Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Dancing David]

Ahh The problem of induction solved by decree...

The behavior of the universe is by defintion real, the labels are arbitrary.

 

[Meed]

But if it does claim consciousness then it can only be through the neural processing since that is what is being modelled.

To nitpick, it is through a model of neural processing, not through neural processing itself. A model is, by definition, not the same thing as what it is modeling.

So if it does claim consciousness then we know that neurons are enough to explain why we claim consciousness.

Explaining why we claim consciousness and explaining why we experience consciousness are not the same thing. The latter cannot really be observed (thus far anyway), except at a subjective/introspective level.

So if neurons are not enough to explain consciousness itself then we would know that the reason we claim to be conscious is not because we are conscious.

It's an interesting thought. I think that possibility is in line with epiphenomenalism.

 

[westprog]

Actually, by definition, the effects of the calculation can be quantified. We can quantify the effect of the calculation that will be the same even when run on top of various differing physical processes.

That is rather obviously not true.

There are billions of calculations going on right now that are having physical effects on other machines and not even being thought of by humans.

I was thinking more of a human being - a naturally occurring machine that is capable of doing all sorts of calculations. We did not invent human beings.

But when you say that devices are doing calculations that have physical effects - OK, I know what you mean, and from an engineering POV that's a reasonable thing to say. But which devices are performing computation, and which are not? Is a bicycle performing computation? Is an alarm clock? How do you define in a physical sense what it means to carry out computation?

The reason this is relevant is because of the claim that performing a particular computation will result in a particular effect - namely, consciousness. Now, either this is a physical process, or it is not. If it is a physical process, to produce the same effect then there must be the same physical thing going on. Hence dealing cards, or neurons operating, or a computer running must have some physical commonality. In order for the theory to make sense, the physical operations of computation must be defined in order that the claim that computation can produce consciousness can be supported.

In general discussion, it's perfectly acceptable to use computation in a loose sense physically. We don't need to concern ourselves with an attempt at precise physical definitions unless someone is claiming precise physical effects.

 

[westprog]

Who cares?

As Robin has pointed out, this is irrelevant.

What is relevant is whether or not such a physical action can also be carried out by a rock.

And that has been your claim from day one -- that a rock can carry out any physical action that a computer can.

Are you backtracking now? Do you want to withdraw that claim?

If you define a computer to include people dealing cards, or clockwork, or any possible device that can carry out computation, what physical difference is there between all these possible devices that separates them from the rock?

The attempt with switches didn't really work. Nor did stability, or interactivity, or non-linearity. It's not really surprising. Look at the literature on this subject, and physical theories of consciousness are very thin on the ground.

 

[westprog]

A cellular control mechanism in a bacterium leads it to undergo cell division due to some small environmental change.

What am I leaving out?

Where is the human mind?

Before the calculation there was a single cell, the final effect is that there are two cells.

Where is the human mind?

A rock falls of the side of a cliff and breaks into two pieces. The human mind isn't there either, and no computation has taken place.

If you want to insist that computation happens in the one case and not the other, then an explanation is required. Or rather, a better explanation.

 

[my_wan]

I was not talking about degrees of freedom. I was talking about degrees of [insert a quality that can be had by a system].

Name a quality that can't be defined as either a variable or constant. Thus these "qualities" have a quantity when fully defined. Both constants or a variables are defined by degrees of freedom. Constants obviously have fewer the variables.

For example, heat, stability or amount of change demonstrated in response to the environment.

Heat is a good example. It is the kinetic energy transfered in an ensemble of collisions. The distribution of this kinetic energy is proportional to mv², distributed among all the translational and rotational degrees of freedom of the medium parts 'm', called the equipartition of energy. It's why iron gets so much hotter in the sun than many other materials. The specific heat of a material is merely a resulting property of the degrees of freedom.

Stability and rate of change in response to an environment is merely the result the degrees of freedom being variably limited to certain paths through the system, i.e., equipartition of energy among available degrees of freedom. In such a case the environment become a part of the system.

Even a circuit board, electronics, etc., is simply a device for sorting and directing energy equipartition through well defined degrees of freedom. A bicycle is the same thing, directing the energy dissipation, by limiting the degrees of freedom, to dissipate through the rotation of the wheel, as required by energy equipartition. For which the rate of dissipation is controlled by the gears, which itself simply defines degrees of freedom.

This was in response to RD emphasizing that a cell changes more than a rock in response to the environment and that certain things are more stable than others.

