Everyone has a metaphysics?

[the PC apeman]

In this thread, mslxl and Paul C. Anagnostopoulos had the following exchange:

Everyone has a metaphysics.

I don't, and I'm quite happy to discuss why. I have an epistemological viewpoint, but no ontological one.

~~ Paul

mslxl later dismissed the response, I think unfairly:

I have made a practice to investigate and uncover my own beliefs and assumptions. You can call it a hobby if you want. I find it useful and educational. When I read Paul's statement that he has an epistemological viewpoint, but no ontology or metaphysics, it strikes me as coming from someone who has not started that kind of investigation, an innocent of sorts. Either that, or he has reached a kind of buddhahood, a condition in which he never gets caught up in or identified with any thoughtform or mental pattern. Whether he is that or just naive (I have my preference, but I don't need to mention it here), I don't need to pursue the conversation with him because -- as I realized while dealing with some of the replies -- my original question was intended for people who agree that everybody holds certain beliefs (in my sense of the word) that are neither provable nor disprovable.

So, Paul, I'd like to hear why and, if you wish, provide an opportunity for rebuttal. I also wonder if your position is similar mine. I've been influenced by a poster I greatly admire on another board. He once posted something along the lines of...

I'm an atheist and there's a field of philosophy called theology which deals with some things I don't believe exist. I'd rather it was called atheology, but that'll never catch on. Similarly, I'm a physicalist and there's a field of philosophy called metaphysics which deals with some things I don't believe exist. I'd rather it was called physics, but that'll never catch on.​

I'm sure there are plenty of defenders of metaphysics here so I'd also like to hear from you too.

-PC-

 

[slingblade]

Wiki told me some metaphysical queries are:

What is the nature of reality?
Why does the world exist, and what is its origin or source of creation?
Does the world exist outside the mind?
If things exist, what is their objective nature?


GAAAAAAAAAAAH!


No, I can not has metaphysics, either.

 

[Puppycow]

Define these terms plz:
metaphysics
epistemological viewpoint
ontology

 

[the PC apeman]

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has the following on ontology:

As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology, like the question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals. These are all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to encompass problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which do exist. There are also a number of classic philosophical problems that are problems in ontology understood this way. For example the problem how a universal relates to a particular that has it (assuming there are universals and particulars), or the problem how an event like John eating a cookie relate to the particulars John and the cookie, and the relation of eating, assuming there are events, particulars and relations. These kinds of problems quickly turn into metaphysics more generally, which is the philosophical discipline that encompasses ontology as one of its parts. The borders here are a little fussy. But we have at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of ontology: first, say what there is, what exists, what the stuff is reality is made out off, secondly, say what the most general features and relations of these things are.​

"An ontology" would be one's on stance on ontological questions.

The SEP's entry on epistemology starts:

Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry. ​

An "epistemological viewpoint" would be one's stance on epistemological questions.

Metaphysics? Aside from the bit in the ontology article, I'll leave that to the defenders of metaphysics.

-PC-

 

[Taffer]

I've replied in that thread, but to briefly sum up here: The only thing I can accept as "true without evidence" is a modified version of the cogito. Namely, "there are thoughts, therefore, there is existence".

 

[Puppycow]

What is the nature of reality?

As far as I'm concerned, it's what my senses tell me it is.

Why does the world exist, and what is its origin or source of creation?

I'd like to know. Evidence suggests the universe started with a Big Bang. Beyond that, who knows? I await further evidence.

Does the world exist outside the mind?

I assume that it does. I don't see any point in wasting much time considering the alternative.

If things exist, what is their objective nature?

As soon as someone figures that out, please tell me. (I would dispense with the first half of the question and simply ask "What is the objective nature of things?")
That's my metaphysics, FWIW.

My ontology: What my senses combined with critical thinking determine to be real, exists. Tangible things, and things whose existence I can reasonably infer. Anything else might exist, but I assume it does not until presented with evidence that satisfies me.

My epistemological viewpoint: There is no absolute certainty of anything. But for practical purposes I evaluate the evidence for and against any proposition and then tentatively assign it a truth value somewhere between almost certainly true and almost certainly not true and assume that my evaluation is correct until something gives me a new reason to doubt my previous conclusion. Then I repeat the process. If something falls in the maybe category midway between true and false, I may be curious and try to gather more information.

 

[Matt the Poet]

My ontology: What my senses combined with critical thinking determine to be real, exists. Tangible things, and things whose existence I can reasonably infer. Anything else might exist, but I assume it does not until presented with evidence that satisfies me.

Well, that’s a metaphysics right there. You have no reason to believe that any of the things you percieve or ‘reasonably’ infer (and I’ll contend that there’s a whole lot more metaphysics discreetly veiled behind that word ‘reasonably’) exist at all.

Of course, solipsism may be a useless path to go down, but as soon as you take a different path you automatically have a metaphysics, because you are asserting that something, of some sort, actually exists.

