Germany had the atomic bomb first

[NWO Sentryman]

Even if Schikelgruber had the bomb, it would be a one-off: it's not like the Reich was exactly swimming in the necessary materials at the time. In addition, presuming a bomb the size of the American ones, the Luftwaffe probably couldn't have delivered anyway.

Also, **** Hitler.

if there even was a luftwaffe at the time.

 

[Paulhoff]

Funny how PBS had something on the radio about what this thread is about, I heard it on the radio a day or two ago.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/hydro/close.html

Paul

 

[BaaBaa]

if there even was a luftwaffe at the time.

Exactly-the most effective delivery I could think of would be as a "take THAT!", booby trap kind of thing especially given that Hitler was given to declaring cities 'fortresses' and demanding Heroic Last Stands(c).

 

[coalesce]

How do you think that mouse got to be six-feet tall? Oh, come on. Everybody knows that radiation causes small animals to grow into huge beasts. There is your proof! Disneyland is 'in on it'.
-LF

Now that's just goofy!

Michael

 

[Debaser]

1st choice: yes, probably London
2nd choice: unlikely to be US - out of range! Either a major Soviet city such as Moscow or Leningrad (Stalingrad was already in ruins), or a major Allied supply port such as Antwerp
3rd choice: Paris, out of spite, or a major German city out of spite and the will to destroy the people who failed him

Even if Schikelgruber had the bomb, it would be a one-off: it's not like the Reich was exactly swimming in the necessary materials at the time. In addition, presuming a bomb the size of the American ones, the Luftwaffe probably couldn't have delivered anyway.

Also, **** Hitler.

Exactly-the most effective delivery I could think of would be as a "take THAT!", booby trap kind of thing especially given that Hitler was given to declaring cities 'fortresses' and demanding Heroic Last Stands(c).

For these reasons I would suggest the first and only choice of target would actually be Berlin. A Berlin swarming with Red Army Bolsheviks and Germans who had shown themselves unworthy of Hitler's leadership.

A grand, defiant and utterly lunatic gesture...

 

[jimbob]

But luckily Heisenberg miscalculated the amount needed for a critical mass, and Germany lacked the infrastructure to produce a bomb, so it is all pretty "academic".

 

[dafydd]

If Hitler hadn't forced many Jewish scientists to flee Germany he might have had the bomb.Some of them worked on the Manhattan Project.I bet that sticks in Magz's Aryan craw.

 

[Simon39759]

For these reasons I would suggest the first and only choice of target would actually be Berlin. A Berlin swarming with Red Army Bolsheviks and Germans who had shown themselves unworthy of Hitler's leadership.

A grand, defiant and utterly lunatic gesture...

It really depends at what time in our fantasy scenario Hitler would have gotten his little hands on the bomb.
If it's early enough, I guess, he would probably have tried to wriggle some kind of delivery system. The Germans had been working on some pretty big transport planes/bombers.

If it happens after the crippling of the Luftwaffe, they probably would have left the bomb at a surprise in whatever city they would be retreating of at the time, including a German one if it happened that late in the war (although, by that time, it seems unlikely that such a research effort could have been sustained).

 

[shadron]

You still there, LGR?

Do you understand what the Manhattan Project involved and why the US didn't need Germany's help in 1945?

The Hiroshima bomb (Little Boy) was relatively easy to build. The hard part was getting and purifying the requisite Uranium. By 1945, the US had that part figured out.

(Fat Man was an engineering nightmare but that's another story.)

Both bombs had the problem of proper initiation. They both also had the problem of finding the correct critical mass in their various configurations.

 

[jimbob]

Both bombs had the problem of proper initiation. They both also had the problem of finding the correct critical mass in their various configurations.

