How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[PixyMisa]

To you obviously nothing. No, that doesn't surprise me.

Well, that certainly answers the question.

As opposed to the drivel you provide?

No, as opposed to my carefully structured, logically rigorous and factually correct anwers.

Yeah, when one tries to communicate with a jackass, sometimes a 2x4 to the head at least gets their attention. I note nothing works for you.

Which, presumably, is why your answers are content-free?

I'm becoming aware that to expect a rational response from you is waste of time.

You have to say something rational in the first place if you wish to elicit a rational response.

Try paying attention. You brought up 1st Law, not me.

Ah crap. Yes, I'll grant you that. I'll now go and remove the evidence.

Well here is your chance to demonstrate why you feel so. As usual your response brings nothing to the discussion.

OK.

Your statement:

Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less.

Reveals a complete lack of understanding of the second law. There is no need for an explanation of how systems become organised, since this doesn't contradict the second law in any way. It's not "in spite of the 2nd Law statment of tendency to disorder", since the second law makes no such generalisation. The second law is quite specific; it says that left to itself, heat will pass from the hotter body to the cooler one. To push heat in the other direction requires an input of work, and to do that requires heat to pass from a hotter body to a cooler one somewhere else. So in any closed dynamic system, you will eventually reach a state where everything is the same temperature and no work can be done. This is known as heat death.

The fact that there are organised systems performing work in this Universe simply tells us that we haven't reached heat death yet.

If you look anywhere and see a system that isn't running down in accordance with the second law, you will find that the system you are looking at is not closed, and that it is drawing energy from another system that is indeed running down. Life on Earth is powered by the Sun, and for all of life's grandeur, when the Sun runs out, it will too.

Please advise where you draw the non-life/life boundary

I don't.

and what makes you believe that.

Life, ill-defined as it is, is clearly a continuum. At one end, we have, say, electrons, and at the other end, cats. Unless you specify exactly what property of life you wish to base the decision on, any fixed dividing line is arbitrary.

What is clear is that you don't show much comprehension of the topics under discussion here. A parrot could provide equally valid comments.

Even a parrot would eventually tire of refuting the same unfounded assertions over and over.

 

[hammegk]

Well, that certainly answers the question.

Ask a question instead of saying "duh".

No, as opposed to my carefully structured, logically rigorous and factually correct anwers.

Good anwer!

Which, presumably, is why your answers are content-free?

I specialize in content-free responses to content-free queries.

You have to say something rational in the first place if you wish to elicit a rational response.

Beginning to appear rationality vs insanity is in the eye of the beholder, huh?

Ah crap. Yes, I'll grant you that. I'll now go and remove the evidence.

Well, it's at least a start.

quote:
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Idealism's axiom of "all-is-mind", or more correctly perhaps "all-is-sentient" starts by providing a mechanism that works in a purposeful way. It's the "why" -- in spite of 2nd Law statement of tendency to disorder -- that everywhere we look what we see consists of combined energy providing more complexity rather than less.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reveals a complete lack of understanding of the second law. There is no need for an explanation of how systems become organised, since this doesn't contradict the second law in any way. It's not "in spite of the 2nd Law statment of tendency to disorder", since the second law makes no such generalisation. The second law is quite specific; it says that left to itself, heat will pass from the hotter body to the cooler one. To push heat in the other direction requires an input of work, and to do that requires heat to pass from a hotter body to a cooler one somewhere else. So in any closed dynamic system, you will eventually reach a state where everything is the same temperature and no work can be done. This is known as heat death.

The fact that there are organised systems performing work in this Universe simply tells us that we haven't reached heat death yet.

If you look anywhere and see a system that isn't running down in accordance with the second law, you will find that the system you are looking at is not closed, and that it is drawing energy from another system that is indeed running down. Life on Earth is powered by the Sun, and for all of life's grandeur, when the Sun runs out, it will too.

