Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

Not the point at all. I was replying to AkuManiMani who claimed that there can be no knowledge without qualia.

And can you think about the set of integers without having the experience of thinking about integers? That's qualia too, it isn't just sensory experience.

 

[Belz...]

Belz, what westprog is saying is that we know, without a doubt THAT qualia are, regardless of our current lack of sufficient "scientific definitions". The term 'qualia' is just a label we put on our experiences, in-and-of-themselves.

If they're such a synonym for "experience", why the insistence on the use of that term over the other, hmm ?

The current challenge is to understand what experience, IAOI, is in relation to the 'external' objects we study scientifically.

That's like saying that it's a challenge to understand how a computer holds an image on its hard drive. We know how it does that; and the brain can also store information, albeit in a different way. Where's the challenge, exactly ?

Qualia cannot be falsified because they are what all knowledge is "made of". How can you speak of falsifying something you already have direct knowledge of?

Nice try. Basically assuming your conclusion.

If "qualia" is a synonym for "experience", which I seriously doubt, then sure, we know we have them. But then there's nothing odd or puzzling about them. You can't have it both ways, Aku.

 

[dlorde]

Why should some patterns of neurons firing in my brain produce subjective experiences while others don't?

The involvement of certain areas and structures is required for consciousness. When you turn on the ignition in your car, the electrical system becomes functional, but you can't go anywhere until the engine is started.

I'm sure there are quite a few neurons firing in all kinds of interesting patterns even when I am in the deepest sleep. Yet I have no subjective experience that I am aware of. So far as I can tell, in terms of subjective experience at that time, being fast asleep is exactly like not existing at all. Of course there's no reason I should remember being dead (before I was conceived), but I can't tell the difference between that state and the state of being fast asleep. Yes, things can happen that end the state of sleeping, so sleeping is not exactly the same as being dead in all respects. But so far as I can tell there doesn't seem to be any difference in terms of subjective experience.

Well a possible facile answer is that you simply may not remember the state of consciousness you were in - e.g. dreams are typically are forgotten within seconds of waking. A better answer is probably that the areas/structures needed for consciousness are not active at that time.

What principle are you invoking to explain how and why this different pattern and an infinite number of others we could "construct" by changing the underlying computational machine should all produce the same subjective experience when (for example) my robotic self hears the sound of a jet aircraft, looks up to find it but sees only a bright blue cloudless sky?

I guess it's the principle of functional equivalence - if you replace the components of a system by functionally equivalent components connected in functionally equivalent ways, then the system itself will function in the same way.

This is why when you or others say something like "subjective experience is the pattern of neurons firing" I am still left puzzled. This doesn't seem to be an explanation based on any established principle or theory. It sounds much more like a bald and rather far fetched assertion to me.

We know how neurons work, how they connect together. We understand how they work together on a local level and something of their wider connections. We know the roles of the other stuff in there, e.g. glial cells, blood vessels, glands, etc. We know that when neurons in certain areas are stimulated, subjective experience is modified, we know that if they are damaged, consciousness and subjective experience can be permanently affected. We know that when people have particular subjective experiences, their neurons show particular patterns of activity across particular areas. It doesn't seem far fetched to me to suggest that our subjective experiences are embodied in the activity patterns of our neurons. That's what the evidence points to.

... I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation? Since when does any particular pattern have precisely one interpretation?

Not sure how meteor showers or rocks moving are self-referential or processing information, but many neural pathways show the feedback connectivity required for SRIP, and biological homeostasis itself is based on a multiplicity of feedback loops, so it's no great surprise to find it there. The brain is an information processor, and consciousness is self-referential by definition (self-awareness)... as I previously said, I think consciousness is based on SRIP, but in my opinion it requires a brain-like functional architecture to be the sort of conciousness we are familiar with.

Whatever precise form of SRIP is meant to produce subjective experience doesn't seem to have been clearly defined.

That's right, it hasn't yet been clearly defined.

Whatever it is, why this should produce subjective experience while other forms of information processing don't is left unexplained. The only connection seems to be a vague hand waving kind of notion that SRIP sounds like it must be related in some way to "I am thinking about what it is like to be 'I'" or similar.

Well we know the brain is an information processor comprising a large number of interconnected neural networks; its activity gives rise to consciousness and subjective experience. Now if you can suggest a way to get 'self-awareness' or 'self-consciousness' without some form of self-reference, then please do so.

