Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

[DevilsAdvocate]

A blindsighted person says he cannot see anything, yet can pick up a red object when asked to. Apparently his nonconscious vision is still working to some extent, but his conscious vision is broken. So he can see a red object, but not experience the associated qualia.

You've still lost me. If I put a bunch of different colored balls in a hat, how can a person without sight pick up the red one? Other than chance. Sounds like a JREF Challenge $1 million prize winner to me. A (totally) blind person cannot pick up a red object when asked to. I'm not getting what you are saying.

Whatever they are, the fact that we are discussing them means they have an effect on our brains. I suspect, and certainly not originally, that the quale serves a purpose as a marker or flag or indicator that "red has been seen," for purposes of planning future action. If so, it is certainly not epiphenomenal.

Still (mostly) begs the question. I think you still don't get it. This is a tough one.

If the quale is a "marker or flag or indicator that red has been seen" it is purely non-epiphenomenal if that marker is a part of our brain matter. But if that marker is outside of our brains (not a neurological cell matter type thing) then the marker is an epiphenominon.

If you look at something red, you not only "know that red has been seen" but also "see red" or maybe a better way to say it is that you "feel" or "experience" red. Hmm...

Let's try something more direct. Go to your toolbox and get out a hammer. Put your thumb on a table, and now smash it good and hard with the hammer. Did you "know" (have a marker or flag or indicator in your brain) that it hurt, or did you actually experience pain that was separate from that knowledge. Now look at something red. You know that it is red. This will also put a marker or flag or indicator in your brain that it is red. Was your experience of seeing red any different from your experience of smashing you thumb with hammer? If you didn't "feel" the same pain when you looked at something red as you did when you crushed your thumb, then isn't there something other than just a marker or flag or indicator in your brain? In other words, isn't there more than the phenomenon of those events, but also an epiphenomenona that you experienced?

You raised the question yourself: if there is not something OTHER THAN a marker or flag or indicator in your brain, then how can we even be discussing the OTHER thing that we experience (which is the epiphenomenon that we are discussing). In other words, if we just have markers in our brains, then why do we believe that we "feel" pain and "see" red? And if the answer is that we don't "feel pain" and "see red", then how can we even be discussing these things that we would not have any knowledge of (which was your point, and a good one I think)?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Devil said:
You've still lost me. If I put a bunch of different colored balls in a hat, how can a person without sight pick up the red one? Other than chance. Sounds like a JREF Challenge $1 million prize winner to me. A (totally) blind person cannot pick up a red object when asked to. I'm not getting what you are saying.

Because a blindsighted person has perfectly good eyes. The damage is to the cerebral cortex on one side, thus knocking out the conscious processing of vision. The nonconscious, evolutionarily-older connection between the eyes and the muscle control centers are intact. So the person can nonconsciously select and pick up an object by its color, even though he says he cannot see.

If the quale is a "marker or flag or indicator that red has been seen" it is purely non-epiphenomenal if that marker is a part of our brain matter. But if that marker is outside of our brains (not a neurological cell matter type thing) then the marker is an epiphenominon.

If the marker is an epiphenomenon, then we could not talk about experiencing it. So we would not be having this conversation.

If you look at something red, you not only "know that red has been seen" but also "see red" or maybe a better way to say it is that you "feel" or "experience" red. Hmm...

If you are blindsighted, you can see red but not know (experience) it.

Let's try something more direct. Go to your toolbox and get out a hammer. Put your thumb on a table, and now smash it good and hard with the hammer. Did you "know" (have a marker or flag or indicator in your brain) that it hurt, or did you actually experience pain that was separate from that knowledge. Now look at something red. You know that it is red. This will also put a marker or flag or indicator in your brain that it is red. Was your experience of seeing red any different from your experience of smashing you thumb with hammer? If you didn't "feel" the same pain when you looked at something red as you did when you crushed your thumb, then isn't there something other than just a marker or flag or indicator in your brain? In other words, isn't there more than the phenomenon of those events, but also an epiphenomenona that you experienced?

I expect your brain did at least two things: (1) Nonconsciously retracted your hand after you hit it; (2) Experienced conscious pain. It is the latter that we call a quale. It is not an epiphenomenon or we could not talk about it.

You raised the question yourself: if there is not something OTHER THAN a marker or flag or indicator in your brain, then how can we even be discussing the OTHER thing that we experience (which is the epiphenomenon that we are discussing). In other words, if we just have markers in our brains, then why do we believe that we "feel" pain and "see" red? And if the answer is that we don't "feel pain" and "see red", then how can we even be discussing these things that we would not have any knowledge of (which was your point, and a good one I think)?[/quote[
I'm not sure what you mean by your first sentence here. What I'm suggesting is that the marker is what we experience as the quale.

