Has consciousness been fully explained?

[!Kaggen]

Please provide a concrete suggestion how the rules of the scientific method should be changed to improve the quality of the results.

One example

Schooler recommends the establishment of an open-source database, in which researchers are required to outline their planned investigations and document all their results. “I think this would provide a huge increase in access to scientific work and give us a much better way to judge the quality of an experiment,” Schooler says. “It would help us finally deal with all these issues that the decline effect is exposing.”

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/13/101213fa_fact_lehrer#ixzz1AA9mkzkx

another

Andrew Gelman, a professor of statistics at Columbia University, proposed the use of “retrospective power analyses,” in which experimenters are forced to calculate their effect size using “real prior information,” and not just the data distilled from their small sample size.

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blo...ghts-on-the-decline-effect.html#ixzz1AAAMfaXU

 

[Orbini]

One example

Schooler recommends the establishment of an open-source database, in which researchers are required to outline their planned investigations and document all their results. “I think this would provide a huge increase in access to scientific work and give us a much better way to judge the quality of an experiment,” Schooler says. “It would help us finally deal with all these issues that the decline effect is exposing.”

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/13/101213fa_fact_lehrer#ixzz1AA9mkzkx

another

Andrew Gelman, a professor of statistics at Columbia University, proposed the use of “retrospective power analyses,” in which experimenters are forced to calculate their effect size using “real prior information,” and not just the data distilled from their small sample size.

Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blo...ghts-on-the-decline-effect.html#ixzz1AAAMfaXU

No doubt that these are useful suggestions, but they have nothing to do with the scientific method itself.

What you are suggesting is improving the accuracy of some of the steps.

 

[PixyMisa]

Right. The problem is not with the scientific method; the problem - and the solutions suggested - lie largely with the application (and misapplication) of statistical methods.

 

[westprog]

That's why I asked about which process. I don't know anyone making the claim in biology as a whole, but I don't work in that general field.

It's a claim that AFAIAA has only surfaced right here. Now, I could be wrong, and it's likely that someone has made the life=computation claim somewhere, sometime - but it's certainly not mainstream biology.

As you say, the claim that neuroscience is computational is certainly not unique, though it remains in dispute.

 

[westprog]

So now you've extended your, as yet unjustifiable, claim from "consciousness is computation" to "life is computation".

And as I've pointed out, the field of biology has managed quite well without this particular insight.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's a claim that AFAIAA has only surfaced right here. Now, I could be wrong, and it's likely that someone has made the life=computation claim somewhere, sometime - but it's certainly not mainstream biology.

Yes, but the real issue is not which authority has used the idea but is it correct? I haven't been following that side of the conversation, so I have nothing to add.

 

[westprog]

I'm reminded of the Kierkegaard quote "The self is a relation relating to itself."

Which is helpful in that it points out that the concept of "self" is far from simple, and certainly not something to be assumed or handwaved away.

 

[westprog]

The problem is that nothing else gives us a workable scientific theory either.

Yes, but that's not really a justification. Saying "well, you've nothing better" isn't a basis for a scientific statement. It just means we don't know.

And, as I've said, the statement "consciousness is the result of neurons operating in a human brain" is as good a scientific theory, and doesn't confuse explanation with definition. If your explanation is your definition, then nothing is explained, and nothing useful is achieved.

And a working definition of consciousness - "a state expressing itself by an assertion of consciousness". Sadly this doesn't include the washing machine.

Are either of these definitions good enough? No, clearly not. They're better than "consciousness is self-referential information processing", but not sufficient by a long way.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, but the real issue is not which authority has used the idea but is it correct? I haven't been following that side of the conversation, so I have nothing to add.

I think a better question is, is it useful? If the concept gives us new tools for understanding biological processes, and those tools work - they produce consistent and accurate results - then it's useful and we might consider it correct.

And if not, then not.

 

[westprog]

Yes, but the real issue is not which authority has used the idea but is it correct? I haven't been following that side of the conversation, so I have nothing to add.

Just because an idea has surfaced for the first time on a (fairly) obscure discussion group doesn't mean that it's worthless. However, I think that being skeptical about it's truth or value doesn't necessarily imply a belief in magic.

It might be that treating life as a form of computation is a useful and clever idea. Or it might be just something someone has come up with off the top of his head. It's certainly up to the person making the claim to justify it, and there's no compulsion on anyone else to just believe it.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, but that's not really a justification. Saying "well, you've nothing better" isn't a basis for a scientific statement. It just means we don't know.

Right, but that's not at all what I'm saying.

And, as I've said, the statement "consciousness is the result of neurons operating in a human brain" is as good a scientific theory, and doesn't confuse explanation with definition. If your explanation is your definition, then nothing is explained, and nothing useful is achieved.

Incorrect. We can define water as H₂O, and the definition is both precise and productive; it defines the word water and is the basis for explaining water's observed properties.

So too with consciousness and self-referential information processing.

If you want to separate consciousness into a behavioural definition and an operational theory - the latter being self-referential information processing - then I'm fine with that, so long as you get the behavioural definition right.

