Has consciousness been fully explained?

[AkuManiMani]

It may be that qualia cannot be tested, and are not accessible to science. However, to thereby assume that they don't exist, or aren't important, is not based on reason or science, but philosophical preference.

I'm not saying they don't exist because they are unfalsifiable. I'm saying that the very fact that they are unfalsifiable should put huge question marks on the claim that they exist at all. So far we've been able to test for every other thing we've ever posited exists... so what about qualia ? Why can't we even define them properly ?

Belz, what westprog is saying is that we know, without a doubt THAT qualia are, regardless of our current lack of sufficient "scientific definitions". The term 'qualia' is just a label we put on our experiences, in-and-of-themselves. The current challenge is to understand what experience, IAOI, is in relation to the 'external' objects we study scientifically. Qualia cannot be falsified because they are what all knowledge is "made of". How can you speak of falsifying something you already have direct knowledge of?

 

[Philosaur]

Belz, what westprog is saying is that we know, without a doubt THAT qualia are, regardless of our current lack of sufficient "scientific definitions". The term 'qualia' is just a label we put on our experiences, in-and-of-themselves. The current challenge is to understand what experience, IAOI, is in relation to the 'external' objects we study scientifically. Qualia cannot be falsified because they are what all knowledge is "made of". How can you speak of falsifying something you already have direct knowledge of?

The problem is not--and has never been--the reality of one's own subjective experience.

What's at issue for many of us is that other people's subjective experience lies beyond an "event horizon" of sorts, where it is forever inaccessible to other minds, and therefore science.

The proposition that you have qualia is, indeed, unfalsifiable. I can't know one way or another.

Also, knowledge is *not* made of qualia. Knowledge is explicitly the set of non-subjective propositions we all agree upon. Qualia do not (and CANNOT) enter into knowledge.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The problem is not--and has never been--the reality of one's own subjective experience.

What's at issue for many of us is that other people's subjective experience lies beyond an "event horizon" of sorts, where it is forever inaccessible to other minds, and therefore science.

The proposition that you have qualia is, indeed, unfalsifiable.

Also, knowledge is *not* made of qualia. Knowledge is explicitly the set of non-subjective propositions we all agree upon. Qualia do not (and CANNOT) enter into knowledge.

Propositions are hypothetical statements within the stream of one's conscious awareness; qualia are the "raw-feels" of that make up one's experiences in that awareness. There is no knowledge sans qualia.

 

[dlorde]

Firstly, the "free will" concept. This deals with whether the conscious person is, as it seems, actively controlling his actions. If he is not - and it's perfectly possible that he isn't - then we are indeed dealing with an illusion of some kind.

Free will has been extensively discussed in other threads, but the consensus seemed to be that the popular concept of free will had an implied dualism (that 'will' was somehow outside mundane deterministic causality), and little useful meaning without that (or without careful redefinition). Taking it as the ability to act without external constraint, the issue turns on whether the conscious self is the agent, or initiator of actions, or whether it is a retrospective interpreter of actions initiated below conscious awareness.

However, that's not the principle element of consciousness, which is experience. Even if we are not exercising free will, we certainly have the sensation that we are. The sensation may be an illusion - the fact that we are having a sensation cannot be.

True enough. When you're that brain and that pattern of activation sweeps across your neurons, that's having the sensation.

.. we are still left with the issue of subjective experience.

It is neurons firing in an organised way in your brain.

 

[westprog]

The problem is not--and has never been--the reality of one's own subjective experience.

What's at issue for many of us is that other people's subjective experience lies beyond an "event horizon" of sorts, where it is forever inaccessible to other minds, and therefore science.

Which seems reasonable enough. I don't see why that translates into the idea that qualia are therefore "doubtful" or might not exist. It rather shows the limitations of science. If science cannot investigate someone's subjective state, should we therefore regard it as of no importance if somebody else is unhappy?

The proposition that you have qualia is, indeed, unfalsifiable. I can't know one way or another.

