I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[barehl]

In the Matrix when an event duplicated itself the occupants recognized it as a sign of an anomaly.

The Matrix or brain in box theories are physical theories. They carry the assumption that someone, somewhere has a physical body and a working brain.

Where does reality end and imagination begin? Can we yet say with any certainty that even dreams do not comprise some variety of reality? Absolutely not... for we have not the slightest capacity to directly adjudicate the phenomenon we call consciousness.

If I believed this I wouldn't be working on cognitive theory.

Conclusion: insisting that 'language' is not 'reality' is (and regrettably I am forced to use the only means currently available...a word) incoherent.

Language is an abstraction which is used for both communication and internal representation of information. I'm not sure why this would be hard to understand.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Having a rock in one's hand is effective at keeping many wary creatures away.

Yeah. Especially Tigers. If a Tiger sees you holding a rock, he will immediately run away!

 

[Dancing David]

What is reality?
If language is not reality, then where does language take place?
You seem to imply a sort of dualism; reality and not reality?

Not at all, language and reality are the nested, language is a subset of reality.

language is not materialism was my original statement

 

[punshhh]

No. We dwell in an actual, material world, and our mind constructs concepts to describe that world.

Thankyou, it is not often accepted around here that the mind is secondary(in our personal experience). And yet folk assert that conscious experience originates in the mental processes of the brain?(which is primary and secondary here?)

This does not favour materialism over idealism either.

No. Why should we have the concept of up and down if we did not live in a world with gravity?

It is only naive interpretations of idealism which entertain notions of a world/consciousness independent of physical material at the human level.

- Imagine a life-form that exists in deep space (never mind how): Do you think it will have concepts like up and down?

It will have an experiential framework, presumably it would gauge things as close, or further away and its orientation, an equivalence to up and down.

You just contradicted your previous claims.

Its not as simple as that, remember the physical and experiential world is identical under the materialist or idealist ontology. I am not making positive claims about the manifestation of idealism in our world. I simply make the observation the our primary experience of being is the primary fact in existence. This being the case, it's properties should be given primary consideration.

 

[punshhh]

I don't think you will do more than special pleading.

I am not pleading, I am doubting. I doubt that artificial mechanisms will exhibit consciousness, this is reasonable is it not. Especially in the absence of a working model.

Also, remember that it may be impossible to determine that a working model is conscious.

 

[punshhh]

The processes by which the brain creates perceptions and thoughts is partly established.

Yes, I do not dispute these physical processes.

What evidence is there for this mind?

It depends specifically which mind one is considering. The human mind is a state in the brain, maintained by the correct functioning of the brain.
I can't speak for idealists on this point, but I presume the idea is that the being in each person(as distinct from their mind as just described), is a piece of the mind of god, which is transcendent.

This is an interpretation of a state, evidence is not required to arrive at the interpretation.

 

[punshhh]

I challenge you all to demonstrate that this rock I hold in my hold does not keep tigers away. There are, after all, no tigers in the vicinity. So there.

I once worried about being attacked by a mountain lion I had seen and found its paw prints outside the cave I was sleeping in, in the Himalayas. After a fairly brief deliberation, I decided to hold a flower and show it to the lion when it approached. It worked, I didn't worry any more and the lion didn't attack.

 

[punshhh]

I understand that within philosophy you can make assumptions like excluded middle is a logical fallacy. However, to make this claim within cognitive theory you have to explain where you got "excluded" and where you got "middle". If you can't define it within an idealistic framework then what basis do you have for discussion?

I cannot speak for idealists as I am not one. My position is more akin to the spiritual one and from here, I see no contradiction on any level with the materialist interpretation of how the brain and mind work and most other physical processes. It is in the speculation about the unknown where we differ.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Thankyou, it is not often accepted around here that the mind is secondary(in our personal experience). And yet folk assert that conscious experience originates in the mental processes of the brain?(which is primary and secondary here?)

Since the material world exists independently of any mind, the mind is obviously secondary. That does not, however, in any way imply that the mind is separate from the material world.

This does not favour materialism over idealism either.

Nor the opposite.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

I am not pleading, I am doubting. I doubt that artificial mechanisms will exhibit consciousness, this is reasonable is it not. Especially in the absence of a working model.

It is your right to doubt it. It is not reasonable, in the meaning rational, because there is no evidence for it.

Also, remember that it may be impossible to determine that a working model is conscious.

No, it is quite possible. You see, to determine that anything is conscious, we need a falsifiable definition of 'conscious', and that will be appliable to anything.

