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Chamberlain vs. Churchill

angrysoba

Philosophile
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It is often said by those who favour pugnacious foreign policies that their opponents are Neville Chamberlains and almost no explanation of this is considered necessary as if it were so obvious that Chamberlain was so awful.

In recent years, the term seems to have been used to refer to people who opposed the Iraq War, oppose bombing Iran, were not in favour of going to war with Putin over Crimea, didn't want to start bombing Syria, and probably many other things that I can't remember right now.

The corollary also seems to be that the person saying it is helping himself (well, it usually is a man but I suppose some women use the meme as well) to the mantle of Churchill; that their desire for war proves that they are either tougher, wiser, stronger and more charismatic than their opponent who, being Chamberlain is usually considered to be:

  1. weak
  2. grovelling
  3. stupid
  4. blind to Hitler's ambition
  5. gullible
  6. impotent
  7. foolish

and various other ridiculous things.

However, I wonder if this is a fair appraisal of Chamberlain, or whether it is a lazy caricature based on hindsight and a lack of serious judgement.

First of all, I should say that I used to accept without question that anybody who can be called a Chamberlain is some kind of fool who enables Hitler-like tyrants through wishful thinking, and that anybody who can be called Churchill is a prescient battler against fascism in all its forms who knows how to see off trouble before it arrives but is not listened to by sheeplike wishful thinkers who can't imagine that there are really, really nasty people out there who are good at spotting weaknesses.

But, once when I was writing an essay many years back in university trying to argue this very thing I found quite a lot of scholarship that seemed to, at the very least, cloud this simple picture. From what I remember, Chamberlain was not as much of a fool as depicted, that in fact he knew full well that Hitler was not to be trusted and ordered massive rearmament of the British armed forces which were never in any state to fight against Hitler to keep him out of the Sudetenland.

It also seems that much of Chamberlain's poor reputation was in fact the work of Churchill's caricature of him in his own memoirs which were accepted following the Second World War almost as though the whole war was Chamberlain's fault in the first place. But again, this cannot be the case if Britain and France were never in any serious position to halt Hitler's advance into the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia (not to mention the fact that Poland was one of the countries that took a bite out of the latter).

It also neglects the fact that Chamberlain himself did declare war on Germany after Hitler invaded the opportunistic dictatorship of Poland alongside another menacing dictatorship of the Soviet Union.

So, I would like to know what those here think about the fairness or otherwise of how Chamberlain is characterized, and perhaps also a re-evaluation of Churchill if such is needed.

For example, one thing that Churchill famously said following the Second World War is that to "jaw-jaw is better than to war-war". Should we then take it that Churchill later thought that negotiation is better than fighting? If so, does this make him some kind of Chamberlainista?

And finally, one thing that seldom comes up (or in fact, I think I have never seen it mentioned) is how come Churchill does not get a lot of stick for what he called the "worst disaster" and "largest capitulation" in British military history, namely the Fall of Singapore?

Could we then say that Churchill was guilty of a Chamberlainista failure to spot the danger of Imperial Japan?
 
It was basically home-consumption politics and Churchill forewarned that he was going to get to write the history and that Neville was going to be tarred with that reputation forever.

I think that what happened is that the meme caught on, as after '39 everything in England was all about "Get Hitler". Anyone who didn't "Get Hitler" early on could easily be seen to be a weak-willed appeaser. Anyone who sat on the sidelines, impotently (as in "not able to do a thing other than talk") brandishing a sword got to claim they were always for stopping him and would've done so earlier.

I don't think Churchill believed his rhetoric; but I don't think he cared. It was politics.
 
You have to understand how horrible the First World War was. Who wouldn't want to avoid a repeat of that if at all possible?

So easy to judge with 20/20 hindsight.
 
Sure, I know Churchill was upfront about making sure history was kind to him by writing it but I would be interested in any historical sources which offers some revision - in the proper sense - of what I think is a lazy meme that should get as much respect from skeptics as Godwin arguments.

Some other things I have just been thinking of is the fact that Britain didn't have Spitfires or radar when the Munich Agreement occurred and also that Churchill's reputation was in some way reliant on fortune. If the British Army had been slaughtered at Dunkirk then his reputation could have been as much destroyed as Chamberlain's is today.

Furthermore Churchill benefitted from a realignment of public opinion not only in th U.K but also in the colonies who may have decided not to become involved with a mission to save the Sudetenland from what looked like a popular merger with Germany.
 
You have to understand how horrible the First World War was. Who wouldn't want to avoid a repeat of that if at all possible?

So easy to judge with 20/20 hindsight.

