Free will and omniscience

[Belz...]

We can only describe an omniscient being from our limited perspective. Including implications that being omniscient is logically understandable and that the laws of physics/nature as we understand it is universal.

No.... WE made that word, and we gave it a clear definition. You're just spouting new age nonsense.

 

[dafydd]

No.... WE made that word, and we gave it a clear definition. You're just spouting new age nonsense.

Punsssh, how are you getting on with that glossary of words that you have redefined?

 

[Roboramma]

To an omniscient being the world is like a painting: the past, the present, the future, it's all there.

To say "You could choose X, but you choose Y", is like saying "this part of the painting could be blue, but it's green". What does "could" mean in this case? The painting is green. The painting is all there is. There's no other potentiality because this part of the painting is green.

 

[dafydd]

The problem is that an omniscient being cannot be understood by us sufficiently, to deal with the issue of freewill. If you examine a sequence of choices in any detail you come up against potentially infinite regression. This may be manageable if we're dealing with numbers or atoms. But when we are dealing with a being and what this being knows it becomes impossible in any relevant way.

I am only required to remind one of the implications of infinity when applied to knowing, to illustrate this.

Say I was deciding what to cook for dinner in a hypermarket. The omniscient being would know/be aware of an infinite variation in possible outcomes in the hypermarket. Indeed with such insight as one would expect from such a being, the being would know how the combination of every atom in an infinitely large universe would affect the movement and interaction of every atom down to the Planck scale (and infinitely beyond it). In fact it would be aware of many infinitely short segments of time between the change of state between two atoms in the hypermarket and its implications.
When the choice was made about what the dinner would consist of, there would potentially be infinite variation in influencing factors for the precise chemical change which swung the issue to become lost in. Such complexity would be a breeze for this being to know. In fact it would know infinitely more details than that.

The distinction between a free choice and a pre-determined choice would become lost in the detail and the difference in cosmic impact between the few choices I was actually realistically likely to chose from might be so slight that there may be space for a genuinely free choice to be made.

Not to mention the large number of choices I was involved in between the entrance of the hypermarket and the point where the menu for the evening were known to myself.

And during all this I knew I was either going to have omelette or curry. I just hadn't made up my mind yet.

Gibberish. Infinitely beyond the Planck scale indeed! Still, it sounds sciency so you probably find it impressive. Or not maybe? Perhaps you could furnish us with your theory and the maths concerning this infinity beyond the Planck length.

 

[H'ethetheth]

To an omniscient being the world is like a painting: the past, the present, the future, it's all there.

To say "You could choose X, but you choose Y", is like saying "this part of the painting could be blue, but it's green". What does "could" mean in this case? The painting is green. The painting is all there is. There's no other potentiality because this part of the painting is green.

I just want to say that this is what I've been trying to argue, only more succinct.

 

[AvalonXQ]

To an omniscient being the world is like a painting: the past, the present, the future, it's all there.

To say "You could choose X, but you choose Y", is like saying "this part of the painting could be blue, but it's green". What does "could" mean in this case? The painting is green. The painting is all there is. There's no other potentiality because this part of the painting is green.

But including beings with free will in the painting, means placing parts of the painting that determine their own color.

The analogy would be if I had a special kind of paint that, when I put it on the canvas, can decide to turn blue or green as I'm painting it. Then the description has meaning -- "this part of the painting could be blue, but it's green". An omniscient being could see that the paint is green but still recognize that it could have been blue -- that the object in the painting itself has a choice.


I do have an analogy for the omniscient being as an actual meddling designer. I, the adult, construct several sets of toy railroad tracks. As I'm constructing them, I take junctions out of the box and place them on the board, then let my kids choose which way the switches for the junctions will be set.

Now, each of my kids is only mentally following a single track as though one train were going on it, and doesn't really focus much on the other tracks. I, on the other hand, am building and re-arranging the whole set so that each child has genuine choices to make with their switches, and those choices then have further effects on the whole train map -- including, in some cases, me choosing to make alterations to the track at places before a particular switch. But at no time do I remove the junctions or render my childs' choices meaningless. For each child, her track (the one whose junctions she controls) will be strongly influenced by the choices she makes, while the other tracks will also be altered to a lesser extent so that they all fit properly on the map.