I think we've got ourselves tied up in a knot.

~~ Paul

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

I think we've got ourselves tied up in a knot.

I think it was just me that got tied up in a knot. Sorry. I understand know what you meant by "a blindsighted person".

In answer to your original question, I think you do understand epiphenomenonalism.

There are also those that will argue that replacing epiphenomenon for a "brain marker" that is "Experienced conscious pain" begs the question of what is "consciousness" and "experience"? Epiphenomenonalists would say that it is an epiphenomenon.

Your argument about "not being able to talk about an epiphenomenon if it is not causally effective" is a good one, but it is not the silver bullet to question of epiphenomenonalism. There are those that will argue that you can talk about it because the epiphenomenon IS causally effective. Or one could argue that it is not causally effective, but is like a data reservoir that the brain can send data to and get data from--but the brain is not actually otherwise affected by it. This is very close to your argument, except that instead of creating an unnecessary epiphenomenon, you claim this is a "marker" or "physical trait" in the brain (at least I'm guessing that that is what you are saying).

Philosophically, this poses certain problems. If I rigged up a computer with some sensors, it would “know” that something “is red” or that a “hammer hit”. But it would not experienced conscious redness or "experienced conscious pain". But what if that experience is only a marker in our brains as you say? What happens if I change the programming in the computer to set a variable to True when it “knows” that is “sees red” or detects that it was “hit by a hammer”. Now our computer rig is just like your description of a marker, which is that it “Experienced conscious pain” or experienced conscious redness. Does that mean that adding that variable “marker” in the computer code gave our rig the same “experience” of “pain” and “redness” that we experience? I certainly don’t think so. To our rig, it is just another bit of data--and non-casual data at that. There is no “conscious experience”.

So here is where we got tied in the knot: If there is no “conscious experience” of “redness” or of “pain” (or hunger, desire, etc.) different from a simple “marker” like a computer would have (in which case it would only “know” that it recorded the empirical observation) then how can we even be discussing such “experiences”? You see, I’m sort of tying the knot around using your own argument against you. This is why I said you are (to some degree) begging the question.

There were a couple of other interesting questions raised in this thread (I think they were both by Interesting Ian.). One is that there is a casually effective epiphenomenon. You can use Occam’s razor on this one, but you can also use a scalpel on the brain. This would actually be a very interesting study. It probably has been done, but I haven’t looked for it. The question would be: can you take someone with perfectly good sight, and then remove a part of their brain such that they can tell you which objects are red without experiencing “red”. It sounds like you evidence of a blindsighted person may fit this bill. I like your explanation that the “experience” by the blindsighted person is “nonconscious” More philosophers should look into that as well (OK, they probably have). I love to see any more info on this if you have any links!

So accepting this blindsighted person phenomenon as fact: This would mean that there is a part of the brain that “knows” and a part of the brain that “experiences”. It also gives credence to the necessity for separate (in other possible words “dualist”) experiences of the brain.

So, yes, that would prove there is no epiphenomenon. It is, and can be proven (although not empirically) separate parts of the physical brain.

So now we just need to figure out what this “conscious experience” from the other part of the brain is all about…

Epiphenomenonalism is nothing new. Philosophers have gone way beyond this. I’ve stated that my own hunch is that there is a certain level of complexity that results in self-awareness that has not yet been discovered--and that actually may be undiscoverable.

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

My own personal beliefs (which are just hunches really because I’m not a professional philosopher) are based on a television program I saw (about 10-15 years ago when I was in college and studying philosophy) about people that had the doolywopthing between the two halves of their brain severed. As I recall, this was done as an extreme measure to stop chronic seizures.

Although the program had a profound influence on me, I don’t remember much about it. I do remember that these people had a very different “experience” that you and I have, but the have the same empirical observations. So they see and hear and feel everything like we do, but they don’t really “see and hear and feel” everything like we do. Hard to explain. Just like a person that can “see” that something is red, but not consciously “see red”.

Well, as the program went on and the philosophical questions I was pondering ran through my brain I realized: “These people have no sense of a ‘self’! The show went on to show tests that proved (at least to me) that they really didn’t. Amazing show!

So my conclusion was that “self” or “mind” is an illusion. It is imaginary. That is why the “pure knowledge” of mathematics is an illusion, but can be related directly (but not always precisely) to the physical world. Self or Mind is a symbol. A construct of a system. The symbolic construct based on empirical observation can create imaginary symbolic constructs of what the physical world WOULD BE. So you can make something like the periodical chart of elements. You can test those imaginary symbolic constructs in the physical world--sometimes.

