Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

[Interesting Ian]

What two positions? The difference between Gestahl's take and the vast majority of descriptions I've read is immense. Every one of the definitions here:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:epiphenomenalism

is, I humbly suggest, ridiculous. Philosophers can't really be using those definitions, so Gestahl must be correct.

Is it possible that epiphenomenalism has become, like fashion, a charicature of itself?

~~ Paul

It's less ridiculous than materialism. At least it is able to say consciousness exists without any inconsistency.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Shall we move on to the Knowledge Argument?

I'll ask every philosopher I meet at TAM about epiphenomenalism. That should make me popular.

~~ Paul

Make yourself even more popular by pretending to be me again.

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

BTW, I am not aware of any problems that dualism has, at least not interactive dualism. Care to name any of these problems?

Just examine Stimpy's dilemma: If it affects, or effects "stuff" it is also "stuff". "Stuff" is a) material or b) non-material. Now is "mind (the possible source of free-will)" material, or not-material? The answer Not-material is some form of idealism.

See the problem?

BTW, non-interactive dualism should suit you, offering a means to forgo ego-death but not breaking any of TLOP. It is of course a sterile conjecture for life as we know it in this universe.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

Just examine Stimpy's dilemma: If it affects, or effects "stuff" it is also "stuff".

He just defines it as being physical if it is causally efficacious - but that's not useful and it is his definition alone. He doesn't believe in any stuff at all. The physical world is exhausted by its properties, but there is not anything which has properties (which is what I would understand by physical "stuff").

"Stuff" is a) material or b) non-material. Now is "mind (the possible source of free-will)" material, or not-material? The answer Not-material is some form of idealism.

Well, I thinkthese definitions of idealism, dualism, and especially materialism tend to be rather ill-defined.

See the problem?

Huh? No not at all. I think the only real problem is the notion of a material substance. Way too metaphysical and obscure. But the notion of physical properties existing independent of our perceptions is ok I suppose. Not something I actually believe of course.

BTW, non-interactive dualism should suit you, offering a means to forgo ego-death but not breaking any of TLOP. It is of course a sterile conjecture for life as we know it in this universe.

Interactive dualism need not break TLOP. The actions brought about by mental causation might be described by physical laws.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

BTW, I am not aware of any problems that dualism has, at least not interactive dualism. Care to name any of these problems?

Well, first off there's the old 'queerness' problem, which is basically that dualism as often as not acts as an ignotium per ignotius when it comes to explaining mental events.

Secondly this bears on the problem of determining the proper makeup of the mind (substance or bundle or....??) and how one might determine/reach understanding of any answer to that question.

Finally there's just the problem that saying 'interactive dualism' doesn't solve the obvious problem with how the interaction is occurring. In this sense, at the very least, it's non-interactive dualism that's less problematic (though also less intuitive).

These are all substantial, and, frankly, obvious problems with dualism in general. Any more particular account will have it's own unique problems, of course.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm I'll give you one, just as soon as you provide a mechanism to explain how electronic impulses moving through specific transistor configurations can be transformed into mathematical operations.

By assigning specific numbers to certain impulses (which will remain as specific configurations either on the CPU, RAM, monitor or printer).

Your turn.

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm THEY ARE THE SAME THING.

Oh no, they are not. It makes you feel confortable to think they are the same. In your example, does a math operation IS a certain configuration of electronic impulses?

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

Interactive dualism need not break TLOP. The actions brought about by mental causation might be described by physical laws.

Nope. If mental causation (let's call that not-materialism) affects/effects what we perceive as "matter", that "matter" is also the same not-materialism stuff that 'mental' is composed of.


Or, goddidit, and/or you are a dualist.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, first off there's the old 'queerness' problem, which is basically that dualism as often as not acts as an ignotium per ignotius when it comes to explaining mental events.

We don't need to explain mental events; they simply exist or are a result of mental causation. It's their neural correlates which need to be explained.

