Can theists be rational?

Ah... I didn't object before because you were entirely correct. It is, in fact, an issue with probability, and at some point there's a probability, however extremely small it may be, that you can actually hit to conclude there's a god.

But in terms of the fine tuning argument, you can imagine two major theories, worst case (and we don't really know it's even this worst case scenario). G would be that God created everything and favored life, and C would be that it arose by chance.

The relevant factor isn't how small P(C) is, but rather, how big P(C) is in comparison to P(G). P(C) can be pretty damned small, but if it is, what reason have we to suspect P(G) is bigger than P(C)? God is much more special than 200 pound slabs of thinking ape.

The fine tuning argument requires you to think of P(G) and P(C) separately, and ignore the relative priors. Effectively, it's what is described here as the probabilistic fallacy of "Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes".

I didn't, however, go on from to derive from the unlikelihood of the current universe the existence of god. I find the probabilistic arguments for and against god extremely unconvincing.

The fine-tuning argument I take simply to show that there is something odd going on. There are a number of explanations, viz

  1. God did it.
  2. The universe is a simulation.
  3. There is some deeper theory which will explain exactly how things came about, but we don't have it figured out yet.
  4. Mutiple parallel universes, each with different constants.
  5. Things just are the way they are.
  6. Something else I/we haven't thought of.

Apart from the second last one, which I find implausible, I wouldn't assign probabilities to any of the above.
 
If you just look at the constants, and ignore the possible universes produced, then you can say that one set of constants is as likely as any other. The unlikelihood arises from the fact* that the universe produced by one particular set of constants is unique, and most of the others look quite similar.

*If it is a fact. Assumed for the probabilistic argument.

I think you got the drift. I am not sure whether I really have to agree to the (un)likelyhood or to the (dis)similarity at all, but that is beside the point anyway.

However, God just does not explain the actual set of constants better than it does explain any other set of constants, or does it? It is inflationary.

And anyway, does God need any stinking ;) universal constants at all? I see no reason why there couldn't be a set of constants which normally wouldn't ever support life or even be 'stable,' and there'd still be life in a stable universe.
 
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I didn't, however, go on from to derive from the unlikelihood of the current universe the existence of god. ...
That's fair, but:
The fine-tuning argument I take simply to show that there is something odd going on. There are a number of explanations, viz
...
1. God did it.
...
5. Things just are the way they are.
...
Apart from [5], which I find implausible, I wouldn't assign probabilities to any of the above.
...and I'm not assigning specific probabilities either. But I think I was arguing that P(5) beats P(1), because P(5) has a 200 pound slab of thinking ape just happening to exist, whereas, look at what P(1) has just happening to exist.

So I'm fine with your finding P(5) implausible. But given that you find P(5) implausible, I'm extremely curious why you don't find P(1) all the more implausible. Is there a flaw in my thinking?
 
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Nope, they are an assumption. David Hume for example was intensely sceptical about causal relationships, as i'm sure you know,and question the very nature of our understanding of causality. For any given event we assume a) causality and b) that natural law applies. We can not demonstrate either in many cases.

Firstly, causality is far more difficult than most people realize. We assume a chain of A ------> B -------> C. This might work well for particles, but it breaks down when we deal with real life examples, when multiple causality and synergistic causality, retrocausality, probabilistic causality and other types of causation crop up all the time. becomes the norm. It fails in our QM models. I think causality is a useful concept, but it is not by any means as obvious as 20th century minds seem to think - it was not obvious historically, and it is not obvious now in some science.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality_(physics)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_causation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessary_and_sufficient_conditions
From Hume we have assumed that causality applies, but this is in fact not deducible, insteaed being an inductive Best Inferred Explanation. We actually now know that causality doe snot appear to function in certain QM relations - at least in the sense we are used to - we can only model it is terms of probablistic causality to the best of my understanding.

The simple way to approach this is to ask how things would look if causality didn't work. Would we induce causality?

Natural laws are again an assumption: see my discussion of Induction and Cosmological Uniformity. There is no reason to assume natural law is homogenous, or that the universe is.

Exactly. And yet we proceed as though they are. Why might that be?

