Belz...
Fiend God
This seems to be the difference in philosophical viewpoint between you and Belz. Though you both seem to agree you are saying 'the same thing'.
Would you care to elaborate on how we are divergent on this issue ?
This seems to be the difference in philosophical viewpoint between you and Belz. Though you both seem to agree you are saying 'the same thing'.
You have a different view of "proscriptive", which you perhaps share with Iacchus, and with which I disagree. Proscriptive laws make something illegal; they do not say what is possible, but what is forbidden. You can break a proscriptive law; if caught, you will pay the penalty.
These "existant and discovered" laws you speak of are not proscriptive. Things do what they do; we cannot, without circularity, claim any sort of law governing what they do (unless we find independent evidence, which is not the case thus far for the physical laws). We are left with descriptive laws, and these are descriptive whether you speak of them as invented or discovered.
The disagreement I have with Iacchus's choice of language (and perhaps yours) is that it is wrong. The universe does not follow or obey laws, it is describable by laws. To say the former circularly requires a lawmaker, and there is no evidence for any thus far that is not merely an inference from the thing allegedly caused. Circular, in other words.
Your use of "proscriptive" is not correct here; you are trying to tease apart two different definitions of "descriptive".
Would you care to elaborate on how we are divergent on this issue ?
It is, because of "obeys". Proscriptive laws must be obeyed, but can be disobeyed. Descriptive laws, it makes no sense to talk about obeying or disobeying, because they describe what is. If, as with Mercury, there is a discrepancy, it is the law that is wrong. "Obey" implies proscription, implies a lawmaker. If you are using proscriptive differently, then it may not be circular, but it is also not a proper use of the term. (I see you choose "governing" instead--as long as "obey" is still a useful term, the circularity exists.)Yup, 'proscriptive' wasn't the best choice of words, 'governing' will do.
The circularity of the argument is unclear.
The points you make are
1) If you say that the universe obeys laws
2) This circularly requires a lawmaker
I can't see that this is a circular argument.
These would be descriptive laws. In which case, inventing or discovering them is mere semantics. The type of law, descriptive, is what matters.Nor can accept that the laws requires a lawmaker; laws may be eternal, they may be emergent properties of an evolving universe.
The former fits with Iacchus's understanding of "law" too, in that he has no understanding at all of descriptive laws. The former still implies proscriptive law, whereas the latter specifies descriptive. The former allows Iacchus or anyone else ignorant of descriptive laws to imply that there must be a lawmaker or governor. Your statement "laws precede the obeying of them" only makes sense with proscriptive laws, and is utterly without meaning when it comes to the descriptive laws of physics.Whether I say 'the law of gravitation governed the movement of the planets a million years ago', or 'the law of gravitation that we have invented recently, describes the movement of the planets a million years ago' is largely a matter of taste. I prefer the former, sometimes, because it more easily fits in with my general sense of the word 'law'; laws precede the obeying of them, rather than describing things that have already happened. However, I'm happy to flip the perspective like a Necker Cube, if the conversation requires it.
Not so much waffling, as demonstrating something that is not always obvious but which is an important distinction to be made. It is very easy to speak of all laws as if they were the same. It is also incorrect.I'm waffling now - so back to you...
I see them as two different ways of saying the same thing.You imply that it isn't possible to break a law of physics, Mercutio implies it is - in which case we make a new one.
I see those two statements as contradictory.
You imply that it isn't possible to break a law of physics, Mercutio implies it is - in which case we make a new one.
I see those two statements as contradictory.
I see them as two different ways of saying the same thing.
The points you make are
1) If you say that the universe obeys laws
2) This circularly requires a lawmaker
Nor can accept that the laws requires a lawmaker; laws may be eternal, they may be emergent properties of an evolving universe.
These would be descriptive laws. In which case, inventing or discovering them is mere semantics.
So, if the laws of physics did not not have an eternal sense about them, how could anything, even the temporary sense be maintained?