Secondly this bears on the problem of determining the proper makeup of the mind (substance or bundle or....??) and how one might determine/reach understanding of any answer to that question.

Yes, but how does this make dualism less likely? We might have difficulty in determining the events on a planet existing somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy, but that gives zero evidence to suppose that no such events are occurring! Also how does materialism and idealism escape these questions? If there exists consciousness, then we have the problem of determining the nature of an self (whether a real self or only an apparent self).

Finally there's just the problem that saying 'interactive dualism' doesn't solve the obvious problem with how the interaction is occurring. In this sense, at the very least, it's non-interactive dualism that's less problematic (though also less intuitive).

How does one billiard ball interact with another billiard ball? The question doesn't make sense because it's just a brute fact about reality that physical causation exists. If a billiard ball can be causally efficacious, why not a non-physical self?

These are all substantial, and, frankly, obvious problems with dualism in general. Any more particular account will have it's own unique problems, of course. [/B]

Ummm . .sorry . .I entirely disagree. The only problem is supposing a consciousness independent reality. This is why I'm a subjective idealist.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

Nope. If mental causation (let's call that not-materialism) affects/effects what we perceive as "matter", that "matter" is also the same not-materialism stuff that 'mental' is composed of.

{shrugs}

I don't see why. Why cannot the mental or non-physical self, affect that which exists independently of the self (which we label matter). I see no probs.

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

Best to give it away right now - Ian refuses to understand (or perhaps simpy refuses to acknowledge the point?). Afterall, he uses the TV transmitter/reciever analogy as a key point in demonstrating his worldview, yet refuses to acknowledge that the analogy itself demonstrates that the two parts (the transmitter and the receiver) exist in the same "realm". Not a great model for explaining "dualism" I'd have thought.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

We don't need to explain mental events; they simply exist or are a result of mental causation. It's their neural correlates which need to be explained.

And this is precisely what I said, actually -- your setup looks something like "There's this puzzling aspect to a certain sort of thing. My explanation of it is wseyiohw qweov wepidni wepwieh[p. That doesn't make much sense, admittedly, and is far more mysterious than the thing puzzling aspect we started from, but that's ok."

Does this make sense as a problem for dualism to you? You're still allowed to hold it, of course, but you do have to keep in mind that you're explaining something puzzling by recourse to something really puzzling. And that's liable to be unsatisfying to a lot of people.

Also how does materialism and idealism escape these questions? If there exists consciousness, then we have the problem of determining the nature of an self (whether a real self or only an apparent self).

Materialism and idealism both have these problems as well (or, more specifically, idealism has the exact same problem and materialism (of what sort, though?) has a similar set of problems). The thing is that with dualism (and idealism) the problems seem far more intractable and mysterious.

How does one billiard ball interact with another billiard ball? The question doesn't make sense because it's just a brute fact about reality that physical causation exists. If a billiard ball can be causally efficacious, why not a non-physical self?

If a non-physical self can be causally efficacious, why not non-existent entity?

That's not intended seriously, of course, but the point is that just because something is a problem does not allow one to infer that an solution which both leaves that problem as is and adds new problems is a good idea. If your thesis is trying to be "interactionist dualism doesn't have a problem spelling out mental causation because physical causation is also hard to spell out or support" you're probably just going to have a lot of people poking you and claiming that they've solved the problem. And, frankly, they're basically right to do so.

Ummm . .sorry . .I entirely disagree. The only problem is supposing a consciousness independent reality. This is why I'm a subjective idealist.

Hm, well if you're a subjective idealist than why aren't I?

I mean, I might as well be as far as you're concerned, right? And you'd probably prefer having me agree with you.....

 

[Interesting Ian]

hammegk,

Best to give it away right now - Ian refuses to understand (or perhaps simpy refuses to acknowledge the point?).

It's not a refusal on my part. I simply have absolutely no idea where on earth he is coming from. He hasn't provided any justification for his contention whatsoever. I very strongly suspect that it is not possible to do so. But I'm open to peoples' arguments.

