How do we know that places like Narnia do not exist?

Tricky said:
A few posts ago Ian thought Pixy was agreeing with him about qualia
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No no no, I agree with Pixy! If qualia exist materilism is necessarily false.

OK he's now changed his mind. I kinda guessed he would. No-one likes to be thought of as denying the existence of the smell of coffee!

Like Pixy, I can put up with the abuse.
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Ya daft twat! ;)
 
Interesting Ian said:
No no no, I agree with Pixy! If qualia exist materilism is necessarily false.

OK he's now changed his mind. I kinda guessed he would. No-one likes to be thought of as denying the existence of the smell of coffee!
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Actually, you have that right. Your mistake was in assuming that because he had a good knowledge of how qualia are defined, that he believed they exist. He hasn't changed his mind, as anyone paying attention can see.

And no one is denying the existence of the smell of coffee either. You assume that the smell is something that a materialistic philosophy cannot accomodate, and in that you are completely wrong.
Interesting Ian said:
Ya daft twat! :wink:
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As you wish.

Hope you are feeling better soon.
 
Interesting Ian said:
No no no, I agree with Pixy! If qualia exist materilism is necessarily false.
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Right.

And there is no evidence that qualia exist.

OK he's now changed his mind.
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Nope.

You took statements I made about consciousness and decided entirely on your own that I was talking about qualia.

Consciousness is real.

Qualia are incoherent philosopher-babble.

I kinda guessed he would.
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Well, you guessed wrong.

No-one likes to be thought of as denying the existence of the smell of coffee!
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The smell of coffee is real and has a direct chemical origin.

Qualia are nonsensical.
 
Interesting Ian said:
Tis true that this data gives evidence that mind/self/consciousness is a product of the brain. No argument from me there.

But it does not give any evidence, any suggestion, that mind is a function of the brain.
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I would also like to hear what the difference is between product and function.
 
Pixy said:
Well, that's just it. Experience isn't distinct from any source it might have in a physical object. When you see, for example, a red rose, philosophers claim you are experiencing the qualia of redness. But there is a direct physical path between the rose and your experience. So qualia, per that definition, don't exist.
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I guess it just depends on how you interpret the word distinct. I see no reason to take it as meaning ontologicaly distinct, but some people certainly mean it that way.

But if you say qualia are irreducible then I will point out that there is no evidence whatsoever that this is so, and considerable evidence that it is not true.
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Oh yes, as soon as someone says they are irreducible, now we've got a problem.

Ian said:
No no no, I agree with Pixy! If qualia exist materilism is necessarily false.

OK he's now changed his mind. I kinda guessed he would. No-one likes to be thought of as denying the existence of the smell of coffee!
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1. Qualia are, by definition, irreducible to the physical.

2. The smell of coffee is a quale.

3. I can smell coffee.

4. Therefore, my mind is not physical.

The above does not constitute a proof of idealism.

~~ Paul
 
People who discuss qualia as meaningful... things... seem to invariably fall down the mineshaft of either idealism or dualism.

But you're right to take me to task for that particular statement, because although the people I have read discussing qualia were either using them as an attack-by-definition on materialism or refuting them as such (Dennett, for example), I certainly haven't read the book in which the term originated, apparently something called Mind and the World Order by C. I. Lewis.
 
Tricky said:
Actually, you have that right. Your mistake was in assuming that because he had a good knowledge of how qualia are defined, that he believed they exist. He hasn't changed his mind, as anyone paying attention can see.
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No, first of all he said they don't exist, now he says they do.

Edited to add: Oh! Now he's changed his mind yet again.
 
PixyMisa said:
Consciousness is real.

Qualia are incoherent philosopher-babble.
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They're the very same thing. It's just that qualia is more of a precise term.

Necessarily if one rejects the existence of qualia, they reject the existence of any consciousness (including their own).
 
