How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[PixyMisa]

It is not proven and will never be proven? that makes you affirm that qualia are an objective stuff?

Yes.
The Laws of Motion are not proven and will never be proven.
The Laws of Thermodynamics are not proven and will never be proven.
The Theory of Relativity is not proven and will never be proven.
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is not proven and will never be proven.

Science doesn't prove things.

They all work though.

The emprical evidence for the physical origin of consciousness is just as good as the empirical evidence for any of the "Laws" of Physics. The theory doesn't currently measure up. That doesn't mean, nor even imply, that consciousness doesn't have a physical origin. We know perfectly well that it does. It just means that we don't fully understand the process.

 

[Q-Source]

Q-Source
I think what people are really asserting is that the incredulous arguments of the dualist brigade are simply BS. The assertion is not that qualia are material, but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia.

And how could they know for sure that there is nothing bizzare and inexplicable about qualia?
Let me guess... maybe because they are speaking from their matelistic points of view.

I do have a metaphysical belief, I would say that I am a reductive materialist, but that is just a belief system .
No one here (or anyone who calls himself a Scientist) should make an assertion about qualia from materialism point of view. That is not Science.

Qualia, despite all the hand-waving, are pretty mundane -- they are no more exciting and bizarre than any number of other cognitive objects, and in fact they are quite a bit less so. Now that's pretty damn exciting if you are a cognitive scientist of some stripe or another, but that's no reason to classify those objects as being materialistically inexplicable.

As a materialist, I would agree with that. However, have any cognitive scientist explained how qualia works?

You know what's bizarre and exciting? the fact that we can learn a complex structured language with amazing speed. The fact that we can look at an incredibly complex image, and simply notice a face hidden in the jumble. The fact that we can abstract incredibly complex rules into compact and unbelievably efficient heuristics (think go). These are bizarre and exciting; qualia are just stiocking stuffers of sophomoric philosophy discussions.

I am almost sure that men will be capable of describing complex processes as those which occur in our brains. Maybe Scientists will find out that in fact qualia are really objective processes. Until then...

The core question -- what do we mean when we say that qualia are materialistic -- is what is being answered. the answer is not the proof that qualia are real, but the proof that there is nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia above and beyond other cognitive processes.

At this moment, I also think that there must be nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia, however I wonder why there is nothing in the Scientific field that explains without a doubt how a subjective experiences arises from the brain?

Q-S

 

[Interesting Ian]

You keep asking this question. Do you agree with this definition.



If this is all qualia are, then the answer is only more complex form of the answer to the question: How is "War and Peace" the exact same thing as this big thing of paper and ink. If you don't know what words are and how they can be represented then it seems just as unsolvable.

We can quite clearly understand how "war and peace" can be a big thing of paper and ink. The following (in blue) is what I have stated on this subject before (although without employing the term qualia).

"To have a scientific understanding of our behaviour it is sufficient that we have knowledge of all facts accessible from the third person perspective. By a third person perspective I mean that anyone with unimpaired sense and instruments could potentially corroborate. This would then include neurons firing in a living brain, but would not include mental states such as emotions. This is because a person cannot literally partake in another person's conscious experiences. So the totality of our behaviour can be explained with reference to third person facts.

As an aside this is why minds can never be scientifically explained. Minds can neither be perceptually sensed nor play a fruitful role in our theories describing the world, therefore from a scientific perspective they are superfluous. Thus within any materialist based understanding of the world, it simply has to be arbitrarily stipulated that they are identical to, or are a function of, or are somehow derived from physical processes within the brain. Sort of like a faith if you will".

So in the context of qualia they are superflous in explaining the world. They are not analogically akin to the information in a book or computer software since we are simply talking about qualitative experiences. It is nonsensical to say they are a fiction. In tasting sugar I have a certain qualitative experience, and it is meaningless if not blatently false to say that experience is either a fiction or doesn't exist.