As far as I can see actual existence is, whether you like it or not, a metaphysical property. What is the difference between things in your head and things ‘out there’? If you are the physicalist that you claim to be then the answer has to be ‘nothing’ – both arise from the interactions of matter. Wouldn’t any difference you claim have to invove some sort of 'special' property that 'real' things have?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I have no idea what it means "to exist." I have no idea what the fundamental ontological existents are. And I have no idea whether it is even meaningful to ask if we can know these things. So I reject metaphysics except as an interesting topic for discussion.

Sure, it's a glib rejection, but years of discussion haven't enlightened me on the subject.

Instead, I'll just assume some sort of variation of scientific epistemology. It requires axioms, so I am making assumptions, but the axioms are falsifiable, I think.

~~ Paul

 

[Apathia]

I have a minimalist metaphysic that it's all done by smoke and mirriors. There's no metaphysical content and no there, there.
I take just enough metaphysics to dismiss metaphysics.

I have no evidence for my position, anymore than I know of any that would cement Materialism, Idealism, or a host of other views of what the ultimate substance is. I just take a philosophical slacker position that there isn't any.

And no matter what the ontology, if I kick a rock with my bare foot,
ouch!

 

[Matt the Poet]

I have no idea what it means "to exist." I have no idea what the fundamental ontological existents are. And I have no idea whether it is even meaningful to ask if we can know these things. So I reject metaphysics except as an interesting topic for discussion.

Sure, it's a glib rejection, but years of discussion haven't enlightened me on the subject.

Instead, I'll just assume some sort of variation of scientific epistemology. It requires axioms, so I am making assumptions, but the axioms are falsifiable, I think.

~~ Paul

You’re not meant to be ‘enlightened’. That’s not what metaphysics is for. Anyone who claims to have ‘answered’ metaphysical questions is talking woo of the highest order.

And you don’t reject it either – you might think you have, but as soon as you start saying things about what you think the world is you are automatically trespassing on its domain. The claim to ‘falsifiability’ is a metaphysical statement in itself – you are claiming that there are categories of ‘true’ and ‘false’ – these are absolutes and hence fall into the world of metaphysics

Even if you refuse to ever say anything about what you think the world is your decision is still a metaphysical one.

Fine, you can say ‘it doesn’t matter to me, personally’, but that’s not the same as rejecting it, you’re just deciding not to examine the inevitable consequences of what you already think.

Metaphysics is the unavoidable end-of-line for any system of thought. It’s the point at which you have to say ‘well, that’s just how it is’. And I don’t believe there’s any thought-system (certainly not the scientific outlook) which doesn’t have one of those points implicit in the way it works.

 

[Matt the Poet]

I
I have no evidence for my position, anymore than I know of any that would cement Materialism, Idealism, or a host of other views of what the ultimate substance is. I just take a philosophical slacker position that there isn't any.

So...your decision to reject metaphysics is based on faith?

The irony is actually burning my face

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And you don’t reject it either – you might think you have, but as soon as you start saying things about what you think the world is you are automatically trespassing on its domain. The claim to ‘falsifiability’ is a metaphysical statement in itself – you are claiming that there are categories of ‘true’ and ‘false’ – these are absolutes and hence fall into the world of metaphysics

I don't say anything about what the world is. I only say things about what I can know about the world. But if logic is part of metaphysics then I'll have to admit to metaphysics and distinguish it from ontology.

Fine, you can say ‘it doesn’t matter to me, personally’, but that’s not the same as rejecting it, you’re just deciding not to examine the inevitable consequences of what you already think.

I'm happy to examine the consequences of what I think. Let's examine away!

~~ Paul

 

[Matt the Poet]

I'm happy to examine the consequences of what I think. Let's examine away!
~~ Paul

OK, I'm game (although may disappear shortly for real life reasons).

You claim to have certain 'axioms' that are 'falsifiable' in terms of whay you believe about the world.

We could start with those...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course, solipsism may be a useless path to go down, but as soon as you take a different path you automatically have a metaphysics, because you are asserting that something, of some sort, actually exists.

I don't think I have to assert that it "actually exists," although that depends entirely on whatever definition of exist we agree on. All I have to assert is that things affect each other, which is an epistemological assertion.

Of course, if you insist that the mere mention of "things" is an ontological premise, then I'm stuck.

~~ Paul

 

[the PC apeman]

Thanks, Paul.

I'm a little late getting this out. I’ll just expand on my view which I’m now more convinced is similar to yours. But first, for the benefit of others, I think I need to back up a bit and define some more terms.

There’s a philosophical position known as materialism. (This is not the same as being materialistic: valuing above all else possessions like big homes, fancy cars, the latest electronics and expensive bric-a-brac.) Materialism is the view that “all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions; therefore, matter is the only substance.” Contrast this with idealism that says thought is the only substance and matter is only an illusion produced by thought.

Closely related to materialism is the physicalism position. One way to look at physicalism is starting with the premise that there are physical entities and working from there using Ockham’s Razor. That is it tries to account for everything without adding unnecessary entities or substances. Note that physics here is more than what we think of in everyday usage. It’s all of science. Astrophysics, nuclear physics, chemistry, neurology, biology, etc. are all branches of physics.

