Houla Massacre, Syria: What If?

[A'isha]

Interesting parallel. Do you have an opinion really on the revolt against the Umayyads to make this poetically valid?

I'm not sure what you mean by "poetically valid". But let me quote from Vali Nasr's The Shia Revival:

Husayn [Hussein] became not only Shiism's flag-bearer, symbolizing its claim to leadership of the Islamic world, but also as a byword for chivalry and courage in the just cause of standing up to tyranny. Shiism is defined by its passion for Husayn, whose martyr's death is the dramatic experience that lies at the beating heart of Shia devotion. Husayn's death has left the Shia with a model of authority that differs from the one that the Sunnis commenced building at the start of the Umayyad period. For the Shia, Karbala [where Hussein was defeated and beheaded by Mu'awiyah] is an emblem of suffering and solace but also connotes the refusal of true Muslim authority to be caged by pragmatic considerations and its willingness to challenge illegitimate authority - not only that of the caliphs but that of any ruler who does not measure up. Shias have often invoked the Husayn story to define their conflicts in modern times: against the Shah's forces in Iran in 1979, against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon in the 1980's, and against Saddam Hussein's death squads in Iraq during the anti-Ba'thist intifada (uprising) that followed the first Gulf war in March 1991.

[...]

Husayn is popularly known as the Lord of the Martyrs (Sayyid al-Shuhada). Shias believe that martyrdom is the highest testament to faith, following the example of the imams, a deed that will gain the martyr entry into paradise just as it will strengthen Shiism.

On the other hand, Nasr also notes in his book that in Pakistan, under the Wahhabist Saudi influenced rule of General Zia-ul-Haq,

The traditional Sunni polemic against the Shias as wayward brothers thus gave way to a newly virulent, root-and-branch rejection of Shiism as a gross heresy. Soon tomes with titles such as The Shias' Revolt Against the Quran and Shias Rebel Against Islam were appearing in bookstores from Karachi to Delhi. Militant Sunnis began to name their sons Muawiya and Yazid, breaking taboos by honoring caliphs who had persecuted and killed members of the Prophet's family. In fact, eulogies for these two Umayyad caliphs soon became an important part of the new anti-Shia discourse. This implied that Sunnis should revere as defenders of the faith rulers who had fought Ali and killed Husayn[.]

 

[Caustic Logic]

I'm not sure what you mean by "poetically valid".

'Poetically appropriate' might've been better. Or something else. Itseemed like you were saying something like "the Sunnis once rose up against a tyranny in the old Muawiya story, just as they are now in Syria." I don't suppose it matters, but was curious if you saw it like that.

But let me quote from Vali Nasr's The Shia Revival:

On the other hand, Nasr also notes in his book that in Pakistan, under the Wahhabist Saudi influenced rule of General Zia-ul-Haq,

Interesting additions. The point about Muawiya being a controversial name that would be offensive to some relevant parties here is a totally valid one, and now a well-explained one.

But there's so much going against the rebel story here, this comes across as almost laughable as a rescue attempt. Especially when it can be bolstered only with Mr. Reurter's straw-man claim that Muawiya and his family allegedly converted to Shi'ism. It sounds improbable, probably was without a name-change too (though by no means impossible), and it was never improbably alleged by anyone.

 

[Childlike Empress]

Among the Ahl al-Bayt, Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad (and the first male convert to Islam) is the most important. To the Shi'a, Ali is second only to the Prophet himself, and was the sole rightful successor (khalif) to the Prophet after his death, supposedly designated as such by Muhammad himself. Ali, however, despite his rightful claim to the position did not become khalif after Muhammad's death. Abu Bakr was the first khalif, followed by Umar, and 'Uthman. Through it all, there were a group of Muslims who supported Ali and his right to lead the ummah. They became known as the Shi'at Ali, the Party or Partisans of Ali. Hence, of course, the name Shi'a.

