Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Third Eye Open]

*me being a jerk*

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't see his statement as a rejection of physicalism. Why do you feel that way about it?

eta: AkuManiMani could you clarify please. Do you feel you are rejecting physicalism up front?

He said that it is irreducible; it is fundamental. If physicalism is true, then what we mean by 'qualia' is necessarily reducible to some process or processes. That is why I asked for the definitions of the words he used to help define what 'qualia' means. What those words represent should also be reducible to simpler processes.

 

[AlBell]

Sometimes I wish I could downvote posts here.

Merry Christmas to you, too.

 

[Third Eye Open]

A wrong idea is a wrong idea and coming up with an alternative is not necessary to recognize it as such. If I were to find a flaw in M Theory, I would not have to come up with an alternative unifying theory of physics before voicing my criticism. It is also useful to a discussion to challenge claims that appear wrong or flawed.

It's fine to point out specific things that are flawed, I'm talking about when the only problem someone is raising is 'we don't know enough'.

It seems that in this thread, many of the objections raised to certain ideas can be boiled down to 'we don't know enough about the brain to say that for sure.'
And then it goes on and on and on and on for dozens and dozens of pages with one side explaining their idea, and the other saying 'but we don't know! we don't know!' Over and over again.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Merry Christmas to you, too.

Aww crap, I'm sorry.
Happy holidays

 

[Third Eye Open]

Of course. Now that I muse on the it, it occurs to me that the personification of pure evil is SATAN and the personification of the platonic ideal of good is, of course, GOD.

Based on their actions, reverse those and I'd be more inclined to agree.

But the whole idea is ridiculous anyway. 'Good' and 'Evil' are not absolute concrete things. They are defined by humans and they fluctuate and change along with us.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Of course. Now that I muse on the it, it occurs to me that the personification of pure evil is SATAN and the personification of the platonic ideal of good is, of course, GOD.

That is certainly the Christian interpretation of neoPlatonism.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't see his statement as a rejection of physicalism. Why do you feel that way about it?

eta: AkuManiMani could you clarify please. Do you feel you are rejecting physicalism up front?

I reject all "-isms" up front. As I said before physical-ism is just a non-falsifiable semantic game; its basic premise is simply that everything real is 'physical'. If one leaves it at that, its simply a non-qualified statement and theres really nothing to accept or reject. In the words of Wolfgang Pauli its 'not even wrong'.

As I told PixyMisa already:

"'Physics' is just a word that refers to our conceptual model of reality. Models, by their nature, are tentative and incomplete."

...Ergo, physical-ism is simply defining reality according to one's particular conception of what constitutes 'physical'. So if a given physicalist encounters a proposition that doesn't seem to fit with their personal pre-existing notion of 'physical' they reject it a priori. Every "-ism" is essentially a conceptual box, and some people's boxes have become a prison that only unlocks from the inside.

 

[ynot]

So has consciousness been fully explained yet? If not please wake me when it has.

 

[AkuManiMani]

So has consciousness been fully explained yet? If not please wake me when it has.

Then you're in for an eternal nap... Its not possible to "fully explain" anything

 

[dlorde]

...
All because of qualia.

All because of pattern matching.

 

[rocketdodger]

I would probably try to determine what the person proposing the hypothesis meant to communicate to me by their references to 'human insight' and 'platonic reality'. What do you mean by those terms?

Insight, for the purposes of this discussion, would be a non-random process for arriving at a thought that is not algorithmic. In layspeak, a deep or profound thought that just "pops" into your head and if someone asks you "what led you to that conclusion" you would just shrug and say "I dunno."

According to Penrose, many human mathematicians have come up with theorems or proofs using this insight, and what they came up with is not something that could be arrived at in an algorithmic fashion. Hence his whole hypothesis. In particular, he thinks it requires non-algorithmic insight to be able to escape incompleteness, which he thinks humans can do since he thinks humans are always able to generate a Godel string for any given system under consideration.

Platonic reality is the place where platonic ideals reside/come from/ have-barbeques-or-whatever-ideals-do-on-the-weekend.

It isn't clear wtf people are talking about when they mention platonic ideals. Where are they? What are they? Huh? And it especially isn't clear when people try to suggest we can somehow access them. All we know is that Penrose thinks many human thoughts can't be arrived at via an algorithm alone and instead they somehow source from non-computable platonic reality embedded in the fabric of spacetime.

Penrose has never, ever -- as far as I know -- given anything resembling even a hint as to how his quantum objective reduction model could possibly lead to the mathematical insight he bases the whole hypothesis on in the first place. That is, even if there was platonic reality, the mechanism that is responsible for somehow helping us gleam the "truth" and get it "into our brain" where normal processing takes place is a completely magical black box as far as his hypothesis is concerned.