In fact we know that laws do change under extreme conditions - breaking symmetry - and that is how our current laws arose - but we can not rule out the possibility they may act differently elsewhere, or here.

Does this not serve as a demonstration that we do not make these assumptions? Else, how could we know under what conditions they may not hold?

In fact laws are probalistic accoding to science - gravity will almost always work - but in theory we do not know it always will. That is not deducible - back to induction. Sure this gets silly, but it is why we have to assume Cosmological Uniformity. Without it our science disappears in to "best guess based on our experience" territory.

Rather I'd say we've found a way to determine our best guess on the basis of what works. If there wasn't uniformity, then our science wouldn't work.

Yes, exactly, and as I say, in doing so precludes any supernatural causality or arbitrary alteration in laws. :)

How so? Are you not making reference to events when talking about what it is that the supernatural has caused?

Ah! Yet the supernatural can still impact upon natural events - its just that science can not allow that causality.

So you are making reference to events when talking about what it is that the supernatural has caused.

Imagine Zeus causes a ligthning bolt to blast some sinner now. The causality is supernatural, the lightning bolt manifests (and is natural as any lightning bolt - its origin is supernatural, it by definition is natural ) and the sinner gets fried. Yet to speculate on the cause of the lightning bolt being Zeus is precluded by the ground rules of science - by the methodological naturalism.

This is now your opportunity to explain how you determine that that particular lightning bolt had a supernatural cause as opposed to all those lightning bolts with a natural cause. That is all I am asking.

Ot take the CFT argument. We can say "this seems to require an intelligent designer" if you want,

This is now your opportunity to explain why we would insert a supernatural cause for this particular event as opposed to all other events.

and draw upon the scientific evidence - but as soon as we propose a God as Creator, we automatically leave sceicne, as this is an illegitmate violation of ontological naturalism.

Yes.

So the ground rules of science mean we explain things in terms of natural causality, regardles of whether or not that is the best explanation - because it is assumed ot be the best explanation.

No. The ground rules of science means that we explain things in terms of the best explanation. That we have a methodology that works to discover a best explanation means that we don't arbitrarily substitute a 'methodology' that doesn't work, for some events.

Thats fine, and sensible, but we can not then use it against theology, for obvious reasons - it is a circular argument.

As I mentioned in the other thread, we have a way to break circularity by simply considering what works, what is useful.

Linda
 
If god is supernatural, then god is different, and operates outside the rules of nature. It is not possible to investigate the extra-natural elements of god. However, it's possible to see any manifestation of god in the natural universe, which can be entirely concealed, made obvious, or left ambivalent - depending on what god wants. Any knowledge of god must be imperfect. That does not mean that god cannot be manifest at all.

That is what I am saying. God manifests itself through natural events, the same way that other forces manifest themselves. So why aren't these other forces called supernatural - gravity, electromagnetism, etc.?

Linda
 
That's fair, but:

...and I'm not assigning specific probabilities either. But I think I was arguing that P(5) beats P(1), because P(5) has a 200 pound slab of thinking ape just happening to exist, whereas, look at what P(1) has just happening to exist.

So I'm fine with your finding P(5) implausible. But given that you find P(5) implausible, I'm extremely curious why you don't find P(1) all the more implausible. Is there a flaw in my thinking?

The reason I find P(1)-P(4) convincing - or at least more convincing - is that they provide some kind of explanation. P(5) provides no explanation, and seems to just decide that there's nothing to be explained.

Any explanation is going to involve a major change in our understanding of what the universe is and how it works.
 
That is what I am saying. God manifests itself through natural events, the same way that other forces manifest themselves. So why aren't these other forces called supernatural - gravity, electromagnetism, etc.?

Linda

Because we think we know how they work. There's a consistent set of behaviours which we refer to as the laws of nature. If something happens in the natural world which is inconsistent with such laws, we would consider that an instance of the supernatural intervening.

It would of course be very difficult to distinguish a supernatural intervention in the natural world with some natural event operating in some heretofore unknown manner. It might be impossible to establish with certainty that some event wasn't natural. However, there would still be events occurring that were supernatural, even if they couldn't be recognised as such with absolute certainty.