Ultimately, there's always going to be the metaphysical divide between the subjective and the objective - I think to expect a complete objective explanation for purely subjective experience is a category error. As Chalmers said:

"..whatever account of processing we give, the vital step - the step where we move from facts about structure and function to facts about experience - will always be an extra step, requiring some substantial principle to bridge the gap.
...
any neurobiological or cognitive account, will be incomplete"

By 'substantial principle' he means some fundamental assertion or assumption.

That's the problem with the subjective - someone else can't understand it for you

 

[westprog]

If they're such a synonym for "experience", why the insistence on the use of that term over the other, hmm ?



That's like saying that it's a challenge to understand how a computer holds an image on its hard drive. We know how it does that; and the brain can also store information, albeit in a different way. Where's the challenge, exactly ?

Why use "qualia"? Because otherwise there's the confusion of how a computer "experiences" an image on a hard drive, and how a person sees something.

Nice try. Basically assuming your conclusion.

If "qualia" is a synonym for "experience", which I seriously doubt, then sure, we know we have them. But then there's nothing odd or puzzling about them. You can't have it both ways, Aku.

I find it very odd and puzzling that anyone would find nothing odd or puzzling about qualia.

 

[PixyMisa]

Why should some patterns of neurons firing in my brain produce subjective experiences while others don't?

Because the patterns are different.

So far as I can tell, in terms of subjective experience at that time, being fast asleep is exactly like not existing at all.

No, it's not. While we can't evaluate non-existence, we can evaluate things like general anaesthesia, which has distinctly different effects on subjective experience than sleep.

What principle are you invoking to explain how and why this different pattern and an infinite number of others we could "construct" by changing the underlying computational machine should all produce the same subjective experience when (for example) my robotic self hears the sound of a jet aircraft, looks up to find it but sees only a bright blue cloudless sky?

Information is substrate-independent.

If you are with Pixy in that you believe the secret ingredient is that the pattern must specifically belong to the class of those that encode some form of "Self-Referential Information Processing" - SRIP - in order for subjective experience to manifest, then I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation?

Rocks being moved about? Meteor showers?

We're talking about information processing. That's a physical process resulting in objectively distinct behaviours.

Whatever precise form of SRIP is meant to produce subjective experience doesn't seem to have been clearly defined. Whatever it is, why this should produce subjective experience while other forms of information processing don't is left unexplained. The only connection seems to be a vague hand waving kind of notion that SRIP sounds like it must be related in some way to "I am thinking about what it is like to be 'I'" or similar.

In other word, you define conscious to be self-referential information processing too. So what are you arguing about?

 

[Frank Newgent]

Not at all.

Referring to how some mental content, such as adherence to a norm, is dependent in part on the mind's relationship to the external world.




Simply put, that relationship is external to the individual's nervous system.

Looks to me as if computationalism fails at describing this particular aspect of consciousness.

Sorry, you have bad assumptions about "computationalism."

Obviously (to computationalists, anyway) the computations include any needed relationships with the external world.

Obviously (to computationalists, anyway) those computations might need to encompass the full external world if one is strict about the boundaries that can be crossed.

In other words, if there is a strict turing machine brain, obviously the entire world the brain lives in must be computed as part of the same tape on the turing machine. Then the brain is actually only a subset of the total tape and total computations going on.

So what?

Nobody cares about that level of strictness, except those that criticize the model such as westprog, and so it is easy enough to talk about a machine brain that is just "hooked up" to the external world -- kind of like our brains are.

Your computations would encompass the full external world? Without leaving anything out? Sounds difficult.

Would Godel describe such a system as inconsistent?

That aside... what about the things in the world which become defined for the first time at some point after your computation? Are they somehow not part of your computations encompassing the full external world?

 

[Belz...]

Why use "qualia"? Because otherwise there's the confusion of how a computer "experiences" an image on a hard drive, and how a person sees something.

I don't remember the likes of you ever claiming that computers experience anything.

But you've just contradicted yourself: if "qualia" is a synonym for "experience" then computers which experience also have qualia. Once again, how do you distinguish the two.

I find it very odd and puzzling that anyone would find nothing odd or puzzling about qualia.

Qualia don't exist, first of all, so there's nothing puzzling about that. I was talking about experiences.

 

[westprog]

I don't remember the likes of you ever claiming that computers experience anything.

But you've just contradicted yourself: if "qualia" is a synonym for "experience" then computers which experience also have qualia. Once again, how do you distinguish the two.

Qualia are what are different between how a person experiences the world and how a brick experiences the world.

Qualia don't exist, first of all, so there's nothing puzzling about that. I was talking about experiences.

So do you think

• There's no need for the term "qualia" because "experience" is just as good
• Hence qualia is synonymous with experience
• And there are no such things as qualia

?

If I've misunderstood, sorry.