May I then assume you state unequivocally that 2nd Law carries no connotation that randomness rather than structure is the expectation? Heat is an interesting form of energy. What did you say energy is?

quote:
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Please advise where you draw the non-life/life boundary
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I don't.
quote:
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and what makes you believe that.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Life, ill-defined as it is, is clearly a continuum. At one end, we have, say, electrons, and at the other end, cats. Unless you specify exactly what property of life you wish to base the decision on, any fixed dividing line is arbitrary.

Okey-dokey, that sounds rational (add quarks maybe?). Does sentience require "life"? How do you justify your position?

Even a parrot would eventually tire of refuting the same unfounded assertions over and over.

Sounds good. When will you stop the parrot act?

 

[Dancing David]

Bump. (Okay kids, you will have to sit apart if you can't get along)

Life is the consequence of a long series of fortuitous accidents,

I think I understand the question about qualia! It is why would there be any red or green in the first place. Or why do our brains choose to present us with qualia in the first place.

It is a utilitarian thing, for example, red, our brains could present us witha cross hatch to represent that color but then it would interfere with our ability to see a cross hatch, so our brain assigns it a value that doesn't interfere with visual perception but enhances it.

The value of the various senses arose during the evolution of life, so the reason we see red is that it proved useful to our ancestors.

Is that the question?

Peace

 

[davidsmith73]

The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer).

False analogy. We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this.

As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

I think you are misusing the term observable. I think qualia are unmeasurable by science as we know it today, but the very nature of observation entails the manifestation of qualia. I give a very different meaning to observation and measurement.

With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

Depends on your viewpoint of what the physical world really is. Within a mental monistic viewpoint, subjective and objective are part of the same realm.

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.

Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?

I think so.

If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?

ESP and PK type experiments where consciousness is an intergral part of the experimental system.

It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.

How the brain works is not explaining qualia or how qualia equate with a physical process. This is the question which no-one here has yet answered.

 

[ChuckieR]

The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer).


False analogy. We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this.

Well, yes, that was exactly my point, as I said in the paragraphs following - although we do not have a mechanistic explanation of gravity, we have very precise formulations for the effects of gravity and how it interacts with all other physical phenomena.

I was highlighting the fact that, as you say, with qualia we cannot do this.

We can explain all of the physical activities of the brain - how it interacts with other physical entities, etc. We can show all of the correlations btwn the physical brain and your consciousness, and how your consciousness and the physical activities of the brain are inseperable. But, after all of that, you will say "Yes, but you haven't shown me the qualia." Same with gravity. We explain its properties and interactions, but not its mechanism per se. I can't "show you" gravity, only its effects.

As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

I think you are misusing the term observable. I think qualia are unmeasurable by science as we know it today, but the very nature of observation entails the manifestation of qualia. I give a very different meaning to observation and measurement.

I meant "observable" in the scientific sense: measurable, quantifiable. And, again, that is my point. It seems that if your position is that qualia are only subjectively knowable, then by this definition they will always remain objectively unmeasurable and unquantifiable even in principle.

So, now I'm confused. Above you agreed that we can't define qualia in terms of its physical effects, but you are now saying that some day we may be able to measure qualia? How could we do this even in principle if qualia are defined to be unmeasurable?

With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

Depends on your viewpoint of what the physical world really is. Within a mental monistic viewpoint, subjective and objective are part of the same realm.

No, that's the nice thing about science. It doesn't depend on my viewpoint or opinion. How would my adopting a mental monistic viewpoint allow me to measure and quantify qualia?

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.

Okay, now we are getting somewhere. What would then be the physical difference between a conscious process and a non-conscious process?

Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?

I think so.

If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?

ESP and PK type experiments where consciousness is an intergral part of the experimental system.

We've had a couple centuries of ESP and PK type experiments, and we are still waiting for the first repeatable result.

It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.


How the brain works is not explaining qualia or how qualia equate with a physical process. This is the question which no-one here has yet answered.

