Do Materialism and Evolution Theory Undermine Science?

[Nick227]

But you are presuming that the only meaning of "self" is the dualistic one that Nick keeps talking about.

That isn't the only meaning.

As I keep saying, another meaning is the name given to system S's reference of system S by system S.

RD,

You are still assuming that "system S" exists as a clearly defined entity prior to reference. This is the issue for me.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

This is the point I am trying to make, because it seems to me that you are assuming the system is fully objectively defined prior to the action of reference.

That would imply that an infant would have the same sense of self as an adult.

Clearly, only an idiot would think such a thing. I am not an idiot. So No, I do not assume that.

 

[rocketdodger]

RD,

You are still assuming that "system S" exists as a clearly defined entity prior to reference. This is the issue for me.

Nick

No I am not assuming that at all.

The only place where S needs to be clearly defined is 1) the laws of whatever fabric S is part of (in this case our universe) 2) in the minds of whatever intelligent systems (E.G. humans) are considering S as part of a proof. S doesn't need to know anything at all about itself to begin with.

 

[Wowbagger]

It is indicative of the objective existence of the system(s) experiencing the "I."

It is a handy quick-reference for communicating concepts among other humans. There may or may not be an actual objective existence there.

You really should read more Blackmore. And, maybe Dennett, though Dennett is more difficult to get through, sometimes. Blackmore is easier to swallow.

not "system S references it's dualistic self that inhabits the apriori netherworld."

It doesn't sound, to me, like Nick is trying to sell any form of dualism. But, just to be sure, I'll ask him:
Nick, are you really trying to sell some form of dualism, in your arguments?

One can accept the idea that there is no real self to refer to, when speaking of "I"; and yet not be a dualist. In fact, the basic principals of that modern approach are very anti-dualism in nature. We are still talking about normally-understood matter, afterall.

That is why I keep telling him to learn computer science

In computer science, it is good practice to break problems down into easily delineable functional units. It would be naive to assume natural life forms are obligated to do the same.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I am not a neuroscientist.

Very few of us are, and I think those on this board who indeed are, won’t come near our pathetic tries to make sense of these issues. Perhaps you’re doing the right thing in simply staying at a very abstract and conceptual level of interpretation?

Before you respond with saying that you are actually doing the very opposite, “that you are explaining it from a first-person perspective,” i.e. from an experiential point of view, keep in mind that there’s also a third-person perspective that can be utilized, which I generally try to do, and which is the reason I think they remain quite abstract and conceptual.

However I submit that the model does work intellectually. It matches experience and what we know, and to me this is no easy achievement given the degree of complexity commonly ascribed to understanding the phenomena of Self neurologically.

If you by intellectually here mean a third-person perspective and how the concepts you utilize are self-sustaining you could be right, but only on a trivial level. Yes, it can be said that without thoughts there’s no identification, and without identification there’s no sense of “I” (and thus no “I” in the tangible sense – like a rock). Or conversely: thinking happens, identification happens, and thus creates the sense/notion of “I”.

I however find that to be quite unsatisfying for a few simple reasons: 1) ‘thinking’ and ‘identification’ are such broad categories here that it’s hard to distinguish what’s excluded from them; 2) ‘identification’ seems to be simply thrown in there as an ad hoc bridge, i.e. we know there’s thinking and we know there’s the sense of “I”, thus there must be a case of ‘identification’ somewhere that “brings” these two notions together, hence ‘identification’ is thrown in as a saviour for solving the dilemma.

In short: There must be identification for the “I” to happen because, well, without identification it cannot happen. I find it a tad like begging the question. It doesn’t really reveal too much about what’s really happening, except, well, “identification” whatever that actually denotes to.

Of course, it's not my own work. This model has been around in symbolic form for millenia. I'd put money on there existing a process which mediates identification with thought and that process being dopaminergic. For me it totally matches all data.

While it’s commendable that ancient “sages” must have gone through extraordinary feats of introspection to confidently reaching such a conclusion, it is also quite a trivial conclusion after the invent of scientific reasoning and accumulation of systematic data. In fact it is pretty much presupposed. If we are to simply move on, we must eventually start breaking down concepts like thinking, identification and “I” into empirically solvable identifiable portions.

