Separating two parts of a conscious system and having both resulting halves remain conscious, but entirely separate, is exactly what we would expect under integrated information theory. A divided consciousness not being explicitly aware of its divided nature would be exactly what we would expect - you're only addressing one half, which feels like it is a consciousness unto itself because it is a consciousness unto itself.

The only way such a divided consciousness could be aware of the fact that it was split (other than by, say, a splitting agony in the brain, which isn't possible since the brain has no nerve endings in itself) is by noticing whatever issues arise from the loss of whatever faculties the other half provided, which is exactly what we see.

The only thing that is different is their information processing capabilities -- as you would expect if a bundle of nerves is "cut". This pretty much refutes materialism, as if materialism were true a brain that was split in half and could no longer communicate with each other would develop two distinct conscious fields.

Aside from the above explanation, no, this wouldn't refute materialism in any way. It would just mean that certain models of consciousness were wrong - but, as above, what we would expect under these models is actually what we see.

 

[Nonpareil]

Hate to break it to you, but this is a type of panpsychism. Modified from traditional panpsychism, sure, but still panpsychism at its core.

The clarification remains important, because it illustrates the difference between an actual scientifically-supported position and superstition.

So materialism is true because you think everyone assumes it is true?

No. Materialism is true because the alternatives are garage dragon arguments.

I would appreciate it if you would actually read my posts before responding.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Separating two parts of a conscious system and having both resulting halves remain conscious, but entirely separate, is exactly what we would expect under integrated information theory. A divided consciousness not being explicitly aware of its divided nature would be exactly what we would expect - you're only addressing one half, which feels like it is a consciousness unto itself because it is a consciousness unto itself.

So they have the self-perception of a being a single unified individual and behave as if they were a single unified individual, yet you say they are "entirely separate"? Sounds like maybe you are distorting the results (and language) to fit whatever your pet ontology is. Generally "entirely separate" means "entirely separate". Not "completely together except for lack of communication on a few distinct sensory inputs".

 

[Nonpareil]

So they have the self-perception of a being a single unified individual and behave as if they were a single unified individual, yet you say they are "entirely separate"? Sounds like maybe you are distorting the results (and language) to fit whatever your pet ontology is. Generally "entirely separate" means "entirely separate". Not "completely together except for lack of communication on a few distinct sensory inputs".

Reading the entire post helps.

The two resulting halves are entirely separate. Each would have the perception of being a single unified individual, because each half is a single unified individual.

 

[Dancing David]

It is well known and acknowledged that scientists don't understand the body sufficiently to say which material in the body produces consciousness and how (or perhaps you can name one?).

********, what neurologist said that or are you pulling a Yrreg and just quoting yourself. What is your source for this statement, the brain and the neurons seem to produce consciousness. Who as a scientist said the **** otherwise?

 

[NotEvenWrong]

The clarification remains important, because it illustrates the difference between an actual scientifically-supported position and superstition.

Seems this continues in your tradition of claiming things are true simply because you say so.

No. Materialism is true because the alternatives are garage dragon arguments.

Wait. There is a garage dragon philosophy? And this garage dragon philosophy encompasses everything that is not materialism? Weird that I have never ever come across any "garage dragon" philosophy ever... in the history of well, pretty much everything. You sure you aren't just making that up and you don't understand anything about philosophy? Here, let's do a simple test -- link me to a reputable philosophy source that talks about the garage dragon alternative to materialism. If you can do this I will begin to believe you. If you can't, well, then I guess that means you don't really understand anything about philosophy. I think we can guess which side of this you fall on.

I would appreciate it if you would actually read my posts before responding.

Already reading them. You are quite funny, I'll give you that.

By the way, wasn't there a poster early on in this thread that referred to the holographic principle (which is a core principle in modern theoretical physics) and how everything is actually information? Where did he refer to garage dragons? Are garage dragons part of modern theoretical physics now? Holy crap!

 

[Dancing David]

I am referring to the prism through which the person percieves the world. There is something there equating to a mind. I would prefer to avoid assuming the mind of the idealist, other than referring to something unknown equating to it.

And you assume a prism, what is there other than the apparent brain?

Might as well say that a car engine has a shmind that makes it move.

 

[Nonpareil]

Wait. There is a garage dragon philosophy?