Also, knowledge is *not* made of qualia. Knowledge is explicitly the set of non-subjective propositions we all agree upon. Qualia do not (and CANNOT) enter into knowledge.

All knowledge is acquired through experience. If a person hasn't experienced something, there is no way for knowledge to be acquired.

 

[Clive]

It is neurons firing in an organised way in your brain.

Why should some patterns of neurons firing in my brain produce subjective experiences while others don't? I'm sure there are quite a few neurons firing in all kinds of interesting patterns even when I am in the deepest sleep. Yet I have no subjective experience that I am aware of. So far as I can tell, in terms of subjective experience at that time, being fast asleep is exactly like not existing at all. Of course there's no reason I should remember being dead (before I was conceived), but I can't tell the difference between that state and the state of being fast asleep. Yes, things can happen that end the state of sleeping, so sleeping is not exactly the same as being dead in all respects. But so far as I can tell there doesn't seem to be any difference in terms of subjective experience.

Suppose for the sake of this discussion that all aspects of the brain associated with subjective experience are Turing computable, and that we have a complete and full understanding of how all the different neurons interact with each other in computational terms and also in terms of how our senses receive information from the physical world, how that information is encoded and sent to or received from the brain. Suppose also that we can scan my brain (to capture all the relevant details), then finally scoop it out and replace it with a some other (very different) type of computer that is simulating what my brain was doing along with all the appropriate connections to all the required inputs/outputs in terms of the rest of my body.

When this version of me is operating there will be no pattern of firing neurons in the physical world - that will have been replaced by a vastly different pattern in some other medium, say electrical impulses in silicon. What principle are you invoking to explain how and why this different pattern and an infinite number of others we could "construct" by changing the underlying computational machine should all produce the same subjective experience when (for example) my robotic self hears the sound of a jet aircraft, looks up to find it but sees only a bright blue cloudless sky?

This is why when you or others say something like "subjective experience is the pattern of neurons firing" I am still left puzzled. This doesn't seem to be an explanation based on any established principle or theory. It sounds much more like a bald and rather far fetched assertion to me. It's rather like someone came up with a "Theory of Subjective Experiences" but didn't bother to tell the rest of the world about it.

If you are with Pixy in that you believe the secret ingredient is that the pattern must specifically belong to the class of those that encode some form of "Self-Referential Information Processing" - SRIP - in order for subjective experience to manifest, then I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation? Since when does any particular pattern have precisely one interpretation?

Whatever precise form of SRIP is meant to produce subjective experience doesn't seem to have been clearly defined. Whatever it is, why this should produce subjective experience while other forms of information processing don't is left unexplained. The only connection seems to be a vague hand waving kind of notion that SRIP sounds like it must be related in some way to "I am thinking about what it is like to be 'I'" or similar.

 

[!Kaggen]

Why should some patterns of neurons firing in my brain produce subjective experiences while others don't? I'm sure there are quite a few neurons firing in all kinds of interesting patterns even when I am in the deepest sleep. Yet I have no subjective experience that I am aware of. So far as I can tell, in terms of subjective experience at that time, being fast asleep is exactly like not existing at all. Of course there's no reason I should remember being dead (before I was conceived), but I can't tell the difference between that state and the state of being fast asleep. Yes, things can happen that end the state of sleeping, so sleeping is not exactly the same as being dead in all respects. But so far as I can tell there doesn't seem to be any difference in terms of subjective experience.

Suppose for the sake of this discussion that all aspects of the brain associated with subjective experience are Turing computable, and that we have a complete and full understanding of how all the different neurons interact with each other in computational terms and also in terms of how our senses receive information from the physical world, how that information is encoded and sent to or received from the brain. Suppose also that we can scan my brain (to capture all the relevant details), then finally scoop it out and replace it with a some other (very different) type of computer that is simulating what my brain was doing along with all the appropriate connections to all the required inputs/outputs in terms of the rest of my body.