Hans

 

[LarryS]

there's no evidence to doubt artificial mechanisms can exhibit consciousness, and there's also no evidence to think they can. 11 things seem certain: 1) most folks doing AI aren't concerned w/ consciousness, and 10) it's going to take a new and great idea to get artificial mechanism to exhibit consciousness, or 11) someone will declare victory with a super watered down definition of consciousness

 

[Dancing David]

And there is no coherent alternative to materialism

 

[barehl]

Not at all, language and reality are the nested, language is a subset of reality.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Language is an abstract or symbolic representation of reality. It is one of the fundamental components of intelligence.

language is not materialism was my original statement

This is not actually true in humans or other organisms. An AI begins with materialism so there is no point in talking about that. I've already stated that there is no known basis for abstraction within an Idealistic framework so if you wanted to make this case you would have to show the basis.

 

[barehl]

it is not often accepted around here that the mind is secondary(in our personal experience). And yet folk assert that conscious experience originates in the mental processes of the brain?(which is primary and secondary here?)

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. The mind is a function of the brain. Experience is part of the function of consciousness. Consciousness is one component of the mind. We don't tend to think about the rest of the parts unless they don't work such as with dyslexia or after a stroke.

Could you explain what you mean by primary and secondary? I looked at the wikipedia Primary article based on Edelman. It seems correct for one aspect of the mind. However, it doesn't seem to distinguish between aware but non-conscious mental states and those involving consciousness. Then we have the wikipedia Secondary article based on Edelman. I have not read his books but his recruitment and reciprocal signalling model to me doesn't seem adequate as an explanation for the binding problem.

It is only naive interpretations of idealism which entertain notions of a world/consciousness independent of physical material at the human level.
It will have an experiential framework, presumably it would gauge things as close, or further away and its orientation, an equivalence to up and down.

That isn't the problem. Name the origin of abstract primitives that would allow general abstraction. For example, what is the origin of good and bad without resorting to a definition based on behavior?

Its not as simple as that, remember the physical and experiential world is identical under the materialist or idealist ontology.

If an Idealistic framework were possible then the experience of consciousness would be the same as in the materialistic framework. This does not carry the claim that the physical world is the same in both frameworks but only that based on experience you can't tell the difference. That is the claim anyway. The aspects of the claim depend on whether you include other minds or you don't.

I am not making positive claims about the manifestation of idealism in our world. I simply make the observation the our primary experience of being is the primary fact in existence. This being the case, it's properties should be given primary consideration.

If I'm understanding you then you are saying the same as my description above that based on experience, it is impossible to distinguish between materialistic and idealistic frameworks. And presumably we should therefore only study experiential phenomenon. I guess I disagree with this.

 

[LarryS]

And there is no coherent alternative to materialism

and that's why we're in deep doodoo because materialism is not coherent either

 

[barehl]

I am not pleading, I am doubting. I doubt that artificial mechanisms will exhibit consciousness, this is reasonable is it not. Especially in the absence of a working model.

When I began working on cognitive theory I couldn't imagine how I could ever disprove a mechanical consciousness. I think I can disprove it now. I can't yet say about an electronic consciousness.

Also, remember that it may be impossible to determine that a working model is conscious.

I don't agree with this.

 

[barehl]

The human mind is a state in the brain

It is not. This is a misapplication of computational theory.

 

[barehl]

there's no evidence to doubt artificial mechanisms can exhibit consciousness, and there's also no evidence to think they can. 11 things seem certain: 1) most folks doing AI aren't concerned w/ consciousness, and 10) it's going to take a new and great idea to get artificial mechanism to exhibit consciousness, or 11) someone will declare victory with a super watered down definition of consciousness

Watered down in what way?

 

[barehl]

materialism is not coherent either

Because?

 

[punshhh]

Since the material world exists independently of any mind, the mind is obviously secondary. That does not, however, in any way imply that the mind is separate from the material world.

Yes, although I would never suggest that the mind, even the "mind of God" is independent of material for its manifestation anyway.

The question I made in my response remains, if our experience of being is physical, how can it also be a product of computation in the brain(mind/abstraction)?

Nor the opposite.

There is no evidence, or rationale which favours materialism or idealism over the other. As I pointed out in my first few posts in this thread.
Philosophically they are two alternative logically derived ontologies

This is why I have been pointing out gaps and unknowns in the materialist interpretation of our world. To illustrate the fact that materialism(Scientism) is not a comprehensive philosophy, it is a blind(lacking foresight) pragmatic assessment. It's foundations are sound due to its being anchored in the scientific method, but it is blind to any further philosophical enquiry.