Everyone has a metaphysics?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You’ll notice that things tend not to disappear from reality. Indeed, the laws of physics that we know appear to preclude it.

Ah, but if something disappeared and we noticed, then it has affected something else and so it is still real. We would endeavor to determine the reason it disappeared and perhaps find out where it went. The only unreal disappearing things are the things we don't know about at all, in which case it's fine that they disappeared. They need never have been around to begin with.

a) it is possible for something to affect something else in the absence of time (i.e. there is a form of ‘timeless being’ – a pretty heavy metaphysical concept)
b) something other than ‘having an effect on X’ maintains the reality of objects (this is similar to the solipsist’s problem above, except that instead of you it’s the whole universe that is ‘looking away’ for a bit.)

I see no reason why the reality of an object needs to be considered if we never knew anything about it to begin with. And an object may very well "disappear" and "reappear" during periods when not a single other thing is interacting with it, if there is such a time. How would we know?

You could, as you’ve said earlier, throw up your hands and say ‘I don’t care about this stuff’. I’m fine with that, not everyone’s into philosophy. But my argument is that by doing this you’re not taking some sort of bold, pragmatist standpoint so much as choosing not to think through the one that you already have.

Oh my, I never meant to say that I was taking a bold pragmatic view. I just meant to say that I don't know how to formulate a coherent metaphysic. I'm perfectly willing to agree that there may be more axioms that need to be stated for my little scientific epistemology.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Matt the Poet,

‘Nothing more than?’ Really? Personally, as a skeptic, I find the fact that even the most modest, practical philosophical outlook can’t escape making assertions that transcend observable reality a pretty large thing to deal with.

Is there any way (beyond the sterile route of solipsism) to ‘minimise’ such statements? Is there any reason for doing so? Are there ‘better’ or ‘worse’ assertions to make (e.g. what, if anything, is wrong with the weaker forms of theism?)

All of these seem to me to be useful, interesting metaphysical topics for discussion.

Those topics are no longer really metaphysical.

For example, the question of how to minimise such statements is generally epistemological in nature. It usually takes the form of asking what is the minimal set of assumptions necessary to reliably and productively use our perceptions to achieve our goals. Scientific epistemology is essentially an attempt to construct exactly such a set of minimal assumptions.

Similarly the question of whether there is any reason for doing so is not metaphysical, but rather practical. What are the goals we are trying to achieve by making these assumptions? Why do we have those goals? Do our assumptions help us to achieve those goals? Unless the goals in question are themselves rather obscure ones that can only be defined by appealing to metaphysical concepts (such as wanting to "know the TRUTH"), these are not metaphysical questions at all.

Similarly the question of one set of assumptions being "better" or "worse" than another is a judgement call, and as such is completely dependant on the values that it is being judged on. Again, nothing metaphysical about that. It is simply a matter of deciding what you mean by "better" and "worse". Better for what?


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

... The only thing I can accept as "true without evidence" is a modified version of the cogito. Namely, "there are thoughts, therefore, there is existence".

Is thought random, deterministic, or neither? If neither, what?

In my worldview, "god" seems a reasonable name.

Do you declare yourself to be a hard atheist, if you don't mind me asking?

 

[cyborg]

Eh? You’ve earlier claimed that talking about the properties of a material object and talking about that object directly are the same thing.

No I didn't. I said talking about the material is achievable through the material alone.

Now you’re saying that my sentence (which, by your lights, is a material object) has the property ‘truth’ (well, ‘non-truth’ now), but doesn’t actually contain any truth. What kind of material property behaves like that?

It's not a "material" property - it's a "material configuration" property. One material configuration is standing in as a proposition about another material configuration. You have to examine the represented configuration to determine the "truth" of the representational configuration.

It is a "self-describing" system.

 

[cyborg]

a) it is possible for something to affect something else in the absence of time (i.e. there is a form of ‘timeless being’ – a pretty heavy metaphysical concept)

Not without either losing what we mean by "time" or "affect".

b) something other than ‘having an effect on X’ maintains the reality of objects (this is similar to the solipsist’s problem above, except that instead of you it’s the whole universe that is ‘looking away’ for a bit.)

Sure.

a rule that, it seems would have to keep such areas well hidden from conscious observers – otherwise we would notice things disappearing all the time.

