I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[barehl]

Be careful though - both include the capacity to measure and quantify.

I have doubts that you can measure and quantify from an idealistic framework. How would you define up or down or larger or smaller without material references?

 

[Dancing David]

I assume you are talking about consciousness. Yes, I would say that consciousness is entirely material and obeys known laws of physics. But you said:



I'm saying that there is no question of belief. Something cannot lack consciousness but believe it has consciousness. I'm also not sure what the impression of consciousness is. Either it has awareness or it doesn't.

And that is the inherent contradiction of the whole p-zombie argument, of which punshh is a fan.

I myself do not agree with punshhh about how something can have all the behaviors of consciousness but not be conscious.

 

[barehl]

And that is the inherent contradiction of the whole p-zombie argument, of which punshh is a fan.

I myself do not agree with punshhh about how something can have all the behaviors of consciousness but not be conscious.

These concepts are not the same. Idealism suggests that you can have a mind but that everything material is part of the imagination of this mind. The claim then is that it would be impossible to prove or disprove idealism. A similar claim is that a person could be a simulation inside a computer. Idealism itself can be disproved because you'll find it impossible to define material things without already having definitions of material things. The computer simulation argument is not as easy to disprove because the material definitions can have a material origin. The computer simulation argument cannot be challenged in terms of sensory information since all of this could be simulated. You can't actually create an AI by simple simulation but that's not really that important to this issue. Let's assume that you had an autonomous electronic AI where all sensory information was simulated. This is identical to the brain in box thesis although presumably an electronic AI would be easier to work with. The question then becomes whether or not the brain or AI could prove to itself that the sensory information was real or simulated. Since both of these assume a material world neither is Idealism. They then become far less interesting. As an example, suppose a woman came up to you and claimed that she was your birth mother. Without more information you would have no way of proving or disproving this and cases like this are far less involved that brain in box ideas.

A p-zombie is a material body that acts like a person but is not actually conscious. This is related to the Chinese Room. I can easily prove that people cannot be p-zombies however this has also been expanded to include AI. The Weak AI theory is that you could have an AI that perfectly mimicked human behavior but did not have actual consciousness. So it would be an artificial p-zombie. The Strong version carries the claim that the only way possible for something to behave the same as a person is if it is genuinely conscious. This is the theory I'm now working on but have not completed.

 

[Dancing David]

I disagree, any thing that has all the behaviors of consciousness, is conscious. What people who have not studied psychology do not understand is that behavior includes all observable and non-obsevable behaviors. So any automata that replicates human behaviors is defacto equivalent yet not identical to a human.

But that is just my POV, and my point is that Idealism and Materialism are moot, as a naturalist, pragmatist and nihilist: all that matter is the way that it acts.
Until there is a way to test for ontology the point is moot.

The universe appears behave as though it is intersecting waves of energy, the ontology is moot. It could be dead matter/dancing energy, godthought or butterfly dreams, all the same.

 

[LarryS]

I have doubts that you can measure and quantify from an idealistic framework. How would you define up or down or larger or smaller without material references?

Up/down large/small and etc are concepts and not extend beyond the mind

 

[barehl]

I disagree, any thing that has all the behaviors of consciousness, is conscious.

That's the strong AI theory.

What people who have not studied psychology do not understand

It isn't a psychological theory.

is that behavior includes all observable and non-obsevable behaviors.

How do you observe non-observable behavior?

 

[barehl]

Up/down large/small and etc are concepts and not extend beyond the mind

That would explain why no one can get clocks to all turn clockwise.

 

[punshhh]

These concepts are not the same. Idealism suggests that you can have a mind but that everything material is part of the imagination of this mind. The claim then is that it would be impossible to prove or disprove idealism. A similar claim is that a person could be a simulation inside a computer. Idealism itself can be disproved because you'll find it impossible to define material things without already having definitions of material things. The computer simulation argument is not as easy to disprove because the material definitions can have a material origin. The computer simulation argument cannot be challenged in terms of sensory information since all of this could be simulated. You can't actually create an AI by simple simulation but that's not really that important to this issue. Let's assume that you had an autonomous electronic AI where all sensory information was simulated. This is identical to the brain in box thesis although presumably an electronic AI would be easier to work with. The question then becomes whether or not the brain or AI could prove to itself that the sensory information was real or simulated. Since both of these assume a material world neither is Idealism. They then become far less interesting. As an example, suppose a woman came up to you and claimed that she was your birth mother. Without more information you would have no way of proving or disproving this and cases like this are far less involved that brain in box ideas.

Idealism cannot be expanded without pure speculation, from the position that mind* is fundamental and any material is in an unknown way a result of it. End of story.

*by mind, I am not specifically referring to the mind of a person, rather a transcendent mind, again unknown, other than through our personal experience of our own mind.

A p-zombie is a material body that acts like a person but is not actually conscious. This is related to the Chinese Room. I can easily prove that people cannot be p-zombies

Please do prove it?