While we're at offensive names: I just read an article (german) about the names the different "rebel" militias have given themselves. As i've learned, the dominating one in the Homs region is named after the title given to the second khalif Umar - Al-Farooq (The one who distinguishes between right and wrong). Hence their name alone must offend Shi'as and Alawites, not to speak of the actions of the brigade which is said to have 4-5 thousand fighters and is led by Abdul Razak Tlas, cousin of Manaf Tlas from Ar-Rastan. Our "rebel attack" witnesses report that he himself with 250 of his men from the Al-Farouk-Brigade were one of the groups who took part in the events in Houla on May 25, although not the massacre itself, but the conquering of the checkpoints.

 

[funk de fino]

I know someone called Fanny. I also know of a shop called Wanko and also one called Bum world.

The horror of offensive names.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I know someone called Fanny. I also know of a shop called Wanko and also one called Bum world.

The horror of offensive names.

I just learned recently the different meaning of Fanny in the UK. Amusing but irrelevant, of course. This actually is serious stuff.

I heard from my translator about the "my daughter/the daughter" issue. He says the translation if good both times. In Arabic too it's a shift from the usual "my"to "the." To his ears, he said it doesn't sound terribly odd. And maybe it's not, but amongst the other clues, there's a good chance that's a momentary slip out of character.

 

[Caustic Logic]

While we're at offensive names: I just read an article (german) about the names the different "rebel" militias have given themselves. As i've learned, the dominating one in the Homs region is named after the title given to the second khalif Umar - Al-Farooq (The one who distinguishes between right and wrong). Hence their name alone must offend Shi'as and Alawites, not to speak of the actions of the brigade which is said to have 4-5 thousand fighters and is led by Abdul Razak Tlas, cousin of Manaf Tlas from Ar-Rastan. Our "rebel attack" witnesses report that he himself with 250 of his men from the Al-Farouk-Brigade were one of the groups who took part in the events in Houla on May 25, although not the massacre itself, but the conquering of the checkpoints.

Fascinating info here. Truther site, Virus? Hezbollah? I tried reading it in Google translate, but I can actually make more sense of the German. Odd, that. No opinion yet. The Farouq brigade burning down of Alawite olive groves is a nice start. Kidnappings, murders, forced relocation, massacres...yeah, this more than just an offensive name game.

I need to learn more about Tlass and the brigades. I wonder who it was that went up to the houses? Less of the (one set of) witnesses mention much past the checkpoints most of them were at or near.

An exception, our one known miracle escapee from the non-rebel witnesses, or former rebel, he says. "Ahmed," last name, by deduction, perhaps Abdul Razaq, who spoke to Jürgen Todenhöfer. (refined from the translation at the Wiki - CE, feel free to beat me to it)

Friends from the neighboring villages, with whom Ahmed had recently demonstrated against Assad, had invaded his house to kill him and his family. They accused him of converting to the Shiite faith. Somehow he managed to convince his old friends that he was still a Sunni Muslim.
Then the murderers rushed into the house next door, where his brother lived with his family. They have actually converted to the Shiite faith. They were murdered along with their children by the rebels."

Locals in this case, unspecified, perhaps from Rastan, not the apparent Libyan contingent. If anyone wants to turn it around and critique a "regime version" witness, "Ahmed" might be a good choice. Sadly, I think that's about all there is from him.

 

[Childlike Empress]

Sadly, I think that's about all there is from him.

Yes, just googled "Todenhöfer Hula" again and that seems to be all. But what i've found is a discussion on his request between him and Christoph Reuter who did the SPIEGEL interviews. From late last month, should be interesting, will read later, again German, sorry.

 

[Childlike Empress]

No further specific information in the talk, but this is interesting:

Reuter: Ich war dort und habe mit Überlebenden gesprochen. Der Ort lag und liegt immer noch unter Beschuss der Armee, die den Schauplatz des Massakers kontrollierte. Die Zeugen erzählen dieselbe Geschichte, teilweise sogar vor der Kamera. Niemand beschuldigt die Rebellen.

