I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Mashuna]

It's a challenge to properly understand both materialism and idealism . . . idealism does not state that the observer creates or imagines the world into existence. What we regard as the observer, the thought engine, senses, imagination, sense of identity, etc.; as well as what we regard as the world; all exist in consciousness, the observer and observed appear in consciousness. Similarly, the materialist would claim that both consciousness and the material world 'appear' in the material world.

So, is it more reasonable to assume the seamless and consistent nature of experience comes from matter or consciousness?

Or that everything comes from stuff.

 

[wea]

There are some who do claim that cognition is definable in terms of computational theory. This is incorrect if we limit computation to Turing computable.

a Universal Turing machine, IIRC, has infinite memory and comp. time, what would prevent it to simulate cognition (admitting we have a model of cognition)?

 

[Belz...]

Materialism is in fact based upon the assumption of material . . . that is, the assumption there is a physical reality independent of consciousness.

Yes, and that axiom fits with all of the evidence we have so far, so there's no reason to change it.

 

[JoeMorgue]

So we have "But you can't prove everything isn't an illusion" and "But you can't prove that the giant invisible sky wizard didn't change the rules of reality" in a race for the biggest anti-intellectual copout.

 

[LarryS]

Yes, and that axiom fits with all of the evidence we have so far, so there's no reason to change it.

Yes, if the evidence suggests that we are a separate identity looking out through our eyeballs at a world of objects with independent existence, and we prefer that description, then yes, there is no reason to change.

 

[Dancing David]

Can all the behaviours be computed, theoretically if not in practice?
I know that I know something.

You have that impression, but is it accurate?

 

[Dancing David]

In other words, I can prove consciousness as necessary to human behavior. But, maybe you are talking about something else. For example, I don't have any way at the moment to prove that a robot that looked like a person couldn't be a p-zombie.

That is rather dependant upon the definition...

I tend to the medical definition of consciousness, so I think you would use the same criteria for an AI, response to pain would be a tough one however.

 

[barehl]

Yes, this is an obstacle to discussion, but does not make the principle self-contradictory. This is why I said that it can only be referred to as a primary principle of mind. This is sound, it is only interpretations of aspects of idealism which are vulnerable to self-contradiction. Again, this can be avoided by following hypothetical considerations and observations of the human mind to give clues of idealism, ephemeral as they may be.

I've never seen anyone able to do this; perhaps you are the first.

So until that time, I can regard the Pzombie argument as valid then?

Daniel Dennett argues against p-zombies as well. He's not as familiar with computational theory but his positions are well known.

Im no expert on computational theory, but I see no reason why any intelligent activity of the brain cannot be emulated in computation, even if simulation is required.

What specifically cannot be computed?

Computational theory is based on information states and actions. This works quite well within a Turing machine framework and is well defined with lambda calculus. The programming language, LISP is based on lambda calculus.

Cognitive theory is quite different because it is based on motivation, inhibition, and comprehension. When you try to combine these two together you end up with problems. This is described reasonably well by Dennett here: http://web.fc.uaem.mx/~bruno/material/dennet_93_cognitiveWheels.pdf

In cognitive theory, any data pattern can be abstracted to cause an action. If you've played Monopoly you have cards which have actions on them like "Go to Jail" or "Go to the Reading Railroad". So, separate the patterns from the actions. For example, you could roll dice or choose a card from a standard deck and then look up the action in a table. Now, if you can have a card that represents an action then you could also use an environmental pattern. When the robot sees pattern X, it runs through the look up table and does whatever is listed in the table. This doesn't require any comprehension, only pattern recognition and a table of actions. So, everything is wonderful. Except it isn't because eventually the table becomes so large that it takes too long to look up anything. This is the tongue-in-cheek description by Dennett about a robot taking too long to figure out a solution.

I understood this problem many years ago when I wrote programs in Prolog which is based on predicate calculus. In fact, this was tried and failed miserably. The closest anyone has gotten to this is IBM's Watson which played on the show, Jeopardy. This too is a miserable failure. Although I suppose many would claim that it is a success in terms of being a natural language interface to a an expert system. In this respect it is related to things like Siri. Most people are aware that Siri has rather legendary problems with comprehension.