In short then qualia are not implied by any third person facts. They cannot fit into scientific theory or account of reality. This makes them unique! And yet on the other hand qualia are the only things that matter. From our perspective they are the only reality, at least qualia and the experiencing mind. And yet they are unique in that they cannot in principle fit into a scientific description of reality!

 

[Interesting Ian]

The assertion is not that qualia are material, but rather than there is nothing bizarre or inexplicable or inconceivable about matrialistic nature of qualia.

I think this gem deserves to be nominated for BillHoyt's illogic prize!

 

[Q-Source]

Pixy,

I don't like the abusive tone of your posts. If you cannot control your emotions, then I cannot hold any discussion with you.

Q-S

 

[PixyMisa]

Do you know how the scientific method works?
Do you know that a scientific theory should hold with empirical evidence?

Yes. You don't seem to.

You have subjective experiences, I wonder if they can be replicated in someone else's brain to support the non-existence theories about qualia.

If we know that mind arises from the brain - and we do - we know that "Qualia" arise from physical processes. Stating that fact doesn't require a fully descriptive theory.

Yes, you're confused.

Why should I present evidence to support that qualia are not the result of objective events?, should I prove a negative?

Because you are suggesting that they are not objective processes.

You say, Qualia might not be objective processes.
We say, All the evidence shows that they are.
You say, Show me a theory that explains exactly how Qualia occur.
We say, We don't have one. You know that.
You say, Then you can't claim that they are objective processes.
We say, You are confusing facts with explanations.
You say, If you don't understand it, you can't claim it's true!
We say, Well, what the hell else do you think qualia might be?
You say, Why should I have to tell you?
We say, Go away until you're prepared to talk sense.

I am not saying that qualia are objective, all I know is that I am having this subjective experiences and noone can explain them in objective terms, not even myself.

Exactly.

Which doesn't change for a moment the fact that we know perfectly well where they come from.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't like the abusive tone of your posts. If you cannot control your emotions, then I cannot hold any discussion with you.

I'll ask you a simple, perfectly polite question then.

Did you know that science doesn't prove things?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes. You don't seem to.If we know that mind arises from the brain - and we do -

We know no such thing.

You say, Qualia might not be objective processes.
We say, All the evidence shows that they are.

In fact there is not only no evidence whatsoever, and indeed there couldn't be. Saying qualia is a brain process is, and can only ever be, an arbitrary stipulation.

 

[PixyMisa]

We know no such thing.

Well, I know that you don't, Ian.

In fact there is not only no evidence whatsoever, and indeed there couldn't be. Saying qualia is a brain process is, and can only ever be, an arbitrary stipulation.

That's false. "Qualia" occur in the mind, yes? If we show that mind comes from the brain, if follows that so do "Qualia", yes?

As for evidence of mind coming from the brain, we know that physical, chemical and electrical interaction with the brain produces changes in the mind. I'm not just talking input and ouput here (the senses and motor control). I'm talking about changes in the way the mind thinks.

And we have mapped the exact type of interaction and the various regions of the brain, and we know what stimuli applied to what regions produce what mental changes.

You want to induce pain? Fear? Lust? Pleasure? You want to induce hallucinations? Sleep? All trivially easy, with a few little electrodes, a few cheap drugs.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't have any answers, but I find it odd that folks would say that qualia are fiction. Perhaps I don't understand what qualia are at all.

Well saying that qualia are a fiction is simple devoid of any meaning. The point is you have the experience of redness. What meaning is actually being conveyed in describing your qualitative experience as a fiction? Surely none at all!

 

[Victor Danilchenko]

Q-Source

And how could they know for sure that there is nothing bizzare and inexplicable about qualia?

Because each "bizarre and inexplicable" aspect of qualia, when closely examined, simply vanishes. Read Dennett's "Quining Qualia" -- it takes the "bizarre an inexplicable" properties of qualia apart, one by one, and he does it with style, grace, and evidence.