Todenhöfer: Ihre Leute wollen ja auch weiterleben. Ich habe Ihre Augenzeugen-Videos an fünf Bewohner von Hula geschickt. Sie sind dazu extra nach Damaskus gekommen. Ihre Aussage lautet: So- lange Hula von Rebellen beherrscht wird, wird niemand in eine Kamera sagen, dass die Rebellen die Mörder waren. Etwas anderes zu erwarten wäre naiv.

Reuter says that Houla was and still is under fire from the Army who "controlled the scene of the massacre" (how did he get there then?). He says his witnesses all tell the same story, nobody accuses the "rebels". Todenhöfer replies that he sent Reuter's witness videos to five residents of Houla he is in contact with. Their reply: As long as Houla is in "rebel" hands, nobody will say into a camera that the "rebels" were the killers. To expect anything else would be naive. They want to survive after all.

 

[Childlike Empress]

The final UNHRC CoI report was released today.

Additional information: Eight more interviews, six of them witnesses from Taldou, two of the six survivors, conducted "by the commission". Obviously the six are the Reuter interviews.

Final conclusion - who would have thought: Government and "Shabiha" did it.

Comments on occasion - some noteworthy details and remarkable reasoning.

 

[Virus]

Final conclusion - who would have thought: Government and "Shabiha" did it.

Who would have thought: Everyone else was right and you were wrong.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Who would have thought: Everyone else was right and you were wrong.

Uh, no. That strangely murky interim report had to lead to massive pressure all around to clarify things. The UN and its organs know their bread gets buttered in New York, not Damascus. It would have been astounding, a slap in the face to the West, to clarify it the other way.

How many of their nearly 400 interviews did they actually call on, I wonder. It seems a big part of the change to a clearer stance is absorbing that crappy, straw-man-laden Spiegel article and its alleged witnesses. Six of them, not the seventh, Ali Adel Al-Sayed... they already interviewed him once, and we've seen what happens when you put together more than one of his accounts. In case they didn't know, I was sure to e-mail the OHCHR the article demonstrating that. Not my fault if they managed to ignore that in choosing to believe one of Ali's stories and the other miracle escapees who tell similar ones.

 

[Childlike Empress]

Uh, no. That strangely murky interim report had to lead to massive pressure all around to clarify things. The UN and its organs know their bread gets buttered in New York, not Damascus. It would have been astounding, a slap in the face to the West, to clarify it the other way.

How many of their nearly 400 interviews did they actually call on, I wonder. It seems a big part of the change to a clearer stance is absorbing that crappy, straw-man-laden Spiegel article and its alleged witnesses. Six of them, not the seventh, Ali Adel Al-Sayed... they already interviewed him once, and we've seen what happens when you put together more than one of his accounts. In case they didn't know, I was sure to e-mail the OHCHR the article demonstrating that. Not my fault if they managed to ignore that in choosing to believe one of Ali's stories and the other miracle escapees who tell similar ones.

The number of nearly 400 interviews was stated by Al Jazeera in their short report Hover Boarder posted. As is a strong likelyhood with everything they report on Syria, the number is bunk. It's the number of total interviews for the report, not the interviews dealing with Houla. Including the eight "new" interviews for the final report they speak of 47 interviews "from several sources", by deduction not all of them witnesses.

[The parts of the report relating to Houla are a summary on page 10/11 and a slightly more detailed write-up in the Annex on pages 64-66]

Allegedly only two of them, those mentioned in the initial SANA report, tell a story different from what all others say. This shows already their sloppy/finished under pressure "investigation", because they are aware that those two were also interviewed by Marat Musin/ANNA, but omit that they did more interviews, five of them clearly identifiable as listed by us.

None other contradicting testimonies are known to them, they say, not at the monastery, and not those by Rainer Hermann, the latter they wash away in footnote 100 (page 64) by claiming that his reports are also based on just those two accounts. I wonder how they came to this conclusion - Hermann is not pleased with the report and has just published a new article in FAZ, picking on some issues and concluding that "the last word isn't spoken".