Yes, the change rate difference is precisely and explicitly, unless physics is wrong at a foundational level, because of the difference in the degrees of freedom available to the two systems. In fact, for it to be otherwise, breaks the notion that empirical data has any foundational validity.

Rolling vs running really has nothing to do with it and I still fail to see how it's a counter-example to my point.

I don't know at what qualitative level of analogy rocketdodger intended, but the analogy was valid right down to the core foundational principles of physics. To the point that the distinction between rolling and running indirectly defines the justification for physical law rather than magic.

 

[westprog]

Note that since a computation maps a natural number to just one natural number, not every physical process qualifies as a computation.

Any physical process is equivalent to the computation which simulates it.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, it's different patterns of movement. Different degrees would be something like different speeds. For example when you say something is more stable than something else you're talking in terms of degree of stability. If something is more hot than something else then you're talking in terms of degrees of heat.

Rolling and running are different types of movement, but they're not degrees along some axis. If they are then how do you define the difference?

I am confident that we could, with just a little thought, come up with some kind of a locomotion system that blurred the distinction between rolling and running.

In such a case, the difference is defined by other systems that interact with it.

Which is my whole point, right? I am trying to convey the notion that it is OK to jump from quantitative differences to qualitative ones. I am doing that by showing that we do it all the time anyway without thinking about it.

That is what this endless argument with westprog is all about. He is adamant that certain differences are purely quantitative while others are purely qualitative. I argue that in fact nothing is purely qualitative, everything is fundamentally quantitative and qualitative differences are just a way to say "so quantitatively different that the systems involved behave in qualitatively different ways from the perspective of other systems."

 

[rocketdodger]

If you define a computer to include people dealing cards, or clockwork, or any possible device that can carry out computation, what physical difference is there between all these possible devices that separates them from the rock?

What physical difference separates a living human from a tub of organic chemicals?

 

[rocketdodger]

A rock falls of the side of a cliff and breaks into two pieces. The human mind isn't there either, and no computation has taken place.

If you want to insist that computation happens in the one case and not the other, then an explanation is required. Or rather, a better explanation.

As I explained, the notion of "computation" is dependent upon the interaction between systems.

If the rock falls off the cliff and lands on something, destroying it, then from the perspective of that (now destroyed) system the rock did indeed perform a computation. The state of the universe was partitioned, by the rock, into { <states where the rock has not fallen> | <states where the rock has fallen } as observed by the (now destroyed) system. The nonlinear change in the rock must map to a nonlinear behavior of the system interacting with it.

If the rock falls and did not land on something, or landed on something and had no effect on it, then from the perpective of that system the rock did not perform a computation. Even though the rock partitioned the set of states of the universe, that partioning didn't affect any other system as such.

In both cases the rock performed a computation from our perspective, because it fell and broke apart. Even if it had not broken apart it would still have behaved nonlinearly -- and performed a calculation -- since before the fall it was stationary in one location and after the fall it was in stationary another location, and us humans are very good at observing location.

 

[Robin]

Any physical process is equivalent to the computation which simulates it.

I had to look twice at the posting name when I read that. Are you being lighthearted? You know I can't always tell.

 

[AlBell]

What physical difference separates a living human from a tub of organic chemicals?

Life. The same thing that separates all lifeforms from a tub of organic chemicals.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Life. The same thing that separates all lifeforms from a tub of organic chemicals.

Well, that's helpful.

 

[Robin]

But when you say that devices are doing calculations that have physical effects - OK, I know what you mean, and from an engineering POV that's a reasonable thing to say. But which devices are performing computation, and which are not? Is a bicycle performing computation? Is an alarm clock? How do you define in a physical sense what it means to carry out computation?

The reason this is relevant is because of the claim that performing a particular computation will result in a particular effect - namely, consciousness. Now, either this is a physical process, or it is not. If it is a physical process, to produce the same effect then there must be the same physical thing going on.

It is not clear to me that this is the case. Are you saying that a physical effect cannot result from more than physical process?. What definition are you using for "physical"?

By the way, I wouldn't call my definition of a computation loose. The recognition that nothing is (as far as we know) a perfect computer does not make the definition loose.

 

[AlBell]

Life. The same thing that separates all lifeforms from a tub of organic chemicals.

Well, that's helpful.

The point being that until our deep thinkers who believe substrate is irrelevant to consciousness sort that out, what are they doing?

