Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
I would respond to what you said, but it was merely a sequence of symbols produced by random acts of typing. Too bad you're not typing "about" something.

Well, now you're just being silly. But, I guess you think I'm being silly too. Ok. Now what?

What "conscious experiences"? People's behavior changes according to the events that happen to them, but I'm not familiar with the "conscious experience" you assert they possess.

Well, if you really aren't, I can see why you'd have trouble following the discussion.

(Hmm ... actually, I think I'm undermining my own argument here ... Ah, what the heck. Which is more important anyway, philosophical consistency or getting in a weak joke? )

Then if it's possible to behave as if one had these unspecified "conscious experiences" without actually having them, what makes you so sure that people have them in the first place?

I'm not sure, strictly speaking. But it just feels right to suppose they do, so, practically speaking, that's what I do.

The only way in which solipsists are wrong is that they believe they're making a meaningful assertion that makes a distinction instead of a tautology that is equivalent to every other valid position.

The positions are equivalent as far as any single person is concerned, but they're not equivalent as far as everyone else is concerned, because the positions differ about whether there is anyone else.

It's a funny sort of difference, because if someone doesn't exist, he doesn't know that he doesn't exist. But, still, it would seem that existing and not existing deserve to be called different, even though only if someone exists can he tell the difference.

("Exists" means "is conscious", here.)

 

[Loki]

69dodge,

But suppose you know that light travels in straight lines. Then, you can deduce what the shape and position of the shadow is, and you can discuss it meaningfully even though you've never seen it. It isn't the shadow itself that causes you to talk about it; it's your knowledge of how it was produced.

Nice try, but I think we've wandered into that area where all analogies go to die - the realm where they confuse more than clarify. If I accept your point, then all it really means is that I can deduce that my shadow exists, and what it almost certainly looks like - but I still haven't actually ever seen a shadow, and never will. Somehow, that doesn't really seem to work too well if I substitute "quale" for "shadow".

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Well, now you're just being silly. But, I guess you think I'm being silly too. Ok. Now what?

"Silly" doesn't do it justice. You were either being stupid, or asking a question that you knew was pointless.

Well, if you really aren't, I can see why you'd have trouble following the discussion.

More to the point, if you're really doubting the idea that we can communicate concepts and understand those of others, attempting to communicate is inappropriate. By trying to express the implication, you contradicted it, invalidating your entire position.

Which is more important anyway, philosophical consistency or getting in a weak joke?

Philosophical consistency.

The positions are equivalent as far as any single person is concerned, but they're not equivalent as far as everyone else is concerned, because the positions differ about whether there is anyone else.

No, they don't. They are completely equivalent. "Other people" can be defined only in a phenomenological sense.

("Exists" means "is conscious", here.)

That explains a great deal about the quality of your argumentation.

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Loki
Nice try, but I think we've wandered into that area where all analogies go to die - the realm where they confuse more than clarify. If I accept your point, then all it really means is that I can deduce that my shadow exists, and what it almost certainly looks like - but I still haven't actually ever seen a shadow, and never will. Somehow, that doesn't really seem to work too well if I substitute "quale" for "shadow".

Well. I thought it was a good analogy.

Let me try to explain what I meant. I haven't seen Win's original argument, but I'm guessing that the reason he specified you never see your shadow was to insure that there was no possibility of it affecting your behavior. My point is, you can be allowed to see your shadow, without that necessarily meaning that the shadow itself affects your future behavior; because even if you didn't look at it, you might still know it was there and be able to describe it. So, therefore, when you describe it after having seen it, you're doing the same thing you would have done had you not seen it. So it didn't change your behavior even though you saw it.

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
if you're really doubting the idea that we can communicate concepts and understand those of others

No, that's not what I'm trying to say. When you say "red," I do understand what you mean, but not because the word "red" inherently has any redness to it; it's because I have previously seen red myself and been taught its name. What we say doesn't inherently carry the full richness of qualia (although others can recreate in their own minds that richness when they hear us speak), and therefore I don't see why our speech "about" qualia is necessarily caused by the qualia that it's supposedly about. Qualia are rich, but our speech, even speech about qualia, is poor enough that it can be caused by something less rich. Like our brains.

But anyway, as I keep saying, brains are capable of producing qualia, in all their richness, so why can't the same brains be the cause of our speech about qualia too? Why must we say, "we talk about qualia; therefore, qualia cause us to talk about them"? Why can't we say, "our brains cause us to experience qualia, and our brains cause us to talk about qualia"?

"Other people" can be defined only in a phenomenological sense.

As far as they're concerned, you're "other people". So where does that leave us?

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

So, if qualia are truly causually inefficacious, we would have no way to talk about this redness, yet we are.