Yes,

And this is one reason why they failed:

link

Powers and Frayn assert Heisenberg never calculated the critical mass of a U235 nuclear bomb. In fact, as my book Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project (University of California Press, 1998) proves, Heisenberg had made such a calculation in early 1940 using the statistical technique known as the random walk and concluded that the critical mass was of the order of tons of U235. He did not simply dream this up as Frayn’s argument insists, but calculated it using nuclear data. The calculation is rehearsed no less than three times in the transcripts of the taped conversations between Heisenberg and other German physicists interned at Farm Hall in England in August 1945. It was this gross overestimate of the amount of U235 required for a bomb that prevented Heisenberg from driving ahead at full speed with the uranium bomb project.

 

[tazjet]

So how would the OP address the findings of the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt who examined the Ohrduf area and found no signs of a nuclear test having taken place.

That's an inaccurate assessment of what the PTB report actually said. It in fact concluded that the question remained open or in other words could neither be proven nor disproven by soil samples taken at Ordruf.

The report said in conclusion (translated to English):

The soil samples show only contamination that due to, among other things, the reactor accident at Chernobyl. A scientific rebuttal to the alleged nuclear test at the end of the Second World War but can not with this or any other sample analysis are provided. A final assessment of the historical context is thus still open.

The PTB report itself is highly deficient and failed to give the Lambada values for Caesium 137 decay at the site which would have told us the age of 137Cs deposits there. It remained silent on the decay ratios of Caesium 137 to Barium 137.

Additionally there was no mention of Xenon 134 which would have been present if the soil was contaminated by Caesium 134 fall out from Chernobyl. Caesium 134 was known to have been spread in fall out clouds from Chernobyl. This makes it all the more disturbing that the 2006 PTB report says nothing about 134Cs/134Xe levels?

Since Xe134 is the decay product of 134Cs and 134Cs is created exclusively inside a nuclear reactor and not at all from a nuclear explosion, I would have thought any half decent report on soil samples would address that point.

When I wrote recently to Dr Herbert Janssen of the PTB enquiring about findings for Xenon 134 I got no response.

The PTB report also ignores the fact that it's soil sampling results at Ohrdruf are a close match for a fall out study of soil samples taken around Hiroshima in 1983.

One should read the Journal of Radiation Research Vol.24, No.3(1983) pp.229-236 report by Robert Santoro, Stephen Egbert, John Barnes, George Kerr, Joseph Pace III, James Roberts, Charles Slater.

At Hiroshima, the only site of a Uranium nuclear weapon explosion Uranium 235 is almost undetectable now above ambient natural U235 radiation levels, however Caesium 137 is still detectable.

The only conclusion which one can draw about the 2006 PTB report on Ohrdruf is that it is superficial and failed to even attempt to resolve questions which the soil samples could have answered.

 

[tazjet]

Even if Schikelgruber had the bomb, it would be a one-off: it's not like the Reich was exactly swimming in the necessary materials at the time. In addition, presuming a bomb the size of the American ones, the Luftwaffe probably couldn't have delivered anyway.

Also, **** Hitler.

I'd say the Nazis were swimming in uranium. When Belgium was overrun in 1940, Germany captured 3,500 tonnes of uranium oxide sourced from mines in the Belgian Congo. This stockpile was stored at salt mines in Strassfurt. By 1945 the Allies recovered only 1,100 tonnes of Belgium's uranium, but 2,370 tonnes remains unaccounted for to this day.

The primary uranium refinery was at Oranienberg, but two others also came into production during the war. Carter P Hydrick, author of Critical Mass - Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb refers to the refining of 280.6 kilograms of uranium metal by the end of 1940. Historian Margaret Gowing reveals that at least 600 tons of uranium was refined to metal by the end of 1941. Dr Reihl who was responsible for German uranium refining during WW2 says the figure was much higher than Gowing’s figures.

Since refining of Uranium metal is not an easy task one must ask why go to so much bother?

The Germans developed Mark III-B ultracentrifuges instead of gaseous diffusion favoured by USA. The German ultracentrifuge was similar to Iran’s P-2 centrifuges and it was about 30 times more efficient than gaseous diffusion methods.