Thus we find some interesting suggestions: Like when Gazzangia proposes the existence of a “narrative self”, as one type of “self-system” in the left prefrontal cortex which seems to be responsible for what we call “self-talk”. The basis for his assumption has come through work with split brain patients and interhemispheric conflict (in Baars 1997). Furthermore, Baars alludes to the possibility of there also being a non-verbal self-system in the right hemisphere.

Baars also introduces some interesting dysfunctions: like anosognosia, where patients may reject their own limbs. So in this case they cannot identify with their own limbs even though their intellectual capacities are intact, thus there certainly are thoughts going on, and there certainly is thinking about identity and identification, yet there is inability to identify with certain parts of “oneself”.

So yes, in a very general way, there is ‘identification’ in the center of the problem again, but the simplicity of just referring to such a category is becoming increasingly unsatisfying.

Finally, Baars also suggest that the “observing self” could be a necessary framework for conscious experience, for which he says the following:

When the observing self is eclipsed by psychogenic fugue or multiple personality disorder, victims report ‘time loss’ — as if the eclipse in the observing self has also caused consciousness to disappear, for weeks or even months. The observing self seems to be a necessary framework for conscious experience. (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No 4, 1997). (See also update 2003: Science and Consciousness Review, October 2003)

These are just some hints as to why at least I don’t think it’s quite sufficient to simply throw the baby out with the bathwater when considering self-referential systems or simply “self-systems”.

 

[rocketdodger]

It is a handy quick-reference for communicating concepts among other humans. There may or may not be an actual objective existence there.

Wait... you are saying that there can be thought without a thinker? A physical process without a physical substrate? I don't think you are an idealist so you are clearly misunderstanding my meaning here.

I am simply asserting that the existence of an "I" reference implies the existence of some system which is the substrate of the reference, which can be said to be the system that is "experiencing" the "I." That seems to be just materialism 101 to me...

You really should read more Blackmore. And, maybe Dennett, though Dennett is more difficult to get through, sometimes. Blackmore is easier to swallow.

Their work has nothing to do with what I am talking about! I am talking about the basics of materialism here!

One can accept the idea that there is no real self to refer to, when speaking of "I"; and yet not be a dualist. In fact, the basic principals of that modern approach are very anti-dualism in nature. We are still talking about normally-understood matter, afterall.

I didn't say anything about being a dualist. I said that to think the only definition of "self" is the dualistic one is dualistic thinking.

The definition of "self" that I use, or my notion of self, is purely materialistic at this point, and it would be absurd to think it is any less "real" than the rest of the objective universe.

If my notion of self is something along the lines of "the entity that is writing this sentence" then how could it not be real? The sentence is clearly real, as real as anything else. So what wrote it? A ghost?

In computer science, it is good practice to break problems down into easily delineable functional units. It would be naive to assume natural life forms are obligated to do the same.

Do you think that single neurons by themselves are responsible for entire thoughts?

 

[thesyntaxera]

But you are presuming that the only meaning of "self" is the dualistic one that Nick keeps talking about.

That isn't the only meaning.

As I keep saying, another meaning is the name given to system S's reference of system S by system S.

And yet another meaning is that there just is no self. If selfhood is an emergent concept based in consciousness then the self is just a construct, or side effect of our awareness. Some animals recognize themselves in a mirror and some do not. We fortunately do, and it's proven quite useful.

 

[Wowbagger]

Wait... you are saying that there can be thought without a thinker?

Unlikely to happen. I'm just pointing out that some models of "I" are better than others, at allowing us to understand ourselves.

A physical process without a physical substrate?

That physical substrate changes more often than you realize the material that is "You", right now, won't be "You" for very long. But, "You" will still exist as the emergent behavior of whatever material you are at that moment.

This is also materialistic. It just models the emergent system, instead of the underlying system.

Do you think that single neurons by themselves are responsible for entire thoughts?

It depends on the thought. But, most of the time, I would say no. Since most thoughts run through many different neurons, and could be influenced by each one, the chances of a single neuron being solely responsible for a thought (even if it had such an ability) is fairly slim.

I am sure you know about neural net algorithms, which are highly simplified models of how the brain supposedly works. The algorithm can afford to be simplified. The actual brain is not obligated to, so a lot more could be going on than we know about, right now. (though, I imagine we could learn.)

 

[rocketdodger]

It depends on the thought. But, most of the time, I would say no. Since most thoughts run through many different neurons, and could be influenced by each one, the chances of a single neuron being solely responsible for a thought (even if it had such an ability) is fairly slim.