When this version of me is operating there will be no pattern of firing neurons in the physical world - that will have been replaced by a vastly different pattern in some other medium, say electrical impulses in silicon. What principle are you invoking to explain how and why this different pattern and an infinite number of others we could "construct" by changing the underlying computational machine should all produce the same subjective experience when (for example) my robotic self hears the sound of a jet aircraft, looks up to find it but sees only a bright blue cloudless sky?

This is why when you or others say something like "subjective experience is the pattern of neurons firing" I am still left puzzled. This doesn't seem to be an explanation based on any established principle or theory. It sounds much more like a bald and rather far fetched assertion to me. It's rather like someone came up with a "Theory of Subjective Experiences" but didn't bother to tell the rest of the world about it.

If you are with Pixy in that you believe the secret ingredient is that the pattern must specifically belong to the class of those that encode some form of "Self-Referential Information Processing" - SRIP - in order for subjective experience to manifest, then I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation? Since when does any particular pattern have precisely one interpretation?

Whatever precise form of SRIP is meant to produce subjective experience doesn't seem to have been clearly defined. Whatever it is, why this should produce subjective experience while other forms of information processing don't is left unexplained. The only connection seems to be a vague hand waving kind of notion that SRIP sounds like it must be related in some way to "I am thinking about what it is like to be 'I'" or similar.

Its just a complicated way of saying- we have to start somewhere - lets assume thinking

The argument that thinking is neurons firing and neurons are matter and matter is particles and particles can be described using mathematics is all after the fact

Materialism assumes idealism
Idealism proves materialism

The real strange loop

 

[!Kaggen]

The problem is not--and has never been--the reality of one's own subjective experience.

What's at issue for many of us is that other people's subjective experience lies beyond an "event horizon" of sorts, where it is forever inaccessible to other minds, and therefore science.

The proposition that you have qualia is, indeed, unfalsifiable. I can't know one way or another.

Also, knowledge is *not* made of qualia. Knowledge is explicitly the set of non-subjective propositions we all agree upon. Qualia do not (and CANNOT) enter into knowledge.

So do we all agree what a rainbow is because of the physics of how a rainbow is produced or because we all see our own rainbows?

 

[!Kaggen]

And no Pixy beating me on the head is no proof of materialism, I might have no pain threshold.

 

[Philosaur]

Propositions are hypothetical statements within the stream of one's conscious awareness;

Sorry, I assumed a context and didn't make it clear. When I use "proposition", I mean it from a linguistic/philosophical/logical context, wherein a proposition is the meaningful content expressed by a sentence or utterance.

In other words:

S1: It is very cold today.
S2: Очень холодно сегодня
S3: Es muy frío hoy.

The sentences above all express the same proposition, just in different languages. There need be nothing "hypothetical" about this kind of proposition.

qualia are the "raw-feels" of that make up one's experiences in that awareness.

Yup, the common definition of qualia...

There is no knowledge sans qualia.

A common definition of knowledge is that it is "justified true belief". Knowledge is comprised of propositions. When someone teaches you something, they cause you to believe, with justification, some truth about things. By this definition, your claim that there is no knowledge sans qualia is simply false.

If your definition of knowledge includes "raw feels", then your point still doesn't hold, if you agree with my definition above.

If your definition of knowledge is that it is solely "raw feels", then knowledge is totally worthless in any commerce with others, since it can never be expressed.

 

[Philosaur]

Which seems reasonable enough. I don't see why that translates into the idea that qualia are therefore "doubtful" or might not exist. It rather shows the limitations of science.

Other people's qualia are always doubtful, if you're honest with yourself. Do you have complete certainty that I have qualia? Is your certainty justified?

If science cannot investigate someone's subjective state, should we therefore regard it as of no importance if somebody else is unhappy?

Strawman much?

Scientists study behavior. If someone acts unhappy or says they are unhappy, then we prescribe therapy, medication, or both.

