How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[Dancing David]

It seems on the surface that the cause of the mind is the brain, I can understand that qualia seems to be some sort of word meaning perception. So why not just say , the world we percieve is perception.
This does not mean that perception is the world.

Peace

 

[Dancing David]

Partially right. Lets assume that technology has become so advanced that it is possible to produce the same physical process in Bob's brain that occurs in Jane when she experiences redness. Jane has been experiencing red all her life.

Now, upon re-creation of this certain neural firing pattern, Bob experiences redness regardless of whether he has done so before.

This is fine. I am not arguing whether this is possible in principle. I am now asking how the materialist interprets this situation. Many people here think that because a physical process takes place and we experience certain qualia at the same time, the qualia is equivalent to that particular physical process.

I am asking for an elaboration of this view beyond a mere assertion that it is just "common sense".

If qualia = a physical process, how do you account for the fact that we are able to identify two aspects of the same thing ?
Also, if qualia = a physical process, why do materialists assert that the physical is somehow more real than the qualia (they are equivalent after all!). In other words, physical processes could just as well be "nothing but qualia".

I am definitly not following your train of logic here,
first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?

Second: why would it be that the neural firing pattern is the same for each person, the neural network is influenced by the enviroment and learning. So I can understand the point only if you assume that the neural patterns are the same for each individual.

The reason that Bob would call it red is because he would talk to other people about it, otherwise he might refer to it as 'that wierd thing I am seeing'.

As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false. Uh, I think that there is an agreement that qualia are a result of a physical process, I haven't said that they are more real than the qualia, just that they are part of the cognition of the brain.

Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.

 

[davidsmith73]

Clarity of explanation? No one is even able to clearly state what qualia are. The entire argument seems to rest on some sort of appeal to ignorance: I just can't imagine how the physical brain could give rise to subjective experience!

I think you are misunderstanding me. You have just clarified my point. Some materialists are adamant that certain physical processes (described by the language of mathematics - not directly experienced) are equivalent in some way to certain qualia but somehow the qualia are subservient in existence to their corresponding physical manifestation. If a definition of qualia is so lacking then I fail to see how a materialistic causal explanation will have any clairity. In fact, this lack of clarity is being expressed by the disappointingly incomplete answers to my simple question posed in the title of this thread.

What barrier, who put it up, and how do we address it?

~~ Paul

The barrier that makes us think the physical and mental worlds are different ontological realms. It was put up probably at the time of Descartes, expressed then as dualism. We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm. We might then assess the validity of this approach by looking at what new predictive theories are possible and how they could explain observations like ESP and PK (if they continue to be found in the lab).

 

[davidsmith73]

Well again I would like to see a short definition of qualia. I would say that the qualia of red, whatever vauge undined process that may be is:
Most likely the cognitive label applies to the perception of red by the frontal cortex.
Unless you mean the direc5t perception of red?

I am trying although you spectacularly won't say what the heck a qualia is.

Funk On

Yes, I mean the direct quality of redness. One can't really define it can one ? This is their principle property IMO. I know what redness is like and I must assume that we are talking about the same qualitative experience when we both refer to redness.

 

[davidsmith73]

I am definitly not following your train of logic here,
first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?

Erm, I wasn't saying anything regarding the link between qualia and their corresponding apparent physical manifestation. I was asking for a more clear materialistic viewpoint on this link because I think such clarity is seriously lacking.

Also, you seem to be muddling your concepts.The term "physical experience" doesn't make much sense to me. Qualia are experience. If you want my opinion on the matter, the physical world as a separate ontological reality is an illusion. The primary "stuff" of the Universe is qualia.

Second: why would it be that the neural firing pattern is the same for each person, the neural network is influenced by the enviroment and learning. So I can understand the point only if you assume that the neural patterns are the same for each individual.

The materialistic theoretical point I was addressing is that for each identifiable qualia (eg, redness) there would be a corresponding physical process (now regarded as occuring in the brain) specific to the formation of this qualia.

The reason that Bob would call it red is because he would talk to other people about it, otherwise he might refer to it as 'that wierd thing I am seeing'.

Yes. Your point being ? My point is that Bob would experience redness regardless of whether or not he can put a name to it.

As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false. Uh, I think that there is an agreement that qualia are a result of a physical process,

Not if you regard a separate physical world as an illusion and really just part of the mental world of qualia.

I haven't said that they are more real than the qualia, just that they are part of the cognition of the brain.

Ok, so they must be equivalent in terms of reality. So are they part of the physical ontological realm ? If so, how do you account for their vastly different manifestation ? What do you specifically mean by "part of the cognition of the brain" ?

Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.

I don't believe I have been rude and I think I am disussing this just fine. Unless you have any specific examples ?

 

[davidsmith73]

Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?

Redness is not a pattern.

 

[davidsmith73]

A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different. This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,Evidence?

Only if you regard the ontological realm of the physical as somehow separate from this "inner" realm of experience.

Of course stimulating the brain results in a specific experience, as demonstrated by experiments during brain surgery in the 50's and 60's. However, the "physical" world manifests to us as qualia. We observe the brain and our "physical" manipulations.

 

[davidsmith73]

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

Perhaps we should be concentrating on our notion of the physical realm rather than qualia. I think we have got the physical all wrong.

 

[Dancing David]

Allright. So if we have a direct perception of the color red. Again there is:
a. the photons enetering the retina and causing a change in the receptors
b. the neural processing in the retina
c. the neural processing in the visual cortex
d. the neural cognition labeling the material in the visual cortex.

If I understand correctly, qualia are the c. the neural processing in the visual cortex, the quality ascribed as red percieved by the visual cortex created by our brains from the sensation in the retina.

So where is the illusionary nature of reality, I agree that we are limited by our perceptions, but the qualia of red is created by the visual cortex after the preliminary sebsation in the retina.
Are the photons illusiory? They are the basis from which the brain generates the qualia.

Now if your argument is based upon the fact that we don't directly percieve reality but are limited by our biochemical senses, and that reality is an illusison that our brain generates, I can agree to that.

But the argument seems to be that qualia are the only reality.

Sorry if I have muddled it, please explain how qualia are seperate from physical reality. Can you have the qualia red without the eyeball?

 

[Interesting Ian]

DavidSmith
Partially right. Lets assume that technology has become so advanced that it is possible to produce the same physical process in Bob's brain that occurs in Jane when she experiences redness. Jane has been experiencing red all her life.

Now, upon re-creation of this certain neural firing pattern, Bob experiences redness regardless of whether he has done so before.

This is fine. I am not arguing whether this is possible in principle. I am now asking how the materialist interprets this situation. Many people here think that because a physical process takes place and we experience certain qualia at the same time, the qualia is equivalent to that particular physical process.

I am asking for an elaboration of this view beyond a mere assertion that it is just "common sense".

If qualia = a physical process, how do you account for the fact that we are able to identify two aspects of the same thing ?
Also, if qualia = a physical process, why do materialists assert that the physical is somehow more real than the qualia (they are equivalent after all!). In other words, physical processes could just as well be "nothing but qualia".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Dancing David
I am definitly not following your train of logic here,

I genuinely find your non-understanding perplexing. I think David Smith is absolutely clear in his question. With what reason are you saying that quale is really a physical process or thing? Do you have any reasons whatsoever??

first you say that qualia and physical experience are coccuring but perhaps not linked. Care to over an explanation?

Did he say this? Where?

As for the last part I think you set up the tautology and then used it to say materialism is false.

I do not think he was explicitly stating materialism is false. He wants to know how materialists extricate themselves from this problem.

Oh well, I suppose the best I can hope for is more rudeness and no discussion, oh but thats right, my perception of your rudeness is a qualia, which you keep asserting materialists don't believe in.

I think you're confusing DavidSmith for me. DavidSmith has never been rude to anyone on this board as far as I am aware.

In fact I don't think I've been rude to you either.

 

[Dancing David]

So can you have qualia without photons?
Sorry I am not trying to be dense, just stuck in my mechanistic world view, trying to see where qualia are not part of a physical process.
So can you have red without photons?
Can you have taste with out chemical reactions in the tounge?
Etc.,etc.

My spectacular miss was my statement trying to correlate qualia to physical processes, it may be clear to you Ian but I still don't get it. Why aren't qualia part of a physical process, I read the posts, I just don't understand them.

Peace

 

[Victor Danilchenko]

ian simply assumes that subjective is irreducible. that's all there is to it. Since he makes this assumption, any explanation which shows how subjective is not necessarily irreducible, simply gets outright rejected by him.

You arern't doing anything wrong, DD. The dualist brigade are the ones with comprehension problem.

 

[Interesting Ian]

ian simply assumes that subjective is irreducible. that's all there is to it. Since he makes this assumption, any explanation which shows how subjective is not necessarily irreducible, simply gets outright rejected by him.

You arern't doing anything wrong, DD. The dualist brigade are the ones with comprehension problem.

No, I do not reject out of hand that qualia can be reduced to the material. But so far no-one has provided any arguments to suppose they can be. Is it unreasonable to question the presumption it can be so reduced in the absence of any arguments which even demonstrate this possibility?