I am sure you know about neural net algorithms, which are highly simplified models of how the brain supposedly works. The algorithm can afford to be simplified. The actual brain is not obligated to, so a lot more could be going on than we know about, right now. (though, I imagine we could learn.)

My point in asking that was to demonstrate that the building blocks of the brain are themselves "easily delineable functional units," which are in turn composed smaller and simpler sub-units, etc, and thus no, it would not be naive to assume natural life forms are obligated to do the same.

Natural life forms are just so much more complex than any of our software it seems as if they are qualitatively different.

 

[PixyMisa]

But you don't need to think to eat. Animals without any known capacity to think manage to nourish themselves. They develop the instinct.

Really?

What animals might that be?

 

[Nick227]

No I am not assuming that at all.

The only place where S needs to be clearly defined is 1) the laws of whatever fabric S is part of (in this case our universe) 2) in the minds of whatever intelligent systems (E.G. humans) are considering S as part of a proof. S doesn't need to know anything at all about itself to begin with.

Whether you consider that System S references System S, or you consider that System S is referenced by another System there is still assumption. The human "considering S as part of a proof" is merely another system assuming itself to be self-referencing considering S as the same.

This is the problem I have with your self-referencing system. The act of reference is merely a narrative created from a data stream. It cannot be said to absolutely convey or define Self, and so the belief that it does so makes more solid what is actually a rather arbitrary border.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

It doesn't sound, to me, like Nick is trying to sell any form of dualism. But, just to be sure, I'll ask him:
Nick, are you really trying to sell some form of dualism, in your arguments?

Not as far as I'm aware.

One can accept the idea that there is no real self to refer to, when speaking of "I"; and yet not be a dualist. In fact, the basic principals of that modern approach are very anti-dualism in nature. We are still talking about normally-understood matter, afterall.

I do find it valid, in some ways, the point that RD makes when he says that he is using "I" as a reference without a referent. However, I submit that the normal human understanding of the term is that it points to some apparently existing limited entity who has thoughts, who owns a body, who has possessions, and so on and so forth.

Relatedly, the behaviourist position which I have seen put out on this forum previously, that of "I" referring to the whole organism, I also consider valid but not really relating to the issue, which again is that of considering why "I" should seem to be the way it does.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I however find that to be quite unsatisfying for a few simple reasons: 1) ‘thinking’ and ‘identification’ are such broad categories here that it’s hard to distinguish what’s excluded from them; 2) ‘identification’ seems to be simply thrown in there as an ad hoc bridge, i.e. we know there’s thinking and we know there’s the sense of “I”, thus there must be a case of ‘identification’ somewhere that “brings” these two notions together, hence ‘identification’ is thrown in as a saviour for solving the dilemma.

In short: There must be identification for the “I” to happen because, well, without identification it cannot happen. I find it a tad like begging the question. It doesn’t really reveal too much about what’s really happening, except, well, “identification” whatever that actually denotes to.

Well, in considering that thoughts can be either passively observed or acted upon, from the first person perspective it does seem rational to hypothesise the presence of an unconscious agency that is mediating this process. Of course, from a third-person, more objective viewpoint this apparent perception of "how it is" may be quite invalid. But I do find it interesting that identification does appear, sensorily, to resemble a neurochemical process.

While it’s commendable that ancient “sages” must have gone through extraordinary feats of introspection to confidently reaching such a conclusion, it is also quite a trivial conclusion after the invent of scientific reasoning and accumulation of systematic data.

Well, I think it is rather that these "sages" simply examined in depth the thoughts they were attracted towards until they made the identification sufficiently conscious so that the truth of self was laid bare.

Remember here also that Dennett or Blackmore's views of the self, which differ slightly, are remarkably close to that of Gautama the Buddha. I must say that I find your rhetoric a little patronising here and to me this could indicate that actually you do not yourself have either the ancient or modern perspectives particular clear. Of course I could be wrong, but in the event that I'm not I would recommend Blackmore: The Meme Machine, closing 2 chapters. She provides imo an excellent summary of various perspectives.

Thus we find some interesting suggestions: Like when Gazzangia proposes the existence of a “narrative self”, as one type of “self-system” in the left prefrontal cortex which seems to be responsible for what we call “self-talk”. The basis for his assumption has come through work with split brain patients and interhemispheric conflict (in Baars 1997). Furthermore, Baars alludes to the possibility of there also being a non-verbal self-system in the right hemisphere.