 

[rocketdodger]

Your computations would encompass the full external world? Without leaving anything out? Sounds difficult.

In a trivial sense, yes that would be the fallback case. But the idea is that perhaps not everything in the universe has a relevant effect on a given consciousness. For example, a supernova in another galaxy, or even what a Chinese woman is doing right now, probably has no effect on my consciousness.

Would Godel describe such a system as inconsistent?

No, incompleteness still applies. In fact incompleteness is even more intuitive and obvious in such a case, because you can't find any arrangement of information that can simultaneously reference all of itself -- it is a simple case of there not being enough resources.

That aside... what about the things in the world which become defined for the first time at some point after your computation? Are they somehow not part of your computations encompassing the full external world?

Take a look at the history of existence and you tell me. Are the planets, is life on Earth, part of whatever events preceeded them? Were we somehow part of the gas cloud that formed into our solar system billions of years ago, or were we not? Personally I don't think the question is meaningful.

 

[rocketdodger]

If you are with Pixy in that you believe the secret ingredient is that the pattern must specifically belong to the class of those that encode some form of "Self-Referential Information Processing" - SRIP - in order for subjective experience to manifest, then I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation? Since when does any particular pattern have precisely one interpretation?

The fundamental concept you are missing is that SRIP occurs when the pattern is what is doing the interpreting, and it recognizes itself.

If you don't believe such a thing happens in some systems and not others, then I have to ask you how you think bacteria are able to behave like bacteria when meteor showers are not able to behave like bacteria.

Get it? Rocks vs. living cells? There are already a number of individuals here who have demonstrated that they are incapable of figuring out why living cells are not like rocks. Are you one of them?

 

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by Frank Newgent:
Would Godel describe such a system as inconsistent?

No, incompleteness still applies. In fact incompleteness is even more intuitive and obvious in such a case, because you can't find any arrangement of information that can simultaneously reference all of itself -- it is a simple case of there not being enough resources.

Although that incompleteness has nothing to do with Godel...

Were we somehow part of the gas cloud that formed into our solar system billions of years ago, or were we not?

Well yes, we are all made from the matter and energy of that original gas cloud, so our physical constituents were part of it.

Personally I don't think the question is meaningful.

Why not?

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't remember the likes of you ever claiming that computers experience anything.

But you've just contradicted yourself: if "qualia" is a synonym for "experience" then computers which experience also have qualia. Once again, how do you distinguish the two.

Qualia are what are different between how a person experiences the world and how a brick experiences the world.

Qualia don't exist, first of all, so there's nothing puzzling about that. I was talking about experiences.

So do you think

• There's no need for the term "qualia" because "experience" is just as good
• Hence qualia is synonymous with experience
• And there are no such things as qualia

?

If I've misunderstood, sorry.

I don't think you've misunderstood. I've repeatedly had this same conversation with Belz for some time now and thats really the logical conclusion of what hes consistently been arguing :-/

 

[Frank Newgent]

Your computations would encompass the full external world? Without leaving anything out? Sounds difficult.

In a trivial sense, yes that would be the fallback case. But the idea is that perhaps not everything in the universe has a relevant effect on a given consciousness. For example, a supernova in another galaxy, or even what a Chinese woman is doing right now, probably has no effect on my consciousness.

Which presents a problem considering your fallback position.

Would Godel describe such a system as inconsistent?

No, incompleteness still applies. In fact incompleteness is even more intuitive and obvious in such a case, because you can't find any arrangement of information that can simultaneously reference all of itself -- it is a simple case of there not being enough resources.

Correct. But earlier you wrote

"if there is a strict turing machine brain, obviously the entire world the brain lives in must be computed as part of the same tape on the turing machine. Then the brain is actually only a subset of the total tape and total computations going on."

You seem to be contradicting yourself at almost every opportunity.

That aside... what about the things in the world which become defined for the first time at some point after your computation? Are they somehow not part of your computations encompassing the full external world?

Take a look at the history of existence and you tell me. Are the planets, is life on Earth, part of whatever events preceeded them? Were we somehow part of the gas cloud that formed into our solar system billions of years ago, or were we not? Personally I don't think the question is meaningful.

I asked because you said earlier that your "computations might need to encompass the full external world". Seems to me that full external world would encompass that which is not yet understood/defined.

Rather than contradict yourself again this time you choose to answer a question different than the one asked.

 

[rocketdodger]

Correct. But earlier you wrote

"if there is a strict turing machine brain, obviously the entire world the brain lives in must be computed as part of the same tape on the turing machine. Then the brain is actually only a subset of the total tape and total computations going on."