I should say a word about physical entities. All material objects are physical entities. Not all physical entities are material objects. Physical entities are whatever is described by physics. This includes not only matter, but energy, space-time, forces, processes, arrangements, states and so on.

At this point, metaphysicians out there will be jumping up and down pointing to all this and saying “That’s ontology! Saying physical entities exist is exactly ontology! You’re doing ontology.” So I should explain my slightly different take on physicalism.

Let’s start with epistemology which is the study of knowledge and its methods. Physicalism can also be viewed as an epistemological stance. Science is a method or way of knowing. I define it as the most reliable, coherent, useful, and robust way of knowing. If another way of knowing is shown to be superior, then that becomes science. That right now, in my view, is physics. I can’t prove any of that. It’s my starting premise.

So what is metaphysics? It's hard to get agreement but etymologically, meta- means after or above so metaphysics is after or above physics. I’m standing stubbornly in the land of physics wielding Ockham’s Razor. The very last thing I’ll do is admit additional territory that is not physics. That’s what the razor is all about. For me, it’s either physics or it is not yet necessary. Perhaps some of what others call metaphysics I simply identify as physics. But there seems to be a nasty habit of unnecessary reification that goes on in metaphysics and I reject that.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You claim to have certain 'axioms' that are 'falsifiable' in terms of whay you believe about the world.

We could start with those...

I'll give it a shot. Stimpson J. Cat gets credit for much of this formulation, and any incoherency is my fault.

Definition: The term real is defined to refer to things that have any affect on other things that are real.

(The word exist is avoided just because it is so laden with assumptions.)

Axiom 0: I am real.

Axiom 1: Real things can be described according to a set of consistent logical rules (regardless of how they "actually behave").

Axiom 2: The laws describing real things can be inferred by observing the effects of events involving those things.

Taken together, axioms 1 and 2 are in some sense falsifiable. If we find that we cannot determine the laws for some events, then either they are not lawful or their laws cannot be determined by observation.

I will stipulate that if the mere reference to "things" is an ontological statement, then this is an ontology. Note, however, that there is no mention of fundamental existents, categories or types of entities, or attributes.

~~ Paul

 

[Matt the Poet]

I don't think I have to assert that it "actually exists," although that depends entirely on whatever definition of exist we agree on. All I have to assert is that things affect each other, which is an epistemological assertion.

Of course, if you insist that the mere mention of "things" is an ontological premise, then I'm stuck.

~~ Paul

Well, no, that would be a bit harsh.

That said, to be purely epistemological, wouldn't you have to say 'things appear to affect each other'? Possibly even 'things appear to me to affect each other'?

If you are saying that things actually do affect each other, then you would be asserting the existence of a property called 'having been affected by X' which exists independently of your own perception - in metaphysical terms I think this would be a 'necessary' property of objects.

 

[Roboramma]

Here's the closest I come to metaphysics:
I have experiences.
I see a certain amount of order in those experiences, though I don't know why.
I assume that that order is due to an underlying cause, rather than simply random.
One of the bits of order that I see is that when I have an experience that I label (thing A) and I leave it for a time and then return to it, it will be the same as when I left it unless some other thing that I can experience affected it.
This isn't always the case, but often enough that I can explain the exceptions as having been affected by things that I didn't see, but which nonethess exist in the same way as thing A (whatever that way is).
Thus I think these exist.
I don't know what exist means, except that it is independent of me.

This is a conclusion which may not be valid, but it is one that i arrive at by induction.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There’s a philosophical position known as materialism. (This is the same as being materialistic: valuing above all else possessions like big homes, fancy cars, the latest electronics and expensive bric-a-brac.) Materialism is the view that “all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions; therefore, matter is the only substance.” Contrast this with idealism that says thought is the only substance and matter is only an illusion produced by thought.

I daresay that super careful analysis of these two positions, with a metaphysical theory that accounts for everything we observe, would render them equivalent. How on Earth can we possibly know whether things are "material" or "mental" or "shiny green sneakers"?

But we've already had that debate endlessly with Interesting Ian and Undercover Elephant, may they rest in peace.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That said, to be purely epistemological, wouldn't you have to say 'things appear to affect each other'? Possibly even 'things appear to me to affect each other'?

Yes, but I think we can dispense with that. No matter what we assert about the world, that knowledge is clearly derived indirectly, through our senses.

If you are saying that things actually do affect each other, then you would be asserting the existence of a property called 'having been affected by X' which exists independently of your own perception - in metaphysical terms I think this would be a 'necessary' property of objects.

Aha, perhaps I spoke too soon above. I suppose we could claim that stuff really happens "out there," not just as a handy assumption in our models of reality, but actually, really, in truth. I have no idea what such a claim would mean, so I won't make it.

This brings up an interesting point about solipsism. It seems to me there is an easy refutation of solipsism. In order for the coherency of the world to be maintained between the times that the solipsist pays attention to it, there must be another agent at work. The solipsist has to claim that this agent is his own mind working subconsciously (since he paid no attention to the world between times). But as soon as an independent subconscious agent is proposed, solipsism goes to hell.

~~ Paul