Groth in fact calculated in 1941 that an early model of the centrifuge would enrich 2 kilograms of Uranium hexafluoride by 7 percent per day.

A Kiel firm Anschütz & Co built the Mark III-A which Dr Paul Harteck deployed to an enrichment plant at Celle, northern Germany. There was also a contract for 600,000 Reichsmarks let by Dr Abraham Essau of the Reich Research Council in April 1944 with funding for 40 mark III-B ultracentrifuges which were built at the Hellage factory in Freiberg. These units were established in a disused linen factory in Kandern, Bavaria.

As for delivery the Germany possesed two aircraft in 1945 which could overfly Britain with impunity from interception. These were the Dornier Do-217K with a service ceiling of 53,000 feet and the Heinkel He-277 with a service ceiling of 47,000ft. Germany had built at least eight He-277 by 1945.

NN+QQ (first prototype) W.Nr.535550
GA+QQ (second prototype) former He177 A-08 W.Nr.23
NE+OD (third prototype)
GA+QQ Heinkel He277 V9 (delivered to Eprobungstelle Reichlin mid 1944)
GA+QR Heinkel He277 V10 (delivered to Eprobungstelle Reichlin mid 1944)
GA+QM Heinkel He277 V26 (delivered to Eprobungstelle Reichlin mid 1944)
GA+QX Heinkel He277 V18 (delivered to Eprobungstelle Reichlin mid 1944)

Robert Jungk wrote a book "Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists" which claimed that Germany's nuclear scientists deliberately sabotaged the Atomic bomb project. It was Jungk whjo also propagated the claim that Heisenberg did not understand the critical mass for an Atiomic bomb.

Historian Margaret Gowing challenged Jungk's theory when she wrote “Niels Bohr and Nuclear Weapons” Niels Bohr A Centenary Edition, edited by A P French & J P Kennedy (Cambridge Massachussets 1985) P.267 notes that in 1941, Houtermanns’ paper not only calculated critical mass for Plutonium but also the critical mass for U235. This was based upon a report by Houtermanns, “Zer Frage der Auslosung” (Nov 1941) pp 31,33 (Oak Ridge G-94, pp.139) 1944 reprint of this report with omissions is (Oak Ridge G-267, pp.33)

Before Jungk's death in 1994 in the face of evidence that Heisenberg had been promoting development of a German A-bomb Jungk retracted his claim that Heisenberg sought to prevent the Nazi A-bomb.

At the Harnek-Haus conference 4th of June 1942, Goering created Physikalisch Technicalish Reichsanstalt RFR (Plenipotentiary of the Reich Marshal for Nuclear Physics) headed by Abraham Essau, then President of RFR, later replaced by Speer with Gelach. Speer did indeed try to sabotage the A-bomb project but was later sidelined in 1944 by Himmler.

Present at the Harnek Haus conference were; Hahn, Diebner, Harteck, Wirtz, Thiessen, Vogler, Heisenberg, from the military were Frederich Fromm (Wehrmacht), Erhard Milch (Luftwaffe) and Karl Witzell (Kreigsmarine) plus Albert Speer.

Milch recalled in his memoirs that when Heisenberg who was seeking funding for such a project described the feasibility of creating an Atomic bomb, Milch stood up and asked heisenberg approximately how big an atomic weapon would be to destroy an entire city?

Heisenberg replied, "About as big as a pineapple."

In direct response to this Milch requested the development of a nuclear bomber with 650 miles penetration at 440mph and engines using GM-1 nitrous oxide, or water methanol injection to attain a service ceiling of 45,000ft. the He-177 A5 and later A7 were attempts to meet this, but the He-277 exceeded Milch's specifications.

 

[dafydd]

All these facts are just going to confuse the Nazi fans.

 

[tazjet]

dafydd said

All these facts are just going to confuse the Nazi fans.