You seem to be contradicting yourself at almost every opportunity.

I don't think the act of simply repeating something I said and then exclaiming "aha -- a contradiction" is ample evidence of an actual contradiction.

Can you actually describe why I am contradicting myself? Because I am not aware of any contradiction.

I asked because you said earlier that your "computations might need to encompass the full external world". Seems to me that full external world would encompass that which is not yet understood/defined.

Rather than contradict yourself again this time you choose to answer a question different than the one asked.

It is quite simple frank. If the set of operations available for computational use includes everything needed to compute the behavior of any particle to an arbitrary level -- and mathematics tells us that the basic operations of computation I.E. arithmetic is sufficient -- then any behavior of any combination of particles can also be computed.

In other words, if you can compute the behavior of 16 particles then in principle you can compute the behavior of 16 zillion, notwithstanding issues of computing resources.

Now I don't know if we have a canonical description of all particle behavior -- I suspect not. But in any case, I doubt we will discover a particle behavior that requires a breach of mathematics and is not computable in the traditional sense. At least, we haven't encountered a single one yet.

That is kind of how math works, Frank. Remember how you would see all those fancy physics equations in school, that looked alien, but it turned out that when you applied them it was just math as usual? Addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, of terms? Yeah....

 

[rocketdodger]

Although that incompleteness has nothing to do with Godel...

Naw its the same basic idea, incompleteness is incompleteness, just another way to think about it.

Well yes, we are all made from the matter and energy of that original gas cloud, so our physical constituents were part of it.

Thats not the "part of" I am speaking about.

Frank doesn't understand how something might exist in a program that was not defined prior to the start of the program, as part of the original code.

This is analagous to humans not being "defined" in the gas cloud that our solar system came from. Yeah the particles might be the same, but the patterns are radically different, and there was no reference to the pattern of humans in the pattern of the gas cloud, unless you consider it a perfectly deterministic system.

Yet, here we are.

Why not?

Because it is the context that gives meaning, not the question itself, in this case.

Do I mean "are we the same particles that existed billions of years ago?" Well, probably quite a few of them are the same, yes.

Do I mean "are the patterns of particles the same as those that existed long ago?" Clearly not.

Do I mean "was there any kind of reference to our pattern in the gas cloud pattern?" Maybe, maybe not, depends on what you mean by "reference."

Do I mean "could someone have predicted the human patterns, given the gas cloud patterns?" Perhaps, perhaps not, depending on the effects of random vs. determined causes in the system.

Etc...

 

[dlorde]

Naw its the same basic idea, incompleteness is incompleteness, just another way to think about it.

I won't tell Godel if you won't

This is analagous to humans not being "defined" in the gas cloud that our solar system came from.

OIC. Yup, OK.

 

[Belz...]

Qualia are what are different between how a person experiences the world and how a brick experiences the world.

A brick has qualia ?

So do you think

• There's no need for the term "qualia" because "experience" is just as good
• Hence qualia is synonymous with experience
• And there are no such things as qualia

?

If I've misunderstood, sorry.

No.

- If qualia are synonymous with experience (your words)
- Then there is no need for the term.

Otherwise:

- If qualia are NOT synonymous
- Then show that they exist at all, because Pixy's explanation doesn't posit such an entity and yet it works.

 

[Belz...]

I don't think you've misunderstood. I've repeatedly had this same conversation with Belz for some time now and thats really the logical conclusion of what hes consistently been arguing :-/

That's alright, Aku. I've repeatedly had the same conversation with you and you've consistently understood nothing of what I've been saying.

 

[AkuManiMani]

A brick has qualia ?

No idea. I suspect not, tho.

No.

- If qualia are synonymous with experience (your words)
- Then there is no need for the term.

Lets make it simple for ya Belz...

- Qualia are to experiences of objects as quanta are to objects of experience

ETA:

I don't think you've misunderstood. I've repeatedly had this same conversation with Belz for some time now and thats really the logical conclusion of what hes consistently been arguing :-/

That's alright, Aku. I've repeatedly had the same conversation with you and you've consistently understood nothing of what I've been saying.

Its quite the reverse, actually. I even racall you using the excuse that English is not your 1st language

 

[westprog]

A brick has qualia ?



No.

There you go, asked and answered.

- If qualia are synonymous with experience (your words)
- Then there is no need for the term.

Call it what you like. I know what I mean, and I strongly suspect that everyone else does too.

Otherwise:

- If qualia are NOT synonymous
- Then show that they exist at all, because Pixy's explanation doesn't posit such an entity and yet it works.

I'm glad it works for you. As far as I'm concerned, it's not even wrong.