Let me guess... maybe because they are speaking from their matelistic points of view.

No, Because they care about facts instead of maintaining a wishy-washy pseudo-agnostic stance.

I do have a metaphysical belief, I would say that I am a reductive materialist, but that is just a belief system .
No one here (or anyone who calls himself a Scientist) should make an assertion about qualia from materialism point of view. That is not Science.

As Pixy said, why do you jump into discussing a subject -- and making authoritative-sounding assertions on the subject -- without actually knowing anything about the said subject?

As a materialist, I would agree with that. However, have any cognitive scientist explained how qualia works?

No; they haven't explained how minds work, and introspection is pretty high up in the hierarchy of cognitive artifacts. However, they have explained how qualia don't work -- and the "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia got totally flushed in the process.

I am almost sure that men will be capable of describing complex processes as those which occur in our brains. Maybe Scientists will find out that in fact qualia are really objective processes. Until then...

As Pixy noted, you apparently aren't familiar with epistemology and philosophy of science either.

Science is never "sure" about anything. Any scientific result always necessarily falls into "almost sure" category -- all of them are provisional, contexctual, and amenable to future evidence.

At this moment, I also think that there must be nothing mystically inexplicable about qualia, however I wonder why there is nothing in the Scientific field that explains without a doubt how a subjective experiences arises from the brain?

We have great conceptual explanations for how subjective experiences arise from mental processes -- they are mind's own interpretation of introspection. We don't have mechanistic explanation of introspection, because we don't yet understand brains and minds well enough; but we have mountains of evidence indicating that subjective experiences are functions of brains.

It doesn't take complete understanding of brain's functioning in order to induce subjective experiences at will -- and we have done that. There are mountains of experiemnts that tie subjectivity to brain processes in a pretty much incontrovertible fashion.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Q-Source

Because each "bizarre and inexplicable" aspect of qualia, when closely examined, simply vanishes.

Who has claimed tjhis about qualia?

Read Dennett's "Quining Qualia" -- it takes the "bizarre an inexplicable" properties of qualia apart, one by one, and he does it with style, grace, and evidence.

I will read it. In fact I've already read the first third of the page. He's a good writer.

No; they haven't explained how minds work, and introspection is pretty high up in the hierarchy of cognitive artifacts. However, they have explained how qualia don't work --

Why does there need to be an explanation for qualia?

and the "bizarre and inexplicable" properties of qualia got totally flushed in the process.

Who has said qualia has bizarre and inexplicable properties??

Science is never "sure" about anything. Any scientific result always necessarily falls into "almost sure" category -- all of them are provisional, contexctual, and amenable to future evidence.

The existence of phenomenal consiousness cannot in principle be explained by science. It cannot play a fruitful role in any theory.

We have great conceptual explanations for how subjective experiences arise from mental processes -- they are mind's own interpretation of introspection. We don't have mechanistic explanation of introspection, because we don't yet understand brains and minds well enough; but we have mountains of evidence indicating that subjective experiences are functions of brains.

No we don't. We have absolutely none whatsoever. Nor in principle could we ever have any. I've explained this before. Read and understand.

It doesn't take complete understanding of brain's functioning in order to induce subjective experiences at will -- and we have done that. There are mountains of experiemnts that tie subjectivity to brain processes in a pretty much incontrovertible fashion.

We have correllations yes. But how does this constitute any evidence that (phenomenal) consciousness is a function??

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Who has said qualia has bizarre and inexplicable properties??
...
No we don't. We have absolutely none whatsoever. Nor in principle could we ever have any. I've explained this before. Read and understand.

You're a tiring fellow sometimes, Ian.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

So the discussion seems to be proceding, there has been the bare minimum of name calling which is good.

Q-source, oh yes , philsophicaly speaking we can say that there is no absolute proof that the brain is the seat of consiousness. And so we should be agnostic on the qualia. OKAY, I suspend my belief that there is anything extraordinary about qualia until the immaterialsts show it.

