Define Consiousness

[BillHoyt]

My claim is that the question exists as an experience. I cannot see you disagreeing with this since the alternative is to suppose that it exists objectively.

It seems that you already presume "purely subjective" when you write "experience." Otherwise, I can't see a reason for you to draw a contrast between "experience" and "objective existence."

You say yourself that you do not deny that experiences exist (which I am curious for you to explain why given your current stance).

Again, you seem to presume "purely subjective." Ryle describes this in many discussions of "category mistakes."

The experience of a question is different to the experience of redness, so we can say their qualia (the way they feel) are different.

What is so different about a question and and observation? You make many presumptions. First and foremost seems to be the presumption that the question is not fully traceable to chemical and electrical events within your body. This flies in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.

So here, we would be trying to falsify the existence of a thing while at the same time acknowledging that the falsification process requires that the thing exists.

Once again, you presume the existence of the very thing you wish to falsify. We're not talking about experience here; we're talking about this magical, immaterial "qualia."

Where your soul parallel breaks down is where you cannot explain why the soul is responsible for the experience of a question. You have evoked a separate entity to account for the ability to pose a question. I am saying that the actual question is the entity that needs to be falsified. When you realise this, the paradox becomes clear and there is no empty assertion.

No, I defined the "soul" as animating you. I took a parallel path to yours by baldly asserting that you can not be animated without a soul and QED'd it in the same lame way you are trying to QED "qualia."

Now, can you, at long last, present a way to falsify "qualia?"



Why do you not deny the existence of experience?



Dennet mentioned that his critics accused him of creating straw man arguments. I agree with his critics with particular reference to the above. What does “special” mean in this context? [/B][/QUOTE]

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Dancing David

Ah, yes the bizzare definition of qualia.

To paraphrase Dennett, "qualia" is a bizzare term for something that could not be less bizzare to each of us: the ways things seem to us.

That's the problem.

If you want to take a functionalist approach to explaining 'the way things seem to us', then fine. I'm with you all the way. But let's be clear on what we're doing. We are offering an alternative to the notion of qualia, not a functionalist explanation for it. We can talk about the organizational structure of the brain, and the sorts of activity that take place there, and we can do that without using the "Q" word at all.

Originally posted by Atlas

If we know that because of physical qualia manifestations like chemical/electrical reactions acting as nerve impulse on pleasure centers of the brain (if we have those) then I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.

Here it is again.

Electro-chemical impulses are exactly what qualia are not. The Lego robot, suitably equipped with a camera and capable of distinguishing between different wavelengths of light, could be programmed to 'go on green' -- but it would not 'experience' green (so the argument goes).

I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.

Whether you meant to or not, I think you've really hit the nail on the head there. The whole notion of qualia rests on the ease with which we are naturally inclined to accept the dualist assumptions that necessitate such a medium of exchange.

 

[davidsmith73]

It seems that you already presume "purely subjective" when you write "experience." Otherwise, I can't see a reason for you to draw a contrast between "experience" and "objective existence."

Of course I presume experiences are purely subjective. The two terms have exactly the same meaning. You surely can't mean anything other than purely subjective when you write "experience", unless you would care to explain otherwise.

Again, you seem to presume "purely subjective." Ryle describes this in many discussions of "category mistakes."

Care to explain in your own words what these "category mistakes" are?

What is so different about a question and and observation? You make many presumptions. First and foremost seems to be the presumption that the question is not fully traceable to chemical and electrical events within your body. This flies in the face of all the evidence to the contrary.

And we are back to the hard problem again. I ask you once more - why do you not deny the existence of experience?

Once again, you presume the existence of the very thing you wish to falsify. We're not talking about experience here; we're talking about this magical, immaterial "qualia."

to me, experience and qualia are synonyms. By the way, I don't think qualia are "magical".

No, I defined the "soul" as animating you. I took a parallel path to yours by baldly asserting that you can not be animated without a soul and QED'd it in the same lame way you are trying to QED "qualia."