This is not necessarily entirely true.

The question of semantics is always a really tricky one, admittedly, but we could conceivably argue that qualia-terms in our language function as theoretical terms. (Which, by the way, we're going to have to do with a lot of terms if a certain sort of causal interaction is the basis for our semantics.)

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

This concept of qualia is utterly pointless. It explains nothing and accounts for nothing; it has no use in either a theoretical or empirical sense.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

This concept of qualia is utterly pointless. It explains nothing and accounts for nothing; it has no use in either a theoretical or empirical sense.

.... EXCEPT that you are, exactly at this moment, experimenting that qualia

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I'm going to assume you meant 'experiencing'.

No, no I'm not.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Yes my bad

So, you are not, mm how can anyone argue against that? Err, are you basically a Zombie? do you have subjective impressions at all? Do you have dreams?

Can you reduce the particular body of sensations you have when reading this forum (the light, the colors, your body possition, the temperature you are feeling, etc) to electrochemical reactions?

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Wrath of the Swarm
This concept of qualia is utterly pointless. It explains nothing [...].

The point of qualia is not to explain other things; they're what needs to be explained.

 

[hammegk]

The point of qualia is not to explain other things; they're what needs to be explained.

Sorry. WotS will never agree since he's not conscious.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

So, you are not, mm how can anyone argue against that? Err, are you basically a Zombie?

Why are you asking me? Zombie-WotS will say the same thing as Conscious-WotS according to your definitions, won't he?

do you have subjective impressions at all? Do you have dreams?

Same problem as your preceding question.

Can you reduce the particular body of sensations you have when reading this forum (the light, the colors, your body possition, the temperature you are feeling, etc) to electrochemical reactions?

Can you reduce the images and sounds that come out of your computer system to electronic impulses? I'll bet you, personally, cannot.

So what?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Why are you asking me? Zombie-WotS will say the same thing as Conscious-WotS according to your definitions, won't he?[/B]

Nope, but yes according to yours. And I find that strange.

Can you reduce the images and sounds that come out of your computer system to electronic impulses? I'll bet you, personally, cannot. [/B]

Yes, to transmit them, for example (oh, and it is very simple, I will tell you which keys you need to press on the keyboard). Yet, while there are infront of me, they are images and sounds, they are conscious experiences, not electronic impulses.

There is a difference, you know?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Nope, but yes according to yours. And I find that strange.

"Zombies" are conceptually defined as behaving exactly the same way conscious people do, but lack a consciousness.

So my answer should be the same, either way. If that's not the case with your definition, you're using the wrong definition.

Yes, to transmit them, for example (oh, and it is very simple, I will tell you which keys you need to press on the keyboard).

No, the question was whether you could take the images you were seeing and sounds you were hearing and trace them back to their electronic origins. And I'm reasonably certain that you are not personally capable of performing that action. Yet you shouldn't have any real doubts that those sounds and images do arise from electronic signals.

I cannot personally trace back thought and behavior to patterns of neural excitation, but I have no serious doubts that they can be.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

So my answer should be the same, either way. If that's not the case with your definition, you're using the wrong definition. [/B]

No, Im using the same. I misunderstood.

Yet you shouldn't have any real doubts that those sounds and images do arise from electronic signals.

I cannot personally trace back thought and behavior to patterns of neural excitation, but I have no serious doubts that they can be.[/B]

One thing is to know they arise from electronic signals, another different is to say they are electronic signals.

Now, you are correctin asuming that neural responses can be transformed in to experiences, but you do not give a mechanism to explain the fact.

I thought you were denying the experiences and just keeping the electrochemical reactions of the brain, attempting to eliminate the problem from the beginning. Are you?

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

Indeed. The blindsighted person can see red objects, but does not experience "redness." So then let's say that it is this redness that philosophers refer to as qualia, and that this qualia is causally inefficacious. That is the best I can do to understand what they are talking about regarding epiphenomenalism.

So, if qualia are truly causually inefficacious, we would have no way to talk about this redness, yet we are.

~~ Paul

How can a blind-sighted person see red objects? A better way of putting it would be that a person born with normal vision would both see red objects and experience the quale of redness. If that person later in life lost their sight (let's say something terrible happened to their eyes, not a result of something wrong with their brain that processes info from their eyes) then that person would not be able to see red, but could still experience redness in their imagination.

Instead of the blind-sighted person, let's consider a mechanical device. We set up a machine with a light sensor that reads the light waves and if the light waves are within the red spectrum it returns a response of "red". So we know the exact causality of this machine. You put a red card in front of it, and it says "red". So we can say that the machine "knows" when it sees red.