I think this answers many questions about why people are deluded, or believe things that are not true, or go crazy, or respond in sensible or non-sensible ways.

This raises the question of “what then is consciousness”. If epiphenomenalism is bunk, then we should be able to derive that answer from analysis of the brain. That’s possible, but I don’t think neurology will ultimately reveal the answer. My hunch is that the answer will come from the “imaginary symbolic constructs” themselves--that is, from mathematics. My hunch is that “intelligence” (which I believe is a result of self-awareness) is a matter of mathematical complexity. Of course, I’d be willing to accept that the knowledge of that complexity is ultimately beyond our knowledge.

(Oooh wow. Just posted a whole lot of stuff. Hope at at least someone actually read my blathering. )

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Devil said:
Your argument about "not being able to talk about an epiphenomenon if it is not causally effective" is a good one, but it is not the silver bullet to question of epiphenomenonalism. There are those that will argue that you can talk about it because the epiphenomenon IS causally effective. Or one could argue that it is not causally effective, but is like a data reservoir that the brain can send data to and get data from--but the brain is not actually otherwise affected by it. This is very close to your argument, except that instead of creating an unnecessary epiphenomenon, you claim this is a "marker" or "physical trait" in the brain (at least I'm guessing that that is what you are saying).

I'm sure some do argue that a quale is epiphenomenal to the original brain event that caused it, but has a downstream effect on further brain events. But that is not what all the definitions I can find seem to say. That is why I'm confused.

If the brain can get data from an "epiphenomenon," then it is not epiphenomenal.

So here is where we got tied in the knot: If there is no “conscious experience” of “redness” or of “pain” (or hunger, desire, etc.) different from a simple “marker” like a computer would have (in which case it would only “know” that it recorded the empirical observation) then how can we even be discussing such “experiences”? You see, I’m sort of tying the knot around using your own argument against you. This is why I said you are (to some degree) begging the question.

The marker is the quale; we don't need another mechanism to experience the quale. Think of it as an evolved behavior: In order to make a plan about what to do about something dangerous, the brain uses a pain marker that "feels uncomfortable" in order to spur me into further action to avoid the pain and its consequences. Why does the marker "feel uncomfortable"? Because it is associated with lots of uncomfortable physiological processes.

It all makes a bit more sense if you think of the brain as a bunch of disjoint modules with evolved hacks for signaling between them.

~~ Paul

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

Paul, thank you for your posts!

I think your ideas on blindsightedness and "being able to discuss the experience" are very interesting challenges to epiphenomenonalism. I'm thinking about them, but I'm still not sold.

What you have said certainly creates some difficulties for pure epiphenomenonalism. But I find it difficult to accept that my "experience" of things like pain and redness (or even sadness and desire) is just some meaty part of my brain. I think it sort of begs the question (or questions) that created the idea of epiphenomenonalism in the first place.

For me, the idea of "your finger 'hurts' when you put it on the stove because this little chunk of brain tells you to think that" doesn't help answer questions about belief or consciousness or intelligence. But your questions certainly pushes toward one high level direction rather than another and provide some great insight.

To me, explaining epiphenomenon (or the conscious experience of sensation) is wholly linked with explaining intelligence. A robot/computer that can record, evaluate, and create a marker of that evaluation does not do the same thing my brain does; it does not have the same conscious experience of sensation (epiphenomenona?) that I do. For me, it comes down to explaining intelligence, which would demonstrate that we either can or cannot create artificial intelligence. My hunch is that there is a system of complexity that creates intelligence--which is a sort of “pulled up by the bootstraps” sort of thing; a “self-awareness”. I think that type of intelligence is based on a complex system of symbols. I don’t think that saying “consciousness” or “mind” or “felling” is some meat part of the brain help answer those questions in any way. That’s why I said it sort of begs the question. Of course, “well, is just this just this epiphenomenona that is totally separate” does far worse things for the cause of understanding.

I’ve droned on way to long. Anyway, based on what you have said, I’ve got some things to ponder and have found some articles that interest me like http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/science/advances.htm

Unfortunately, I find myself looking into brain damage.

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

Brain damage

Are there any other conditions like "blindsight" that would be similar or relevant conscious experience of sensations? I found asonognasia as a similar type of condition.

Does anyone know what the thing is that connects your right brain to your left brain, or what the procedure is called when it is severed?

 

[69dodge]

Re: Brain damage

Originally posted by DevilsAdvocate
Does anyone know what the thing is that connects your right brain to your left brain [...] ?

corpus callosum