Tough

Why didn't Hitler use the bomb?

Because by August 1944 Himmler had full control over the bomb project and was negotiating a peace deal behind Hitler's back with Count Folke von Bernadotte.

Germany was still on the Strategic Bombing Survey list of targets for the Allied nuclear bomb until October 1944 when it was mysteriously taken off the list.

Dulles in Switzerland had been ordered by the American Government not to negotiate with Himmler for Operation Sunrise, but to seek someone less tainted in the SS to deal with. That was SS Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolf, however one suspects that Kammler really called the tunes in Sunrise negotiations and that Himmler became an embarassment to the British by 27 April 1945 when the BBC outed him.

The reason I speculate that Kammler was the real power behind the throne is that in effect he controlled the nazi nuclear project in 1944-45 and Gen Dornberger revealed after the war that he and von Braun had gone to Lisbon together in December 1944 to negotiate with two men from General Electric for the secret surrender of rocket scientists.

Neither von Braun nor Dornberger had the authority to guarantee safe delivery of Penemunde scientists to the Americans, however kammler did and it was kammler who defied Hitler's orders to liquidate the Penemunde engineers to prevent them falling into Soviet hands.

It was also Kammler who spirited nuclear scientist Kurt Diebner away to Garmisch Partenkirchen.

 

[Jungle Jim]

While this has turned out to be an interesting thread, let's be clear, the answer to the OP is a resounding NO!

 

[tazjet]

While this has turned out to be an interesting thread, let's be clear, the answer to the OP is a resounding NO!

Why?



Please don't disappoint an interesting thread with monosyllabic answers. I am happy to justify my views with sources. Please do likewise.

We all know they didn't use an Atomic Bomb. That doesn't mean ipso facto that they couldn't.

 

[Foolmewunz]

Why?



Please don't disappoint an interesting thread with monosyllabic answers. I am happy to justify my views with sources. Please do likewise.

We all know they didn't use an Atomic Bomb. That doesn't mean ipso facto that they couldn't.

I realize you're new and can't post links, but you can cite your sources and some us will help you parse them into hyperlinks.

I, for one, would like to know your sources on the Himmler/Red Cross peace initiatives. That sounds like smidgens of facts interspersed with dot-connecting.

 

[Jungle Jim]

Why?



Please don't disappoint an interesting thread with monosyllabic answers. I am happy to justify my views with sources. Please do likewise.

We all know they didn't use an Atomic Bomb. That doesn't mean ipso facto that they couldn't.

The OP states the Germans had the atomic bomb first. There has been nothing in the eight pages of this thread that confirms that view. Please excuse the brevity of my posts, but I generally give no more effort than is required.

 

[tazjet]

Count Folke von Bernadotte wrote his own autobiography before being assasinated by the Isreali Stern gang in September 1948. His book was published postumously.

Instead of Arms, Hodder and Stroughton,1949

I guess you could say there was no greater authority on the talks he held with Himmler than Bernadotte himself?

Bernadotte had negotiated a number of releases with Himmler and later in the war Himmler had been keen to discreetly distance himself from Hitler and war crimes in the eyes of the Allies

Himmler proposed surrender terms with Bernadotte at Lubeck on 24 April 1945 for Germany to continue fighting the Soviet Union but surrender to the western Allies. Bernadotte passed this information to Churchill and Truman but they rejected the idea. On 27 April 1945 Hitler heard a BBC broadcast whilst in his berlin bunker exposing these talks and promptly ordered the arrest and execution of both Himmler and Kammler.

Comments about Himmler's unacceptability arise from "Operation Sunrise," by Smith & Agarossi. Also from Operation Sunrise: America's OSS, Swiss Intelligence and the German Surrender 1945, by Stephen Hallbrook.

Interestingly it appears Hitler himself was aware of operation Sunrise at least as early as 17 April 1945.

