Free will and omniscience

[Roboramma]

Precisely.

Omniscience is a symbol for greater than the great, or beyond counting, or beyond understanding. Logically it is a nonsense, in a similar way that to contemplate infinity in anything real is a nonsense.

Contemplating infinity in real things is not nonsense. For instance, it's not nonsense to suggest that the universe is infinite in spacial extent.

If there is anything approaching the notion of omniscience in existence, it is clearly beyond the capacity of our simple minds to understand.

That may be clear to you, but its certainly not clear to me.

 

[punshhh]

Contemplating infinity in real things is not nonsense. For instance, it's not nonsense to suggest that the universe is infinite in spacial extent.

Yes that is not nonsense, but neither is it a contemplation of an infinity in real things. It is a statement.

For example I can state that there are an infinite number of points on the head of a pin. Now we can agree with the statement, because it makes sense. But try contemplating the points on the pin, visualise zooming in on the head of the pin with a microscope. Visualise the points and realise that each point is in fact a collection of countless smaller points and each of these smaller points is a collection of countless smaller points and so on ad infinitum.

Do you now have a visualisation a bit like a fractal? In which the scale of the points on the pin become meaningless, as there is a perception of gradations in the size or breadth of each point larger and also smaller than the size of point you visualise at any moment, stretching to infinity.

That may be clear to you, but its certainly not clear to me.

If you can conceive of all the points on the head of the pin described above, perhaps you could understand the mind of an omniscient being. But I doubt it, from the perspective of someone who has spent thousands of hours in deep thought about such issues.

Perhaps you should give it a bit more thought.

 

[Roboramma]

Yes that is not nonsense, but neither is it a contemplation of an infinity in real things. It is a statement.

And cosmological models in which the universe is infinite in spacial extent are contemplation of an infinity in real things: that is, they are looking at the actual implications of that infinity in a real thing (the spacial extent of the universe) and comparing those implications to the world that we see. The fact that there's an infinity involved doesn't in any way invalidate that process, or make it impossible.

If you can conceive of all the points on the head of the pin described above, perhaps you could understand the mind of an omniscient being. But I doubt it, from the perspective of someone who has spent thousands of hours in deep thought about such issues.

Perhaps you should give it a bit more thought.

I didn't suggest that I could have a complete understanding of the mind of an omniscient being. I suggested that we could understand it, but I'll admit that can be taken in many ways. I am trying to suggest that we can understand some aspects of it, that we can make statements about it and determine if those statements are true or false.

For instance, I can say that an omniscient being must necessarily know my birthday, because a) my birthday is an actual thing in this universe (I have a birthday) and b) being omniscient it knows all things.

This doesn't mean I can fully understand the mind of an omniscient being, only that it's not impossible to know some things about it.

Which, to get back to the topic, means that it's at least possible that we can understand whether or not omniscience is compatible with free will.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I think the typical problem people have in reconciling these two concepts is that they have an idea in their head of how omniscience works and there's no reason to believe it actually works that way.

Omniscience isn't conceptually any different than considering the past from the viewpoint of the present. Our current knowledge of past decisions don't constrain their freedom; neither does the knowledge of an atemporal being do so.

Since libertarian free will is a bogus concept anyway in and of itself, obviously it cannot be reconciled with another iffy concept. Not only can there be no free will if omniscience; no, there cannot be free will period.

 

[punshhh]

And cosmological models in which the universe is infinite in spacial extent are contemplation of an infinity in real things: that is, they are looking at the actual implications of that infinity in a real thing (the spacial extent of the universe) and comparing those implications to the world that we see. The fact that there's an infinity involved doesn't in any way invalidate that process, or make it impossible.



I didn't suggest that I could have a complete understanding of the mind of an omniscient being. I suggested that we could understand it, but I'll admit that can be taken in many ways. I am trying to suggest that we can understand some aspects of it, that we can make statements about it and determine if those statements are true or false.

For instance, I can say that an omniscient being must necessarily know my birthday, because a) my birthday is an actual thing in this universe (I have a birthday) and b) being omniscient it knows all things.

This doesn't mean I can fully understand the mind of an omniscient being, only that it's not impossible to know some things about it.

Which, to get back to the topic, means that it's at least possible that we can understand whether or not omniscience is compatible with free will.

Yes I agree in principle, however it does tend to become an exploration of the human condition.

Also I would point out that omniscience being a reference to knowing something, requires a being which knows something through a subjective life. This adds another dimension to the ideas of physical modeling of infinity. Namely the existence of a realm of mind, an omniscient mind is quite different to an infinite space.

Another thought is the implications of the combined presence of an omniscient mind and an infinite space. Which becomes a very lofty notion surrounded by regression. Not to mention the notion of an infinite existence, which can only be approached through some kind of transcendent thought process.

 

[edge]

Why does there have to be a set of infinite possible universes? Picture just one universe. I only see one second at a time, and I choose what to do at every second. If God is omniscient, he sees the entire timeline, from beginning to end. He sees me drink the soda. It wasn't his will, necessarily. He sees it happen before I make the choice, because he's outside the timeline and can see past / present / future. He could be a complete nonparticipant in any decision making. He just happens to know what we're going to choose. Is it his will that we make that choice? Not necessarily. I believe in a benevolent deity, so I don't necessary believe it was God's will that my cousin was accidentally shot and killed. He knew it was going to happen before it happened, just as he knows everything that's going to happen before it happens.

I just don't think the two are connected. Somehow knowing (ahead of time) how someone is going to act doesn't mean that it's your will that they make that decision. It's their decision. You just know about it before it happens.