Um...the way you describe it sounds as if it is like a religious belief to you. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by 'supporting a hypothesis'. Does considering it and/or testing it constitute support in the context of your above question?

Well it is impossible to "not" consider anything, right. As soon as it enters your brain it is being considered somehow.

But a hypothesis like Penrose's, taken in entirety, doesn't warrant more than a cursory dismissal. Where would the platonic reality be? Dunno. What kinds of ideals are there? Dunno. What would such ideals mean for the human experience? Dunno. How does Orch-OR communicate those ideals to our brain? Dunno. Why did you start this pursuit? I was convinced that humans are more than just matter because mathematicians like myself are so smart. ....

So, why should I even consider this radical hypothesis when the computational model thus far has zero inconsistencies with observed human behvior ??

 

[dlorde]

You never actually left square one. And you won't, until you recognize that "qualia" is a meaningful term for 'meaning'.

This is a sceptic forum. If that is your claim, you need to produce the evidence.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

As I said before physical-ism is just a non-falsifiable semantic game; its basic premise is simply that everything real is 'physical'.

That depends entirely what you mean by 'physical'. The way the word 'physicalism' is used most commonly in these parts, it is primarily an epistemic position with minimal ontological claims.

It does, however, make specific claims, so it is not unqualified. Specifically, it is a monism. We generally make no claim on the identity of the ur-substance; but it also claims that the universe/multiverse works by some set of rules. The epistemic claim is that all we can learn is how the rules work. It makes the further claim that everything we encounter is reducible to whatever the ur-substance is or to its actions (which follows from the idea of monism).

It is essentially coequal with Rorty's Neopragmatism.

"'Physics' is just a word that refers to our conceptual model of reality. Models, by their nature, are tentative and incomplete."

Correct.

...Ergo, physical-ism is simply defining reality according to one's particular conception of what constitutes 'physical'.

Sort of. Physicalists do not typically identify what we know of physics currently as what actually is. We identify current physical theories as our current tentative model of the world. I have no idea what reality *is*. Reality is only something we can get a general idea of with the models we construct.

So if a given physicalist encounters a proposition that doesn't seem to fit with their personal pre-existing notion of 'physical' they reject it a priori.

Doesn't follow. Whatever the rules of the universe are we have no option but to accept if we are to be honest. We decide what is provisionally true about the world based on evidence and the models that we construct best to explain that evidence. The strength of evidence within a model always depends on the number and types of alternative explanations. If alternative explanations are not available within a model, we are forced to change the model, as has occurred in the past.

 

[PixyMisa]

You never actually left square one. And you won't, until you recognize that "qualia" is a meaningful term for 'meaning'.

In what way is that meaningful?

We already have a term for meaning. It's meaning. We already have a definition. We already know how it comes about as a result of purely physical systems.

What do these qualia of yours do? Where do they come from? How do they interact with the physical world? With the brain? With the mind? How do you know this? Are they irreducible and non-physical? If so, aren't you proposing a logically incoherent system of metaphysics, and if not, why not? If they are reducible and physical, don't they just map on to an already known and named physical process, in which case why the new name?

Sorry, AkuManiMani, you are still struggling to get to square zero.

 

[PixyMisa]

Again, to even ask the question shows that either A) you are not conscious yourself or B) you have no idea what you're asking.

I already gave as clear and concise a definition of qualia as is posible to convey with words alone. When one speaks of qualia one is speaking of the the fundament the foundation of meaning IN AND OF ITSELF.

You wanna to know the definition of FEELING? Introspect your own goddamn feelings. Wanna know what an EMOTION is? Dude, you %@&*ing experience them all the time! You ask what SENSATION is? Touch your flippin' keyboard! To even ask "what is perception?" -- "what is experience?" -- "what are qualia?" demonstrates a profound lack of self-awareness. THEY ARE THE SPECTRUM OF YOUR VERY BEING!

Sorry. Doesn't work. Consciousness is an illusion. Introspection is hopelessly unreliable. We can see what actually happens in the brain. Test it. Measure it. We know that nothing you are saying is true. Sorry, dude.

Mind is a function of matter. If there are qualia, then they're just matter doing stuff. And then the term is unneeded.

THAT qualia are is beyond question to any self-aware being.

Really? I'm self-aware. That statement is proof. I have no idea what you are talking about when you mention "qualia". Looks like incoherent anti-scientific nonsense invented by washed-up immaterialist philosophers to me.