Basically, the die-hard Computational Theorists claim that Motivation, Inhibition, and Comprehension can be simulated however this rather misses the point. Cognitive theory requires general solutions based on broad abstraction. In contrast, cognitive theory relies on external abstraction protocols which have never had a general solution. So, can you create general solutions without adding yet another rule every time the computer makes a mistake? Computational theorists would like to say, yes. Based on what I know about Cognitive theory I would say this cannot be done within the framework of a Turing machine.

 

[Aepervius]

It's a challenge to properly understand both materialism and idealism . . . idealism does not state that the observer creates or imagines the world into existence. What we regard as the observer, the thought engine, senses, imagination, sense of identity, etc.; as well as what we regard as the world; all exist in consciousness, the observer and observed appear in consciousness. Similarly, the materialist would claim that both consciousness and the material world 'appear' in the material world.

So, is it more reasonable to assume the seamless and consistent nature of experience comes from matter or consciousness?

The material world existed before conscious human and will exists after it. Idealism is a dead born philosophy "wanking" which leads to no new knowledge no new model no new laws. Materialism on the other hand... Lead us to where we are now.

Yeah I think I'll state that materialism is far more reasonable than the alternative : in fact we reason on it on regular basis to make model and projection.

All that idealism gave us is the brain-in-a-jar solipsistic philosophy more or less.

 

[barehl]

a Universal Turing machine, IIRC, has infinite memory and comp. time, what would prevent it to simulate cognition (admitting we have a model of cognition)?

Whenever you have a general abstract framework (which you do have for cognition) you run into the problem with applied computation of having to choose between two options:
A.) You can do general searches for each change in the environment.
B.) You can create associative tables to avoid searches.

A general search takes something like nⁿ time where n is the number of data elements. Making tables will reduce the time to something like n² but the memory requirement grows at the rate of xⁿ.

Doing general searches is time prohibitive and tables are space prohibitive.

 

[LarryS]

The material world existed before conscious human and will exists after it. Idealism is a dead born philosophy "wanking" which leads to no new knowledge no new model no new laws. Materialism on the other hand... Lead us to where we are now.

Yeah I think I'll state that materialism is far more reasonable than the alternative : in fact we reason on it on regular basis to make model and projection.

All that idealism gave us is the brain-in-a-jar solipsistic philosophy more or less.

too much of an adolescent understanding of Idealism for me to respond

 

[Hlafordlaes]

.... Basically, the die-hard Computational Theorists claim that Motivation, Inhibition, and Comprehension can be simulated however this rather misses the point. Cognitive theory requires general solutions based on broad abstraction. In contrast, cognitive theory relies on external abstraction protocols which have never had a general solution. So, can you create general solutions without adding yet another rule every time the computer makes a mistake? Computational theorists would like to say, yes. Based on what I know about Cognitive theory I would say this cannot be done within the framework of a Turing machine.

Would you mind expounding on that? Not a challenge, rather a request for further argument.

 

[punshhh]

You have that impression, but is it accurate?

The accuracy of the impression is irrelevant. It happened and is still happening moment by moment. Rather like the idea that you have to actually be conscious to experience the illusion of consciousness. In order to know something the knower has to both exist and be real, Just what exists and is real is another question.

 

[Aepervius]

too much of an adolescent understanding of Idealism for me to respond

Usually that means the person has no example whatsoever of knowledge progress offered by idealism, be it in applied science or fundamental science. So rather than admit it , they simply ad hominem the person : like "adolescent understanding". And as usual the ad hominem shows the real lack of evidence.

I maintain the idealism has brought us nothing beyond philosophy (and maybe a few nice SF stories).

Care to address that ?

or will you ad-hom again ?

 

[NutCracker]

It is funny to see the same patterns in pseudo-knowledge everywhere.

The pretentious silliness exposed by the idealists here is just staggering.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

The accuracy of the impression is irrelevant. It happened and is still happening moment by moment. Rather like the idea that you have to actually be conscious to experience the illusion of consciousness. In order to know something the knower has to both exist and be real, Just what exists and is real is another question.