The fact that I built the track up to the point of the junction doesn't determine the junction, and the fact that I continue to build track before and after the junction doesn't render the junction meaningless (I could, of course, do so, but I won't and I certainly don't have to).

 

[GeeMack]

But including beings with free will in the painting, means placing parts of the painting that determine their own color.

Oh, nonsense. An atemporal omniscient being knows that the part you allegedly choose to be green will be green, and it knows it even if you wavered between green and blue before you settled on green. That is, unless you still insist on dishonestly redefining omniscience.

 

[H'ethetheth]

But including beings with free will in the painting, means placing parts of the painting that determine their own color.

The analogy would be if I had a special kind of paint that, when I put it on the canvas, can decide to turn blue or green as I'm painting it.

Yes, and the question remains: What does it mean for the paint to "decide" its color if I can know with absolute certainty that it will turn out green? It is indistinguishable in every thinkable way from green paint that has no choice whatsoever.

ETA: Basically this paint can be described as "paint that will decide to be green". I'd just call that green paint.

 

[Belz...]

But including beings with free will in the painting, means placing parts of the painting that determine their own color.

I think you're a bit confused about the point, here. Let me make that clear:

Omniscience precludes free will. Free will precludes omniscience. You can't have one without the other, so you pick your poison.

However, since neither free will nor omniscience are physically possible, the only sensible option is to disbelieve in their existence altogether.

 

[dafydd]

Omniscience precludes free will. Free will precludes omniscience. You can't have one without the other, so you pick your poison.

Christians want to have their cake and eat it. Witness their pick 'n' mix approach to the bible.

 

[punshhh]

I think you're a bit confused about the point, here. Let me make that clear:

Omniscience precludes free will. Free will precludes omniscience. You can't have one without the other, so you pick your poison.

However, since neither free will nor omniscience are physically possible, the only sensible option is to disbelieve in their existence altogether.

Sounds like you've got it all sown up.

Oh apart from the bit where I point out that we don't actually know what exists and therefore whether our particular brand of reasoning can address such an issue. Or whether our conclusion bares any relation to what exists.

 

[dafydd]

Sounds like you've got it all sown up.

Oh apart from the bit where I point out that we don't actually know what exists and therefore whether our particular brand of reasoning can address such an issue. Or whether our conclusion bares any relation to what exists.

We do know what exists. Take a look around you without using your special branch of reasoning.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Yes, and the question remains: What does it mean for the paint to "decide" its color if I can know with absolute certainty that it will turn out green? It is indistinguishable in every thinkable way from green paint that has no choice whatsoever.

It matters if the decision process itself has value.

Yay for analogies. Let's say that I have a liquor cabinet in my house, and I don't want my son to drink anything in it. Consider the following two situations:

1) I leave the liquor cabinet unlocked, in full view of my son, and tell my son not to open it.

2) I lock the liquor cabinet, and tell my son that the cabinet is locked.

Assume also that in both scenario 1 and scenario 2, the son doesn't open the liquor cabinet. I nonetheless claim that the two situations are different in a valuable way -- even though the outcome is the same, in the first case my son chose the right outcome, and in the second case I chose the right outcome for him. The first scenario therefore gives my son an opportunity to develop self-control and grow, while the second does not.

The process of allowing someone to make a free will decision matters, even if the decision itself could have been replicated even in the absence of free will.

 

[dafydd]

It matters if the decision process itself has value.

Yay for analogies. Let's say that I have a liquor cabinet in my house, and I don't want my son to drink anything in it. Consider the following two situations:

1) I leave the liquor cabinet unlocked, in full view of my son, and tell my son not to open it.

2) I lock the liquor cabinet, and tell my son that the cabinet is locked.

Assume also that in both scenario 1 and scenario 2, the son doesn't open the liquor cabinet. I nonetheless claim that the two situations are different in a valuable way -- even though the outcome is the same, in the first case my son chose the right outcome, and in the second case I chose the right outcome for him. The first scenario therefore gives my son an opportunity to develop self-control and grow, while the second does not.

The process of allowing someone to make a free will decision matters, even if the decision itself could have been replicated even in the absence of free will.

But there is no sky daddy who locks up his drinks cabinet.

 

[H'ethetheth]

It matters if the decision process itself has value.

Yay for analogies. Let's say that I have a liquor cabinet in my house, and I don't want my son to drink anything in it. Consider the following two situations:

1) I leave the liquor cabinet unlocked, in full view of my son, and tell my son not to open it.

