Right, the argument is supposed to prove that God's (universe-builder/fine-tuner) existence moves from the realm of possible to probable (greater than .5).
">0.5" should be discarded. Probable means likely enough to be worth considering. It could be much lower of a probability if you like (I wouldn't play Russian roulette, for example, because killing myself as a result is quite probable), and it could even be something you can't stick a probability on (I wouldn't gamble that you don't have milk in your refrigerator--and I have no clue what the probability is). My point here is simply that the reigns should be loosened.
Still, even with the reigns this loose, "that it is possible"/"looks like it could be a result of" isn't sufficient to tack a probability on.
You have to think in terms of epistemic probabilites.
Well, okay, I'll
argue in terms of epistemic probabilities. But essentially, the idea is that "possible" is insufficient data to use to work with them.
"The universe appears to be fine-tuned"
For the record, what I was originally referring to said:
You're sooo close. Just a few more baby steps:
"God is possible, the universe is fine-tuned, therefore God is possible probable."
...which is ever so distinct from "The universe appears to be fine-tuned."
"The universe appears to be fine-tuned" is a claim about the universe that can be assigned [emphasis mine] an epistemic belief value.
...and doing so would be useless. You do realize just how low the bar is on possible, don't you? Do you realize just how many things are possible? That even if we filter this by "possible things that would explain things I see" (as a lemon test for "appears to be x"), that it's still insanely huge? And that if you're going to work with such a hypothesis, whatever it is, then by mere symmetry, any certainty you scare up out of it should necessarily apply to any other nonspecific notion in this set?
Furthermore, when you add in the realization that it's impossible that all of these possible things are true, and that there's so many of them, most of them being false, that as a general rule, any random possible thing is false, you will begin to see where the problem starts.
Assigning a starting probability, just to get a prior to pump through the Bayesian process,
is the very thing you can't do. You need to
start with something that's
probable (weakly, "likely enough to be considered"). Merely
being possible doesn't count for anything. The only thing you're going to do by priming the Bayesian pump is deceive yourself.
There's a whole seperate argument for whether this claim should be given a high degree of belief or low degree.
That's exactly what I was saying. But to even start out with probabilities so tremendously huge, they can be expressed in 90 English words or less, you must have some sort of filter being applied to the possible.
No, the claim would be more like: "Mount Rushmore appears to have 4 faces carved on it".
Bad form. This was my example to illustrate a distinct point, which is not refuted by simply screwing up my example to not illustrate the point any more. The example is necessarily illustrative of a separate kind of claim--something that appears a certain way that you, being a sane person, don't really think is that way.
"Old man" is homage to "old man of the mountain", not Mt Rushmore.
I hate changing examples mid-stream, but perhaps I need to. Let's talk about those footprints in the snow. They could be formed by large rabbits, small bears, woolly mammoths with malformed feet, really skinny watchmakers, and a chupacabra-mule hybrid. We know large rabbits cause footprints, as do small bears (and even woolly mammoths, which we know aren't around). We don't quite know for sure if there are watchmakers with such bad feet, or chupacabra-mule hybrids (it
is possible, mind you--i.e., it hasn't been ruled out).
I think perhaps we should give more credence to the chupacabra-mule hybrid. I mean, the footprints
do appear to be from a chupacabra-mule hybrid, and you can't prove there isn't such a creature. There's a whole argument to be made about whether or not we should assign a low probability or a high probability to chupacabra-mule hybrids that walk in snow.
But it's possible. And it appears to be. We could assign a probability to it, and then start applying some epistemic probability theory, and start adjusting it. Without, of course, first taking the time to see if it's even
probable in the first place (otherwise, you'll contend, and that's my entire argument--then I'll shut up and we'll be bored--we don't want that, do we?)
Separate subthread:
I didn't say God. I said "fine-tuner". Call it a universe-builder if you want.
You're
completely missing the point of what I was saying. I didn't claim you did say God--nor did I assume you did. Nor am I arguing that you said God. I'm saying, straight up, that you're presuming there are specific traits that a being must manifest in order to count as a god.
What you're specifically saying is that once we prove there's a fine-tuner--specifically, someone who tuned the universe in order for it to create life, we need to do more to prove there's a god. But why I can't I just call that a god outright? What else do we need to establish? That it inspired the New Testament? That it wears a crown?
You need a god criteria to meaningfully speak of additional things to prove. Guy who tweaked the universe on purpose to create life sounds like a perfectly reasonable thing to call god to me--if cj wants to do that, it's his business.
Heck, I'm playing the theist side of the arguments now! But it is seriously one of my major objections that the term per se is treated as more meaningful than it is (which is why I can "feign" polytheism so easily).