I get that but my point is not that Chamberlain did everything at all costs to avoid war. I think that THAT is the main inaccuracy. I think that Chamberlian somewhat expected war and worked to prepare for it. I also think he was a realist about Britain's chances when it came to the Sudetenland and that he was not as naive as is generally believed about Hitler.
 
I recently read Leo McKinstry's book about the Battle of Britain. He stated that opinion regarding Chamberlain is in the process of being revised. His contention in the book is that the appeasement meant that instead of being thrust into war in 1938 woefully under prepared, entering the war in 1939 and engaging in the phony war allowed British industry time to try to gear up for war work.
 
Well I suppose one must grapple with this, if one is to argue that "he was not as naive as is generally believed about Hitler".

Chamberlain landed at Heston Aerodrome on 30 September 1938, and spoke to the crowds there:

The settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem, which has now been achieved is, in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine. Some of you, perhaps, have already heard what it contains but I would just like to read it to you: ' ... We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.'[3]​

Later that day he stood outside 10 Downing Street and again read from the document and concluded:

My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.[3]​

Unfortunately, this is what most people remember about Chamberlain. I'm sure there are a more nuances, but regular people who are not historians tend to mostly only recall the broad brushstrokes and striking (memorable) incidents.
 
I recently read Leo McKinstry's book about the Battle of Britain. He stated that opinion regarding Chamberlain is in the process of being revised. His contention in the book is that the appeasement meant that instead of being thrust into war in 1938 woefully under prepared, entering the war in 1939 and engaging in the phony war allowed British industry time to try to gear up for war work.

Was Germany not also more prepared in 1939 than in 1938?
 
I get that but my point is not that Chamberlain did everything at all costs to avoid war. I think that THAT is the main inaccuracy. I think that Chamberlian somewhat expected war and worked to prepare for it. I also think he was a realist about Britain's chances when it came to the Sudetenland and that he was not as naive as is generally believed about Hitler.

Quite.
And remember, he was also being advised by the military of our state of preparedness compared to the Germans, and that advice pretty much came down to "we need some more time". The common date I've seen is early 1941.
 
I agree with your overall contention, but some of the conclusions you're coming to require much more speculation than we should be having in a discussion of history. There are good sources out there with contemporary comments on the situation. I haven't got my full library here (part of it is back in NYC) but I know I had a book that had copious quotes from the time. If I can find any references on line not behind paywalls, I'll link them. But I'm pretty sure that the majority opinion in England at that time actually supported appeasement.

Sure, I know Churchill was upfront about making sure history was kind to him by writing it but I would be interested in any historical sources which offers some revision - in the proper sense - of what I think is a lazy meme that should get as much respect from skeptics as Godwin arguments.

Well, Chamberlain can join an august list of people tarred by history written by the victors, political or military. I agree that it's a lazy meme. I don't think we're going to do much to change the public perception. It'd take a major repatriation effort in the UK and that's only happening in dribs and drabs. Scholars pretty much concur that there is much more to this than Churchill's stark black-and-white portrayal of the era.


Some other things I have just been thinking of is the fact that Britain didn't have Spitfires or radar when the Munich Agreement occurred and also that Churchill's reputation was in some way reliant on fortune. If the British Army had been slaughtered at Dunkirk then his reputation could have been as much destroyed as Chamberlain's is today.

Well, as to the first part, Britain acknowledged that they were far behind Germany in development of air power in '38. That's a given. It's one of the major items under "military preparedness or lack thereof", but just one. Overall, England - even an England mobilizing for a pending and possibly inevitable war - was no where near ready to take on Hitler's forces. The war advisors in the UK said they'd be ready in 6/8 months. They obviously over-estimated their own production/readiness or underestimated Germany's advantage.

I don't think we can speculate on what might've happened if there had been a slaughter at Dunkirk. It may have rallied the Brits like Pearl Harbor did the Americans. It may have had the opposite effect. Can't say.

Furthermore Churchill benefitted from a realignment of public opinion not only in th U.K but also in the colonies who may have decided not to become involved with a mission to save the Sudetenland from what looked like a popular merger with Germany.

Once the war was under way, all sentiments shifted to supporting the cause. As of Munich, though, it was a pretty partisan divide. In one completely unreliable and unscientific poll in a pro-engagement paper, when asked if Hitler's designs would now end at the Sudetenland, 7% said yes and 93% no. (Apparently back then no one was ever undecided, conveniently for newspaper editors.) But the commentary in all papers was pretty well divided.

Note: If I seem to be adding more detail it's because as I was piecing together my responses, I found an interesting document for you. It doesn't hyperlink to the sources but it lists them, in detail, and breaks out the discussion that was surrounding the signing at Munich.
http://www.loyno.edu/~history/journal/1993-4/Lilly.html
 
I recently read Leo McKinstry's book about the Battle of Britain. He stated that opinion regarding Chamberlain is in the process of being revised. His contention in the book is that the appeasement meant that instead of being thrust into war in 1938 woefully under prepared, entering the war in 1939 and engaging in the phony war allowed British industry time to try to gear up for war work.