Q-source: your point is valid but absurd to the extreme. The psychology of perception is not is dispute. The neural pathways of perception are very well documented, any search engine will show you that.
The only area that could be in dispute is that, the neural pathways of cognition are not mapped out. HOWEVER there is a huge body of evidence concerning the way brain injury effects cognition, alot of it started in world war two and has carried on since then. For almost every cognitive process there is someone who has been injured and had that cognitive process messed up.
This is very compelling evidence that the brain is the seat of cognition.
I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.

The issue is not if we should be agnostic in the abcense of final proof of causation but what can be done with concepts that gives them scientific validity. Mess with someones brain and they will loose the ability to percieve qualia.

Where is any prooof that qualia are not brain processes?

Peace

 

[PixyMisa]

I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.

I can accept that subjective experiences are real; the important question is real what. So, as you say, they are real brain processes. I'm fine with that.

Qualia, though... Qualia are either brain processes too, or are pure concepts and therefore not real at all. People seem to want to claim that qualia are both real and not tied to reality in any way. That doesn't work.

 

[Interesting Ian]

So the discussion seems to be proceding, there has been the bare minimum of name calling which is good.

Q-source, oh yes , philsophicaly speaking we can say that there is no absolute proof that the brain is the seat of consiousness. And so we should be agnostic on the qualia. OKAY, I suspend my belief that there is anything extraordinary about qualia until the immaterialsts show it.

Q-source: your point is valid but absurd to the extreme. The psychology of perception is not is dispute. The neural pathways of perception are very well documented, any search engine will show you that.
The only area that could be in dispute is that, the neural pathways of cognition are not mapped out. HOWEVER there is a huge body of evidence concerning the way brain injury effects cognition, alot of it started in world war two and has carried on since then. For almost every cognitive process there is someone who has been injured and had that cognitive process messed up.
This is very compelling evidence that the brain is the seat of cognition.
I do disagree respectfuly with Pixy, subjective experiences are physical processes, but they are real. They are based in the reality of neurochemestry. The question is if they are valid.

The issue is not if we should be agnostic in the abcense of final proof of causation but what can be done with concepts that gives them scientific validity. Mess with someones brain and they will loose the ability to percieve qualia.

Where is any prooof that qualia are not brain processes?

Peace

The proof is that they are utterly uncharacteristically unlike each other, and we have absolutely no reason to either say one is the very same thing as the other, or one is caused by the other. A only can be said to cause B if both A and B are elements in some theory descrihbing the world. Qualia can never ever play any role in any such theory because qualia are causally inefficaceous.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I can accept that subjective experiences are real; the important question is real what. So, as you say, they are real brain processes. I'm fine with that.

Qualia, though... Qualia are either brain processes too, or are pure concepts and therefore not real at all. People seem to want to claim that qualia are both real and not tied to reality in any way. That doesn't work.

Qualia is reality. At least of the external world. There is nothing over and above qualia and selves.

 

[Dancing David]

I think I understand the point:
It is that our perceptions bound our understanding of reality. Is that close?

 

[PixyMisa]

Qualia is reality. At least of the external world. There is nothing over and above qualia and selves.

Time for Yahzi's Bat again, I think.

The problem with your theory is simple: The world just doesn't act that way. It stubbornly persists in existing. Thoughts do not affect the world, but the world affects thoughts. Minds act as though they arise from brains. Every test that we try confirms all of this.

As far as the world is concerned, Qualia and Selves are utterly irrelevant. Selves die and the world continues. You say yourself that Qualia are not causally efficaceous, that in simpler terms they don't do anything.

The world, on the other hand, is, and does. You may find this rude and presumptuous, but that's the way it is.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Circularity Alert!

All qualia discussions have now become circular. No need to continue. Alert! Everyone to get from street!

~~ Paul