2) I lock the liquor cabinet, and tell my son that the cabinet is locked.

Assume also that in both scenario 1 and scenario 2, the son doesn't open the liquor cabinet. I nonetheless claim that the two situations are different in a valuable way -- even though the outcome is the same, in the first case my son chose the right outcome, and in the second case I chose the right outcome for him. The first scenario therefore gives my son an opportunity to develop self-control and grow, while the second does not.

The process of allowing someone to make a free will decision matters, even if the decision itself could have been replicated even in the absence of free will.

But that does not address my problem at all. The point is that if it is knowable with 100% certainty that your son will not, in this universe, open the drinks cabinet, then what does it mean to say he could have opened the drinks cabinet? With equal ease I could assert the very opposite, namely that your son was absolutely predestined not to open it, as evidenced by the fact that he didn't. There is no way to determine who is correct, so it is a meaningless proposition.

 

[GeeMack]

It matters if the decision process itself has value.

Yay for analogies. Let's say that I have a liquor cabinet in my house, and I don't want my son to drink anything in it. Consider the following two situations:

1) I leave the liquor cabinet unlocked, in full view of my son, and tell my son not to open it.

2) I lock the liquor cabinet, and tell my son that the cabinet is locked.

Assume also that in both scenario 1 and scenario 2, the son doesn't open the liquor cabinet. I nonetheless claim that the two situations are different in a valuable way -- even though the outcome is the same, in the first case my son chose the right outcome, and in the second case I chose the right outcome for him. The first scenario therefore gives my son an opportunity to develop self-control and grow, while the second does not.

And in any case, if there was a magical atemporal omniscient being, the outcome of the scenario is known. Since the outcome is known, any alleged exercise of free will is only an illusion of choice. Unless you're going to dishonestly redefine omniscience and/or free will again.

 

[joobz]

It matters if the decision process itself has value.

Yay for analogies. Let's say that I have a liquor cabinet in my house, and I don't want my son to drink anything in it. Consider the following two situations:

1) I leave the liquor cabinet unlocked, in full view of my son, and tell my son not to open it.

2) I lock the liquor cabinet, and tell my son that the cabinet is locked.

Assume also that in both scenario 1 and scenario 2, the son doesn't open the liquor cabinet. I nonetheless claim that the two situations are different in a valuable way -- even though the outcome is the same, in the first case my son chose the right outcome, and in the second case I chose the right outcome for him. The first scenario therefore gives my son an opportunity to develop self-control and grow, while the second does not.

The process of allowing someone to make a free will decision matters, even if the decision itself could have been replicated even in the absence of free will.

There isn't a practical difference in the scenarios. It is possible that your son would break the lock to the cabinet. Hence, these do not represent an example of a case of free will/no free will.

If one believes in an omniscient god, it is impossible for free will to be real. As he knows the scripts by which all things play out. Our ignorance of that script doesn't negate it.

From a general view, I do believe we exercise a form of free will. At least I choose to believe it. This is made possible as I do not believe there is a master plan we follow. There isn't an external being that has a desired outcome we are working towards. As such, there are multiple paths that are always before more, and I get to choose which way the script is wrought.

 

[AvalonXQ]

But that does not address my problem at all. The point is that if it is knowable with 100% certainty that your son will not, in this universe, open the drinks cabinet, then what does it mean to say he could have opened the drinks cabinet?

It means that he had the choice to open the liquor cabinet, rather than not having that choice.

Making the choice not to open the liquor cabinet is a different experience for my son than experiencing an inability to open the liquor cabinet.

So, my choice to constrain or fail to constrain my son has consequences, because a free will choice to do X is not experientially equivalent to encountering restraints that force X.

 

[AvalonXQ]

If one believes in an omniscient god, it is impossible for free will to be real. As he knows the scripts by which all things play out. Our ignorance of that script doesn't negate it.

You keep saying that, but you don't demonstrate why it is so.

I've explained how choices free of coercion are meaningful even if the outcome is known.

 

[joobz]

You keep saying that, but you don't demonstrate why it is so.

if it is known, your choice doesn't exist.

I've explained how choices free of coercion are meaningful even if the outcome is known.

I am not talking about the outcome. I am talking about the choice.
If it is known by god what you are going to do, then you are following a script.
You didn't make a choice. You only think you are.