And a working definition of consciousness - "a state expressing itself by an assertion of consciousness". Sadly this doesn't include the washing machine.

Depends on the washing machine, of course. Well-designed microcontroller software routinely monitors its own activity as well as the activity of the mechanism it controls, in the hope that it won't all go Ariane 5 on you.

And guess what that self-monitoring constitutes, Westprog?

Are either of these definitions good enough? No, clearly not. They're better than "consciousness is self-referential information processing"

No, clearly not.

 

[Orbini]

And, as I've said, the statement "consciousness is the result of neurons operating in a human brain" is as good a scientific theory, and doesn't confuse explanation with definition

It also excludes alien life forms in the entire universe for no particular reason.

And a working definition of consciousness - "a state expressing itself by an assertion of consciousness". Sadly this doesn't include the washing machine.

What if the washing machine was equipped with a sticker that said : "I assert that I'm conscious" ?

 

[PixyMisa]

What if the washing machine was equipped with a sticker that said : "I assert that I'm conscious" ?

More to the point, what if its microcontroller ran a self-check loop in a separate thread and provided status updates not just on the progress of your load of washing, but on the process monitoring that progress, and, if you want to go further, on the self-check loop itself?

Normally you don't see that self-check process, but it's there in any complex embedded system that needs to be at all reliable.

 

[Malerin]

You do realise that this is a different statement? You are now using my definition to identify a process as conscious, not addressing the definition itself. In this case, though it's a mess grammatically, it's semantically valid.

But it is not the same statement as before.


No, that's incorrect:



That would follow if your previous statement were sound, but it's not, so it doesn't.

There is no condition here. That's inaccurate and potentially very misleading. You don't have a P and a Q to form a bidirectional connective between. You just have a P.

Pixy, if concsiousness = SRIP, how are they NOT logically equivalent?

In logic, statements p and q are logically equivalent if they have the same logical content.

Syntactically, p and q are equivalent if each can be proved from the other. Semantically, p and q are equivalent if they have the same truth value in every model.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_equivalence

Even if you're claiming they're only materially equivalent, you still use IFF:

In writing, phrases commonly used, with debatable propriety, as alternatives to "if and only if" include Q is necessary and sufficient for P, P is equivalent (or materially equivalent) to Q (compare material implication), P precisely if Q, P precisely (or exactly) when Q, P exactly in case Q, and P just in case Q.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_equivalence

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixy, if concsiousness = SRIP, how are they NOT logically equivalent?

They are. That's what I've been saying all along. That is precisely why your position of necessary-and-sufficient is incorrect.

Logical equivalence is different from material equivalence. The material equivalence of p and q (often written p↔q) is itself another statement in same object language as p and q, which expresses the idea "p if and only if q". In particular, the truth value of p↔q can change from one model to another. The claim that two formulas are logically equivalent is a statement in the metalanguage, expressing a relationship between two statements p and q. The claim that p and q are semantically equivalent does not depend on any particular model; it says that in every possible model, p will have the same truth value as q. The claim that p and q are syntactically equivalent does not depend on models at all; it states that there is a deduction of q from p and a deduction of p from q.

 

[westprog]

It also excludes alien life forms in the entire universe for no particular reason.

Alien rights, man. There is a reason for excluding alien life forms. I'll leave it to the class as an exercise. (It's pretty much the same reason as applies to intelligent robots).

What if the washing machine was equipped with a sticker that said : "I assert that I'm conscious" ?

That's why the definition is insufficient. We'd need to agree on what was a spontaneous assertion of consciousness, and not something assigned by someone else whom we already agree to be conscious.

However, at least a discussion like that would be dealing with the issue of consciousness, not something else altogether.

 

[Orbini]

Alien rights, man. There is a reason for excluding alien life forms. I'll leave it to the class as an exercise. (It's pretty much the same reason as applies to intelligent robots)

Why not exclude women, using the same reasoning ?

 

[PixyMisa]

That's why the definition is insufficient. We'd need to agree on what was a spontaneous assertion of consciousness, and not something assigned by someone else whom we already agree to be conscious.

I don't think an assertion is sufficient; what you should be looking for is the ability to answer questions regarding your state of mind.

"Are you awake?" being the classic, if trivial, example.

However, at least a discussion like that would be dealing with the issue of consciousness, not something else altogether.

Until someone points out to you that you are talking about self-referential information processing...

 

[dlorde]

Originally Posted by dlorde:
Why properties 'similar to those exhibited by life'?
Why not simply properties 'that can support computation'?

Well that is a further conclusion, yes -- but you need to do much more inference to get to it. Namely, you need to be able to infer that life is the result of computation.

Now I'm confused. If we agree that consciousness depends on computation, and computation doesn't depend on life, why does that imply or require that life depends on computation?

 

[dlorde]

... Pixy is using a computer science defintion to argue consciousness belongs in the realm of... wait for it... COMPUTATION. What a brilliant move! No tautology there at all!

Yeah, and maybe we should stop doctors using medical definitions to diagnose disease...