Well, you clearly do not understand where your parallel breaks down.

Now, can you, at long last, present a way to falsify "qualia?"

I've already explained why it's meaningless to entertain the falsification of qualia

 

[Atlas]

Electro-chemical impulses are exactly what qualia are not. The Lego robot, suitably equipped with a camera and capable of distinguishing between different wavelengths of light, could be programmed to 'go on green' -- but it would not 'experience' green (so the argument goes).

I used bad sentence structure. I was referring to the result from the stimulated pleasure center that would ostensibly be the qualia of bright and warmth. I certainly wouldn't have objected to the term dualist in any description of myself before joining this forum. I'm searching for language to express the physicalist viewpoint while at the same time celebrating that which is called consciousness.

Toward that end I am putting forward the quale of warmth. It seems a whole body experience that is different from "greeness". I believe it ties easily to the survival impulse and is one of the necessary "knowings" all animals share. It is neither imaged nor necessarily articulated as many qualia are.

I have no trouble anymore using the word God or Soul in conversations with believers. I mean something totally different when I use the term but in casual conversation with inoffensive people I don't mind the appearence of support for their worldview. I can be honest within my definitions and am open about those definitions when pressed but I do not feel the need to be in opposition to people I like if they merely have a way of speaking that I understand but don't agree with.

I'm looking to understand this issue in the same way. Qualia is a word and concept that won't be going away for awhile. Hammegk points out that it's a term that can be used just as honestly by physicalists as idealists. I agree with that. I just think that idealists have coopted the word with an epiphenomenal definition and a few visual qualia ideas that they can use for the strange purpose of denying physical reality. I want to get away from visual qualia for awhile. I like Ian's "smell of bacon and eggs" because I think one can discuss the evolving organism's relation to smell and survival in the physical world. Likewise the warmth of sunshine is good for me because it has real world consequences for things as unconscious as seeds.

 

[Atlas]

... to me, experience and qualia are synonyms. ...

David,

Is this common or unique to you. Do you have a link to someone discussing qualia that makes this assertion or defines qualia this way? Just asking. The word experience seems so real world compared to qualia. It also leans more toward learning whereas qualia seems to lean more toward information. That's my take anyway from the discussion so far.

 

[hammegk]

...I just think that idealists have coopted the word with an epiphenomenal definition and a few visual qualia ideas that they can use for the strange purpose of denying physical reality. ....

Idealists deny the "physical -- with the connotations that word carries" but accept that objective reality exists, and assume that it's the same for all awareness that recognizes it.

Accept dualism:
or,
choose "physical" (one implication, consciousness is an epiphenomena)
or,
choose "~physical" (one implication, physical is the epiphenomena).

 

[BillHoyt]

Of course I presume experiences are purely subjective. The two terms have exactly the same meaning. You surely can't mean anything other than purely subjective when you write "experience", unless you would care to explain otherwise.

No, the question is deeper than you're allowing, and gets to Ryle's whole discussion of "category mistake." Experience is subjective in one sense, because I am the one with my set of experiences. But you have not demonstrated that experience is subjective in the other sense; the sense that it is inaccessible to objective verification or inquiry. The root cause of your error is the category mistake of thinking that minds and bodies belong to different categories.

When I write "experience," I think of it as a collection of my memories, any one of which can be made to replay in my mind by electrical stimulation of my brain. (This research was long ago established and repeated several times.) It is a function of my brain and my body. I easily envision the day in which someone will be able to probe my brain and replay, for any external observer to see, any one of my experiences. I warn the strippers about this whenever they suggest particularly kinky things, of course.

You seem to assume that because your experiences are subjective, in the first sense, that they are necessarily subjective in the second sense. You assume the existence of this immaterial, ineffable "qualia" and then demand we ignore hundreds of years of evidence to accomodate your foregone conclusion. Not gonna happen.

By the way, I don't think qualia are "magical".

I think you need to think about the implications of your position again. You have disconnected qualia from a basis in the material realm.

