Explain consciousness to the layman.

[PixyMisa]

I understand your bending over backwards to defend your tribal member. It is amazing how tribalism can lead to so much mental gymnastics and warping and wrangling of words to defend one's tribe despite that nagging cognitive dissonance.

Yes. It also leads to projection.

Cockroaches have SRIP

Evidence?

and indeed an air-conditioning system (with a thermostat) has SRIP too. Thus according to the notion that SRIP is the “essence or basis of consciousness” we would be forced to conclude that air-conditioning systems are conscious.

Well, yes. Since that would be a tautology.

Accordingly, using the same illogic one may also then argue that A PENCIL is on some level ALIVE.

Please show your work.

Don’t you think that a layman who reads that any programmer can make any computer become conscious would be quite misguided by the assertions?

If the layman deliberately ignored the explanation, yes. But that is not my fault, now is it?

 

[keyfeatures]

It did. I think an important first step is to consider what is meant by "computational".

I consider that interaction with the environment - the actual, unsimulated environment - is potentially an important element of consciousness.

I'm always happy to go back to first principles.

The actual, unsimulated environment being something we have no possible way of ever discovering because it has to be filtered via our own virtual reality simulators (brains). We're stuck in the circle of our own perception.

 

[annnnoid]

The actual, unsimulated environment being something we have no possible way of ever discovering because it has to be filtered via our own virtual reality simulators (brains). We're stuck in the circle of our own perception.

This would appear to be…at everything from first to all-but last glance, the obvious interpretation of the situation.

….but….is it also not evident that we, individually (…and collectively…but that is academic) experience some kind of fundamental disconnect from our condition. The apparent evidence for this (besides...well...everything) is the simple fact that we lack the ability to unconditionally conclude that we ‘know’ ourself. IOW…we must invariably conclude that (ultimately) we not only do not understand what we are talking about….we do not understand anything. Including the rather paradoxical situation of not understanding that we do not understand that we do not understand….even though it is impossible to come to any other either rational or intuitive conclusion.

So what if it were possible to proceed past this point? By will, or some incomprehensible coincidence of synchronicity (alternatively...there's always the unknown). What dimensions of meaning might then become apparent? Perhaps the ‘actual, unsimulated environment’ might then become somewhat more accessible to our by then slightly less dysfunctional perceptions. The geography of the mind is, after all, still rather virgin territory. Academic meanderings on a glooming weekend morn. Reality beacons…grey, grey, is the eternal toil of man….leave emancipation to the gods!

 

[dafydd]

This would appear to be…at everything from first to all-but last glance, the obvious interpretation of the situation.

….but….is it also not evident that we, individually (…and collectively…but that is academic) experience some kind of fundamental disconnect from our condition. The apparent evidence for this (besides...well...everything) is the simple fact that we lack the ability to unconditionally conclude that we ‘know’ ourself. IOW…we must invariably conclude that (ultimately) we not only do not understand what we are talking about….we do not understand anything. Including the rather paradoxical situation of not understanding that we do not understand that we do not understand….even though it is impossible to come to any other either rational or intuitive conclusion.

So what if it were possible to proceed past this point? By will, or some incomprehensible coincidence of synchronicity (alternatively...there's always the unknown). What dimensions of meaning might then become apparent? Perhaps the ‘actual, unsimulated environment’ might then become somewhat more accessible to our by then slightly less dysfunctional perceptions. The geography of the mind is, after all, still rather virgin territory. Academic meanderings on a glooming weekend morn. Reality beacons…grey, grey, is the eternal toil of man….leave emancipation to the gods!

You are speaking for yourself there. Which gods should we leave it to? The list of gods that mankind has invented is a long one. Should they all get together and have a conference about emancipation and then issue a policy document?

 

[annnnoid]

You are speaking for yourself there. Which gods should we leave it to? The list of gods that mankind has invented is a long one. Should they all get together and have a conference about emancipation and then issue a policy document?

Yes of course dafydd….you have achieved enlightenment. Must have overlooked that somewhere. The next time the physicists over at the LHC are stuck I’ll be sure and give them your number.

In the future, read this. It’ll explain why I won’t be responding to your unintelligible irrelevance anymore.

 

[Belz...]

If I had an irony meter it would be well and truly destroyed by now.

I don't know what's wrong with the irony meters you guys are using. Mine just go off the scale.

 

[Belz...]

Evidence?

More like "relevance ?" So what if cockroaches have SRIP ? It just means they have a very rudimentary and crude consciousness, at best.