And, as I argued, no one will ever be able to answer it because of the way qualia is defined.

You said above that "We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this." And now you complain that no one will tell you how to do this. This was exactly the point of my post.

Do you now see why we find this line of discussion tedious and fruitless?

[edited to add more clarification after first quote]

 

[davidsmith73]

Well, yes, that was exactly my point, as I said in the paragraphs following - although we do not have a mechanistic explanation of gravity, we have very precise formulations for the effects of gravity and how it interacts with all other physical phenomena.

I was highlighting the fact that, as you say, with qualia we cannot do this.

Hence how a materialistic notion that qualia = physical process has not been explained at all adequately !
Gravity is manifest as a physical description and thus can be equated with one. A materialist would say that qualia can be given the exact same treatment. I am asking for this to be shown.

We can explain all of the physical activities of the brain - how it interacts with other physical entities, etc. We can show all of the correlations btwn the physical brain and your consciousness, and how your consciousness and the physical activities of the brain are inseperable. But, after all of that, you will say "Yes, but you haven't shown me the qualia." Same with gravity. We explain its properties and interactions, but not its mechanism per se. I can't "show you" gravity, only its effects.

But you have missed the all important distinction. "Gravity" is defined as a relational set of observations. And these observations manifest as experience. I agree that one cannot be shown gravity, only its effects. Now, qualia are not defined by a relational set of observations. Lets take redness. Which relational set of observations define redness ? None do. Redness is simply not reducable to such a definition.

I meant "observable" in the scientific sense: measurable, quantifiable. And, again, that is my point. It seems that if your position is that qualia are only subjectively knowable, then by this definition they will always remain objectively unmeasurable and unquantifiable even in principle.

So, now I'm confused. Above you agreed that we can't define qualia in terms of its physical effects, but you are now saying that some day we may be able to measure qualia? How could we do this even in principle if qualia are defined to be unmeasurable?

Sorry, I'm not sure what I meant by what I said myself. I meant to say this: because qualia are not quantifiable they are not recognised by science, as we know it today, as being the fundamental nature of reality. Science holds realtiy to be necessarily describable by mathematics. This may not be the case.

No, that's the nice thing about science. It doesn't depend on my viewpoint or opinion. How would my adopting a mental monistic viewpoint allow me to measure and quantify qualia?

Within a mental monistic view, there would be no physical realm. The physical realm would really be a contruction of the mental realm. So when you measure something "objectively" you are not obtaining information about another realm outside of your experience. Rather this information exists within the single realm of qualia. Scientific observation and measurement would exist as part of the mental realm of qualia.

Okay, now we are getting somewhere. What would then be the physical difference between a conscious process and a non-conscious process?

There isn't a difference. Consciousness/qualia is reality. The physical world is a construction composed of qualia. I'm not sure in which context you ask the question.

We've had a couple centuries of ESP and PK type experiments, and we are still waiting for the first repeatable result.

I think the validity and repeatability of these experiments is a topic for another thread. I included them here to answer a question but suffice it to say, I disagree with you

And, as I argued, no one will ever be able to answer it because of the way qualia is defined.

Or perhaps more importnatly, how "physical" is defined. Anyway, are you saying the definition of qualia is wrong ? Can you show how it is wrong ? Can you show me how qualia = physical process ?

You said above that "We can define grafity just fine in physical effects using equations. With qualia we cannot do this." And now you complain that no one will tell you how to do this. This was exactly the point of my post.

So you must conclude that the materialistic notion that qualia = physical process is wrong.

I don't really understand the main point of your post. You seem to agree with me that qualia cannot be reduced to physical descriptions but then say that somehow the whole concept of what qualia are is wrong.

Do you now see why we find this line of discussion tedious and fruitless?

No I don't (surprise ). I think its the most important and interesting discussion one can have about the nature of experience. If thats tedious for you then you can go play golf or something if you like.

