Another lying bastard. I made no such claim. I said he apparently knows. That is to say that from the extract I quoted it appears to be the case that he is saying he knows that no Narnia type worlds exist.
Perhaps we need to backtrack a bit then. I disagree with this primary assertion on which you base your entire discussion. I don't think it's apparent at all that Dawkins believed he knew with certainty that no Narnia-type worlds exist, based solely on that single statement. This would probably be a good starting point. Perhaps you can go into detail your reason for making this assertion. No doubt you will claim it obvious, and declare any that disagree as doo-doo heads, but I fail to find another single supporter of this assertion in this entire discussion. Perhaps you need to convince at least one person that Dawkins did believe such a thing, so that you may then properly argue with them that he was wrong to do so.
I'm saying that we don't know whether any Narnia type world exists or not. Everybody else is saying either they do know or they are saying that it's overwhelmingly probable that no such type of world exists. I feel that such a world doesn't exist, but I deny that we can say that we either know it, or can claim that it's overwhelming improbable (how does one calculate probabilities in such a scenario??). Their justification for their position is that you cannot prove that Narnia type worlds do not exist.
Given your reply earlier, I find this bolded part of your statement superfluous and intentionally misleading, as you have already made clear no one has said this. The statement is saved from being an outright lie, of course, by the qualifying 'or' and subsequent information. On that track, however, it is entirely consistent for such a world to be "overwhelming[sic] improbable" and yet not "know whether any Narnia type world exists or not". Therefore, you do not necessarily disagree with this misterious "everybody else" you complain about.
As to your final exasperation about probability, understand it this way. There are three possible scenarios for such a world:
1. There is not now, nor will there ever be any interaction between our existance and that world.
2. Interaction is one way. Specifically, we can travel from this existance to that world, but cannot return (e.g. an afterlife).
3. There is some possible interaction between our existance and that world.
Case 1 is resistant to any probability examination, but is also uninteresting, since there is absolutely nothing more do discuss about such a world. I'm sure this is painful for some, for such a wonderous world to be discarded out of hand just because it can never be touched, but that is how adults deal with things with no relation to themselves.
Case 2 is also resistant to any probability examination, but is discarded as uninteresting by skeptics. Their focus is on examining this existance, and the examination of others can wait until this one is finished.
Case 3 we can talk about probabilities a bit, but only in abstract terms. Since in our specific example, we're discussing travel, let's look at the history of travel discovery. In the beginning, man walked. After a time, man domesticated animals and used flowing water for travel power. Later, combustion allowed new records in speed, even permitting one to reach another planet within a lifetime.
In the end, though, the type of travel is still the same as the first. Given enough time, some gravity, a suitable surface to produce friction, and protection from the environment, it is still possible to walk to any destination reachable by the most advanced modes of travel. Therefore, for such a world to exist, there must exist a mode of travel very different from any so far and yet completely undiscovered in all of human history.
To a skeptic, the odds of such a discovery are the length of his lifetime(since discovery after his passing is relatively uninteresting for discussion) vs. all of history, which is very small indeed.
To a dreamer, the odds of such a discovery is all of the future vs. all of the past. The former being infinate and the later being at least no larger, the odds seem much better, I'm sure.
