I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

If consciousness is computation, yes it is.

No. By any meaningful definition of 'simulation' it is not.
Once your computation reaches a fidelity where it is actually conscious, it is no longer a simulation.

- The moment a flight simulator actually takes off, it becomes an aircraft.

Hans
 
No. By any meaningful definition of 'simulation' it is not.
Once your computation reaches a fidelity where it is actually conscious, it is no longer a simulation.
This is more of a semantic problem - when does a simulation of computation become an emulation, and when it becomes an emulation, does this mean it's no longer a simulation?

For example, the simulation of a Hewlett Packard HP57(?) calculator on my phone isn't a real HP calculator, but it simulates the appearance in 2D, and emulates its computational capabilities. It seems to be a calculator in its own right, and both an emulation of a HP57 and a simulation of a HP57...
 
No. By any meaningful definition of 'simulation' it is not.
Once your computation reaches a fidelity where it is actually conscious, it is no longer a simulation.

- The moment a flight simulator actually takes off, it becomes an aircraft.

Hans

Once again: if consciousness is computation, a simulation of consciousness, which is also computation, becomes emulation and thus is conscious. The difference is that a flight simulator doesn't have actual wings or air to fly in, while a simulated consciousness has actual computation.
 
Feel free to confine "experience" to brain function, I dont.

And you have no reason for doing so.

As before I am reducing experience to the cell along with the origin of consciousness.

Which remains nonsensical and meaningless.

Because, a cell (a single cellular organism) exists, lives, interacts with its environment, dwells, in the world. Just like us, which are known to have experience(our control).

That's wonderful.

It's still not conscious.

Perhaps you can, but you can't rule it out, as it is logically derived, given that our personal experience of existing* is our primary and only irrefutable knowledge.

Yes, you can.

Idealism falls apart the moment you have any sort of meaningful definition of the word "is". We've been over this.

I think it could be - if a simulation of a computational process can be detailed enough to be an emulation of that process - i.e. functionally identical; and if consciousness itself is fundamentally computational (which it appears to be).

It could be, yes - at which point it is no longer a simulation.

A brain is an enormously complex thing. It is more than possible to create a simple model of one which does not share the properties of consciousness.

If consciousness is computation, yes it is.

Not all computation is consciousness, but all consciousness is computation.

I've mentioned this before. In fact, I've talked about it at such length, regarding Christof Koch's work on the subject, that I'm boggled that you all don't remember it. Consciousness is computational, but my PC is not conscious. The key for actual consciousness is that it is an integrated computational system.

I wonder if it is really necessary to point out the degree to which this flatly contradicts just about everything you’ve been arguing for the past…forever.

I wonder if it's really necessary to remind everyone of exactly how little you have ever understood of anything I've argued.

No. By any meaningful definition of 'simulation' it is not.
Once your computation reaches a fidelity where it is actually conscious, it is no longer a simulation.

- The moment a flight simulator actually takes off, it becomes an aircraft.

Hans

This is exactly correct.
 
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You "guess" you are a computer scientist?
Do you have a screening test like AA?

Well, actually, yes. This does imply - in fact, it confirms - that the brain is at least partially based on computation which could be carried out by a Turing machine. It does, in fact, mean that the brain is a computer. That is what being Turing-equivalent means.
This is incorrect. Turing Complete refers to a language that can duplicate a Turing Machine. The brain has no such language. Turing Equivalent is true if item A can simulate B and B can simulate A. Obviously a brain can simulate a Turing Machine since brains invented Turing Machines. However, no Turing Machine can simulate a brain. What you are running into is the bounds of Computational Theory which makes the false assumption that a Universal Turing Machine would be brain equivalent; it is not.

If you claim that this goes "beyond computational theory", then your claim - if it is to have any possibility of being true at all - must not be that the brain is not a computer, because that is demonstrably untrue, but that the brain is not just a computer, or at least not a computer that can be modeled in its entirety via Turing machine.
The brain is demonstrably not a computer by any stretch of the imagination. The brain for example cannot run into the Halting Problem but all computers can.