 

[DrMatt]

I don't know a lot of neurology, but a neuroscience researcher recently tried to explain to me some of the latest findings on nerves and quaglia. The example he used suggests that forming categories and classifying experiences into prior categories are pre-wired tendencies reflected by groups of neurons in different parts of the brain firing in phase with each other to reflect different previously-categorized parameters of a single quaglia.

 

[ChuckieR]

But you have missed the all important distinction. "Gravity" is defined as a relational set of observations. And these observations manifest as experience. I agree that one cannot be shown gravity, only its effects. Now, qualia are not defined by a relational set of observations. Lets take redness. Which relational set of observations define redness ? None do. Redness is simply not reducable to such a definition.

Are you saying that someone could be perceiving redness and that we would not be able to tell using physical measurements, even in principle? I think this is incorrect.

Someone's perception of redness is always correlated with specific brain activity, no? If we had the right technology (a super MRI machine that can monitor individual neurons, for example, which is in principle possible), we could always tell w/out error when someone was perceiving redness.

Yet this is apparently not satisfying to you. Of course, we don't yet have the technology to do this, but there are no conceptual barriers to this type of experiment.

So, yes, we can describe the correlation btwn redness and brain activity. But, no, as you say, we cannot "quantify" the qualia of redness itself, because that is defined to not be objectively measureable. Qualia is defined to be what you perceive, not what is objectively measureable. Then you complain that we can't objectively measure qualia.

Sorry, I'm not sure what I meant by what I said myself. I meant to say this: because qualia are not quantifiable they are not recognised by science, as we know it today, as being the fundamental nature of reality. Science holds realtiy to be necessarily describable by mathematics. This may not be the case.

Then if you accept that science cannot investigate qualia, why do you complain that science cannot investigate qualia? Or are you contending that some day we will be able to quantify qualia? I'm just not sure where you are headed here.

I can conceive of a machine that would allow us to measure the impulses of each neuron and measure the chemical activity of the whole brain. I cannot even conceive of the possibility of a machine that would "measure qualia", because qualia are defined to be unmeasurable. It just becomes a word game.

How would you propose we do this, even in principle? ESP experiments? Fine, how would this help? What sort of experiment would help us investigate qualia? My point is that none are possible even in principle.

Within a mental monistic view, there would be no physical realm. The physical realm would really be a contruction of the mental realm. So when you measure something "objectively" you are not obtaining information about another realm outside of your experience. Rather this information exists within the single realm of qualia. Scientific observation and measurement would exist as part of the mental realm of qualia.

This is where I start to get confused and loose interest because, obviously, I do not hold a mental monistic view of the world. To me, this just sounds like the "It's a mystery" answer - a religious answer to what you pose as a philosophical/scientific question.

I'm just curious. Within this viewpoint (mental monistic), will the investigation of qualia be considered science, or will it be something else (meditation, prayer, or some such thing)? And, again, how will simply changing your viewpoint allow you to measure something that you say is unmeasurable scientifically?

There isn't a difference. Consciousness/qualia is reality. The physical world is a construction composed of qualia. I'm not sure in which context you ask the question.

Wait! You left out your original quote, and my question preceeding it:

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.

So here you say "no", they are not the same - meaning that there is a physical difference between a conscious and non-conscious process. Now in your last post, you say there is not a physical difference. Which is it?

If there is a physical difference, then we can measure it. If there is not, then it is undetectable even in principle.

Maybe what you are saying is that from a materialist perspective, they cannot be measured, but from a mental monistic perspective they are measurable? Is this accurate?

If that's the case, then how should we proceed with the investigation of qualia? Are they only investagable from a religious perspective? Maybe that is your point? In your opinion, will qualia ever be able to be investigated scientifically?

I think the validity and repeatability of these experiments is a topic for another thread. I included them here to answer a question but suffice it to say, I disagree with you

Okay, we can agree to disagree. But it should not be a matter of opinion or belief whether ESP etc. are valid. If they are valid, you (someone) should be able to design an experiment that would convince "the rest of us". Until that day, ESP will be rightly dismissed by mainstream science. Right now, it seems that only people who believe in ESP believe in ESP, if you get my drift.