Garage dragon.

By the way, wasn't there a poster early on in this thread that referred to the holographic principle (which is a core principle in modern theoretical physics) and how everything is actually information? Where did he refer to garage dragons? Are garage dragons part of modern theoretical physics now? Holy crap!

The holographic principle is not incompatible with materialism. It just tells us what matter is.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Reading the entire post helps.

The two resulting halves are entirely separate. Each would have the perception of being a single unified individual, because each half is a single unified individual.

This is great. You are saying there are two halves, and each is a single unified individual. Yet the individual (with two distinct halves) only perceives him/herself as one single individual. Either you just proved 2 = 1 or your interpretation of the experimental results is completely undeniably wrong. I am going to go ahead and state that I think the foundations of mathematics are intact here, and you're probably just wrong.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Garage dragon.

Yeah um, that's just an analogy. It's not saying "everything non-materialism = garage dragon". What is even going on here?

The holographic principle is not incompatible with materialism. It just tells us what matter is.

lol. Yeah, information is more fundamental than matter, yet since matter is information then materialism. Mind is more fundamental than matter, yet that means mind is matter so materialism is still right. Garage dragons are more fundamental than matter, yet that just means garage dragons are matter so materialism is right yet again!

This defining everything to be materialism sure is awesome and useful. Plus you get to be right no matter what!

 

[Nonpareil]

This is great. You are saying there are two halves, and each is a single unified individual. Yet the individual (with two distinct halves) only perceives him/herself as one single individual.

Except I'm not. You really should read my posts.

There are two distinct consciousnesses, each of which perceives themselves as a complete individual, residing within one brain. Only one of those consciousnesses is in direct control of the body (or at least enough of it to make us think of it as the one in control).

This is not complicated.

Yeah um, that's just an analogy. It's not saying "everything non-materialism = garage dragon". What is even going on here?

I really do wish you would read before responding. It would save us all a whole lot of uninteresting repetition of simple points.

Idealism is a garage dragon argument. It is in no way distinguishable from a materialistic universe. Thus, it is not true, because it is a garage dragon.

lol. Yeah, information is more fundamental than matter, yet since matter is information then materialism.

That is rather what it means, yes, though the phrase "information is more fundamental than matter" is pointless, since they are the same thing.

Mind is more fundamental than matter

No, it isn't.

 

[Pixel42]

This is great. You are saying there are two halves, and each is a single unified individual. Yet the individual (with two distinct halves) only perceives him/herself as one single individual.

No. Nonpareil is clearly saying that there are two unified individuals, each of which perceives him/herself as a single unified individual.

 

[The Man]

By the way, wasn't there a poster early on in this thread that referred to the holographic principle (which is a core principle in modern theoretical physics) and how everything is actually information? Where did he refer to garage dragons? Are garage dragons part of modern theoretical physics now? Holy crap!

Well there was, and still is, a poster on this thread who did refer to the holographic principle. However, he certainly never asserted it as "a core principle in modern theoretical physics".

 

[NotEvenWrong]

Except I'm not. You really should read my posts.

There are two distinct consciousnesses, each of which perceives themselves as a complete individual, residing within one brain. Only one of those consciousnesses is in direct control of the body (or at least enough of it to make us think of it as the one in control).

So there are actually two consciousnesses in the brain, it's just that they are tricking us by behaving as if their is only one consciousness! So when we actually try to get empirical validation of your theory that there are two consciousnesses, we can't actually see them because the two demons are tricking us! So do they have like a fight to the death to determine which one is in control, and that's why your second conscience is invisible? Is your invisible green dragon the referee?

This is not complicated.

I know, lol. That's what is so great about this.

I really do wish you would read before responding. It would save us all a whole lot of uninteresting repetition of simple points.

I've read everything. It's just that nothing you write makes sense.

Idealism is a garage dragon argument. It is in no way distinguishable from a materialistic universe. Thus, it is not true, because it is a garage dragon.

This is word salad. And I wasn't even talking about idealism. Just not-materialism.

That is rather what it means, yes, though the phrase "information is more fundamental than matter" is pointless, since they are the same thing.

"Everything is matter by definition, so I win!"

No, it isn't.

Well, even if it was, you would still just say mind = matter therefore materialism is right. It's absolutely hilarious that you don't see this.