No, they don't seem to believe a computer simulation of life is "alive". Why not, since they believe a non-biologic simulation of the highest expression of life will be conscious?

 

[nescafe]

The point being that until our deep thinkers who believe substrate is irrelevant to consciousness sort that out, what are they doing?

No, they don't seem to believe a computer simulation of life is "alive". Why not, since they believe a non-biologic simulation of the highest expression of life will be conscious?

What is this "highest expression of life" thingy you talk about?

 

[my_wan]

But when you say that devices are doing calculations that have physical effects - OK, I know what you mean, and from an engineering POV that's a reasonable thing to say. But which devices are performing computation, and which are not? Is a bicycle performing computation? Is an alarm clock? How do you define in a physical sense what it means to carry out computation?

I would say a bicycle and and alarm clock is performing calculations. The question of "which devices are performing computation, and which are not" is relevant. The misappropriation of which device is doing what is involved in the pen and paper calculation producing intelligence.

The reason this is relevant is because of the claim that performing a particular computation will result in a particular effect - namely, consciousness. Now, either this is a physical process, or it is not. If it is a physical process, to produce the same effect then there must be the same physical thing going on. Hence dealing cards, or neurons operating, or a computer running must have some physical commonality. In order for the theory to make sense, the physical operations of computation must be defined in order that the claim that computation can produce consciousness can be supported.

When you demonstrate on paper an algorithm capable of sophia, it does not produce sophia on that paper. That's because you are the process driving the algorithm. That's why I've said before it effectively proves you have the properties your demonstrating on paper. Only when it is translated to a machine that can autonomously run the algorithm can it be said that you have created an autonomous sophia, not dependent on your sophia to demonstrate.

As you noted, from a physical perspective which devices are doing what is critically important. And the pen and paper sophia thought experiment demonstrates exactly this failure to recognize ourselves as one of the physical devices involved.

In general discussion, it's perfectly acceptable to use computation in a loose sense physically. We don't need to concern ourselves with an attempt at precise physical definitions unless someone is claiming precise physical effects.

The symmetries defined by a calculation can generally be translated to many different physical subsystems. While putting it on paper it is merely a subsystem of yourself plus pen and paper or equivalent. We conceptually generalize because we can recognize that same symmetry in many different physical subsystems. But the fact remains it is always a physical subsystem, even when it's only a physical subsystem of yourself as a thought process.

It's true we don't always have to be so precise. Yet not recognizing what we are not being precise about leads to things like the claim some ink written on paper can have sophia. When in fact the physical processes demonstrating sophia is the author. All calculations, algorithms, etc., whether solely in our heads or in external physical processes, are physical processes.

I get this detailed about physical definitions and algorithms because I want to nail these definitions down to the point of defining the specification for the actual equipment we need to pull it off. At least push the technology to a new level, getting us closer.

 

[westprog]

I had to look twice at the posting name when I read that. Are you being lighthearted? You know I can't always tell.

No, I think it's reasonable. The best way to compute the path of Mars around the Sun is to observe the path of Mars around the Sun. Running an astronomical simulation is second best. How can the simulation have additional qualities to the thing it's attempting to simulate?

 

[rocketdodger]

No, they don't seem to believe a computer simulation of life is "alive". Why not, since they believe a non-biologic simulation of the highest expression of life will be conscious?

Um, we do believe simulated life is alive. In the space of the simulation.

Just as life in our space is only alive within that same space.

EDIT -- An interesting tidbit is that westprog has outright stated that if we are in fact in a simulation right now then we are neither real nor conscious. Do you share that sentiment?

 

[westprog]

It is not clear to me that this is the case. Are you saying that a physical effect cannot result from more than physical process?. What definition are you using for "physical"?

"Physical" can be broadly considered as "something that can be put into a physics textbook without looking out of place". There's a tighter definition than that, I'm sure, but that will do as a placeholder.

Can the same effect be brought about by different physical processes? Of course it can. We can accelerate mass by gravity, by electrical force, by magnetism, by throwing it. These are very different physical processes, but they are unified by the physical concept of force. Gravity and electromagnetism are quite separate , but they both apply force, and force works the same way for all massive objects.

If computation were as well-defined a concept as force, then it could rightfully take its place in the physics textbooks and we could clearly see when computation is taking place and when it is not.

By the way, I wouldn't call my definition of a computation loose. The recognition that nothing is (as far as we know) a perfect computer does not make the definition loose.

It's possible for a definition to be exact, but not applicable to a particular field.