The Strong version carries the claim that the only way possible for something to behave the same as a person is if it is genuinely conscious. This is the theory I'm now working on but have not completed.

Yes this appears to be the assertion. I don't see it myself, especially if all behaviours can be computed.

 

[LarryS]

These concepts are not the same. Idealism suggests that you can have a mind but that everything material is part of the imagination of this mind. The claim then is that it would be impossible to prove or disprove idealism. A similar claim is that a person could be a simulation inside a computer. Idealism itself can be disproved because you'll find it impossible to define material things without already having definitions of material things. The computer simulation argument is not as easy to disprove because the material definitions can have a material origin. The computer simulation argument cannot be challenged in terms of sensory information since all of this could be simulated. You can't actually create an AI by simple simulation but that's not really that important to this issue. Let's assume that you had an autonomous electronic AI where all sensory information was simulated. This is identical to the brain in box thesis although presumably an electronic AI would be easier to work with. The question then becomes whether or not the brain or AI could prove to itself that the sensory information was real or simulated. Since both of these assume a material world neither is Idealism. They then become far less interesting. As an example, suppose a woman came up to you and claimed that she was your birth mother. Without more information you would have no way of proving or disproving this and cases like this are far less involved that brain in box ideas.

A p-zombie is a material body that acts like a person but is not actually conscious. This is related to the Chinese Room. I can easily prove that people cannot be p-zombies however this has also been expanded to include AI. The Weak AI theory is that you could have an AI that perfectly mimicked human behavior but did not have actual consciousness. So it would be an artificial p-zombie. The Strong version carries the claim that the only way possible for something to behave the same as a person is if it is genuinely conscious. This is the theory I'm now working on but have not completed.

The highlighted is a description of Idealism from the POV of Materialism, and as such, it is not consistent with Idealism.

It's not the case that material is constructed by the 'imagining' of the mind, but rather, everything that exists, including the mind, exists in consciousness.

Similarly, a Materialist would not claim that matter 'imagines/produces' a non-material substance named consciousness . . . according to a Materialist, everything that exists, including consciousness (should they admit that consciousness exists), exists in matter.

In looking these two POV, as to whether consciousness or matter is fundamental, and which POV makes the more sense, it would seem we need to define what we mean by matter and what we mean by consciousness - and can we find either 'substance' and look at it directly.

 

[Dancing David]

That's the strong AI theory.


It isn't a psychological theory.


How do you observe non-observable behavior?

The same way someone can posit having all the behaviors of consciousness but not being conscious.


Which brings up a point I often raise, people assume they are conscious, and when you ask 'What evidence supports the idea that you are conscious?', the answers are rather vague.

 

[punshhh]

The same way someone can posit having all the behaviors of consciousness but not being conscious.

Can all the behaviours be computed, theoretically if not in practice?

Which brings up a point I often raise, people assume they are conscious, and when you ask 'What evidence supports the idea that you are conscious?', the answers are rather vague.

I know that I know something.

 

[barehl]

Idealism cannot be expanded without pure speculation, from the position that mind* is fundamental and any material is in an unknown way a result of it. End of story.

*by mind, I am not specifically referring to the mind of a person, rather a transcendent mind, again unknown, other than through our personal experience of our own mind.

It actually doesn't matter what kind of mind you are discussing. Idealism is not defensible without including material definitions from an outside source. This makes idealism self-contradictory.

Please do prove it?

I'll include it as a chapter in my book.

Yes this appears to be the assertion. I don't see it myself, especially if all behaviours can be computed.

I'm not sure what you mean by computed. There are some who do claim that cognition is definable in terms of computational theory. This is incorrect if we limit computation to Turing computable.

 

[barehl]

The highlighted is a description of Idealism from the POV of Materialism, and as such, it is not consistent with Idealism.

It's not the case that material is constructed by the 'imagining' of the mind, but rather, everything that exists, including the mind, exists in consciousness.

The problem with your claim is that it is self-referential. It would be like if I used an assumption of material to try to prove materialism. I've already seen William Lane Craig's best effort at a theory based on an immaterial mind. His theory doesn't work because he is unable to form any concepts without material references. It's an understandable mistake that many people would make in terms of abstraction.

according to a Materialist, everything that exists, including consciousness (should they admit that consciousness exists), exists in matter.

Consciousness is a function of material processes and actions, yes. Take away the material and you have no consciousness. I'm not sure what the difficulty would be in having consciousness within a material framework. Maybe you can explain it.

 

[barehl]

The same way someone can posit having all the behaviors of consciousness but not being conscious.

This may or may not be possible. Again, I'm working on this theory now. The frame problem is likely to prevent a non-conscious set of instructions from exactly duplicating conscious behavior.

Which brings up a point I often raise, people assume they are conscious, and when you ask 'What evidence supports the idea that you are conscious?', the answers are rather vague.

That depends on your starting point. If we assume a material body then I can prove that people are not p-zombies. In other words, I can prove consciousness as necessary to human behavior. But, maybe you are talking about something else. For example, I don't have any way at the moment to prove that a robot that looked like a person couldn't be a p-zombie.