BTW, which people on this thread are proposing dualism?

 

[ChuckieR]

... In fact, this lack of clarity is being expressed by the disappointingly incomplete answers to my simple question posed in the title of this thread.

The answers are incomplete in the same way that an explanation of gravity is incomplete. We understand that matter is associated with gravity, but we don't really have a "mechanistic" explanation of why/how gravity works. Likewise, it's possible that science may never provide an explanation of "experience" that you will find satisfying (actually, it seems that you do indeed find it satisfying that science can't provide a satisfying answer).

As far as the NCC==Qualia question, it seems that the term Qualia is pretty much defined as an unobservable thing (especially if you hold Chalmer's view that two otherwise identical physical systems can differ as to their consciousness), then science is faulted for not being able to observe it. This is different from the gravity situation, where we can very exactly quantify the effects of mass and gravity.

With Qualia, there seems to be no such hope. As far as I understand it (please correct me if I am wrong), Qualia produce no objective observables. Qualia do not interact with the physical universe in any objectively observable way (right?).

I want to throw the ball back in your direction by asking a few questions, which may shed more light on your original question.

1. Do you hold Chalmers view that it's possible to have two identical physical systems/processes, one of which is conscious and one which is not?
2. Do you see the discussion of Qualia as part of the furthering of scientific inquiry into consciousness?
3. If yes to the above question, how would you propose investigating "qualia"? Would you be doing anything differently than current neuroscientists are doing? What specific sorts of experiments would you recommend that might shed more light on the question of qualia?

It seems to me that the term Qualia is often used as a battering ram against the materialist viewpoint (in the same way that Intelligent Design is used against Evolution), rather than as a constructive framework for further inquiry. Maybe you can show me that my dismal outlook on Qualia is incorrect.

I don't put myself in the "denying consciousness" camp. I just don't think we will wind up needing a new force of nature to explain how the brain works. I think it's a bit premature to abandon the physical approach at this point.

We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm.

Okay, how do we do that? What tests can we do to rule that possibilitiy in or out? Is there any way to tell? How much money do you need for your research

We might then assess the validity of this approach by looking at what new predictive theories are possible and how they could explain observations like ESP and PK (if they continue to be found in the lab).

"continue to be found"??? Hmm, we might want to first have a successful, repeatable demonstration of those things before we waste time trying to explain how they work.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

We must address it by seriously looking at the possibility that the physical world is actually a constructed aspect of the mental realm.

If the construction is really good, we won't even be able to tell that the physical world isn't real. That's a bit of a philosophical bummer, no?

I've got an idea for a set of experiments to test this idea. Let's find someone who can override the construction rules and change his physical reality in such a way that the rest of us can tell.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I've got an idea for a set of experiments to test this idea. Let's find someone who can override the construction rules and change his physical reality in such a way that the rest of us can tell.

~~ Paul

Do you have free will? Can you make a plan and follow it?

Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.

It must suck to have faith in materialism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.

Well, physicalists can certainly postulate the first thing, too. As for HPC, I don't really understand it, but it smacks of the same overfluffiness as qualia. Maybe it's the same problem:

http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HARDPROB.html

I think idealists just replace the supposed HPC with the problem of perceptual constancy, which we might call the Hard Problem of Consistency (HPC).

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

Do you have free will? Can you make a plan and follow it?

Idealists can at least postulate that thought does change brain wiring/biochem/etc. Neither is HPC a problem.

It must suck to have faith in materialism.

Uh , who said that thought does not change the neural firing patterns,
Actually materialism is a relieve, why have to worry about all that stuff, we are here, that it is cool, 'nuff for me.

Idealism must be a theoretical pain in the non-existant ass.

 

[hammegk]

Uh , who said that thought does not change the neural firing patterns,

Few "say" it, since it is another blind alley for materialists.

How would you propose "thought" (mental) reprograms brain (physical)? And forget the crap about photons to retina; *I* at least "think" disregarding the external stimuli du jour, and sorting through the "thoughts" that appear willy-nilly -- appearance I assume courtesy of *me* and my perceived-as-physical-brain. IMO, this aspect of *I* & *me* underlies hpc/qualia (for lack of a better term).

What is mindfullness & meditation ( some would say prayer )?

 

[Dancing David]

I know you have that view and I respect you for it.

As far as how thought reprograms the brain, neurons are not switches, they change in thier sensitivity to other neurons, that is why we obtain new memories.

As far as what is meditation, for me it is either: learning to focus on one thing or it can be learning to live without thought.( I practise both), oh I forgot the other mindful one where you match your thoughts to your body.