What surprised me in his article is that there actually is an official statement of the German Government from June 29, saying that there are contradicting witness reports and not enough reliable evidence available to draw any conclusions about the perpetrators. This statement came after one party used a parliamentary mechanism called "kleine Anfrage" to inquire on the matter.

Am 29. Juni antwortete die Bundesregierung auf eine Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der Linkspartei, die vorliegenden Augenzeugenberichte zu den Vorgängen in Hula seien widersprüchlich. Die Täterschaft lasse sich nicht eindeutig klären, belastbare Hinweise auf eine Beteiligung regimenaher Milizen lägen nicht vor.

While they (imho unconvincingly) try to find contradictions in the two mixed-together SANA statements (footnote 98), they implicitly deny that there are any contradictions in our boy Ali's statements (both page 64):

At the same time, accounts of other witnesses interviewed by the commission remained consistent over time, including those collected from children, despite the fact that they were conducted by different interviewers.

As Rainer Hermann points out, the main argument of their adjusted reasoning is about who had access to which parts of the town at which point. While they are quite secretive on the source of their knowledge about this, it seems to be in part based on satellite images where they played "spot the tank" and Hermann points out that a destroyed tank which doesn't move looks the same as one in battle.

Anyway, they conclude that the "rebels" may have had access to the Al Sayed homes, but likely not to the Abdulrazzak homes. Reason (page 65):

11. At the Abdulrazzak crime scene, where over 60 persons were killed, the commission considered it likely that a large number of perpetrators would have been necessary to carry out the crime. The killings occurred in broad daylight. Testimony received indicated that the perpetrators arrived both by foot and in vehicles, and that some arrived with pickups with machine guns mounted on top, in addition to a number of cars and minivans. The commission found that the movement of vehicles or weapons, as well as the size of the group, would have been detectable by Government forces at the Water Authority position. At the same time, access to the scene for any sizable group of anti-Government armed men would have been practically impossible, especially if they arrived in vehicles as multiple eyewitnesses attested.

Fair enough, eh, but then comes the next point - spot the contradiction:

12. Opposition members did manage to access the scene and remove the bodies later that evening and apparently did so using vehicles. However, they were apparently shot at by Government forces and had to abandon their efforts until the following morning.

Going on with the "reasoning" - were the Al Sayed's government loyalists (page 66)?

14. The Government report depicted the loyalties of the Al-Sayed family as pro-Government. Muawia Al-Sayed, who was killed alongside his son and young daughter that day, was a retired colonel in the security forces. His son Ahmad was still on active duty, but had been home on extended sick leave. The commission found it compelling that their family members, who survived, fled to opposition-controlled areas of Taldou and chose not to seek assistance from the Government forces nearby. From there, they requested that UNSMIS facilitate the handing over of the bodies to their location. Moreover, testimonies from surviving members of those families clearly describe Government forces and Shabbiha, as the perpetrators.

So yes, Government loyalists at least via their jobs, but they fled to rebel-controlled areas, so duh.

Completely absent from this "final report" is the possibility of a third force being involved in the massacre, while the "Oral update" mentions this possibility reported by the "other side" witnesses.

Sloppy work indeed, likely finished under pressure, and I agree with Hermann that the last word on this is far from spoken. For that we'll have to wait until Houla is free from "rebel" control (reportedly Houla has its own Al-Farouk Battalion offspring by now)...

 

[Caustic Logic]

Thanks much for that overview. I'm almost ready to finally wrap my brain around this latest development. It's good to see yours already at work, gives me a head start.

400 Interviews for the Houla massacre alone did sound high. 47, a good number, not that numbers matter so much as authenticity.

by deduction not all of them witnesses.

Do you mean in the sense that one of the two sets has to be wrong (fake)? Or some other, more specific deduction?

And the proportions from each major school of thought are relevant. If only two SANA witnesses were considered for the one side, they had about 45 for the other side? They say:

Apart from the two witnesses in the Government report, no other account supported the Government’s version of events.

Bullcrap, as you noted. These supposed contradictions need to be assessed.

Hermann is not pleased with the report and has just published a new article in FAZ, picking on some issues and concluding that "the last word isn't spoken".