 

[dafydd]

Yes of course dafydd….you have achieved enlightenment. Must have overlooked that somewhere. The next time the physicists over at the LHC are stuck I’ll be sure and give them your number.

In the future, read this. It’ll explain why I won’t be responding to your unintelligible irrelevance anymore.

Translation- I refuse to answer awkward questions.

I have already read that juvenile, insulting post. You have nothing to say. Goodbye.

 

[PixyMisa]

More like "relevance ?" So what if cockroaches have SRIP ? It just means they have a very rudimentary and crude consciousness, at best.

You are correct. But it is also not clear that cockroaches (and other insects) have SRIP - as per my earlier discussion of the sphex wasp, they don't appear to display introspection at all.

 

[westprog]

The actual, unsimulated environment being something we have no possible way of ever discovering because it has to be filtered via our own virtual reality simulators (brains). We're stuck in the circle of our own perception.

That's perfectly true - we experience reality as an indirect model. However, that doesn't imply that we can interact consciously with something that isn't the real world.

 

[westprog]

I suggest that, unless otherwise specified, we should take it as referring to the computational theory of mind, where the brain is said to function as a symbol manipulator "taking input from the natural world to create outputs in the form of further mental or physical states. A computation is the process of taking input and following a step by step algorithm to get a specific output. The computational theory of mind claims that there are certain aspects of the mind that follow step by step processes to compute representations of the world". A difficulty with a definition like this, for people unfamiliar with the field, is the way layers of computational abstraction can obscure the underlying stepwise algorithmic nature of the process. For example, one can create a neural net that appears not to behave in a stepwise algorithmic way, by connecting a number of neural processors that individually operate in a stepwise algorithmic way.

It's important to note that a neural net is not equivalent to a single processor carrying out the same computation. It might be computationally equivalent. To claim that it's equivalent in terms of consciousness is to predetermine the answer that consciousness is entirely computational.

It's no coincidence that many, if not most, AI and artificial consciousness research projects use robotic interfaces to the environment. Perhaps we skipped ahead too quickly in the thread to talking about simulated environments when it really isn't necessary to the discussion (although it's interesting that control systems for practical robots, such as Boston Dynamics' 'Big Dog', tend to be developed with the simple physics of virtual environments and then tested in the real world).

I've been asserting that the computational view of AI and consciousness is not compatible with the robotic interaction with the environment approach - that the two approaches are distinct and incompatible. I'm not sure if that's accepted by everyone here. Perhaps in your role as umpire you could establish exactly what people are claiming. It would be more interesting that what other people claim that they are claiming.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's important to note that a neural net is not equivalent to a single processor carrying out the same computation.

Yes it is.

I've been asserting that the computational view of AI and consciousness is not compatible with the robotic interaction with the environment approach - that the two approaches are distinct and incompatible.

Yes, you have. You're wrong.

 

[rocketdodger]

That's perfectly true - we experience reality as an indirect model. However, that doesn't imply that we can interact consciously with something that isn't the real world.

Lol, yes, it does.

You know when you have a video phone conversation on your iphone?

Your girlfriend isn't really a shrunken head in your hands ... you are talking to a representation of her.

That representation happens to be isomorphic to the real girlfriend, but this is irrelevant -- it is still just a representation.

And let us not forget that by your own logic, the face on the iphone would have no meaning if a human wasn't observing it !!!

 

[Belz...]

It's important to note that a neural net is not equivalent to a single processor carrying out the same computation. It might be computationally equivalent. To claim that it's equivalent in terms of consciousness is to predetermine the answer that consciousness is entirely computational.

Indeed. How is consciousness not computational ?

 

[dlorde]

It's important to note that a neural net is not equivalent to a single processor carrying out the same computation. It might be computationally equivalent.

If done correctly, it would be computationally equivalent. This jumps ahead of my early recapitulation to an important (side?) issue. My question now is: in what functionally relevant way is it not equivalent? what does a neural net do that a single processor emulating a neural net cannot, and how is it relevant to generating consciousness?

[IOW, what is the crucial difference between two or more artificial neuron instances that have their own inputs, outputs, storage, and processors, and two or more artificial neuron instances that have their own inputs, outputs, and storage, but time-share a single processor?]

I've been asserting that the computational view of AI and consciousness is not compatible with the robotic interaction with the environment approach - that the two approaches are distinct and incompatible. I'm not sure if that's accepted by everyone here.