Afterall, he uses the TV transmitter/reciever analogy as a key point in demonstrating his worldview,

No, the relationship of the substantial self to the brain.

yet refuses to acknowledge that the analogy itself demonstrates that the two parts (the transmitter and the receiver) exist in the same "realm".

No, you're taking the analogy too far. It's an analogy; necessarily it breaks down at some point. Nevertheless I feel it is useful to express the idea involved.

Not a great model for explaining "dualism" I'd have thought.

It doesn't explain dualism, and I'm not a dualist. It explains the nature of the relationship between self and its brain.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
We don't need to explain mental events; they simply exist or are a result of mental causation. It's their neural correlates which need to be explained.

Eleatic Stranger
And this is precisely what I said,

Huh?? I thought you said that we need to explain mental events.

actually -- your setup looks something like "There's this puzzling aspect to a certain sort of thing.

No I don't think so. I see no puzzling aspect. What is this puzzling aspect?

My explanation of it is wseyiohw qweov wepidni wepwieh[p. That doesn't make much sense, admittedly, and is far more mysterious than the thing puzzling aspect we started from, but that's ok."

No I don't think my "setup" remotely resembles that. I do not see any puzzling aspects to mental events.

Does this make sense as a problem for dualism to you?

No it doesn't. I do not see any problems for interactive dualism apart from the one I mentioned.

quote: Also how does materialism and idealism escape these questions? If there exists consciousness, then we have the problem of determining the nature of an self (whether a real self or only an apparent self).


Eleatic Stranger
Materialism and idealism both have these problems as well (or, more specifically, idealism has the exact same problem

Well, if it is a problem for dualism, then yes, idealism must have it too.

Eleatic Stranger
and materialism (of what sort, though?) has a similar set of problems). The thing is that with dualism (and idealism) the problems seem far more intractable and mysterious.

I'm afraid I emphatically disagree with you there! Materialism seems to me to be the one with the intractible difficulties, not to mention its incredible implausibility and uncommonsensical nature!

II
How does one billiard ball interact with another billiard ball? The question doesn't make sense because it's just a brute fact about reality that physical causation exists. If a billiard ball can be causally efficacious, why not a non-physical self?

Eleatic Stranger
If a non-physical self can be causally efficacious, why not non-existent entity?

Well it can be, but but how would this be different from events just happening?

Eleatic Stranger
That's not intended seriously, of course, but the point is that just because something is a problem does not allow one to infer that an solution which both leaves that problem as is and adds new problems is a good idea.

But I don't recognise any problems at all.

If your thesis is trying to be "interactionist dualism doesn't have a problem spelling out mental causation because physical causation is also hard to spell out or support" you're probably just going to have a lot of people poking you and claiming that they've solved the problem. And, frankly, they're basically right to do so.

Actually you've got it the wrong way around. If anything, it would be physical causality which is problematic, whereas mental causality isn't. After all we are all intimately acquainted with our own causal agency. But how can one set of qualia -- the visual appearance of a billiard ball -- affect another set of qualia -- another billiard ball? Personally I don't see it as a problem though -- reality is just like that.

II
Ummm . .sorry . .I entirely disagree. The only problem is supposing a consciousness independent reality. This is why I'm a subjective idealist.


Eleatic Stranger
Hm, well if you're a subjective idealist than why aren't I?

I have no idea.

I mean, I might as well be as far as you're concerned, right? And you'd probably prefer having me agree with you.....

No not really, I don't mind what you believe in.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

By assigning specific numbers to certain impulses (which will remain as specific configurations either on the CPU, RAM, monitor or printer).

Not good enough. I demand precise and complete explanations for how electronic impulses are translated into images. After all, would you be willing to accept the theory of computation as an explanation for how the behavior of neurons can be translated into thoughts and experiences? Of course not.