Information about Dornberger's revelation at CSDIC internemnet camp 11 come from a 14 page report on what General Dornberger unwittingly disclosed to his compatriots at the camp in the presence of hidden microphones.

WO.208/4178.​

TOP SECRET
C. S. D. I. C. (U.K.)
G.G. REPORT
IF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS REQUIRED FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION. IT SHOULD BE PARAPHRASED SO THAT NO MENTION IS MADE OF THE PRISONERS' NAMES, NOR OF THE METHODS BY WHICH THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED​

G.R.G.G. 341​

Report on information obtained from Senior Officer PW on 2 -- 7 Aug 45
________________________________________
Generalmajor Bassenge (GOC Air Defences, Tunis & Biserta)
Captured Tunisia, 9 May 43
Generalleutnant von Schlieben, (Comd., Cherbourg)
Captured Cherbourg, 26 Jun 44
Generalleutnant Heim (Commandant Boulogne)
Captured Boulogne, 23 Sep 44
Oberstleutnant von der Heydte (Comd., Fallschirmjäger Kampfgruppe von der Heydte)
Captured Monschau, 23 Dec 44
General der Infanterie Röhricht (OKW Pool, formerly Comd., LIX AK,
Captured Artfeld) 1 Apr 45
Generalmajor a D. von Pfuhlstein (Former Comd., Brandenburg Div.)
Surrendered Wertheim a/M, 2 Apr 45
________________________________________


________________________________________

DISTRIBUTION
BY C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.)
M.I.19.a War Office (70 copies)
N.I.D. Admiralty ( 9 copies)
A.D.I.(K) Air Ministry (14 copies)​

________________________________________

I ARRIVAL​

Generalleutnant Walter Dornberger, 'Beauftragter z b V der Heereswerke GmbH', and Inspector of the Long-Range Rocket Arm (Inspekteur der Fernraketentruppe), has not arrived at No. 11 Camp.
Dornberger is 49 years old and a Protestant; his home is in Berlin. He was captured at Garmisch-Partenkirchen on 2 May 45.
Some details of his career are as follows:
1914-1918 served as an artillery officer.
The story of rocket development as seen by a PW who served under Dornberger and described by him in interrogation has been published as SRM.1264.
---

II DEPARTURES
III POST-WAR GERMANY
IV THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

V THE ATOM BOMB​

1. Generalleutnant Dornberger gave to SS-Obergruppenführer v Herff and Generalleutnant Heim the following account of German attempts to split the atom.

VI THE 'V 2'​

1. Generalleutnant Dornberger stated as below to Generalleutnant Heim that Hitler had publicly apologised for his failure to appreciate the full worth of the 'V 2' weapon:

Dornberger: The following incident was interesting: When I saw the Führer the last time, which was in May 1943, after I'd shown him a film about us, he was quite taken aback. Formerly the Führer had always turned the V-2 business down 100%. He said: "If only I' d believed in it!" If it really comes to anything, Europe is too small for the war", and all kind of things like that. Then he said: "There are two people in my life whose pardon I must ask. One is Generalfeldmarschall v Brauchitsch, who said at the end of each report he made to me: "My Führer, think of Peenemünde!", and the other is you, general, for not having believed in you."

Heim: It's incredible that he admitted it.

Dornberger: he admitted it in front of Keitel and the others.

Heim: I believe that really is the only thing he ever admitted in his life.

2. Dornberger claimed, on the other hand, that he had begged the Führer to stop the V-weapon propaganda, because nothing more could be expected from just one ton of explosive. To this Hitler had replied that Dornberger: might not expect more but he himself certainly did.