Bother with whom? Me or them?Yes, you're absolutely right. That's all our carefully considered arguments blown out of the water. Sometimes I don't know why I bother...
You imply that it isn't possible to break a law of physics, Mercutio implies it is - in which case we make a new one.
I see those two statements as contradictory.
So, if the laws of physics did not not have an eternal sense about them, how could anything, even in the temporary sense be maintained?
Listen. Mercutio says we can break the laws of physics because he's talking of the laws as established by man. I'm talking about "laws" as in, what's physically possible in the universe, whether we know the exact "law" or not. So, using MY definition of physical laws, NO, it is impossible to break the laws of physics, and I think Shakespeare's Sock Puppet would agree. Incidently, using his meaning for physical laws, I agree with Mercutio. No contradiction.
No, they're not. Laws of physics are man-made, as Mojo said. The universe works in a certain way, but it doesn't "guide" evolution as you understand it.
Wow, isn't that amazing?Listen. Mercutio says we can break the laws of physics because he's talking of the laws as established by man. I'm talking about "laws" as in, what's physically possible in the universe, whether we know the exact "law" or not.
You must explain that one to me; I don't get it.The reply of fundies everywhere..(Sorry, couldn't resist, again).
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It is part of what a proscriptive law is. They limit the things you are allowed to do, but have nothing to do with what you are capable of doing. That is why, when you break them, you are punished, rather than the law being changed.You haven't explained why why this is circular. There is a premise, a conclusion and premise<>conclusion. It ain't circular.
You don't explain why a proscriptive law implies the existence of a lawmaker. Other properties of the universe an apparently exist without requiring an x-maker, so I don't see the need for your 'implication'.
But they do not govern them. They describe them. The law of gravity, for instance, does not tell us why or how bodies are attracted to one another; it tells us that they are, and describes the attraction (decreasing with the square of the distance, etc.)These are not descriptive laws, in the sense you were using it. Laws are not broken and then rewritten. They are proscriptive in that they govern which events can follow them.
We may well be talking about the same thing, but your preference for the first of the two sentences shows that you do not realize that they are not synonymous.The rest of your post ensures that we are talking about the same thing. You did realise that was the point of the two sentences I contrasted?
The circularity argument stands, and the difference between the proscriptive phrasing of the first and the descriptive phrasing of the second is absolutely crucial. When we talk about "obeying" the law of gravity, it is a metaphor. We have no choice not to obey it. Obeying implies the ability to disobey. We may disobey a traffic law, but not the laws of inertia. It's not that it's a bad idea; it cannot be done without demonstrating that the law is not a law in the first place.What is not justified is your preference for one form of expression over the other (other than the circularity argument). I can't see that it is theoretically possible to discriminate between the two forms. I don't see it as an important distinction - at least in the scientific sense, it may be philosophically.
It is part of what a proscriptive law is. They limit the things you are allowed to do, but have nothing to do with what you are capable of doing. That is why, when you break them, you are punished, rather than the law being changed.
But they do not govern them. They describe them. The law of gravity, for instance, does not tell us why or how bodies are attracted to one another; it tells us that they are, and describes the attraction (decreasing with the square of the distance, etc.)
We may well be talking about the same thing, but your preference for the first of the two sentences shows that you do not realize that they are not synonymous.
The circularity argument stands, and the difference between the proscriptive phrasing of the first and the descriptive phrasing of the second is absolutely crucial. When we talk about "obeying" the law of gravity, it is a metaphor. We have no choice not to obey it. Obeying implies the ability to disobey. We may disobey a traffic law, but not the laws of inertia. It's not that it's a bad idea; it cannot be done without demonstrating that the law is not a law in the first place.
And what is matter and energy then, except for your account of something that didn't exist?
Flies love dung don't they?
So, what exactly would you build your house upon? A foundation made out of rock or, a foundation made out of sand? I would opt to go with that which is more solid and substantial myself.
That's an ad hominem by the way.![]()