Yes, this is the type of thing I am thinking about.
 
It wasn't just aircraft that were lacking it was vehicles, tanks, artillery, ammunition
 
I recently read Leo McKinstry's book about the Battle of Britain. He stated that opinion regarding Chamberlain is in the process of being revised. His contention in the book is that the appeasement meant that instead of being thrust into war in 1938 woefully under prepared, entering the war in 1939 and engaging in the phony war allowed British industry time to try to gear up for war work.
Several points here. Germany was also not prepared, and the chaos of the occupation of Austria illustrated that, it seems. (But nevertheless Germany may have been relatively better prepared than the UK, I admit.)

Was handing over the defences in the Sudetenland a good idea, resulting in the loss of the substantial Czechoslovak forces to the anti-Hitler cause?

If the UK (and France) indulged in the Phoney War to catch up, why were they so unprepared in May 1940? Why did they collapse so speedily? The time they gained was spent no more profitably than was Stalin's in the same and later months during the Nazi-Soviet pact. Stalin is excoriated for that, rightly. Should Chamberlain escape censure?
 
If the UK (and France) indulged in the Phoney War to catch up, why were they so unprepared in May 1940? Why did they collapse so speedily? The time they gained was spent no more profitably than was Stalin's in the same and later months during the Nazi-Soviet pact. Stalin is excoriated for that, rightly. Should Chamberlain escape censure?

Time was spent by the British just equipping forces. What caught them by surprise was the German advance through the Ardennes and the tactics used. What appeared to be the main German attack to the north with the bulk of their forces was a huge diversion.
It drew the French and British forces north and allowed the main attack in behind the main force.
Conventional doctrine was based on artillery. You can only advance under your guns. These take time to move and replace before they can come in to action, they are also slow to move and take up a lot of space on the roads. French and German guns relied on horses to move, Britain had mechanized the artillery in the 30s and they were more mobile but the 6" guns were still known as the 'Divisional Roadblock'.
German doctrine was to use the air force in place of tactical artillery allowing them to send their mechanized forces through country that was thought to be impassable.
Their other innovation was to concentrate their tanks and support them with infantry fighting from tracked vehicles in 'combined arm's units allowing them to advance at. High speed.
Germany had no more tanks than the allies but they were used as a weapon in their own right rather than as support for the infantry.

Guderian wrote a book 'Achtung Panzer' before the war it detailed the tactics used and how best to use armour. He based it on the tactics evolved in the 20s and 30s by the British experimental 'Armoured Force' that exercised on Salisbury Plain for several years in various War games.
Unfortunately the British ignored their own lesson.

So in that respect what could be done by Chamberlein was done, It was down to the Generals to use the equipment that the delay brought them. It was as good as and, in some areas better than the German equipment.
Unfortunately the tactics relied on the enemy doing what you wanted them to do. Attack through Belgium like they always did allowing the French and British to anchor their line on the coast to the left and the Maginot Line to the right.
It didn't allow for modern air power and the concentration of combined arm's units. What we now call the Blitzkreig.
 
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Considering Chamberlain died from cancer in November 1940, was he perhaps in poor health in 1938/39? Could that have affected his decision?

Also, how many other people at the time realized the extent of Hitler's ambitions and wickedness? Fascism was hardly viewed as the cesspool of ideology it is synonymous with today, and antisemitism was extremely common everywhere in Europe and the US.
 
Time was spent by the British just equipping forces.

There is a lot to this, and the inability of British factories to meet the demands of rearmament of the British Army after Dunkirk and the equipping of Dominion forces as well lead to the realization that production was going to need to be sent out of Britian if demand was to be met.

Conventional doctrine was based on artillery. You can only advance under your guns. These take time to move and replace before they can come in to action, they are also slow to move and take up a lot of space on the roads. French and German guns relied on horses to move, Britain had mechanized the artillery in the 30s and they were more mobile but the 6" guns were still known as the 'Divisional Roadblock'.

Commonwealth doctrine was still based on the use of the artillery at the end of the war. The lessons of '39 though lead to a lot of improvement in artillery doctrine, the abandonment of heavier and more cumbersome systems and a very responsive method of fire control - which is still in use today.

German doctrine was to use the air force in place of tactical artillery allowing them to send their mechanized forces through country that was thought to be impassable.

Which worked great, so long as they had air superiority. Once that was lost, artillery started to reassert itself.