I've already explained why it's meaningless to entertain the falsification of qualia

See? There you go again.

 

[hammegk]

.... Does matter have a mind of it's own that tells it what to do when 'the laws aren't watching' the way we seem to have a mind?

Consider Mach's principle and the value of inertial mass we would assign to a specific perceived object. Then, what is your answer to your question?

The main difference between the materialist philosophy and the mental monist one is that the latter does not have the hard problem of consciousness to deal with.

Or "consciousness" -- dare I call it awareness -- in all aspects.

In the minority there are folks like hammegk, who refuse to live in the paradox they see and so throw pragmatism down for illusion.

Illusion? No; the question is what is the nature of the beast.

... I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.

What is "higher" consciousness? Either consciousness exists, or it does not. What world am I destroying?

"its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

~consciousness ... some might say 'death'.

i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.

We can? Can you falsify their existence, too?

Where exists a qualia without an organic frame work? Qualia are learned they do not stand alone!

I'd say: Where exists a physical frame without a quale? Physical frames are defined they do not stand alone!

 

[Mr. E]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E

"its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

~consciousness ... some might say 'death'.

'Death' usually means something terminal involving cremation or internment in a coffin. I'm not talking directly about that.

BTW, I'm understanding the '~' character to amount to traditional logical negation ala the excluded middle principle, A or ~A but not both.

The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.

Speaking for myself, there seem to be things I cannot do effectively without qualia. So they are necessary to that extent, whether they exist or not.

ME

edit - correct 'where' to 'whether'

 

[hammegk]

'Death' usually means something terminal involving cremation or internment in a coffin. I'm not talking directly about that.

Nor was I. Think of it as ~Life (or may I call it .. physical matter as we perceive it).

BTW, I'm understanding the '~' character to amount to traditional logical negation ala the excluded middle principle, A or ~A but not both.

Yes.

Unfortunately, as I understand it, one answer to the Bell-Aspect problem is that Aristotelian logic Does Not Apply to reality.

The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system.

And some might say nothing but qualia exist.

II does want a Self, but I haven't figured out how that part might work. Some form of non-interactive dualism might do it I suppose.

 

[Atlas]

... I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.

What is "higher" consciousness? Either consciousness exists, or it does not. What world am I destroying?

Consciousness appears to be the product of a physical brain. Some I suppose grant plants consciousness. I don't. Animals have it and humans have it to a greater degree primarily, I believe, because of their mastery of language. Now that may also be my bias for my own species but we seem to be able to use consciousness in ways that animals can't. We multiply or leverage it's power with machines that we design and build.

Higher consciousness though is different. For me, it exists external to a physical body... external to a brain. I don't believe in that form of consciousness at all but many do and believe our own consciousness is fractured off or descending from that unified higher consciousness they may even name as God.

I'd like your opinion. Can consciousness exist external to a physical brain? If so, is it different from our own with it's input from stimuli, process against memory associations, and output as volition?

As far as my world. I grew up Catholic and later fell in love with Zen. Each maintained that this world was illusion and a greater reality or truth existed beyond our senses. Each maintained a higher consciousness though each approached these issues differently.

Each of these allowed adherents a conscious appreciation of the beauty and warmth of their truth. That is, each offered a form of conscious emotionalism or emotional consciousness.

Skepticiam seems colder and harder at first. Science seems like work at first. But both have an appeal as well and both allow for but do not necesarily celebrate emotionalism. But it is life and skeptics are all for life especially because of it's finality.

Realizing it is one thing, embracing it is another. I embrace the physical world. I embrace man's tiny existence in the world and the universe. Matter in all it's forms is truth. It lights the universe and consciousness rises from matter like fusion power.

That's where I am coming from. Though I like to think that consciousness is capable of much more. It is really the power of many consciousnesses that is producing the fusion of the modern technological world.

I wish you'd write a whole paragraph or two sometime on how you size things up. Your one and two sentence answers often raise more questions about where you come from than they answer.

 

[BillHoyt]

'The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.