Excellent. He's either paid up consistently, or is genuinely convinced he's right and fired up to fight the lie.

What surprised me in his article is that there actually is an official statement of the German Government from June 29, saying that there are contradicting witness reports and not enough reliable evidence available to draw any conclusions about the perpetrators.

The CoI said just that with their interim report on June 27, so why is it surprising?

they implicitly deny that there are any contradictions in our boy Ali's statements (both page 64):

Originally Posted by CoI
At the same time, accounts of other witnesses interviewed by the commission remained consistent over time, including those collected from children, despite the fact that they were conducted by different interviewers.

I e-mailed them the article on the main child witness. Unless they're lying, they're using a non-standard definition of one of those words. I'm guessing "consistent" is taken as "always blaming the Shabiha."

On the Abdelrazak access contradiction - the rebels couldn't have done it because one of the army posts would have seen them and attacked? As proof, later they were attacked while trying to help, in the area they could access. Later was longer after their initial attacks on all these government posts that left them, on average, less able to spot and respond to things like normal. Some of them were dead or on fire.

I'm not versed yet on who says which positions were attacked and when, etc. But Hermann's right that the CoI probably doesn't know as much either as they pretend to.

The Al-Sayed family ... the alleged survivors ran into the rebels' arms as if to their own family, right?

 

[Childlike Empress]

Do you mean in the sense that one of the two sets has to be wrong (fake)? Or some other, more specific deduction?

No, I mean that they mention some accounts of people who weren't witnesses, so not all but an unknown, smaller amount of the 47 are with witnesses. For example, they mention the FSA guy SPIEGEL interviewed, who claimed that he defected after the Army ordered him to bribe witnesses to tell the Government story. While they (and HB) buy that story told two months after the fact without a second thought, the obvious question is: And after he defected the Army just gave up on their evil deeds? If not him, nobody will do it? Where are the witnesses bribed in their cunning plan? The ANNA set comes from immediately after the events, can't be them.

The CoI said just that with their interim report on June 27, so why is it surprising?

It surprised me that I wasn't aware of that statement.

I e-mailed them the article on the main child witness. Unless they're lying, they're using a non-standard definition of one of those words. I'm guessing "consistent" is taken as "always blaming the Shabiha."

Good on you. Yeah, that's maybe it.

The Al-Sayed family ... the alleged survivors ran into the rebels' arms as if to their own family, right?

As most of Taldou was under rebel control, and the killers knocked on the front door, it's only logical that they fled through the backdoor through the fields behind the house, and not tried to get help from the army far down the mainstreet ... a completely non-argument if one doesn't assume that the whole town was out to get them anyway, in which case they would have had a hard time of surviving until then...

 

[Childlike Empress]

On the Abdelrazak access contradiction - the rebels couldn't have done it because one of the army posts would have seen them and attacked? As proof, later they were attacked while trying to help, in the area they could access. Later was longer after their initial attacks on all these government posts that left them, on average, less able to spot and respond to things like normal. Some of them were dead or on fire.

Ok, read in that light it doesn't seem as contradictory as I first thought, but still strange. And I have to correct myself on the Al-Sayed access, I confused that with what they've written in the "Oral update". 'Cause by now:

The commission has since determined that the checkpoint at Al-Qaws remained in Government hands at the end of the day the incident occurred. The checkpoint demarcated the new front line between the opposition and Government forces. The commission concluded that Al-Sayed house was adjacent to the National Hospital and lying south of Al-Qaws checkpoint and that the crime scene remained in Government-controlled territory the entire time. Indeed, when UNSMIS arrived the next day and negotiated the handover of the bodies from the site (see the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2012/523, 27 May 2012), Government soldiers were on duty at the checkpoint and in control of the crime scene. [...] Both Al-Sayed family homes, conversely, were readily accessible to Government forces or local militias, but the same access would have been extremely risky if not impossible for anti-Government groups.

