Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Robin]

What does physics have to say about how my subjective experience should act?

What does that have to do with the price of tea?

I am obviously talking about what physics have to say about how the atoms in our brains will behave and interact with each other, how the brain components like neurons will behave and interact with each other. Physics ought to be able to describe that.

And I have been very explicitly asking about externally observable behaviour.

What laws does it have to follow? Gravity? Speed of light?

The atoms in our brain would have to follow every physical law that there is.

No, it will report whatever it's programmed to report.

How many times do I have to correct this? In my example it is not programmed to report Sofia events. Why on earth do people keep saying that?

It is programmed to model the interactions of the physical components of our brains.

Any behaviour that arises from it would have to arise from those interactions.

Key word: simulating

Yes, that is the whole point - it is a simulation.

So if the reason we cry out in pain is because we actually feel pain, and the simulation of those same brain processes does not actually feel pain - then why does it still let out a simulated cry in pain?

Personally, I don't think they are. I was assuming Piggy's POV: we may eventually know enough about neurons and their arrangements and interaction to explain subjective experience, but we're not there yet.

Obviously we are not there yet. We don't have a complete understanding of the brain structure and we don't completely understand the function of the structures that we do know about. And we don't have the computing power.

But if it were not even in principle possible to have a simulation of an animal brain that mapped sensory input to externally observable behaviour - then that would mean that the matter in the brain was not acting according to any known physical law.

Simple chat-bot simulations programmed to report sofia don't tell us anything.

But who is talking about chat bots? Not me.

 

[Robin]

Do you mean Robin?

Since I haven't said anything even remotely like that, I am not sure why you would even suggest such a thing.

You are perhaps confusing me with someone else???

In fact, in other threads I have had great trouble convincing people that algorithms don't have some sort of life of their own.

I won't name names.

 

[westprog]

Approximating to an arbitrary degree of precision is not considered "calculating?"

No, there's a technical difference.

 

[westprog]

So a computer simulation is a physical system, not just an abstract algorithm.

Indeed it is. In fact, any computation has to take place as a physical event. However, if someone is insisting that any physical method of performing a given computation is equivalent to any other physical method, be it electrical, chemical, quantum, mechanical or sheets of paper placed in cubbyholes, then it's not really possible to refer back to the physical nature of the computation as being critical - since the claim is that the computation is in fact identical.

IMO, the physical action is what is actually happening, and similarities between a mechanical desk calculator and an electronic computer are merely in the minds of the people making use of the output. However, if you claim that the same calculation is going on in the various cases, you can't then refer back to the physical nature of the expression of the computation which you've just discarded as inessential.

 

[westprog]

Can you provide an example?

Put a set of thermocouples under a rock in the sun, set to trigger events when they reach a particular temperature. There is no limit to the extent of the events which can be triggered. The process by which the base of the rock reaches a particular temperature at a particular time is enormously complex - indeed, far too complex to be accurately modelled. It is certainly not linear.

 

[westprog]

Since I haven't said anything even remotely like that, I am not sure why you would even suggest such a thing.

You are perhaps confusing me with someone else???

I'd also be interested to see who the person is who's denied that computations take place on physical systems. A quote would be good.

 

[Robin]

Indeed it is. In fact, any computation has to take place as a physical event. However, if someone is insisting that any physical method of performing a given computation is equivalent to any other physical method, be it electrical, chemical, quantum, mechanical or sheets of paper placed in cubbyholes, then it's not really possible to refer back to the physical nature of the computation as being critical - since the claim is that the computation is in fact identical.

IMO, the physical action is what is actually happening, and similarities between a mechanical desk calculator and an electronic computer are merely in the minds of the people making use of the output. However, if you claim that the same calculation is going on in the various cases, you can't then refer back to the physical nature of the expression of the computation which you've just discarded as inessential.

I don't think that the specific physical implementation of an algorithm is critical either, other than it is actually capable of running the algorithm.

But I don't see how you can say that the similarities are only in the mind of the people making the calculation.

If my desk calculator, electronic computer, smart older brother etc do the same resolve a particular arithmetic expression and come up with the same answer then clearly they are doing the same (ie equivalent) calculation. The fact that the number on the output is the same in each case is not just a function of the observer's mind.

 

[Meed]

Since I haven't said anything even remotely like that, I am not sure why you would even suggest such a thing.

You are perhaps confusing me with someone else???

In fact, in other threads I have had great trouble convincing people that algorithms don't have some sort of life of their own.

I won't name names.

To clarify, I didn't say you did, you just said the closest thing I could think of and I wasn't sure who RD meant.

What you said (that came to mind) was:

"Of course the question was not - "does it have a Sofia?". The question was - would it behave as though it did?

First, we know it is an algorithm.

We are not asking if it has a Sofia because we can examine both possibilities:

1. It has a Sofia. This would mean that an algorithm can have a Sofia, or

2. It does not have a Sofia. But since we know that any behaviour we observe from it must be a function of the modelled interactions of the same brain architecture that we have, its claim to have a Sofia comes from the same mechanism that produces our claim to have a Sofia.