What was your point again?

All knowledge is acquired through experience. If a person hasn't experienced something, there is no way for knowledge to be acquired.

What experience led me to believe that the set of integers is infinite? Or do I not "know" that? Is this like Mr. Miyagi saying "Karate...here," while pointing to his heart?

 

[Philosaur]

So do we all agree what a rainbow is because of the physics of how a rainbow is produced or because we all see our own rainbows?

Imagine all those blind people who don't know what a rainbow is...

 

[westprog]

Other people's qualia are always doubtful, if you're honest with yourself. Do you have complete certainty that I have qualia? Is your certainty justified?

I have total certainty that I have qualia. I have no certainty about what they are. I have no idea whether you have qualia or not. Maybe you don't.

However, even if qualia only exist in my mind, they still have to be explained.

Strawman much?

Scientists study behavior. If someone acts unhappy or says they are unhappy, then we prescribe therapy, medication, or both.

What was your point again?

My point is - does it matter if someone is unhappy? We can make people happier or unhappier.

What experience led me to believe that the set of integers is infinite? Or do I not "know" that? Is this like Mr. Miyagi saying "Karate...here," while pointing to his heart?

Now we're into the realm of whether the set of integers is a "real" thing or not. If it is, it certainly isn't a "thing" in our universe.

 

[westprog]

I have total certainty that I have qualia. I have no certainty about what they are. I have no idea whether you have qualia or not. Maybe you don't.

However, even if qualia only exist in my mind, they still have to be explained.

(And the same applies to anyone else who has qualia - they can be certain that they exist. It's only people who don't have them who can legitimately doubt them).

 

[Philosaur]

I have total certainty that I have qualia. I have no certainty about what they are. I have no idea whether you have qualia or not. Maybe you don't.

However, even if qualia only exist in my mind, they still have to be explained.

At least this is a pretty small circle we're going around.

Once again: the problem is not now, and has never been, your own subjective experience. The doubt enters the picture for everyone else's subjective experience.

My point is - does it matter if someone is unhappy? We can make people happier or unhappier.

I have no idea where this particular part of the thread is going. I don't know if it matters. Sure. No wait. No, it doesn't. Wait. What?

Now we're into the realm of whether the set of integers is a "real" thing or not. If it is, it certainly isn't a "thing" in our universe.

Not the point at all. I was replying to AkuManiMani who claimed that there can be no knowledge without qualia.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why should some patterns of neurons firing in my brain produce subjective experiences while others don't? I'm sure there are quite a few neurons firing in all kinds of interesting patterns even when I am in the deepest sleep. Yet I have no subjective experience that I am aware of. So far as I can tell, in terms of subjective experience at that time, being fast asleep is exactly like not existing at all. Of course there's no reason I should remember being dead (before I was conceived), but I can't tell the difference between that state and the state of being fast asleep. Yes, things can happen that end the state of sleeping, so sleeping is not exactly the same as being dead in all respects. But so far as I can tell there doesn't seem to be any difference in terms of subjective experience.

Suppose for the sake of this discussion that all aspects of the brain associated with subjective experience are Turing computable, and that we have a complete and full understanding of how all the different neurons interact with each other in computational terms and also in terms of how our senses receive information from the physical world, how that information is encoded and sent to or received from the brain. Suppose also that we can scan my brain (to capture all the relevant details), then finally scoop it out and replace it with a some other (very different) type of computer that is simulating what my brain was doing along with all the appropriate connections to all the required inputs/outputs in terms of the rest of my body.

When this version of me is operating there will be no pattern of firing neurons in the physical world - that will have been replaced by a vastly different pattern in some other medium, say electrical impulses in silicon. What principle are you invoking to explain how and why this different pattern and an infinite number of others we could "construct" by changing the underlying computational machine should all produce the same subjective experience when (for example) my robotic self hears the sound of a jet aircraft, looks up to find it but sees only a bright blue cloudless sky?