This is good especially the last part.

But, then he does interact to change the outcome sometimes as reported… but as far as I can tell only for the better.

 

[Belz...]

The kind of hatred you have is what I avoid in people in real life.

More random nonsense.

Calling you on your nonsense is not hatred.

 

[Belz...]

But the decision wasn't "determined", only known.

There was litterally no other possibility, since God knows in advance, and nothing can make it otherwise. How is that not 'determined' ?

The omniscient entity doesn't force you to pick anything

Irrelevant.

it only knows enough about you and your circumstances to know what choice you will make.

Wrong: it knows the decision you'll make, not through circumstances. It doesn't guess: it knows.

 

[Belz...]

So now you're claiming that the being is only "omniscient" because it forces us to act according to its plan?

I don't accept this; I want to consider an entirely passive, powerless omniscient being.

Do you claim the omniscience itself, without any ancillary powers, eliminates free will?

Quantum fluctuations alone could make a 100% prediction wrong. But not God, oh no.

 

[Belz...]

A better way of looking at it is to understand that whatever happens, the omniscient being knows. That's the quality of omniscience.

No. You're simply redefining the term.

 

[AvalonXQ]

There was litterally no other possibility, since God knows in advance, and nothing can make it otherwise.

Sure, something can make it otherwise -- the free will agent choosing another decision.

 

[Belz...]

Carroll Shelby designed and built really hot sports cars. He did this with full knowledge that some people would be killed driving the cars he designed and built.

Is he responsible for their deaths? Why or why not?

Please, Mycroft. Don't tell me you think this is the kind of knowledge we're talking about.

 

[Belz...]

Sure, something can make it otherwise -- the free will agent choosing another decision.

No. The omniscient being knew in advance which choice you could make. You can't make it otherwise. From the point of view of this atemporal being (omniscience kinda makes you atemporal to begin with) this has already happened. You can't change it.

If a free will agent can choose something else, then the omniscient being didn't know what decision it would make and therefore isn't omniscient.

 

[AvalonXQ]

No.

Yes.

The omniscient being knew in advance which choice you could make. You can't make it otherwise.

The choices you could make, plural.

From the point of view of this atemporal being (omniscience kinda makes you atemporal to begin with) this has already happened. You can't change it.

Sure you can. You won't, but you can.

If a free will agent can choose something else, then the omniscient being didn't know what decision it would make and therefore isn't omniscient.

Nope. A free will agent can choose something else, but the omniscient being still knows what decision it will make.

You have yet to explain what is contradictory about these two concepts.

 

[GeeMack]

Sure, something can make it otherwise -- the free will agent choosing another decision.

So now you're redefining the term "omniscience" to mean all-knowing, but not really, because someone might change their mind, so for the purpose of this discussion omniscient doesn't mean omniscient. You do understand that changing the meanings of terms in order to support your position is dishonest. You're welcome. No feigned indignation necessary.

 

[AvalonXQ]

So now you're redefining the term "omniscience" to mean all-knowing, but not really, because someone might change their mind,

Nope. Nice try, though.

Since your only purpose on this thread (or, as far as I can remember, any other thread we've shared) seems to be to try to play "gotcha" and accuse other posters of dishonesty, there's really no any reason to read your posts.

 

[cyborg]

Free will requires an unconstrained capacity to choose.

So you're saying that given two choices A and B there is literally no constraint on which is chosen?

Well this is compatible with the idea that a thing can exist that knows what you will do but it does force the choices you make to be essentially random. I do not think this is what you want "unconstrained" to mean. The problem is of course that if you allow mechanism to become involved then it is reducible to a computer - this would make your decisions knowable to anything that could replicate your calculations rendering an omniscient being merely an issue of sufficient computer power.

 

[cyborg]

You have yet to explain what is contradictory about these two concepts.

There isn't any: the concepts are being presented as paradoxical which is not exactly the same thing.

All knowing is being focused on as being the problem because of worrying about whether or not a "being" can exist which has that property.

The real problem is the concept of choice: the assumption being that the concept of choice is incompatible with the concept of things being knowable before they have occurred - that is where choices must be made by a computational system. In a computational system with access to an Oracle the problem is that the Oracle might as well define the computation; they are equivalent.

 

[dafydd]

If there is anything approaching the notion of omniscience in existence, it is clearly beyond the capacity of our simple minds to understand.

It is easy to understand.

 

[dlorde]

If we posit that, for example, for any given choice of strawberry, chocolate, or vanilla ice-cream, the resulting selection that Avalon makes is completely predictable, it seems to me that Avalon's version of free will must involve allowing for some variation in his internal state - i.e. although the selection he actually makes in each instance is completely predictable, given a slightly different internal state, he would [be physically able to], make a different selection. As he says, he has the capacity to make any selection.

To me, this approach treats the internal state as effectively private, analytically off-limits, and also appears to boil down to a compatibilist view - free will is exercised if the options are physically available to be selected barring coercion or constraint, given an appropriate internal state when the decision-making occurs.

Part of the cross-talk here is that one group is taking the wholly analytical approach where the choice is illusory because the single clearly defined internal state evolves predictably as the processing of the input options gives rise to the inevitable output selection, and another group is black-boxing the internal state and saying the choice exists because, depending on the precise internal state, any selection is possible.

So maybe it's not about whether omniscience changes or forces the selection, but whether or not you want to precisely specify the individual's internal state when discussing this. I'd prefer that we did, however comforting the feeling might be that we 'have a choice' because if the starting point was slightly different the outcome would be different.

How QM indeterminacy can be assimilated into either view, I don't know