If I were challenging his statement, I would ask if he accepts that much (perhaps most) of what we do is automatic - neither rational or irrational.
My foot, when I'm not thinking about it, is doing something. And I yawn without intent; I blink my eyes without rational choice. But I can also move my foot or close my eyes intentionally. In the first examples, I am running on automatic. I assume he'd accept that, at least some of the time, and even for very complex behaviors involving choice - like driving home - I actually accomplish a lot without analysis or introspection. If he accepts this, he then has the duty to show why other situations are different in some material, detectable fashion.
In the end, and just like with free will, we can't tell if we have a "real" choice or not. How could we, if whatever is going on is going on behind the scenes? I think I consider all the options and choose, but I always seem to choose the best option available. Like the spectator who picks a card at the magician's behest, I may very well feel as though my choices are free when they are not.
But, most importantly, since I cannot detect the trick, the situation is exactly the same whether I have free will or not; rationality or not.
My foot, when I'm not thinking about it, is doing something. And I yawn without intent; I blink my eyes without rational choice. But I can also move my foot or close my eyes intentionally. In the first examples, I am running on automatic. I assume he'd accept that, at least some of the time, and even for very complex behaviors involving choice - like driving home - I actually accomplish a lot without analysis or introspection. If he accepts this, he then has the duty to show why other situations are different in some material, detectable fashion.
In the end, and just like with free will, we can't tell if we have a "real" choice or not. How could we, if whatever is going on is going on behind the scenes? I think I consider all the options and choose, but I always seem to choose the best option available. Like the spectator who picks a card at the magician's behest, I may very well feel as though my choices are free when they are not.
But, most importantly, since I cannot detect the trick, the situation is exactly the same whether I have free will or not; rationality or not.