3. Dornberger alleged in the following passage with Generalmajor Bassenge that the Russians had made offers to men concerned in "V 2" development and had undertaken to double any bids from the American side:
Dornberger: The Russians sent one of my engineers to me when I was with the Americans, who told me under the seal of secrecy that he had such and such an offer to make to us on behalf of the Russians. We were to go back to Peenemünde. Peenemünde would be rebuilt and a parallel factory in Russia, and they offered us double what the Americans were offering us, and we could move our families with us and all that sort of thing. We turned it down flat. They tried again to kidnap our leading lights from us -- [Prof Dr Wernher von] Braun at Witzenhausen(?). They appeared at night time in English uniform; they didn't realize it was the American zone. They came to us and wanted to come in. They had a proper pass. But the Americans were quick to realize it and wouldn't let them in. So they got into cars and drove off again. That's how the people work. Real kidnapping, they don't stick to the boundaries at all.

4. Dornberger spoke to Generalleutnant Heim as below about his intention to sell his services to the best bidder:
Dornberger: If the English make me a better offer than the Americans within the next fortnight, I'm preparing to work for them at Vancouver. I have given instructions that nothing is to be signed yet., Actually I don't want to work for the English at all, I only want to play them off against the Americans.

5. Asked by Generalmajor v. Pfuhlstein whether he spoke English, Dornberger replied that with the Englishmen he did not do so on principle. He could understand them quite well but it gave him more time if he pretend otherwise. To Pfuhlstein's suggestion that he should not weaken his position by giving too much away, Dornberger replied that he intended to reveal no real technical secrets noting of decisive value. Asked by Generalleutnant Heim whether he was going to America to work there, he replied that he was, or rather that he did not know whether, as a 'general' he would be allowed to go there.

6. Dornberger stated to General Fink that Kammler had been ordered by the Führer not to let Braun, Dornberger and the 450 scientists and technicians at Peenemünde fall into Anglo-American hands but to liquidate them all beforehand.

7. Dornberger, in conversation with Generalmajor Bassenge, made the following miscellaneous remarks dealing with the 'V 2'. He said that:

a. 720 persons were killed in the first raid on Peenemünde and all the work there suffered two months' delay.

b. In Poland, at the Heidelager, they had once fired a 'V 2' into a concentration camp. He consoled himself with the thought that that would be chalked up to the SS and not to themselves.

c. A German general in a Russian tank had one day appeared in front of one of Dornberger's 'Regimenter' which was near Arnswalde and had called upon its members by megaphone to come over to the Russians. He had promised them that the Tchochinski(?) Works were waiting to receive them and would pay them the maximum wages to build 'V 2s' for Stalin.

d. Braun and Dornberger himself had realised at the end of December 1944 that things were going wrong and had consequently been in touch since that time with the General Electric Company through the German Embassy in Portugal, with a view to coming to some arrangement.

VII GERMAN ATROCITIES​

1. Oberstleutnant v.d. Heydte stated to other senior officer PW that to him it was no favour, but a punishment, to have to see the atrocity films. it was just clumsy propaganda, and he would no more yield to pressure on that issue than he had formerly done as regards reading the 'Völkischer Beobachter' or 'Vorwärts.'

2. Generalleutnant Dornberger, after maintaining to Generalmajor Bassenge in the following passage that the Concentration Camp stories were one-sided, went on to blame Kammler for some very definite atrocities:

Dornberger: Look, what a fuss they've made about all those concentration camps. In the first place, one can counter them simply, because all the ministers and officials have been in concentration camps, and if things had gone as badly as that with them, they wouldn't be alive. Of course, swinish things did happen. At Nordhausen Standartenführer Behr (?) said: "We've got 6000 people who are ill and cannot be taken away; what shall we do with them?" Kammler said: "Get rid of them!" He said: "How am I supposed to get rid of 6,000 people?" "Oh, take them to that rock and then blow it up over them, and then the matter's settled." That's how he dealt with people. The Allies are very much after him. The fellow was ruthless. In Holland, he made Dutchmen build the sites for the V 2, then he had them herded together and killed by MG fire. He opened brothels for his soldiers with 20 Dutch girls. When they'd been there a fortnight they were shot and new ones were brought along, so that they couldn't divulge anything they might discover from the soldiers.