Not sure what you mean. How or why is a computational view of consciousness not compatible with robotic interaction with the environment?

Perhaps in your role as umpire you could establish exactly what people are claiming.

I'm not an umpire; I'm trying to establish to my own satisfaction the reasoning behind the assertion that consciousness is not or cannot be computational.

Some here seem to be saying that we don't know whether consciousness is computational, and I accept this - all the more reason to find out. In the absence of convincing argument or evidence that it isn't, and given that the brain appears to be composed of computational units, I assume that it is.

But there does seem to be an argument against it being proposed here, possibly structural (architectural), and possibly related to the computational equivalence question above. I haven't been able to make out quite what the argument is, or what the reasoning behind it is, i.e. what is/are the essential non-computational features of neural nets that are relevant, and why are they relevant?

If this isn't the core of the argument, perhaps someone could post a concise summary of what they think it is.

 

[doronshadmi]

Indeed. How is consciousness not computational ?

Maybe Dina Goidin's article Computation Beyond Turing Machines ( http://oldblog.computationalcomplexity.org/media/Wegner-Goldin.pdf ) can be used for better understanding of consciousness in terms of computation:

"Though mathematics was adopted as a goal for modeling computers in the 1960s by analogy with models of physics, Gödel had shown in 1931 that logic cannot model mathematics [Go31] and Turing showed that neither logic nor algorithms can completely model computing and human thought.

In addition to interaction, other ways to extend computation beyond Turing machines have been considered, such as computing with real numbers.

However, the assumption that all of computation can be algorithmically specified is still widely accepted. Interaction machines have been criticized as an unnecessary Kuhnian paradigm shift. But Gödel, Church, Turing, and more recently Milner, Wegner and Van Leeuwen have argued that this is not the case."

Also please look at Dina Goldin and Peter Wegner work The Interactive Nature of Computing:
Refuting the Strong Church-Turing Thesis. Here is a quote taken from this work:

"According to the interactive view of computation, interaction (com-
munication with the outside world) happens during the computation,
not before or after it. Hence, computation is an ongoing process rather
than a function-based transformation of an input to an output. The
interactive approach represents a paradigm shift that redefines the
nature of computer science, by changing our understanding of what
computation is and how it is modeled. This view of computation is not
modeled by TMs, which capture only the computation of functions;
alternative models are needed."

 

[westprog]

Indeed. How is consciousness not computational ?

How is consciousness not spiritual? How is consciousness not a quantum effect?

Demonstrate that consciousness is in fact computational, and I'll accept that it is computational. That's how it works. Until it's demonstrated that it is, I see no reason to believe that it is.

 

[Belz...]

How is consciousness not spiritual? How is consciousness not a quantum effect?

Demonstrate that consciousness is in fact computational, and I'll accept that it is computational. That's how it works. Until it's demonstrated that it is, I see no reason to believe that it is.

Yes, sure. Saying that consciousness is computational is exactly like saying it's spiritual or quantum.

And it's not my fault you skipped over all those times that it was demonstrated.

 

[westprog]

Not sure what you mean. How or why is a computational view of consciousness not compatible with robotic interaction with the environment?

I've discussed this a number of times before. A computation is something well defined by the Turing model. According to that model, a computation has a number of properties, viz:

• The computation consists of the code and the data, which are a fixed quantity.
• The outcome of the computation is determined by the code and data, and nothing else.
• The result of any computation is fixed and independent of the speed at which the computation is performed.
• Even if independent portions of the computation are performed in different orders, or at the same time, this will not effect the outcome of the computation.

This is given in my own words, and is not intended to be rigourous, but I think it's a fair summary of what computation is.

If we deal with robotic control we are faced with the following properties:

• Robotic control is extremely time dependent.
• Even though operations might be independent, they might need to be performed simultaneously in order to produce a correct outcome.
• The data for the robotic control program is neither fixed nor known, and involves interaction with the environment.

Again, this is written in my words, and doesn't claim to be entirely precise or complete. However, it seems clear that computation and robotic control are different in what they do.

 

[westprog]

Yes, sure. Saying that consciousness is computational is exactly like saying it's spiritual or quantum.

And it's not my fault you skipped over all those times that it was demonstrated.

Yes, somehow I always seem to miss that bit. I keep encountering the times where I'm told that it has been demonstrated, or is going to be demonstrated. In fact, numerous posts explain how I wouldn't accept it if it were demonstrated, so why bother?

See my reply to dlorde for hints as to why consciousness probably isn't computational.