I addressed this, mystery. I responded that you failed to answer the question. You cannot falsify something by presuming its existence in this way. Let us say we concoct the idea that blinking string of christmas lights works because there is a little elf with a little switch inside one of them. We then propose an experiment like yours: we will take the bulbs out, one at a time, until the string stops blinking. When we find the elf-bulb we declare the research done.

Now go back to your description of removing quale content and compare it to removing the elf-bulb. Do you see the problem? Do you see you didn't distinguish between the elf hypothesis and any number of alternative elf hypotheses? You simply retained your a priori assumption, and got nowhere. Your "removing quale content" experiment is the same. You simply retained your a priori assumption, and got nowhere.

Now, please, somebody propose something to falsify qualia. So far, we've got two basic kinds of answers. In the first the poster baldly asserts that qualia are obviously real, but immaterial and not subject to scientific inquiry. In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X.

 

[Mr. E]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Mr. E
'The response I offered earlier to BillHoyt was the question of whether we can come to understand the proper role of qualia by evaluating what happens to consciousness as quale-content is systematically eliminated bit by bit from a conscious system. Bill refuses to address the issue seriously, for whatever good reasons he may have. Qualia may appear magically in some loose sense of the word; the goal of reverse engineering is to "de-magicalize" this, make it understandable, and then possibly to reproduce it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I addressed this, mystery. I responded that you failed to answer the question.

As I've pointed out before, empty denial is insufficient. You had and yet have not defined your terms sufficiently to require me to offer you any other response as an answer. Obstinacy is not the same as perseverance.

You cannot falsify something by presuming its existence in this way.

Which way and why not? Or better yet, tell us the formula for falsification as you would have us use it. I've asked about Popper, you've ignored the repeated inquiry or I missed some post of yours explicit to the inquiry.

Now go back to your description of removing quale content and compare it to removing the elf-bulb. Do you see the problem?

Yeah, the problem is that the fairy tale doesn't even closely resemble what I supposed.

In the second, the poster sets out to prove X by assuming X.

Not if you refer to my answer.


ME

 

[Mr. E]

Nor was I. Think of it as ~Life (or may I call it .. physical matter as we perceive it).

You mean physical matter as we infer from our perceptions of it, rocks-in-themselves for example? The very act of perceiving something is of course as far as we know a matter of Life, conscious Life even.

Unfortunately, as I understand it, one answer to the Bell-Aspect problem is that Aristotelian logic Does Not Apply to reality.

Am I correct in assuming that you agree that bunk exists or at least occurs, whether fictional or real or some mixed state, and further that not all proposed answers are to be taken seriously?

And some might say nothing but qualia exist.

That would be their problem first. So far I haven't seen a definition of 'exist' which makes such an assertion of more than passing interest.

ME

 

[BillHoyt]

As I've pointed out before, empty denial is insufficient. You had and yet have not defined your terms sufficiently to require me to offer you any other response as an answer. Obstinacy is not the same as perseverance.

Excuse me, but those presupposing the existence of "qualia" as an immaterial, special thing are the ones making the claim. The onus is on them to provide evidence. That goes as well for those taking the position that the question is beyond the realm of science. The onus is on them to provide evidence.

Which way and why not? Or better yet, tell us the formula for falsification as you would have us use it. I've asked about Popper, you've ignored the repeated inquiry or I missed some post of yours explicit to the inquiry.

There is no formula, mystery. Never has been, never will. Perhaps you simply fail to grasp the concept? You must provide an experiment that will distinguish between an immaterial "qualia" hypothesis and all others. You've repeatedly presumed quale existence and suggested that we simply cut off all quale and see what happens. That's laughable, mystery, and certainly fails to address the base issues of distinguishing between the quale hypothesis and the host of alternatives.

Yeah, the problem is that the fairy tale doesn't even closely resemble what I supposed.

Not if you refer to my answer.


ME

It most assuredly does. You hypothesize X. I ask for falsification. You propose we eliminate the hypothesized Xs and see what happens. That's a zip, zero, nada, non-starter.