Baars also introduces some interesting dysfunctions: like anosognosia, where patients may reject their own limbs. So in this case they cannot identify with their own limbs even though their intellectual capacities are intact, thus there certainly are thoughts going on, and there certainly is thinking about identity and identification, yet there is inability to identify with certain parts of “oneself”.

So yes, in a very general way, there is ‘identification’ in the center of the problem again, but the simplicity of just referring to such a category is becoming increasingly unsatisfying.

Finally, Baars also suggest that the “observing self” could be a necessary framework for conscious experience, for which he says the following:



These are just some hints as to why at least I don’t think it’s quite sufficient to simply throw the baby out with the bathwater when considering self-referential systems or simply “self-systems”.

I am not suggesting throwing things out with bath-water. I'm just pointing out the fundamental issues with considering the notion of a "self-referring system" to be absolutely valid.

As to Barr's idea, I have pointed out repeatedly that without this self-narrative, or "benign user illusion" to use Dennett's term, there simply can be no experience. He seems to be reinforcing my point. Thinking creates duality.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Wait... you are saying that there can be thought without a thinker? A physical process without a physical substrate? I don't think you are an idealist so you are clearly misunderstanding my meaning here.

To my mind you are confusing things when you use words like "thinker" because you are implying selfhood. There are thoughts. The presence of thinking does not mean there actually exists "a thinker." It is only other thoughts that construct it so. The thoughts frequently appear to relate the perspective of a "thinking self," who is the apparent "doer" of the thinking, as well as the holder of opinions, the owner of a body, the possessor of various objects and an assortment of other things. This does not mean that a thinking self exists. Indeed it is clear that it does not in the sense that it appears to.

I am simply asserting that the existence of an "I" reference implies the existence of some system which is the substrate of the reference, which can be said to be the system that is "experiencing" the "I." That seems to be just materialism 101 to me...

It implies the existence of it, yes.

I didn't say anything about being a dualist. I said that to think the only definition of "self" is the dualistic one is dualistic thinking.

The definition of "self" that I use, or my notion of self, is purely materialistic at this point, and it would be absurd to think it is any less "real" than the rest of the objective universe.

If my notion of self is something along the lines of "the entity that is writing this sentence" then how could it not be real? The sentence is clearly real, as real as anything else. So what wrote it? A ghost?

The issue is that the perspective is still dualistic.

Writing takes places because thinking takes place and identification with thought takes place. If one considers Dennett's "parallel processor" model, then one of the Multiple Drafts being near-constantly created are these thought narratives, these little stories that appear to be happening to some "self." When identification with these stories takes place so notional selfhood is constructed.

To my mind, one may validly consider that, at the level of an apparently independent organism existing embedded within its environment, there is a self having thoughts. But this perspective simply does not exist beneath this level and it is inevitably dualistic.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I must say that I find your rhetoric a little patronising here and to me this could indicate that actually you do not yourself have either the ancient or modern perspectives particular clear.

But, but… there is actually no one to be patronized or anyone doing the patronizing!

I am not suggesting throwing things out with bath-water. I'm just pointing out the fundamental issues with considering the notion of a "self-referring system" to be absolutely valid.

One fundamental issue is of course to consider the actual existence of those physical processes that makes it appropriate to speak of them as self-referential systems.

As to Barr's idea, I have pointed out repeatedly that without this self-narrative, or "benign user illusion" to use Dennett's term, there simply can be no experience. He seems to be reinforcing my point. Thinking creates duality.

And it is exactly at that point where you might go astray, or simply muddle the waters again. It is not completely satisfying to say that without a self-narrative there can be no experience. You seem to equate ‘self-narrative’ with ‘benign user illusion’ which could be problematic. If you also read what I presented in reference to Gatzzangia, who proposed the existence of a narrative self, then you ought to notice that it does not necessarily mean the same thing as a self-narrative. The distinction could be considered minuscule, but potentially quite elementary for avoiding putting the cart before the horse.