Which is itself a problem, because then you run up against either the Church-Turing thesis (that anything computable can be computed via Turing machine)
The Church-Turing thesis is incorrect.

If you say that the brain is a new kind of computer that has computational abilities beyond that of a Turing machine, well, the Church-Turing thesis has borne up under a lot of scrutiny over the years, and you need a hell of a lot to overturn it.
Yes, I would need a new theory like the one I've been working on. The Church-Turing thesis is completely correct within computational theory. There is nothing else. What I keep trying to explain to you is that computational theory itself is not adequate for cognition.

If you say that the brain is flat-out not functioning through computation, well, there's just no evidence in support of that.
That's a rather brave assertion on your part. There is zero evidence that the brain is based on computation.

Any logic function or series thereof can be modeled via Turing machine, period.
I don't know who you are trying to convince. I can draw up a circuit using nothing but NAND gates or NOR gates. I'm familiar with computers from circuitry to code.

The lack of complete neural replication is due to the fact that there are a hell of a lot of connections between a hell of a lot of neurons that are hard to map accurately on account of them being inside our heads, not because Turing machines have some arbitrary number of logic operations at which they stop working.
I'm not entirely sure what you are trying to say. I think you are asserting that a neural simulation of the brain would be possible if the computer were large enough. And, secondly that this neural simulation would therefore replicate brain function. This is a common but naive assertion. You can duplicate any given instant of brain neural state using this model but you won't be able to duplicate brain function. I'm sorry.

No, they haven't. What are you talking about? The field of artificial intelligence makes incredible leaps on a regular basis - and even if it didn't, that wouldn't necessarily indicate what you say it does.
Name even one leap in the past 30 years that is not related to faster hardware.

And given the aforementioned issues regarding lack of evidence supporting this, no one is particularly inclined to believe you.
Your belief is not my problem.
 
Not all computation is consciousness, but all consciousness is computation.

I've mentioned this before. In fact, I've talked about it at such length, regarding Christof Koch's work on the subject, that I'm boggled that you all don't remember it. Consciousness is computational, but my PC is not conscious. The key for actual consciousness is that it is an integrated computational system.

But that isn't what you said and what I responded to. You said simulated consciousness isn't consciousness. I disagree.
 
But if he moves them around in just the right way (in some way that he knows will produce a simulated universe, I guess), then you get a simulated universe.

But it is taken for granted by some people here (who should know better), that if you move rocks around you can simulate conscious people. So the next time you see some kids in a dirt-clod fight, tell them to show a little respect for the fleeting conscious entity that may have just popped into existence.
Most people inherently understand that a simulation is different from something real. For example, a flight simulator doesn't fly. However because the limitations of philosophy, computational theory, and biology there have indeed been people who have asserted that the right program would become conscious. It is true that it is naive but it is not naive within the bounds of computational theory. When your theory asserts that it can account for all analytical functions regardless of mechanism then you assume that this includes brains as well. I will state again that computational theory is not adequate for brain function.

Moving rocks is not actual computational function. Moving rocks is nothing more than a simulation of computation. But notice that if you can naively claim that a simulation of brain function is adequate to achieve cognition then why wouldn't a simulation of a simulation achieve the same result? I guess you could think of this as a self-contradiction that falsifies the assertion.
 
This is incorrect. Turing Complete refers to a language that can duplicate a Turing Machine. The brain has no such language.

Except that it demonstrably does, since it can duplicate a Turing machine.

Turing Equivalent is true if item A can simulate B and B can simulate A. Obviously a brain can simulate a Turing Machine since brains invented Turing Machines. However, no Turing Machine can simulate a brain.

This is a bare assertion and nothing more, and it goes against the Church-Turing thesis.

If you have, as you say, disproven the Church-Turing thesis, this would turn all of computer science on its head. What proof do you have of this?

The brain is demonstrably not a computer by any stretch of the imagination.

Except that it demonstrably is.

The brain for example cannot run into the Halting Problem but all computers can.

"Run into the halting problem" is a nonsense phrase. The halting problem is not some sort of error in a computer system. It refers to the process of determining whether or not a given input will cause a program to loop forever or eventually stop.