Pixy said:
But you're right to take me to task for that particular statement, because although the people I have read discussing qualia were either using them as an attack-by-definition on materialism or refuting them as such (Dennett, for example), I certainly haven't read the book in which the term originated, apparently something called Mind and the World Order by C. I. Lewis.
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I think it's just another poorly defined philosophy term, which tends to get loaded with whatever worldview the speaker has.

To declare qualia as irreducible just begs the question in the most blatant way. But then we continue on with word games: To reject qualia* is to reject consciousness.* You're an idiot if you don't see why.

~~ Paul

* According to my sooper sekrit definition.
 
Qualia: Qualia (singular: "quale", pronounced KWAHL-ay) are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&start=3&oi=define&q=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Consciousness: Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&start=2&oi=define&q=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

Qualia and consciousness are not the same thing, Ian. The two are, in fact, very different.

Of course, seeing as you have an incorrect understanding of consciousness, I now understand why you had a problem with the idea of a conscious android. I suggest you break open a book.
 
zaayrdragon said:
Qualia: Qualia (singular: "quale", pronounced KWAHL-ay) are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&start=3&oi=define&q=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

Consciousness: Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=X&start=2&oi=define&q=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

Qualia and consciousness are not the same thing, Ian. The two are, in fact, very different.

Of course, seeing as you have an incorrect understanding of consciousness, I now understand why you had a problem with the idea of a conscious android. I suggest you break open a book.
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What else is there to consciousness apart from experiences?

Allow me to put it another way. What would it mean to not have any experiences i.e qualia, but be conscious?
 
Jekyll said:
I think Ian is trying to argue that a working brain is a necessary but not sufficent criterea for consciousness.
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I believe this is a desperate bid for Ian to prove that he has what could be defined as "consciousness."

Interesting Ian said:
No need to ignore my insults. Take note of them and hence stop communicating with me.
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He obviously doesn't take his own advice on this one, since he's still on the forum. I've seen several insults thrown his way throughout this thread, and I'm sure it's not uncommon.

I'm really not adding anything productive to this thread, and I realize that. I just wanted to applaud the patience of some of this forum's members, Pixy being an example, in trying to get a (what was that phrase, Ian? oh yeah...) daft twat to follow the twists and turns of critically thought out logic and to actually consider another's viewpoint before spouting off and abusive response.

You guys impress me, as does the denseness of at least one member of this forum in particular.
 
Interesting Ian said:
No, first of all he said they don't exist, now he says they do.

Edited to add: Oh! Now he's changed his mind yet again.
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If you define qualia as simply "subjective experience", then fine, they exist, and are generated by the brain.

If you define qualia as "irreducible subjective experience", and you do define it that way, Ian, as does Dr. Elitzur, then it's just incoherent philosopher-babble.

I have made that perfectly clear from the beginning, if you would actually read my posts rather than reading things into them.

If qualia are just experience, we have no need for the term.

If qualia are irreducible experience, we have no need for the term, because the concept makes no sense.

Either way, you cannot use qualia to disprove materialism.
 
Anyway, since Ian is back, I'll ask again:

How is anterograde amnesia possible under your model of consciousness? The subject is fully conscious and self-aware, able to converse and to relate older memories, but is completely incapable of forming new memories.

How can that work, Ian? You don't need to provide the right answer; any plausible mechanism will do.
 
Let's see ... the brain acts as a filter on the immaterial mind. Each memory, stored in the mind, has a timestamp. The brain has a copy of the most recent timestamp and uses it as input to a function that determines how fuzzy the memory will appear in the person's awareness. It's sort of an opaquing function. The function checks for and completely opaques any memories with a timestamp later than the brain's timestamp value, as these are clearly errors.*

Anterograde amnesia causes the brain's timestamp to freeze. Even though the mind still records new memories, any memories that are recalled with a timestamp later than the brain's frozen value are completely opaqued by the function.

Does that work?

~~ Paul


* Except in certain odd cases, known as precognitive memories.
 
Yes, that works. It's close to what dualists really seem to think happens, as far as I can tell.

I wonder if Ian agrees.
 
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