Let’s backtrack to Baars again and quote him a little bit more (I’m pretty sure it is still within fair use, especially since it’s from the same paragraph), (underlining mine):

The ‘self’ involved in conscious access is sometimes referred to as the self as observer. William James called it the knower, the ‘I’. This is of course our common intuition, one that was not seriously doubted until this century, when philosophers like Gilbert Ryle found ways to question it. Empirically we now know that Ryle was wrong. The ‘narrative interpreter’ found in the left frontal cortex of split-brain patients, does indeed receive conscious sensory information (Gazzaniga, 1993). (Baars 1997: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No 4, 1997).

Now, when you say that without a self-narrative there cannot be experience, some clarifications and qualifications must be presented.

First, there is probably a difference between self and narrative, especially when also considering the content of the narrative. If the content of the narrative revolves around a central figure called “I”, then I tend to agree with you in that such central figure only exists when such narrative is active – you might call it an illusion. But of course, there are also other definition for I.

Second, when you say that “you” can passively observe “your” thoughts, but not necessarily act upon them, I assume that what you mean by “you” is something other than the central figure in the previously mentioned narrative. Thus, I assume you mean by such “you” to be a sort of self-reference (or what Baars presented as the narrative interpreter)… but not the “I” who is presented in the narrative of “I” (i.e. what you coined as a self-narrative)?

To finish off with your beloved Daniel Dennett, this blast from the past might be appropriate:

That of which I am conscious is that to which I have access, or (to put the emphasis where it belongs), that to which I have access . . . (Dennett 1978: Brainstorms)

 

[rocketdodger]

Whether you consider that System S references System S, or you consider that System S is referenced by another System there is still assumption.

The only assumption at this point in the process is that solipsism is false. I am starting to think that (solipsism) is really what you are after...

The human "considering S as part of a proof" is merely another system assuming itself to be self-referencing considering S as the same.

No. The notion of reference is independent of the notion of self. I could have no notion of self and still understand and make use of the notion of reference.

I only say "S references itself" instead of "S references S" because humans have a strong notion of self. But I don't have to say it that way. It would be perfectly possible to express all our ideas with a huge string of the propositional calculus or something along those lines. It would just be fairly dry (and tedious), if you ask me.

This is the problem I have with your self-referencing system. The act of reference is merely a narrative created from a data stream.

Huh?

It cannot be said to absolutely convey or define Self, and so the belief that it does so makes more solid what is actually a rather arbitrary border.

Yes, it can, if that is how Self is defined. I don't understand why you are clinging to the dualistic notion of self and then dogging on the dualistic notion of self. Seriously its like you are arguing with yourself at this point.

 

[Nick227]

But, but… there is actually no one to be patronized or anyone doing the patronizing!

I can foresee any future criticisms I might make of your understanding being dealt with in similar manner! Lucky that I am not "in it to win it."

And it is exactly at that point where you might go astray, or simply muddle the waters again. It is not completely satisfying to say that without a self-narrative there can be no experience. You seem to equate ‘self-narrative’ with ‘benign user illusion’ which could be problematic.

As I see it, it would be problematic if there was no identification. How would you consider it problematic?

If you also read what I presented in reference to Gatzzangia, who proposed the existence of a narrative self, then you ought to notice that it does not necessarily mean the same thing as a self-narrative. The distinction could be considered minuscule, but potentially quite elementary for avoiding putting the cart before the horse.

Watch the duality radar here. Spelling radar too!

Let’s backtrack to Baars again and quote him a little bit more (I’m pretty sure it is still within fair use, especially since it’s from the same paragraph), (underlining mine):

Originally Posted by Baars 1997: Global Workspace Theory
The ‘self’ involved in conscious access is sometimes referred to as the self as observer. William James called it the knower, the ‘I’. This is of course our common intuition, one that was not seriously doubted until this century, when philosophers like Gilbert Ryle found ways to question it. Empirically we now know that Ryle was wrong. The ‘narrative interpreter’ found in the left frontal cortex of split-brain patients, does indeed receive conscious sensory information (Gazzaniga, 1993). (Baars 1997: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No 4, 1997).

I think if you examine this notion of a "narrative interpreter" you will agree that it cannot be regarded as a self.

Now, when you say that without a self-narrative there cannot be experience, some clarifications and qualifications must be presented.

First, there is probably a difference between self and narrative, especially when also considering the content of the narrative. If the content of the narrative revolves around a central figure called “I”, then I tend to agree with you in that such central figure only exists when such narrative is active – you might call it an illusion. But of course, there are also other definition for I.