Or perhaps more importnatly, how "physical" is defined. Anyway, are you saying the definition of qualia is wrong ? Can you show how it is wrong ? Can you show me how qualia = physical process ?

So you must conclude that the materialistic notion that qualia = physical process is wrong.

I don't really understand the main point of your post. You seem to agree with me that qualia cannot be reduced to physical descriptions but then say that somehow the whole concept of what qualia are is wrong.

What I'm saying is that we can (or will be able to in the future) completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions. And what I'm further saying is that that will apparently not be enough for you, because the term "qualia" was invented specifically as a counter to materialism, w/out giving any possible way, even in principle, to scientifically investigate the qualia themselves.

No one will ever be able to show that "qualia = physical process" because qualia is defined as the subjective experience that accompanies certain physical processes. It specifically defined to not be the physical process itself. What we will be able to say definitively, IMHO, is that qualia will always result from certain physical processes (just like gravitational attraction will always be present between two masses).

I am not saying that the definition of qualia is wrong. I'm saying that the concept of qualia is not scientifically useful.

No I don't (surprise ). I think its the most important and interesting discussion one can have about the nature of experience. If thats tedious for you then you can go play golf or something if you like.

Investigating how the brain works is the frontier of neuroscience. It is extremely important and very interesting to me. There are many questions to be answered.

At the end of the day, when we have a complete physical description of how the brain works, you will still be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed, and you will not provide any fruitful method of addressing your own question.

That is what I find tedious.

 

[davidsmith73]

Are you saying that someone could be perceiving redness and that we would not be able to tell using physical measurements, even in principle? I think this is incorrect.

No, I'm not saying that. I'm making a comparison about the nature of qualia and the nature of physical descriptions.

Lets take gravity again. The concept of gravity is manifest as a set of relational observations i.e., two objects being attracted to one another. And we have contructed a mathematical description of the quantitative aspects of those observations. Like you said, gravity cannot be something that can be refered to or "shown" outside of this set of relational observations.

However, qualia can be refered to directly without a constructed set of relational observations. Redness is just that - redness.

Someone's perception of redness is always correlated with specific brain activity, no? If we had the right technology (a super MRI machine that can monitor individual neurons, for example, which is in principle possible), we could always tell w/out error when someone was perceiving redness.

But we would still not have defined redness. This is not a constructed set of relational observations that define redness in the same way a set would define gravity. IMO this is the fundamental difference that separates a physical description from qualia. Materialism tries to marry the two things together in an attempt to say they are equivalent. I don't understand how this can be done.

Yet this is apparently not satisfying to you. Of course, we don't yet have the technology to do this, but there are no conceptual barriers to this type of experiment.

There are only conceptual barriers to the interpretation of the result.

So, yes, we can describe the correlation btwn redness and brain activity. But, no, as you say, we cannot "quantify" the qualia of redness itself, because that is defined to not be objectively measureable. Qualia is defined to be what you perceive, not what is objectively measureable. Then you complain that we can't objectively measure qualia.

Yes, I'm complaining that because this is the case, IMO there is no case for the materialistic notion that physical descriptions refer to and are equivalent to qualia.

Then if you accept that science cannot investigate qualia, why do you complain that science cannot investigate qualia? Or are you contending that some day we will be able to quantify qualia? I'm just not sure where you are headed here.

I'm complaining (I'd call it debating ) that some people seem to think that physical descriptions refer to and are equivalent to qualia.

I can conceive of a machine that would allow us to measure the impulses of each neuron and measure the chemical activity of the whole brain. I cannot even conceive of the possibility of a machine that would "measure qualia", because qualia are defined to be unmeasurable. It just becomes a word game.