[...]"

The distinctions I would make are:

"It" is a computer, not the input (program) directing the computer's behavior.

This (1.) would not mean that an algorithm can have a Sofia, but that a computer can have Sofia.

 

[rocketdodger]

Of course, unless the cutoff point is made between movement and complete stillness. I'm not sure what your point is.

I'm not sure what your point is or how that relates to anything I said.

You said we shouldn't classify things based on degrees. I provided a clear and intuitive counterexample -- rolling vs. running.

Different than...?

Different than the other behavior. If the behavior of the system isn't different due to the nonlinearity, then it can't be observed by another system as such. This is usually implicit in the process, though.

For example, the nonlinearity of a transistor's impedance clearly maps to the behavior they exhibit -- vastly increasing the number of charged particles that migrate through them, all else being equal.

I just wanted to make that clear. You might say "well that is obvious, because that is what a nonlinear impedance is," but some people have a tendancy to see numbers as just numbers rather than descriptions of reality.

Can you provide an example?

Yes, a melting rock. The environment is system A and the rock is system B.

But what is the "local minima" in this example?

They are meta-states. Solid and liquid. No matter what state you leave a rock in, if the ambient temperature is low then it will converge on a specific state that is part of the solid metastate. If the ambient temperature is above a certain threshold it will always converge on the liquid metastate.

There is no useful reason to look at specific states, because any system with nonzero energy is constantly changing its specific state. What you need to look at is the systems metastates -- which can only be defined by how it interacts with other systems. For example, we humans define the solid and liquid metastates according to how a system reacts to forces applied to it by some other system (roughly -- I am sure more precise material science definitions can be arrived at).

 

[rocketdodger]

I'd also be interested to see who the person is who's denied that computations take place on physical systems. A quote would be good.

You.

When you deny that a physical theory of computation exists, it seems to suggest that you think computation must be non-physical somehow.

Is this wrong?

 

[Meed]

You said we shouldn't classify things based on degrees.

We can't classify things based on degrees without specifying and justifying some sort of cutoff point by which things either fall into or do not fall into the definition. That is what I was trying to say, but I might not have been as clear as I could have.

I provided a clear and intuitive counterexample -- rolling vs. running.

Rolling and running aren't different degrees of something as far as I can tell. They're qualitatively different. What do you mean?

It is not just non-linearity. It is non-linearity mapping to a completely different behavior.

Different than...?

Different than the other behavior.

What other behavior?

If the behavior of the system isn't different due to the nonlinearity, then it can't be observed by another system as such. This is usually implicit in the process, though.

Are you saying the system must change non-linearly and the change must be recognizable by another system?

For example, the nonlinearity of a transistor's impedance clearly maps to the behavior they exhibit -- vastly increasing the number of charged particles that migrate through them, all else being equal.

I just wanted to make that clear. You might say "well that is obvious, because that is what a nonlinear impedance is," but some people have a tendancy to see numbers as just numbers rather than descriptions of reality.

Ok. So the key point is that the non-linear change in the system results in a change in the behavior of the system in a way that affects other systems' interactions with it. If I understand you correctly.

Yes, a melting rock. The environment is system A and the rock is system B.

They are meta-states. Solid and liquid. No matter what state you leave a rock in, if the ambient temperature is low then it will converge on a specific state that is part of the solid metastate. If the ambient temperature is above a certain threshold it will always converge on the liquid metastate.

There is no useful reason to look at specific states, because any system with nonzero energy is constantly changing its specific state. What you need to look at is the systems metastates -- which can only be defined by how it interacts with other systems. For example, we humans define the solid and liquid metastates according to how a system reacts to forces applied to it by some other system (roughly -- I am sure more precise material science definitions can be arrived at).

Gotcha.

 

[Malerin]

What does that have to do with the price of tea?

I am obviously talking about what physics have to say about how the atoms in our brains will behave and interact with each other, how the brain components like neurons will behave and interact with each other. Physics ought to be able to describe that.

And I have been very explicitly asking about externally observable behaviour.

The atoms in our brain would have to follow every physical law that there is.

How many times do I have to correct this? In my example it is not programmed to report Sofia events. Why on earth do people keep saying that?

It is programmed to model the interactions of the physical components of our brains.

Any behaviour that arises from it would have to arise from those interactions.

Yes, that is the whole point - it is a simulation.

So if the reason we cry out in pain is because we actually feel pain, and the simulation of those same brain processes does not actually feel pain - then why does it still let out a simulated cry in pain?

Obviously we are not there yet. We don't have a complete understanding of the brain structure and we don't completely understand the function of the structures that we do know about. And we don't have the computing power.

But if it were not even in principle possible to have a simulation of an animal brain that mapped sensory input to externally observable behaviour - then that would mean that the matter in the brain was not acting according to any known physical law.