Address the question, please: how do you falsify the "qualia" hypothesis?

 

[davidsmith73]

No, the question is deeper than you're allowing, and gets to Ryle's whole discussion of "category mistake." Experience is subjective in one sense, because I am the one with my set of experiences. But you have not demonstrated that experience is subjective in the other sense; the sense that it is inaccessible to objective verification or inquiry. The root cause of your error is the category mistake of thinking that minds and bodies belong to different categories.

I have not assumed that minds and bodies belong to different categories. By this one is making an ontological distinction between a physical objective reality (bodies) and a subjective reality (minds) and doing so creates dualism. However, to reflect on the nature of experience, one does not need to conceive of an objective physical reality. In fact, I have suggested that it is more appropriate to assume that objective physical reality does not exist.

When you ask for verification of subjectivity (in your second sense) the question becomes meaningless because one has to either assume objective reality is the only reality, or experiential reality is the only reality, or both (dualism). These are the fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality that we must make before we can go any further. To then ask for a verification of such assumptions is meaningless, as I have been trying to explain. Consider how you would verify the existence of an objective reality to me. But then again, I wouldn't expect such a question to be answered, simply because it's also meaningless.

When I write "experience," I think of it as a collection of my memories, any one of which can be made to replay in my mind by electrical stimulation of my brain.

Cognitive memories are in the category of experiences. Therefore you have to explain what experiences are. You can't just refer to a subset of experiences as an attempt to explain why you think they exist. Also, repeating the fact that experiences are correlated with physical processes does not address the hard problem. You say that experiences exist. You therefore must give some indication as to what criteria you identify an experience by.
So here's my question;

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?

I think you will find that upon answering that question, you must be forced to identify the subjective nature of experiences (in your second sense). Please explain if you don't.

You seem to assume that because your experiences are subjective, in the first sense, that they are necessarily subjective in the second sense. You assume the existence of this immaterial, ineffable "qualia" and then demand we ignore hundreds of years of evidence to accomodate your foregone conclusion. Not gonna happen.

No, I don't think I have assumed subjectivity in the first sense. Can you point out where I have? In fact, I would go so far as to say that experiences are not private at all. So, I haven't made any link with the assumed privacy of experiences and their subjective nature, unless you can point out where.

I think you need to think about the implications of your position again. You have disconnected qualia from a basis in the material realm.

Correct, I have disconnected experiences from objective physical reality. However I don't see how "magic" now comes into it. I don't even know what you mean by the term.

 

[hammegk]

You mean physical matter as we infer from our perceptions of it, rocks-in-themselves for example? The very act of perceiving something is of course as far as we know a matter of Life, conscious Life even.

So far I haven't seen a definition of 'exist' which makes such an assertion of more than passing interest.

Can something be said to 'exist' in a state of total unawareness of its surroundings? I'd say no; now, what is that awareness, and when does it begin? Or could we say when does "consciousness" begin?


I note that this in no way suggests the antropomorphic definition of consciousness some seem to ascribe to it.

Am I correct in assuming that you agree that bunk exists or at least occurs, whether fictional or real or some mixed state, and further that not all proposed answers are to be taken seriously?

Of course. Tell me, do you take my comment(s) to be a priori bunk, or is that your considered opinion?

That would be their problem first.
ME

You deny "thought" to be an existent? If so, how interesting. Actually, my most objective sense is that *I* think, but of course that could be The Solipsist's dream(i.e. Thought Exists).


The ongoing discussion of falsifying qualia is a materialistic laugher. For individual human level qualia, its easy; Die (in the human sense).

by Atlas
I'd like your opinion. Can consciousness exist external to a physical brain?

Not at "human" level. The perceived-as-physical brain is necessary, but is it sufficient? To date the answer remains "no" to reductionists' dismay.