VIII THE 20TH JULY 'PUTSCH'​

Generalleutnant Dornberger gave to Generalmajor Bassenge the following description of what he saw when he went to report to Fromm on 21 Jul 44:
Dornberger:

On 21 Jul I went to make my report to Fromm. I arrived at 8:30 in the morning and Stauffenberg and Co were lying out in the courtyard. I had no idea what was going on.

Bassenge: Did you see him lying there?

Dornberger: Yes.

Bassenge: With any signs of maltreatment?

Dornberger: No, shot. They were lying near the sand heap, just at the door.

Bassenge: Not even covered over?

Dornberger: Nothing at all. Shortly afterwards they were taken away -- there were four of them. General Olbricht was one of them -- they'd torn off his shoulder badges. I then went up. I had no idea at all what was happening. They said Fromm wasn't there; I waited two hours and then Himmler came. Only then we realized what was up. Himmler addressed the nation. They shot Fromm, quite recently, perhaps a fortnight before the collapse. Himmler had a persecution mania. He had me arrested on 27 Apr, for not carrying out orders. I only got away thanks to Kammler, who was also to be arrested. We both drove off to Garmisch.

IX THE GERMAN ATTACK ON RUSSIA​

General Röhricht gave to various other Senior Officer PW the following picture of the background against which the decision to attack Russia in 1941 was taken:

Schlieben: How was it that we actually came to attack Russia?

Röhricht: We ourselves at Fontainebleau were very surprised when it turned out that this GAF attack on England had proved an absolute failure, and we had to draw the conclusions of the whole prosecution of the war. "England cannot be defeated now; in order to bring the GAF and the Navy up to the pitch necessary to defeat England, we must forfeit a great part of the army. As long as the army is still available let's quickly make one last big effort and form the new 'Divisionen'." That very pleasant and unbiased man Siewert here, will confirm that at that time Hitler sent for Fromm to come to the Obersalzberg, and discussed with Fromm the possibility of forming further 'Divisionen', before von Brauchitsch heard anything about it. Brauchitsch was told about it by Fromm. Even if the army had a higher opinion of Russia's power than the Party did, it didn't estimate it nearly high enough. Kinzel, who was Chief of General Staff 'East', always said, even in his report before the Russian campaign, when it was primarily for the OKH a question of concentrating: "e have no definite information. The only means we have at the moment, apart from diplomatic sources and what we find out by devious means, is wireless interception, and according to that the situation looks thus and thus; how much of that is true, and how much they are bluffing us, I don't know. The frontier is hermetically sealed." As well as that there was the fact that the campaign against Finland had not made any overwhelming impression on us. When Halder expressed his opinion of the affair, he said something which gave us a terrible shock: "There will be surprises, perhaps on a tremendous scale." One of those was the Russians' improvised strategic concentrations brought up by rail for the move into Poland. Halder said that was an achievement of which no-one would have thought the Russians capable. That is illustrated very well by the personal memories of Heim; the idea was rampant that if we defeated the Russians at the front the State would collapse anyhow, and that in winter we would simply advance into Russia and change over to form strongpoints there from which to suppress any risings. Heim said that this order was issued more or less at a time when they were in the midst of heavy fighting, and all the suppositions proved false.

CSDSIC(UK)
11 Aug 45​

________________________________________

(29111) Wtr51755/3515 37,000 2/45
A. & E.W.Ltd GP.692 J.7303
TOP SECRET​

 

[tazjet]

The OP states the Germans had the atomic bomb first. There has been nothing in the eight pages of this thread that confirms that view. Please excuse the brevity of my posts, but I generally give no more effort than is required.

Then you've obviously expended an awful lot of effort over the past eight pages for nothing and should maybe give up posting now.

Nothing you have said subsequent to my posts has persuaded me that the information I have posted is invalid and neither have you made any worthwhile effort to dispute my evidence thus far.