But who is talking about chat bots? Not me.

Because you weren't clear. That's usually what happens when you think a lot of people are misinterpreting what you're saying.

 

[Malerin]

What does physics have to say about how my subjective experience should act?

What does that have to do with the price of tea?

I am obviously talking about what physics have to say about how the atoms in our brains will behave and interact with each other, how the brain components like neurons will behave and interact with each other. Physics ought to be able to describe that.

That's all well and good, but what does physics have to say about how my consciousness behaves? Am I prohibited from imagining travelling faster than light, or floating up to the moon?

So if the reason we cry out in pain is because we actually feel pain, and the simulation of those same brain processes does not actually feel pain - then why does it still let out a simulated cry in pain?

Because the designer of the simulation programmed designed it to do so?

Personally, I don't think they are. I was assuming Piggy's POV: we may eventually know enough about neurons and their arrangements and interaction to explain subjective experience, but we're not there yet.

Obviously we are not there yet. We don't have a complete understanding of the brain structure and we don't completely understand the function of the structures that we do know about. And we don't have the computing power.

Right...

But if it were not even in principle possible to have a simulation of an animal brain that mapped sensory input to externally observable behaviour - then that would mean that the matter in the brain was not acting according to any known physical law.

This is not clear.

 

[rocketdodger]

Rolling and running aren't different degrees of something as far as I can tell. They're qualitatively different. What do you mean?

Well at a fundamental level the particles of those systems are just moving in 3-space -- there is no qualitative difference there, it is all just degrees of movement.

The qualitative difference only emerges when another system recognizes it somehow (which is exactly what you ask about below )

Are you saying the system must change non-linearly and the change must be recognizable by another system?

Ok. So the key point is that the non-linear change in the system results in a change in the behavior of the system in a way that affects other systems' interactions with it. If I understand you correctly.

Gotcha.

Yes. Exactly.

That is my physical theory of computation. It is just a way of explaining how the same behaviors at the particle level can snowball into wildly divergent behaviors at the system level.

And I think the explanation for life is part of this framework. Systems that, by random luck, had "interactions" ( calculations ) that steered them away destruction ended up lasting longer. And one such system -- life on Earth -- stumbled upon a sequence of calculations that ended up being "reproduction." And ever since, that system -- life on Earth -- has existed.

 

[Robin]

That's all well and good, but what does physics have to say about how my consciousness behaves?

For the moment - who cares? That has nothing to do with the example

Because the designer of the simulation programmed designed it to do so?

But I have already stipulated the designer did no such thing. They programmed it to simulate the behaviour of physical brain components, nothing else.

But since you didn't read this the last time I corrected you I doubt you will read it this time.

 

[westprog]

I don't think that the specific physical implementation of an algorithm is critical either, other than it is actually capable of running the algorithm.

But I don't see how you can say that the similarities are only in the mind of the people making the calculation.

If my desk calculator, electronic computer, smart older brother etc do the same resolve a particular arithmetic expression and come up with the same answer then clearly they are doing the same (ie equivalent) calculation. The fact that the number on the output is the same in each case is not just a function of the observer's mind.

In what sense do they come up with the same answer, outside of the observer's mind? A calculator will display an LED pattern. An abacus will have a row of beads. The computer will have voltage potentials. The child's book of tables will have marks on paper. The only thing that combines these entirely physically disparate concepts together is the mind of the observer. If one rock on the dark side of the moon rolls next to another, is that a calculation? If it is, then everything in the universe is calculating all the time.

 

[Robin]

Because you weren't clear. That's usually what happens when you think a lot of people are misinterpreting what you're saying.

Oh, come on - how could you think that when I was saying over and over again that it is a simulation of the physical components of the brain that I meant that it was preprogrammed to mimic certain behaviours?

Why would I be asking if it would behave like a human if I was stipulating that it was pre-programmed to behave like a human? That makes no sense whatsoever.

And how on earth could I have been talking about a chat bot????

I may not have been completely clear, but that sort of misunderstanding is beyond comprehension.

 

[westprog]

You.

When you deny that a physical theory of computation exists, it seems to suggest that you think computation must be non-physical somehow.

Is this wrong?

The concept of computation is something that applies purely in the minds of human beings. A computer might be carrying out a physical action, but it's only the interpretation of a human being that makes it a computation.

 

[Robin]

In what sense do they come up with the same answer, outside of the observer's mind?

In another observer's mind. And another observer's mind. And in as many observer's minds as read the figures. And in another computer to which the data is sent.

Do you think that the same answer to a particular calculation is just a figment of a single observer's imagination?

 

[westprog]

Rolling and running aren't different degrees of something as far as I can tell. They're qualitatively different. What do you mean?

There might be some boundary point where it's difficult to tell whether something is rolling or running, but there are also cases where it's possible to apply an objective standard to distinguish between the two. However, it's a matter of definition.