Strangely enough, I've located the mentioned report (and linked it on the wiki), but it says nothing of the kind, and is dated July 6, not May 27. All it says about Houla is this (page 3/4):

13. On 25 May, the town of Al-Houla, Homs overnorate, was subjected to an attack, initially by shelling. The following day, UNSMIS observers saw a total of 100 bodies, including those of 41 children and 9 women, in several locations, including three mosques and a house. Some of the bodies bore wounds that appeared to be consistent with heavy artillery fire; others appeared to have received gunshot wounds or suffered serious head injuries. In one house, UNSMIS observers saw the bodies of eight people, including six children and one woman, the latter with a gunshot wound to the head. UNSMIS personnel identified both recent and potentially older impact marks on village buildings from direct and indirect artillery, mortar and tank fire, along with pieces of shrapnel from those shells, including 23 mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannons and rounds from a 122 mm howitzer. On 27 May, the Security Council issued a press statement condemning the killings in the strongest possible terms. In addition,the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic conducted a special inquiry into the events in Al-Houla and reported its findings in an oral update issued on 26 June.

Timeloop?

Anyway, that's another important question here: Where's the detailed report of the UNSMIS observers' visit to Houla? Is it available to the public? Does anybody know? I couldn't locate it.

 

[Caustic Logic]

There is something I was tipped off to the other day and meant to mention and/or follow up on. Let me go dig that up. Ah, just this e-mail that mentioned a report from Gen. Mood to Ban Ki-Moon and the secretariat, but never shown to the Security Council or made public. I've asked the sender for details.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Nothing further on the unknown report(s), but I'm back on the case. I think a good thing now would to get a grip on what the different groups of witnesses describe for the attack and its general play in space and time.I've been meaning to, now working out the non-rebel side. That'll start appaearing at the wiki soon.

Along the way, I'm looking at what this CoI report says. And by the way, this is the report, isn't it, that had major research help from Karen AbuZayd of the Washington think-tanks Middle East Policy Council?
Latest UN Syria Report Compiled by Washington Think-Tanker

Anyway, it's their conclusions to focus on, not the ad-hom attack of presuming just because someone runs a DC foreign policy think tank they can only work towards US goals while helping the UN sift through this amazingly complex set of data.

...the crime scene remained in Government-controlled territory the entire time. Indeed, when UNSMIS arrived the next day and negotiated the handover of the bodies from the site (see the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2012/523, 27 May 2012), Government soldiers were on duty at the checkpoint and in control of the crime scene.

What? "Indeed," since they were (back?) in control the next morning, they must've been in charge the whole time that security positions came under attack on the 25th? The CoI earlier acknowledged 'one or two' security positions apparently fell to the rebels during a coordinated attack-by rebels-on several positions. This when the rebels only mention an isolated clash at a check-point, or just the usual protest, or some combination, triggering the shelling and the home invasions, after the rebel retreat.

We've discussed their ridiculous paragraph 44 where they imply that little Ali was somehow "consistent" (Again for those who haven't been following, this is the contrary evidence the UNHRC was sent in time to consider)

And, says para 44, the TWO non-rebel witnesses they think exist were "inconsistent." We have nine accounts listed now, one coming from plural "activists,"and apparently gathered from others, and I think maybe two that should be compressed into one and yea, none of them are amazing, or totally clear on what was seen directly vs. learned otherwise. But this is more than those two, although they're I think the best. Their reasons for considering them liars:

As noted, the commission’s request to interview those two witnesses was not fulfilled.

Admittedly, not a good sign, but far from conclusive under the circumstances.

The commission, nevertheless, carefully reviewed their testimony as set out in the Government report and interviews they gave to other sources, and deemed their accounts to be unreliable as they contained a number of inconsistencies.

And they give six examples. I'll cover the first two.

As examples: 1. They failed to describe the location of the main incident, specifically the Abdulrazzak family home;

Okay, I'm not certain that's correct, but why are they required to describe the location of that portion of this city-wide attack?