 

[BillHoyt]

I have not assumed that minds and bodies belong to different categories. By this one is making an ontological distinction between a physical objective reality (bodies) and a subjective reality (minds) and doing so creates dualism. However, to reflect on the nature of experience, one does not need to conceive of an objective physical reality. In fact, I have suggested that it is more appropriate to assume that objective physical reality does not exist.

And with that suggestion, you are immediately outside rationality. You are immediately outside one of the few axioms of science.

When you ask for verification of subjectivity (in your second sense) the question becomes meaningless because one has to either assume objective reality is the only reality, or experiential reality is the only reality, or both (dualism). These are the fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality that we must make before we can go any further. To then ask for a verification of such assumptions is meaningless, as I have been trying to explain. Consider how you would verify the existence of an objective reality to me. But then again, I wouldn't expect such a question to be answered, simply because it's also meaningless.

What is truly meaningless is this metaphysical fog. The existence of objective reality is axiomatic to science, and has been for several hundred years. In all those years of experimentation, there has yet to be compelling evidence against this axiom. If you wish to assume that you wanted the experience of a snowball hitting you from behind rather than having been caught off guard by some mischievous kids, then be my guest. I hope you'll pardon the snickering from the kids and anybody else not caught in this metaphysical fog.

Cognitive memories are in the category of experiences. Therefore you have to explain what experiences are. You can't just refer to a subset of experiences as an attempt to explain why you think they exist. Also, repeating the fact that experiences are correlated with physical processes does not address the hard problem. You say that experiences exist. You therefore must give some indication as to what criteria you identify an experience by.

I already have. I even alluded to the research indicating that specific experiences can be recalled by probing specific brain cells. Here's the easy way to clear the fog. Get a plane ticket. Get on the flight. Fly someplace. I will make the simple claim that, unless you died in flight or on some serious drugs, you will have had the experience of that flight. We can objectively verify that experience by checking your purchase records, and the airline's manifest. Then we can objectively verify the experience within you (if you will) by probing an area of your brain that will trigger your recall of that experience.

So here's my question;

How do you identify a physical process that gives rise to an experience as opposed to one that does not?

I think you will find that upon answering that question, you must be forced to identify the subjective nature of experiences (in your second sense). Please explain if you don't.

I just did. Again. And again. I can probe your memory. But, of course, if you don't believe you have a brain, I will certainly not refute that contention.

No, I don't think I have assumed subjectivity in the first sense. Can you point out where I have? In fact, I would go so far as to say that experiences are not private at all. So, I haven't made any link with the assumed privacy of experiences and their subjective nature, unless you can point out where.

Excuse me, but you are arguing objective reality ain't, and now you are arguing subjective reality ain't. How about just concluding "ain't," it would be just as silly and not waste our time.

Correct, I have disconnected experiences from objective physical reality. However I don't see how "magic" now comes into it. I don't even know what you mean by the term.

If it ain't rooted in matter or energy, sir, it is rooted in magic. Some mystical, ephemeral nothingness that you have to explain, not I.

 

[T'ai Chi]

I can probe your memory.

Could you explain how you plan on doing that?

 

[BillHoyt]

Could you explain how you plan on doing that?

"We are in the operating room of the Montreal Neurological Institute observing brain surgery on Buddy, a young man with uncontrollable epileptic seizures. The surgeon wants to operate to remove a tumor, but first he must discover what the consequences will be of removing various portions of the brain tissue surrounding the tumor ... Suddenly an unexpected response occurs. The patient is grinning; he is smiling; eyes opening when that area is stimulated. "Buddy, what happened, what did you just experience?" "Doc, I heard a song, or rather a part of a song, a melody." "Buddy, have you ever heard it before?" "Yes, I remember having heard it a long time ago, but I can't remember the name of the tune." When another brain site is stimulated, the patient recalls in vivid detail a thrilling childhood experience. ... As if by pushing an electronic memory button, the surgeon, Dr. Wilder Penfield, has touched memories stored silently for years in the recesses of his patient's brains."

Penfield's stimulated memory recall work dates back to the 1940s.

Memory