Their other innovation was to concentrate their tanks and support them with infantry fighting from tracked vehicles in 'combined arm's units allowing them to advance at. High speed.
Germany had no more tanks than the allies but they were used as a weapon in their own right rather than as support for the infantry.

Guderian wrote a book 'Achtung Panzer' before the war it detailed the tactics used and how best to use armour. He based it on the tactics evolved in the 20s and 30s by the British experimental 'Armoured Force' that exercised on Salisbury Plain for several years in various War games.
Unfortunately the British ignored their own lesson.

One of the great ironies of military history - armoured warfare as practised by the Germans in WWII was the brainchild of a Englishman.
 
The main lesson I remember from studying this back in secondary school was that Britain was not prepared for war in in the late 30s, in terms of equipment, and psychologically - there was little desire for more conflict. Appeasement bought time, if nothing else.

Question is whether those who gave in to Hitler's early demands really believed they were going to avoid war (the "peace of paper" speech may simply have been a bit of flummery for domestic consumption).
 
I agree with your overall contention, but some of the conclusions you're coming to require much more speculation than we should be having in a discussion of history.

Thanks for your post and your link.

I agree of course that we cannot come to some of these conclusions without a bit more evidence.

I was wondering if anyone had sifted Neville's diaries and found anything that we can consider his real, private thoughts.

For some reason I do seem to remember hearing about a letter to his sister that said something along the lines of "Herr Hitler is a truly decent chap who only wants a little peace (a little piece of Czechoslovakia, ho ho!), and after a nice heart-to-heart chat we came to a final solution...etc...." My memory might not be that good on this one.

Here's a summary from a biographer on Chamberlain that I think is a more nuanced view:

Yet notwithstanding Chamberlain's personal predilection for negotiation, what is beyond question is that he perceived himself to be a prisoner of forces largely beyond his control. As he noted stoically in January 1938, "In the absence of any powerful ally, and until our armaments are completed, we must adjust our foreign policy to our circumstances, and even bear with patience and good humour actions which we should like to treat in a very different fashion."

His pragmatic response to this conundrum was a "double policy" of rearmament at a pace the economy could sustain, while simultaneously seeking better relations with the dictators in the belief that only by redressing Germany's legitimate grievances would it be possible to remove the military threat - or failing that, to expose Hitler as an insatiable megalomaniac bent on world domination. As Chamberlain told Lord Halifax, his foreign secretary, the underlying strategy was to hope for the best while preparing for the worst.

When seen from this perspective, Chamberlain faced a brutally simple choice at Munich. Was Britain prepared to threaten Germany with war on behalf of a state which it certainly could not save and which would probably never be resurrected in its existing form? There was the absolute certainty that any attempt to do so would provoke a ruinous and probably un-winnable war which would slaughter millions, bring in Japan and Italy, destroy the British Empire, squander its wealth and undermine its position as a Great Power.

When confronted by this unenviable dilemma, Chamberlain concluded that such an outcome would be far more disastrous for the empire, Europe and the long-term victory of good over evil than territorial concessions in the Sudetenland which Britain could not prevent and to which Germany had some ostensibly legitimate claim.
 
...snip... But I'm pretty sure that the majority opinion in England at that time actually supported appeasement.

The same was true of the people of the UK as well.... :p But yes hardly anyone wanted a war or thought the German annexations were the Empire's business.


...snip...


Well, Chamberlain can join an august list of people tarred by history written by the victors, political or military. I agree that it's a lazy meme. I don't think we're going to do much to change the public perception. It'd take a major repatriation effort in the UK and that's only happening in dribs and drabs. Scholars pretty much concur that there is much more to this than Churchill's stark black-and-white portrayal of the era.

...snip...

Churchill's reputation today is based on the propaganda of the war, that totally overwhelms the historically accurate material. Many, many people of the time thought Churchill was anything but a heroic figure or the saviour of the Empire. Sadly these folk are now fading into history so we are left with the propaganda.

An awkward question for those that believe the propaganda version of Churchill is "Why didn't he win the general election after the war?"
 
Considering Chamberlain died from cancer in November 1940, was he perhaps in poor health in 1938/39? Could that have affected his decision?

Also, how many other people at the time realized the extent of Hitler's ambitions and wickedness? Fascism was hardly viewed as the cesspool of ideology it is synonymous with today, and antisemitism was extremely common everywhere in Europe and the US.

So true:

Lord Rothermere, telegram to Adolf Hitler 1st October, 1938:

My dear Fuhrer everyone in England is profoundly moved by the bloodless solution to the Czechoslovakian problem. People not so much concerned with territorial readjustment as with dread of another war with its accompanying bloodbath. Frederick the Great was a great popular figure. I salute your Excellency’s star, which rises higher and higher.​
 

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