2. The witness purported to know that in the northern part of the town “terrorists” were distributing ammunition to each other, but elsewhere the witness described her presence as being in the centre near the clock tower or further south during the same time frame

On previous review, I got the impression, though never stated, that she got numerous clues beyond herself from radio-based sources. I'm not sure what her location was supposed to be, but a security post at the clock tower was said to be hit (as well as one at 'the mosque,' and there's a big mosque right by the clock tower, I just noticed, so it's probably the same place). Most of what she describes is the attack on the police end, no direct details from the killing scenes (radio silence for that part?), and things you'd learn from listening in.

She was probably listening to police scanners, was a police officer, and may well have been killed for her “unreliable” testimony (as of the interview, she remained in Taldou despite the danger, she said).

3-. The witness also stated that the “terrorists” included “strangers who don’t belong to our village,” and was able to remember their names individually while the village has 30,000 people, and the whole area of Al-Houla’s population is more than 100,000. It is unclear how she could be so certain of terrorist individual identities\names in the described context;

The individuals named are of known local criminals, who would be known to law enforcement. They needn’t even see the people themselves - a field ID can be radioed in and heard.

And since I have no answer to it, point 4:

The witness said she saw the burning at the hospital area “when we passed by.” The area around the hospital was in government hands throughout, so it is unclear when and how she was able to reach the given location given the circumstances of the day

???

Not so much emphasis, by the way, on the other of the TWO witnesses they admit to. From what he says, he saw the rebel attack from within the rebel attack, be it from an obscure side-view (I cannot locate Tripoli Street, where he says his group was stationed, but Tripoli Lebanon is due southwest, a direction in which few roads run clearly)

 

[Caustic Logic]

UNSMIS personnel identified both recent and potentially older impact marks on village buildings from direct and indirect artillery, mortar and tank fire, along with pieces of shrapnel from those shells, including 23 mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft cannons and rounds from a 122 mm howitzer.

Separately, an entrepoint point for weapons buffs or others - that's a bit of specific info we could look at. Fragments of said munitions are fairly good clues such were used (though they could conceivably be planted as well). Some of the weapons capable of the damage seen, as the CoI earlier said, were smaller weapons like mortars, that the rebels are known to have plenty of. Where does the 122 mm howitzer fit in on that scale, or the 23 mm ZU-23?

 

[Childlike Empress]

As to their footnote about the "contradicting" witnesses, it's complete poppycock. btw, seen the footnote 97 on page 63 (where the Annex begins, not on 64 as I mistakenly referenced above)?

On 3 August, the commission received a call from the Geneva Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic offering to arrange interviews with the two witnesses. By the deadline for submission of this report the interviews had not taken place.

Well, then. I fail to see where they even get some of their supposed inconsistencies from.

Point one, both mention Abdulrazzak although the women seems to confuse the victims of both families (through the barbwire?) and the rebel is ambiguous about the location.

Point two, the ammo distribution is mentioned in the SANA article but neither there not in the ANNA interview the woman says anything about her location, and it's clear that she is not only reporting what she saw with her own eyes. While the rebel says in his ANNA interview that HE came from the city center and made it south from there, but not as far as to come to the crime scenes.

Point three, agree with you.

Point four, no idea where they even get that. Again, she does not describe her location at all, and did not "pass" anywhere.

5. She suggested that the armed groups were in fact mentioning the real first names of the groups’ leaders over their radio communications. The commission finds this lacking credibility;

Again, no idea where this is coming from. They really should've shared their sources with us... Also for this, which seems to be simply made up reading the testimony - also as in other points unclear who "the witness" is, although it seems to be mostly the woman:

6. The witness described the Al-Sayed family as having been shot from across the street when all other evidence, including by UNSMIS visiting the scene, indicate the victims died from gunshots at close range.

Nothing of the kind in either the ANNA or SANA testimonies.

CL, re-reading their statements, something just dawned on me: Remember when we wondered that we have three FSA guys named Bako(u)r now, and I told you that I already checked if that name is on the list of perpetrators? I must have been blind - it indeed is, on the list in the "knowledgeable woman" article and in both their testimonies!!!