One problem here... it is not only the presence of a narrative about "I" that creates a sense of self. Once the notion of limited selfhood is created in the brain any thinking narrative will maintain this notional selfhood, for it will constantly appear that there must be a self that is experiencing the thoughts. Furthermore, the thoughts themselves will soon relate almost entirely to this notional self.

Whilst thinking, and identification with thought, are taking place it will tend to reinforce selfhood, pretty much no matter what the thinking is about. An exception might be a narrative specifically intended to attack the idea of notional selfhood though.

As Blackmore (1999) relates, self may validly be considered purely memetic. Her term is "selfplex", hope I'm allowed to quote...

In most people the selfplex is constantly being reinforced. Everything that happens is referred to the self, sensations are referred to the observing self, shifts of attention are attributed to the self, decisions are described as being made by the self, and so on. All this reconfirms and sustains the selfplex, and the result is a quality of consciousness dominated by the sense of 'I' in the middle - me in charge, me responsible, me suffering.

Second, when you say that “you” can passively observe “your” thoughts, but not necessarily act upon them, I assume that what you mean by “you” is something other than the central figure in the previously mentioned narrative. Thus, I assume you mean by such “you” to be a sort of self-reference (or what Baars presented as the narrative interpreter)… but not the “I” who is presented in the narrative of “I” (i.e. what you coined as a self-narrative)?

Well, narratives are narratives. They create self. When I say one can passively observe thinking I am trying to relate that which appears to take place. Who knows?

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

To my mind you are confusing things when you use words like "thinker" because you are implying selfhood. There are thoughts. The presence of thinking does not mean there actually exists "a thinker." It is only other thoughts that construct it so. The thoughts frequently appear to relate the perspective of a "thinking self," who is the apparent "doer" of the thinking, as well as the holder of opinions, the owner of a body, the possessor of various objects and an assortment of other things. This does not mean that a thinking self exists. Indeed it is clear that it does not in the sense that it appears to.

That is textbook idealism. You are an idealist. Is anyone else reading this nonsense?

The issue is that the perspective is still dualistic.

What typed that sentence on a keyboard, entering it in browser, such that it arrived on these forums?

Was it the entity on the JREF forums that other users reference as Nick227?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

 

[Nick227]

That is textbook idealism. You are an idealist. Is anyone else reading this nonsense?

An apt question indeed!! But, it is not idealism, RD. It is pretty much straight-down-the-line modern materialism. You may recall some months ago, on another thread, me pointing out that when you start to investigate selfhood, beneath the level of the functioning independent organism, it gets weird. It gets very weird indeed. Things seem to be deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. You refused to accept this, despite me urging you to read Blackmore, Dennett, and others. I figure you clearly are interested at some level or other, elsewise why would you continue the dialogue? I'm just wondering if you will ever realise that actually it is pretty strange.

What typed that sentence on a keyboard, entering it in browser, such that it arrived on these forums?

Was it the entity on the JREF forums that other users reference as Nick227?

Is that the entity that replied to the immediately preceeding question?

et al

If you read the rest of that post you will see that I point out that I'm fine to consider things solely at the level of the functioning organism and conclude that there really is a self doing things. But once one gets beneath that level, as inevitably one must if one is to meaningfully investigate selfhood and consciousness, things get very strange indeed.

This is the problem. It's is not that things are necessarily complicated. It is that they are deeply, deeply counter-intuitive. Scientists have spent decades trying to find "places in the brain where things become conscious" and similar. They have spent decades trying to create and sustain a model that matches what seems intuitively correct. They haven't got very far. This, as I think most now realise, is because the models that work are deeply counter-intuitive. They challenge directly the brain of the scientist working on them, for what is related in the model must also be going on inside that brain. All the defences that the notional self uses to protect itself are inevitably activated to deal with any threats the model creates in the brain of the investigator, and this is the real issue.

Nick

 

[Wowbagger]

My point in asking that was to demonstrate that the building blocks of the brain are themselves "easily delineable functional units," which are in turn composed smaller and simpler sub-units, etc,

What if this wasn't true? What if there is a tremendous overlap in the tasks many parts of the brain are supposed to do? I think we are finding is that there are trends for thoughts to occur in certain places, but that exceptions and differences crop up, every now and then. The functional units are not as easily delineable as you might think.