How would you propose we do this, even in principle? ESP experiments? Fine, how would this help? What sort of experiment would help us investigate qualia? My point is that none are possible even in principle.

I suppose you are right in that no experiment would reveal some "hidden" true nature of qualia. However, I think ESP and PK experiments may help to dissolve the notion that qualia are phenomena that are confined to the locus of each individual nervous system that they are hypothesised to be generated from.

I'm just curious. Within this viewpoint (mental monistic), will the investigation of qualia be considered science, or will it be something else (meditation, prayer, or some such thing)? And, again, how will simply changing your viewpoint allow you to measure something that you say is unmeasurable scientifically?

It would still be science. I don't claim that redness will be given any intrinsic quantification, just that the nature of any physical description would be aknowledged to necessarily be made (for want of a better word) of qualia and not refer to a separate ontological reality. Its a concept I find hard to think about myself, but I'm trying to make it clearer !

Wait! You left out your original quote, and my question preceeding it:
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Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?

If I was coming from the mental monist camp then no.
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So here you say "no", they are not the same - meaning that there is a physical difference between a conscious and non-conscious process. Now in your last post, you say there is not a physical difference. Which is it?

I didn't mean that. I said no to the original question because the concept of a non-conscious vs a consious system would be meaningless because existence is consciousness (qualia). If I perceive another person and they are talking away to me, I might presume they are conscious and if they are lying on the slab, I might presume they are not consious. However, the mistake here is that I first presume that the person is a physical system existing on a separate ontological realm to my perception of them and capable of being in either a "conscious" or "non-conscious" state. Whereas the mental monist view says that everything is manifest as qualia. So I think the problem of attributing a state of consciousness vs non-consciousness to "objects" stems from a notion of the physical vs qualia.

Maybe what you are saying is that from a materialist perspective, they cannot be measured, but from a mental monistic perspective they are measurable? Is this accurate?

I'm on shaky ground when we're talking about measuring qualia. I need a little more time to think about it. Its seems that from either philosophy, qualia can't be quantified. Perhaps it is right to say that nothing can be quantifed without relating it to something else. Isn't that the nature of measurement - comparison ?

What I'm saying is that we can (or will be able to in the future) completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions. And what I'm further saying is that that will apparently not be enough for you, because the term "qualia" was invented specifically as a counter to materialism, w/out giving any possible way, even in principle, to scientifically investigate the qualia themselves.

I don't think the term qualia was invented as a block to materialism at all. Qualia exist to be explained by science or understood as a basis for a philosophical framework of reality or both. For reasons I have given, even if we did completely describe all of the brain activity that accompanies subjective perceptions we would still be left with this huge philosophical problem of how qualia can be refered to without a set of relational observations and physical descriptions, like gravity, cannot.

No one will ever be able to show that "qualia = physical process" because qualia is defined as the subjective experience that accompanies certain physical processes.

It specifically defined to not be the physical process itself. What we will be able to say definitively, IMHO, is that qualia will always result from certain physical processes (just like gravitational attraction will always be present between two masses).

But, as I have said, this comparison is not fair. Gravitational attraction is manifest as the relationships between a set of observations. We do not have something else to refer to outside of this description. With redness, we do. We have the physical description in terms of neural processes and we have redness.

Investigating how the brain works is the frontier of neuroscience. It is extremely important and very interesting to me. There are many questions to be answered.

Very interesting to me too. I'm studying and work in this area.

At the end of the day, when we have a complete physical description of how the brain works, you will still be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed, and you will not provide any fruitful method of addressing your own question.

That is what I find tedious.

I don't claim to have the answers, I'm just trying to find out the truth. And yes, when we have a complete description of how the brain works, I will be complaining that qualia have not been adequately addressed. However, changing your philosophical viewpoint about the nature of reality can be a very interesting experience. Perhaps it may have no results for science, perhaps it will help someone develop new theories by releasing some of the theoretical constraints emposed by materialism, who knows.