Not necessarily. Noting a difference requires a memory of there being a difference.

Not having the detail to see the difference precludes there being a memory of the difference. Therefore such a thing cannot be noted.

 

[Matt the Poet]

It's not a "material" property - it's a "material configuration" property. One material configuration is standing in as a proposition about another material configuration. You have to examine the represented configuration to determine the "truth" of the representational configuration.

It is a "self-describing" system.

Your system now contains two kinds of property. "Material" properties of objects, and something called a "Material Configuration" property.

As this is a new technical term, please describe it's application. Can you always tell the difference between one and the other? Is it always clear which configurations are pointing to which other configurations, and which is the 'represented' configuration as opposed to the 'representational' one in each case?

If I am in orbit around a star other than the sun and I make the statement 'Today is Friday etc., what do I mean, and to what extent am I making a true or untrue statement?

 

[Matt the Poet]

Oh my, I never meant to say that I was taking a bold pragmatic view. I just meant to say that I don't know how to formulate a coherent metaphysic. I'm perfectly willing to agree that there may be more axioms that need to be stated for my little scientific epistemology.

~~ Paul

I wasn't suggesting that you should, or could, form one. I am suggesting that you already are - that 'scientific epistemology' unavoidably implies some sort of coherent metaphysics - an example of one aspect of which we've fruitfully discussed above.

 

[Matt the Poet]

Not without either losing what we mean by "time" or "affect".



Sure.

So you've admitted that neither a) is not possible given our current understanding and that b) is inherently metaphysical, as it suggests some sort of force whose sole job is to return stuff to reality. The only other alternative is continuous time, unless...

Not necessarily. Noting a difference requires a memory of there being a difference.

Not having the detail to see the difference precludes there being a memory of the difference. Therefore such a thing cannot be noted.

...you do this, which is a fair point. But for a strict materialist such as you appear to be to suggest the possibility that both things and our memory of things are being continually 'edited' by some unknown force seems odd.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I wasn't suggesting that you should, or could, form one. I am suggesting that you already are - that 'scientific epistemology' unavoidably implies some sort of coherent metaphysics - an example of one aspect of which we've fruitfully discussed above.

I'm not sure what it means to "unavoidably imply some sort of coherent metaphysics." I agree that a reasonable epistemology requires consistency in observed behavior and this is stated as an axiom. I don't understand which aspects of the behavior are required to be called ontological rather than epistemological. For example, there is no reason why real things can't pop in and out of reality as long as that has no effect on anything else. Therefore, constancy of reality is not required.

I'm sure there are aspects of an epistemological stance that philosophers would demand be called ontological, and such a demand is probably reasonable. I just don't know what those things are. I suppose one might be time: I am assuming that time passes, or the concept of observation is meaningless. But is time an ontological assumption or merely a thing we observe? We've agreed that simply saying there are things is not a metaphysical statement.

~~ Paul

 

[cyborg]

Your system now contains two kinds of property. "Material" properties of objects, and something called a "Material Configuration" property.

Not really: the material configuration is an artefact of the need that the system must have some distribution of the material in it.

As this is a new technical term, please describe it's application.

Telling the difference between diamond and coal.

Can you always tell the difference between one and the other?

One is a synthetic description and the other is the thing being described.

Is it always clear which configurations are pointing to which other configurations, and which is the 'represented' configuration as opposed to the 'representational' one in each case?

Clear to what?

If I am in orbit around a star other than the sun and I make the statement 'Today is Friday etc., what do I mean, and to what extent am I making a true or untrue statement?

To what extent you are making a true or untrue statement depends on what you mean.

 

[cyborg]

So you've admitted that neither a) is not possible given our current understanding

Well no, it's certainly possible we just wouldn't understand it as having "time" as we usually mean it.

...you do this, which is a fair point. But for a strict materialist such as you appear to be to suggest the possibility that both things and our memory of things are being continually 'edited' by some unknown force seems odd.

Who said anything about unknown force? Our memories are the results of physical processes ergo a change in physical configuration of that which the memory is contingent upon entails a change in memory.

It's not 'editing' it's 'iterating'.

 

[c4ts]

I have my own Metaphysics. I have a copy of Kant's Metaphysics, Aristotle's Metaphysics, and no good translations for any of them.