Aside from your entire claim being meaningless because of a category error, it is also untrue on the grounds that "running into the halting problem" is not part of the mathematical definition of a computer. Anything that is Turing-equivalent is a computer. That is the end of it.

The Church-Turing thesis is incorrect.

It's honestly rather refreshing to run into someone who is so willing to put something like that out there where anyone can comment on it, so out of respect for your bluntness, I will be just as straightforward.

No, it isn't, and no, you haven't proven otherwise.

I guarantee it.

Yes, I would need a new theory like the one I've been working on. The Church-Turing thesis is completely correct within computational theory. There is nothing else. What I keep trying to explain to you is that computational theory itself is not adequate for cognition.

You keep saying that. You have yet to provide any evidence.

That's a rather brave assertion on your part. There is zero evidence that the brain is based on computation.

Except for all the demonstrable computation happening in it, which we can observe and interpret.

Really. This isn't arguable. The brain is a computer. We know this. It isn't an assertion. We can look inside it, see what computations are happening, and interpret them through other computers to such an extent that we can actually pull images from the brain's visual cortex.

I'm not entirely sure what you are trying to say.

That the brain is a computer, and not having a complete neural net replica of one yet is because it's a very complex and delicate one rather than because it isn't computational in nature.

Name even one leap in the past 30 years that is not related to faster hardware.

That's rather circular, since you're the one asserting that the brain cannot be replicated on traditional hardware. Outright excluding anything that is related to this hardware is a bit cheaty, hm?

Regardless, this should get you started.
 
But that isn't what you said and what I responded to. You said simulated consciousness isn't consciousness. I disagree.

Yes, and that was me clarifying on that point.

Simulated consciousness is not consciousness. If it were consciousness, it would not be a simulation. A is equal to A; if the simulation is also equal to A, it isn't a simulation. That's not what "simulation" means.

A model that is indistinguishable from the thing it is modeling is the thing that it is modeling.

I think that, as dlorde mentioned earlier, this is a semantic issue rather than a conceptual one.
 
Nonpareil said:
Consciousness is computation.

Now that's an assertion without evidence. In fact, it's an assertion without any theoretical basis...unless you count circular reasoning.

You know nothing about computer or cognitive science.

"Consciousness is computation" is one of the single most evidentially-supported claims in the history of science. Literally everything that we know about the brain supports it.

I repeat, without any exaggeration whatsoever: literally everything we know about the brain supports it.

Nothing that we know about the brain contradicts it.

We can point to the parts of the brain that compute visual signals, and we can decode these computations. The brain is a computer. Every day, we understand more of it.

The brain is a computer. Consciousness comes from the brain.

Either it's computation or it's magic. Take your pick.
 
Except that it demonstrably does, since it can duplicate a Turing machine.
Do you ever get dizzy on your circular reasoning conveyance?

This is a bare assertion and nothing more,
Right, nothing but an assertion and a century of evidence...other than that, it's just an assertion.

and it goes against the Church-Turing thesis.
Yes, that's what I said.

If you have, as you say, disproven the Church-Turing thesis, this would turn all of computer science on its head.
Not really. Computational theory is a subset of cognition theory. It's completely correct within the Turing bounds.

What proof do you have of this?
None until I publish.

Except that it demonstrably is.
Yeah, give that demonstration a shot.

"Run into the halting problem" is a nonsense phrase. The halting problem is not some sort of error in a computer system. It refers to the process of determining whether or not a given input will cause a program to loop forever or eventually stop.
Thank you for explaining the halting problem without actually refuting what I said. Slick.

Aside from your entire claim being meaningless because of a category error, it is also untrue on the grounds that "running into the halting problem" is not part of the mathematical definition of a computer. Anything that is Turing-equivalent is a computer. That is the end of it.
Do you ever get tired of sidestepping the issues? EVERY single computer in existence has the halting problem. Every, single one. Brains do not. Does that tell you anything?