This is why when you or others say something like "subjective experience is the pattern of neurons firing" I am still left puzzled. This doesn't seem to be an explanation based on any established principle or theory. It sounds much more like a bald and rather far fetched assertion to me. It's rather like someone came up with a "Theory of Subjective Experiences" but didn't bother to tell the rest of the world about it.

If you are with Pixy in that you believe the secret ingredient is that the pattern must specifically belong to the class of those that encode some form of "Self-Referential Information Processing" - SRIP - in order for subjective experience to manifest, then I also want to know how we are supposed to recognise the existence or absence of SRIP in any particular pattern of neurons firing, rocks being moved about, meteor showers flying past in the night sky, and so on. Surely that's a matter of interpretation? Since when does any particular pattern have precisely one interpretation?

Whatever precise form of SRIP is meant to produce subjective experience doesn't seem to have been clearly defined. Whatever it is, why this should produce subjective experience while other forms of information processing don't is left unexplained. The only connection seems to be a vague hand waving kind of notion that SRIP sounds like it must be related in some way to "I am thinking about what it is like to be 'I'" or similar.

No, you are conflating two issues.

Subjectivity comes from identity.

Experience comes from SRIP.

They are independent. It just so happens that we have both, so we have subjective experience. But you can have subjective existence sans experience, and objective experience, just as well.

Thats why you are puzzled -- it doesn't make sense to say "experience IS the pattern of neurons firing," and it doesn't make sense to say "SRIP is responsible for subjectivity."

 

[AkuManiMani]

Propositions are hypothetical statements within the stream of one's conscious awareness;

Sorry, I assumed a context and didn't make it clear. When I use "proposition", I mean it from a linguistic/philosophical/logical context, wherein a proposition is the meaningful content expressed by a sentence or utterance.

In other words:

S1: It is very cold today.
S2: Очень холодно сегодня
S3: Es muy frío hoy.

The sentences above all express the same proposition, just in different languages. There need be nothing "hypothetical" about this kind of proposition.

And outside the context of a conscious entity able to perceive those symbols and associate them with some subjective experience(s) [i.e qualia] they have no meaning.

There is no knowledge sans qualia.

A common definition of knowledge is that it is "justified true belief". Knowledge is comprised of propositions. When someone teaches you something, they cause you to believe, with justification, some truth about things. By this definition, your claim that there is no knowledge sans qualia is simply false.

If your definition of knowledge includes "raw feels", then your point still doesn't hold, if you agree with my definition above.

If your definition of knowledge is that it is solely "raw feels", then knowledge is totally worthless in any commerce with others, since it can never be expressed.

When I say "raw feels" I'm not just speaking specifically of emotions or sensations, per se, but *all* subjective phenomena. Qualia are the basic subjective elements that make up experiences, whether they're perceptions of some external object(s) or apprehension of some abstract concept(s). Language works by using learned symbolic associations to evoke organized patterns of thought in the consciousness of another that are drawn from some base of shared experience(s). Without consciousness, without experience, there is no knowledge, and there are no beliefs, true or otherwise.

 

[!Kaggen]

Imagine all those blind people who don't know what a rainbow is...or anything else that they do not subjectively experience (added for emphasis)

Ah, so now we are allowed to use the evidence "imagine what its like to not see a rainbow (qualia)"

Your Theory of Knowledge assumes what it refutes.

 

[Malerin]

Ah, so now we are allowed to use the evidence "imagine what its like to not see a rainbow (qualia)"

Your Theory of Knowledge assumes what it refutes.

I was going to ask how a person blind from birth has any idea what a rainbow looks like (or what the process of seeing is like, for that matter).

 

[!Kaggen]

I was going to ask how a person blind from birth has any idea what a rainbow looks like (or what the process of seeing is like, for that matter).

If you don't include something to do with computation, SRIP, physicalism or all the other jargon that assumes what it refutes then you would be scoffed at for believing in magic