Oh no, they are not. It makes you feel confortable to think they are the same. In your example, does a math operation IS a certain configuration of electronic impulses?

Ask me a question in English, and I'll try to give you an answer.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Not good enough. I demand precise and complete explanations...

.. Ask me a question in English, and I'll try to give you an answer... [/B]

You demand, I laugh

I can ask you a question, but as it is now evident after several attempts, you wont answer it.

So I choose to laugh more.

It would be good if computers could ever be this happy.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

"Does a math operation IS a certain configuration of electronic impulses?"

I can't answer that question because IT IS NOT WELL-FORMED ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF ENGLISH.

 

[hammegk]

You demand, I laugh

It would be good if computers could ever be this happy.

I was getting curious when you would tire of a smelly sock that 'might' pass the Turing test for intelligence.

 

[Gestahl]

OK, so here is my idea on the mind/body problem.

First, there is not difference between object A affecting object B, and object B experiencing object A's influence. Note, however, B is not conscious, nor is A. The entire universe and everything in it is experiential. If B does not experience A, how does it 'know' to respond?

Therefore, the question of "What are we?" is: we are a standing pattern of electrical excitation in the brain, and maybe the entire nervous system itself. If we were to stop thinking (electrical excitation ends, or could get locked in a single pattern), we would cease to exist experientially.

What, then, separates our consiousness from other thing's experiential existance:

1) Memory. We have patterns formed that we have a reference to. If you never have something to refer your current condition too, you cannot know you exist.

2) Modification. The brain's hardware self-modifies underneath the electricity. If the brain never changed, we would never have the concept of time, and possibly not existence at all.

3) Complexity.

I am not sure if this is monistic idealism, or something new... I have never heard it expressed this way, and is certainly not the same position as "everything is mind" or "everything is alive" as I have understood them.

More like just a recognition that mind and matter are like the wave particle duality.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Devils said:
How can a blind-sighted person see red objects? A better way of putting it would be that a person born with normal vision would both see red objects and experience the quale of redness. If that person later in life lost their sight (let's say something terrible happened to their eyes, not a result of something wrong with their brain that processes info from their eyes) then that person would not be able to see red, but could still experience redness in their imagination.

A blindsighted person says he cannot see anything, yet can pick up a red object when asked to. Apparently his nonconscious vision is still working to some extent, but his conscious vision is broken. So he can see a red object, but not experience the associated qualia.

3) So we are left with option 3: This is the option that I support. The causality in my eyes and brain are exactly the same as the causality in the mechanical machine. The difference is that my brain is sufficiently complex to create a “consciousness” that can create a quale of “redness”. But both the consciousness and corresponding quale are illusions--constructs created by neurological phenomenon that are necessary to process the data of those phenomenon. Much like there is no such thing as the number two. There is no thing that exists that is “the number two”. It is just an illusion or construct created by my brain to process the data of phenomenon. It isn’t something that really “exists”, just as “redness”, “pain”, and “self” (or “soul” or “mind”) don’t really exist. There are not really any epiphenomenona. They are not phenomenon that have causal effectiveness, but constructs of phenomenon used to analyze those phenomenon.

Whatever they are, the fact that we are discussing them means they have an effect on our brains. I suspect, and certainly not originally, that the quale serves a purpose as a marker or flag or indicator that "red has been seen," for purposes of planning future action. If so, it is certainly not epiphenomenal.

For example, jumping out of the way of an attacking predator is useful, but doing both that and generating a "predator attack" token for future processing is even more useful. Perhaps that token is the quale.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dodge said:
What do we say about redness that a nonconscious robot couldn't say? (Robots don't experience any qualia, so they certainly don't experience causally efficacious ones.)

We say sentences like this one you just said. A robot would be like a blindsighted person and have no conscious experience of redness. Therefore he would never say what you just said.

If there is anything more to qualia than what a blindsighted person experiences, then that extra stuff is causally efficacious.

~~ Paul