That is nonsense. If you don't know what exist and real is, because you have to question it, then you can't use exist and real as a positive claim.

 

[punshhh]

I've never seen anyone able to do this; perhaps you are the first.

It depends what you are thinking about. I have pointed out towards the begining of the thread that it is not possible for humanity from our position to determine the ontology we have. As such there is no way to prove materialism or idealism, or to distinguish what each scenario would be like if it were something which could exist,( Indeed the distinction between the two is a rather short sighted naivety).

One has to work from the assumption of an ontology and then consider empirical observations in relation to it.

Daniel Dennett argues against p-zombies as well. He's not as familiar with computational theory but his positions are well known.

Due to our limited understanding of what it is to be a human and any knowledge of existence( other than what presents itself), the issue cannot be resolved, or the coherence determined and applied.

Computational theory is based on information states and actions. This works quite well within a Turing machine framework and is well defined with lambda calculus. The programming language, LISP is based on lambda calculus.

Cognitive theory is quite different because it is based on motivation, inhibition, and comprehension. When you try to combine these two together you end up with problems. This is described reasonably well by Dennett here: http://web.fc.uaem.mx/~bruno/material/dennet_93_cognitiveWheels.pdf

In cognitive theory, any data pattern can be abstracted to cause an action. If you've played Monopoly you have cards which have actions on them like "Go to Jail" or "Go to the Reading Railroad". So, separate the patterns from the actions. For example, you could roll dice or choose a card from a standard deck and then look up the action in a table. Now, if you can have a card that represents an action then you could also use an environmental pattern. When the robot sees pattern X, it runs through the look up table and does whatever is listed in the table. This doesn't require any comprehension, only pattern recognition and a table of actions. So, everything is wonderful. Except it isn't because eventually the table becomes so large that it takes too long to look up anything. This is the tongue-in-cheek description by Dennett about a robot taking too long to figure out a solution.

I understood this problem many years ago when I wrote programs in Prolog which is based on predicate calculus. In fact, this was tried and failed miserably. The closest anyone has gotten to this is IBM's Watson which played on the show, Jeopardy. This too is a miserable failure. Although I suppose many would claim that it is a success in terms of being a natural language interface to a an expert system. In this respect it is related to things like Siri. Most people are aware that Siri has rather legendary problems with comprehension.

Basically, the die-hard Computational Theorists claim that Motivation, Inhibition, and Comprehension can be simulated however this rather misses the point. Cognitive theory requires general solutions based on broad abstraction. In contrast, cognitive theory relies on external abstraction protocols which have never had a general solution. So, can you create general solutions without adding yet another rule every time the computer makes a mistake? Computational theorists would like to say, yes. Based on what I know about Cognitive theory I would say this cannot be done within the framework of a Turing machine.

thankyou, most interesting.

 

[punshhh]

That is nonsense. If you don't know what exist and real is, because you have to question it, then you can't use exist and real as a positive claim.

I wasn't referring to the meanings of the words "exists" and "real", I was referring to the knower, which I have just said exists and is real.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I wasn't referring to the meanings of the words "exists" and "real", I was referring to the knower, which I have just said exists and is real.

Yes, but what does exist and real mean?

 

[LarryS]

Usually that means the person has no example whatsoever of knowledge progress offered by idealism, be it in applied science or fundamental science. So rather than admit it , they simply ad hominem the person : like "adolescent understanding". And as usual the ad hominem shows the real lack of evidence.

I maintain the idealism has brought us nothing beyond philosophy (and maybe a few nice SF stories).

Care to address that ?

or will you ad-hom again ?

The progress we have made in understanding how things in the world work together is based upon our ability to measure and quantify - which has nothing to do with whether the world exists in consciousness, or is independent of consciousness (material). Materialism and Idealism are descriptions or ways to represent reality - and if properly understood, are both compelling, perhaps in different applications. The question is: which of the two do you find more useful in describing your experience? It's possible that during the course of a lifetime or a single day, we might swing between the two descriptions.