Let me make this easy for you. I'm not going to partially publish a theory on this forum. That would be rather idiotic as even you should be able to understand. So, you say I have no proof. True, I have no referential proof. All I can tell you is what I have already found. Now, if you want to try to make the claim that my statements about the Church-Turing thesis are the equivalent of perpetual motion, knock yourself out. But what you cannot do is give any actual evidence that counters what I've said. Secondly, your only defense of naive computational theory is to claim that computers aren't big enough yet...but someday.

Now, I'll say this again. No computer based on Turing architecture can simulate a brain. No simulation by a Turing based computer can duplicate cognition although it could theoretically reproduce any given instant of neural brain state.

That's rather circular, since you're the one asserting that the brain cannot be replicated on traditional hardware. Outright excluding anything that is related to this hardware is a bit cheaty, hm?
Please pull your head out of the philosophical mud. What exactly do you know about computers? Can you draw a logical circuit using gates? Are you familiar with Lambda calculus? Are you familiar with predicate calculus? What is the extent of your AI programming? I'm asking these questions because I don't really want to waste my time arguing with you if you can't understand what I'm talking about.
 
It could be, yes - at which point it is no longer a simulation.

A brain is an enormously complex thing. It is more than possible to create a simple model of one which does not share the properties of consciousness.
Yes.

Unfortunately the computable consciousness discussions here (and elsewhere) are muddied by the lack of consensus in the precise use of these terms - I'm just as much a culprit as anyone.
 
... What exactly do you know about computers? Can you draw a logical circuit using gates? Are you familiar with Lambda calculus? Are you familiar with predicate calculus? What is the extent of your AI programming? I'm asking these questions because I don't really want to waste my time arguing with you if you can't understand what I'm talking about.
Until you back up your assertions with some explanatory argument this will just continue going in circles.
 
Until you back up your assertions with some explanatory argument this will just continue going in circles.
There's no circle. Every single project to build AI using computational theory has failed. And from this failure you conclude that the brain is definitely based on computation? Does that strike you as something of a violation of common sense? As I've said, I know how computers work from circuits to software. If I could build an AI using any programming language, any compiler, or any computer hardware; I would do it. I'm telling you I can't and the fact that no one else has should tell you something.
 
Do you ever get dizzy on your circular reasoning conveyance?

That's not circular reasoning. That's what "computer" means. It means "Turing-equivalent". The brain is demonstrably at least Turing-equivalent, because it can do what a Turing machine does. It is therefore a computer.

None until I publish.

Post it or stop claiming it.

Thank you for explaining the halting problem without actually refuting what I said. Slick.


Do you ever get tired of sidestepping the issues? EVERY single computer in existence has the halting problem. Every, single one.

You aren't a computer scientist. You don't understand what the phrase "halting problem" means. It is not an issue that computers can have like some sort of virus or hardware issue. It is a "problem" in the same sense that "1 + 1 = ?" is a problem.

No computer "has the halting problem". The halting problem is a question of analyzing computer programs to find out whether or not they loop infinitely given a certain input. That's it. That's all.

Your statement is meaningless, and the fact that you continue to act as though I am "sidestepping" anything only indicates further that you actually understand nothing about computer science.

Let me make this easy for you. I'm not going to partially publish a theory on this forum. That would be rather idiotic as even you should be able to understand. So, you say I have no proof. True, I have no referential proof. All I can tell you is what I have already found. Now, if you want to try to make the claim that my statements about the Church-Turing thesis are the equivalent of perpetual motion, knock yourself out. But what you cannot do is give any actual evidence that counters what I've said.

Let me make this easier for you: I can claim that I have come up with evidence that completely refutes special relativity and the absolute speed of light, but this doesn't actually constitute any kind of argument unless I actually produce said evidence.

Until you do, you're just wasting everyone's time.

Please pull your head out of the philosophical mud. What exactly do you know about computers?

More than you, as demonstrated above.
 
Simulated consciousness is not consciousness. If it were consciousness, it would not be a simulation.

Well that's semantics, however. If what you simulate is equivalent to the simulation then it ceases to be a simulation and becomes an emulation but the change in terminology changes nothing about whether it's conscious or not.
 

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