Now if you put a red card in front of my eyes and ask me what color it is, I also say respond "red". So I also "know" when I see red. But I also seem to experience this epiphenomenona quale of "seeing redness". There are four possible answers:

1) I experience the quale of "seeing redness" which has a causal effect of me "knowing" that the card is red.

2) The light waves received by my eyes are processed in my brain such that my brain "knows" that the card is red, but there is also a quale of "seeing redness" that is non-causal.

3) The light waves received by my eyes are processed in my brain such that my brain "knows" that the card is red AND causes my brain to believe that it experienced a quale of "seeing redness".

4) The light waves received by my eyes are processed in my brain such that my brain "knows" that the card is red and there is no quale of "seeing redness".

To address these possibilities (out of order):

4) The problem that you mentioned is with number 4: if there is there is no quale of "seeing redness", we would have no way to talk about this redness, yet we are. The issue is that we really, really, really DO seem to experience "redness" just as we experience "pain" and so forth. Try hitting your thumb with a hammer or holding your hand on a hot stove and tell me you just have neurological responses and don't "feel pain". So your argument is actually FOR epiphenomenalism: if qualia did not exist then we would have no way to talk about them, but we do therefore the epiphenomenona of qualia must exist.

2) Number 2 has similar problems, but not as severe: if the explanation for behavior and knowledge is based on causal effects, and the by-product quale of "seeing redness" is non-causal, how can the brain be caused to be aware of them and react to them? In other words, why are we talking about them if they have no causal effect that would cause our brains to talk about them? There would have to be SOME causal effect.

1) For number 1: This would explain why we have a way to talk about this redness, but requires that these qualia are truly causally efficacious. This experience of "redness" is the same as experience of "self" (or "soul" or "mind") and so raises the problems of dualism.

3) So we are left with option 3: This is the option that I support. The causality in my eyes and brain are exactly the same as the causality in the mechanical machine. The difference is that my brain is sufficiently complex to create a “consciousness” that can create a quale of “redness”. But both the consciousness and corresponding quale are illusions--constructs created by neurological phenomenon that are necessary to process the data of those phenomenon. Much like there is no such thing as the number two. There is no thing that exists that is “the number two”. It is just an illusion or construct created by my brain to process the data of phenomenon. It isn’t something that really “exists”, just as “redness”, “pain”, and “self” (or “soul” or “mind”) don’t really exist. There are not really any epiphenomenona. They are not phenomenon that have causal effectiveness, but constructs of phenomenon used to analyze those phenomenon.

Of course that leaves big tough questions: How can certain phenomenon create awareness of and constructs of that phenomenon? That seems to beg the question of “what is consciousness/self/mind/soul” if it is NOT an epiphenomenonon? But actually it eliminates the possibility of epiphenomenonon, and asks for other answers. I don’t know what they are, but I think that there are some answers these questions that are not dependent on epiphenomenononalism.

I'm quite rusty on philosopy, but I hope this helps in some way.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

One thing is to know they arise from electronic signals, another different is to say they are electronic signals.

Precisely. So why don't you stop using the incorrect terminology?

The mathematical operation of addition does not "arise" from the behavior of electronic impulses in specially-constructed circuit patterns. The behavior of electronic impulses in specially-constructed circuit patterns IS a manifestation of addition.

Now, you are correctin asuming that neural responses can be transformed in to experiences, but you do not give a mechanism to explain the fact.

I'll give you one, just as soon as you provide a mechanism to explain how electronic impulses moving through specific transistor configurations can be transformed into mathematical operations.

I thought you were denying the experiences and just keeping the electrochemical reactions of the brain, attempting to eliminate the problem from the beginning. Are you?

THEY ARE THE SAME THING.

 

[hammegk]

LOL.

Now all we need to do is reconcile the 1st person nature of your experiences with my 3rd person science requirements -- and vice-versa.

(... concept courtesy of Win ...)

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

That begs the question we can *really* know what someone else means by anything. I'll let that slide ;-).

My take:

Epiphenomenalism is exactly what it would be like if you were a conscious computer program. Your thoughts would be a be a by-product of the computer. Furthermore, since the electrical activity is what causes your singular thought, your thought cannot modify the computation that caused it, although it might modify other computations in the future. The difference in what you are reading is simply a difference of opinion on whether epiphenomenalism is entirely non-interactive, or somewhat interactive in the non-immediate sense.

I agree with hammegk, dualism is rife with problems.

If it modifies other computations in the future, then it is either materialism or interactive dualism, depending on whether the thought itself is physical or non-physical. But it wouldn't be epiphenomenalism.

BTW, I am not aware of any problems that dualism has, at least not interactive dualism. Care to name any of these problems?