 

[barehl]

Can all the behaviours be computed, theoretically if not in practice?

If we limit the discussion to Turing computable then I say that all behaviors are not computable either in theory or practice.

 

[LarryS]

The problem with your claim is that it is self-referential. It would be like if I used an assumption of material to try to prove materialism. I've already seen William Lane Craig's best effort at a theory based on an immaterial mind. His theory doesn't work because he is unable to form any concepts without material references. It's an understandable mistake that many people would make in terms of abstraction.


Consciousness is a function of material processes and actions, yes. Take away the material and you have no consciousness. I'm not sure what the difficulty would be in having consciousness within a material framework. Maybe you can explain it.

Materialism is in fact based upon the assumption of material . . . that is, the assumption there is a physical reality independent of consciousness. Or, put another way, the materialist assumes consciousness because we can observe the material world. Of course this assumption includes two prior assumptions - the observation itself, even if there be no 'viewer', and, that there is a material world outside of our being aware of it - which is different than the observation.

Regarding the second highlighted phrase - in principle, I see no difficulty in having consciousness within a material framework . . . overlooking the difficulty in explaining how material can be conscious, and, assuming we had a material framework. I assume by 'material framework' you mean 'having intrinsic existence independent of consciousness'.

 

[barehl]

Materialism is in fact based upon the assumption of material . . . that is, the assumption there is a physical reality independent of consciousness. Or, put another way, the materialist assumes consciousness because we can observe the material world. Of course this assumption includes two prior assumptions - the observation itself, even if there be no 'viewer', and, that there is a material world outside of our being aware of it - which is different than the observation.

I'm not seeing this logic. Observation only includes the assumption of the consciousness of the observer. This is neutral in terms of anything else. Speculation on the nature of the surrounding world depends on a number of things. For example, observations seem to be consistent; gravity doesn't vary from day to day or change with mood. This suggests that properties of what is being observed are independent of the observer. Again, this is based on consistency rather than a priori assumption. Observation of others who seem similar in consciousness is another issue. You could assume that they are not independent of the observer but this is a much more difficult proposition. The simpler assumption is that others are similar consciousnesses. At this point, we are still not up to an assumption of material.

in principle, I see no difficulty in having consciousness within a material framework . . . overlooking the difficulty in explaining how material can be conscious

I'm working on this; not there yet.

I assume by 'material framework' you mean 'having intrinsic existence independent of consciousness'.

Yes. This tends to follow with observations that actions and properties are consistent rather than being altered by either our own feelings or those of others. For example, people don't seem to suddenly get better from terminal cancer because we want them to. Missing people aren't found. Disasters are not averted. We note that dice and shuffled cards still appear random. So, for whatever reason, those things around us seem to have a consistency that does appear to be independent of ourselves as observers.

I guess these types of discussions are classic metaphysics. I'm not a philosopher but I don't mind discussing it since I am working on cognitive theory.

 

[LarryS]

It's a challenge to properly understand both materialism and idealism . . . idealism does not state that the observer creates or imagines the world into existence. What we regard as the observer, the thought engine, senses, imagination, sense of identity, etc.; as well as what we regard as the world; all exist in consciousness, the observer and observed appear in consciousness. Similarly, the materialist would claim that both consciousness and the material world 'appear' in the material world.

So, is it more reasonable to assume the seamless and consistent nature of experience comes from matter or consciousness?

 

[punshhh]

It actually doesn't matter what kind of mind you are discussing. Idealism is not defensible without including material definitions from an outside source. This makes idealism self-contradictory.

Yes, this is an obstacle to discussion, but does not make the principle self-contradictory. This is why I said that it can only be referred to as a primary principle of mind. This is sound, it is only interpretations of aspects of idealism which are vulnerable to self-contradiction. Again, this can be avoided by following hypothetical considerations and observations of the human mind to give clues of idealism, ephemeral as they may be.

I'll include it as a chapter in my book.

So until that time, I can regard the Pzombie argument as valid then?

I'm not sure what you mean by computed. There are some who do claim that cognition is definable in terms of computational theory. This is incorrect if we limit computation to Turing computable.

Im no expert on computational theory, but I see no reason why any intelligent activity of the brain cannot be emulated in computation, even if simulation is required.

What specifically cannot be computed?

 

[punshhh]

It's a challenge to properly understand both materialism and idealism . . . idealism does not state that the observer creates or imagines the world into existence. What we regard as the observer, the thought engine, senses, imagination, sense of identity, etc.; as well as what we regard as the world; all exist in consciousness, the observer and observed appear in consciousness. Similarly, the materialist would claim that both consciousness and the material world 'appear' in the material world.

Agreed, I would distinguish consciousness from mind though. Idealism as I understand it, is specifically in reference to mind, as distinct to consciousness.

So, is it more reasonable to assume the seamless and consistent nature of experience comes from matter or consciousness?

Agreed, I would call the consciousness alternative the Hindu idealist system, or the spiritual cosmogeny, rather than the philosophical idealism.