WHAT qualia are is not something that can be conveyed by words alone.

That's rather a failure on your part then, isn't it? Because our theory of mind not only coincides with confirmable reality, it can actually be communicated.

More pertinent questions would be: What is the ontological relation between our "interior" subjective being and the "exterior" objective world?

The subjective is a subset of the objective.

 

[PixyMisa]

Doesn't follow. Whatever the rules of the universe are we have no option but to accept if we are to be honest. We decide what is provisionally true about the world based on evidence and the models that we construct best to explain that evidence. The strength of evidence within a model always depends on the number and types of alternative explanations. If alternative explanations are not available within a model, we are forced to change the model, as has occurred in the past.

Right. Of course we don't reject things a priori. We're basing our theories on the observed behaviour of the Universe. If we reject an observation, then pretty soon someone else is going to come along and make the exact same observation. The Universe is stubborn that way. As are people.

It is rather those who believe in qualia (which they can't define, apparently) who are basing the observed behaviour of the Universe on their theories. The problem with that approach is simple - you get the wrong answers.

If we're not careful when we apply science, sometimes a bridge falls down.

This doesn't happen with qualiaism, because they somehow never get around to building any bridges in the first place.

 

[PixyMisa]

Answer my earlier question, and you'll find that you already know the answer to yours...

I see no question there, just dishonesty.

They do so by learned association. The entities in question must be conditioned to associate particular symbol(s) with some common experience(s) between them.

Right. How?

Once the association is sufficiently embedded every time the particular symbol(s) enter the awareness of the conscious entity(s) in question it will trigger the corresponding experience(s).

Right. How?

'Physics' is just a word that refers to our conceptual model of reality.

And, by extension, to the behaviours of reality and reality itself.

Models, by their nature, are tentative and incomplete. I would amend your statement to: "If you can't explain it, tentatively, with physics, then it doesn't exist within our model".

Nope.

Physics is limited, but it is also broadly correct. It's not just our model, it is the only working model. When you abandon it, you inevitably wander off into nonsense.

You are right in one regard. Symbols, IAOT, do not have meaning outside of their association with something else.

Yep.

However, the root "something else", from which all meaning is derived, is experience.

What's experience?

Even an IP system has no meaning as such outside of the context of some entity(s) that can experience them as such.

What are these entities? What's this experience? Apparently information processing systems aren't entities with experiences. So what are these entities? What are these experiences? How do they work? Where do they come from? What are they made of?

We know beyond rational doubt that experiences are not fundamental, because we can see them happening, and they only happen in physical systems with certain properties. So, over to you.

Qualities are the 'suchness' that -define- an experience; symbols are a means of evoking experiences in a -constrained- manner.

How do identify a quality then? What is it made of? What does it do? How does it interact?

Information, broadly speaking, is a constraint -- in formation.

"In formation"?

Its high time for you to open than closed loop of yours to the larger reality...

What closed loop might that be?

 

[Meed]

It's fine to point out specific things that are flawed, I'm talking about when the only problem someone is raising is 'we don't know enough'.

What's wrong with that? In many contexts that is a serious problem. You can't equate "we don't know enough" with "we don't know enough, because we can't know anything for sure". For instance saying we don't know enough to calculate the probability of a given planet with earth-like conditions containing life, or we don't know enough to conclude that M Theory is correct, is very different from saying we don't know enough to conclude that the Earth is not flat or 10000 years old.

It seems that in this thread, many of the objections raised to certain ideas can be boiled down to 'we don't know enough about the brain to say that for sure.'
And then it goes on and on and on and on for dozens and dozens of pages with one side explaining their idea, and the other saying 'but we don't know! we don't know!' Over and over again.

Well, it's true. We don't know enough about the brain to conclude all that much.

 

[PixyMisa]

What's wrong with that? In many contexts that is a serious problem. You can't equate "we don't know enough" with "we don't know enough, because we can't know anything for sure". For instance saying we don't know enough to calculate the probability of a given planet with earth-like conditions containing life, or we don't know enough to conclude that M Theory is correct, is very different from saying we don't know enough to conclude that the Earth is not flat or 10000 years old.

However, the idea that M Theory impacts consciousness clearly falls into the latter category.

Well, it's true. We don't know enough about the brain to conclude all that much.

Yes. Yes we do.

We know, for example, that the brain is a switched, pulse-coded, electrochemical network processor.
We know, for example, that consciousness is not unitary.
We know, for example, that Penrose's quantum theory of mind is false (and was never science to begin with).
We know, for example, that qualia don't exist.
We know, for example, that neutral monism is pure nonsense.