Nidal Bakkour is said to be a rebel group leader and the (former) neighbour of the Al-Sayeds!

He explained that the group led by one Haitham al-Housan hated al-Sayed family, and that they're killers, not revolutionaries, and their trade is abduction, murder and theft through which they amassed millions, adding that this group didn't even fire at the detachment but rather at the house where Okba al-Sayed, his brother, his sister-in-law and their children were, killing them.

The witness noted that next to al-Sayed house was a house belonging to Nidal Bakkour, the leader of another group, and that the people in that house are still alive while the others were killed, and that the same applies to several houses near the detachment, concluding that the massacre was simply an attack against specific families by the gunmen.

On Friday, May the 25th, at 2 pm right after Friday prayers, an army checkpoint and the army repelled this attack. The armed group was led by Nidal Bakkour. Shortly after that, another armed group attacked another checkpoint. This second group is from a family called Al-Hallak, also locally called Al-Hassan. They attacked the checkpoint located at the mountain. The plan was that they take over the checkpoint at the mountain and the other one located at the village because they wanted to position themselves at an elevated place that allows them to easily control the checkpoint located at the village. Somebody called Nidal Bakkour and asked him to send an armed group of strangers; he called him right when the attack started. When the armed men attacked the checkpoint, 25 of them were killed.

And one of his namesakes is the guy who wants us to believe that he defected after the army ordered him to bribe witnesses to tell the government story...

 

[Caustic Logic]

Oh, zing. I missed that too so far.

Mohammed Tayyib Baqur and Malik Baqur are said to be cousins, aren't they? They spoke together to Spiegel, both FSA defectors, still wearing their old uniforms. I haven't taken down their accounts yet but Spiegel says:

Colonel Mohammed Tayyib Baqur, who served in the Syrian army for two-thirds of his life and deserted a few weeks ago, worked most recently in the political division of the Defense Ministry. He now reports that, on May 28, he received a call from Jamil Hassan, the head of Syrian Air Forces intelligence and one of the leading members of the regime: "He told me to come in on June 2. He pointed out that I was from Houla, and that an international conspiracy against Syria was underway. For that reason, he wanted me to find a few people, as poor as possible, from Houla or the surrounding area. I was to bring them to Damascus so that they could circulate the regime's version of the massacre. He said that the people from Houla would be paid, and so would I. Then he called his office manager and told him to give me 25,000 Syrian pounds." This is the equivalent of slightly more than €300 or roughly $385.

After 35 years in the army, says Baqur, he realized that the time had come to change sides. "I didn't want to be part of it anymore, so I brought my family to safety and fled."

One could suspect he was paid to make things up, possibly even $25,000 Syrian pounds. (that's $385 these days, I presume). As you've noted, June 2 is just as SANA ran their two witnesses, in some minds the only two ever. Trying for more witnesses only then is a slow reaction to a massacre they themselves allegedly carried out a week earlier. And these other witnesses must be the few more we've heard from - the activists, Ahmed, Jibril, the wounded soldier and wounded policeman, etc.

No guarantee of relation to Akrama Bakour, who knew every detail of the campaign, but the name is the same, just a different transliteration. We have possibly three Bakours in the rebel forces NOW, not clear what they all claim to have done on the day of the massacre.

And one of the ANNA/SANA witnesses has to mention that a Nidal Bakour was neighbors with the Sayeds, the other mentioning that Nidal led one of the fighting units. (perhaps with family help?)

So was Mohammed slipping in references to his own family members - as the attackers - in the versions he was getting people to say? Nope - as mentioned, these two were prior to his stated assignment. And I don't think any later ones mention Nidal (they're all shorter on details)

So, allegedly, the government had their first two witnesses name this family, then hired a possible member of it to find them fake stories as cover. Hm, actually there is a certain logic to that, once a lot of real-world things are stripped away (like the ability to follow through on any related blackmail). But I lean more towards his being a family member compelled to make up stories against the government to protect his family and/or attack the government. If family is involved, the 20,000 pounds wouldn't even be important.