Arthur C. Clarke said:
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
 
In other words you don't understand why it's proof, and you think that pointing out absolute statements provides you with a reason to maintain your own opinion.

So, he goes:

If something (a god or otherwise) is supernatural, but observable in some way, then it should be detectable because of the effects it has on the natural world. When that thing (a god or otherwise) is defined as undetectable, then it cannot affect the natural world, is onobservable and is therefore in the realm of the imaginary.

I'm not talking to CJ. I'm talking to you.

So please explain those "obvious" holes or retract your statement.

Oh, very well.

If we accept that the god in question is effectively omnipotent, then it will clearly be possible for him to intervene in the natural world and not be detected. It would indeed be implausible that he would be detected except precisely when he wanted to be detected. He would be undetectable if he wished to be. Saying that he would be undetectable does not mean that he would not be effecting the natural world in any way. Operating at the level of quantum randomness, for example, god could direct the universe in any way he wanted without even breaching the laws of nature. If allowed free rein to override natural law in any way he wanted, he could clearly have massive effects on the universe and remain undetected. As any detective can confirm, things that aren't detected can have an effect.

The fact that something is unobserved does not mean that it is necessarily unobservable. Something can be unobserved and still have an effect. If the effect is designed to not be observed, then it won't be.

The flaw in the argument - and in all such arguments - is in using the rules of science to disprove the possibility of a subjective, arbitrary element to the world. The assumption of science is that no such element exists - so naturally scientific thinking will disallow it.
 
Well, here we are folks. Page 50 (well, it's page 50 for me). I think the noes have it.

Page 50 for me too. And although I think this post of yours should be the last as it is most definitely the conclusion I agree with, I have already noticed that there are a couple more to go to. So, on I go, ever onwards....

All very interesting, though.
 
The reason I find P(1)-P(4) convincing - or at least more convincing - is that they provide some kind of explanation. P(5) provides no explanation, and seems to just decide that there's nothing to be explained.
And this seems to be the same issue I find with Malerin. Sure, P(5) provides no explanation, other than chance. But that shouldn't in itself matter. P(X) is P(X) regardless of what X is. If P(C)>P(G), and G explains things, P(C) should still be preferred. You're showing a particular bias towards explanation, which I think is undue.

The fine tuning argument is doomed from the get go--it's arguing solely based on how likely P(C) is, but explicitly ignores what this implies for how low P(G) is. They scale, though. Gods are much more specific and special entities than humans, or mere life in the universe. P(G) necessarily requires a god to exist, and P(C) is argued small precisely because of the improbability, by chance, that a much, much less special entity exists than the god in G.

Now, personally, I don't place much stock in C myself... and some of your other options seem much more plausible. But P(G) doesn't come into play until it beats P(C).

Now, you don't need an arbitrary bias in order to get low probabilities to suggest something other than chance, though. Your message across the sky is entirely different. If I is the likelihood that the stars are that way by chance, and Z that Zeus arranged them so, the unlikelihood of P(I) does not suggest more extreme unlikelihood for P(Z).

It's simply the case that to get a god into the equation in the first place, you need to put a god into the equation. Improbability of things existing by chance seems to highly disfavor god, so there should be a different approach--alternate evidence. This approach does you no good--but there's an infinite number to choose from.

Edit: Also, this is the start of page 42. Geesh... how do you guys read this thread through such low posts per page settings? :)
 
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SETI is searching for empirical evidence of aliens. Sure, advocates of the fine-tuning argument would probably love for empirical evidence to be found to support their premises, but they rarely if ever search for empirical evidence to support the premises of the fine-tuning argument.

I think you just made that up. How would you know what areas of exploration are of interest to physicists and whether certain components are deliberately left unexplored?

You would agree that what SETI is doing isn't a scientific endeavor? Or are you objecting that my description describes what SETI is doing? If the latter, you have yet to point out how what SETI is doing differs from the description.

I would agree that "looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor."

Sure, I am of the opinion that SETI is doing exactly as I described. They are indeed looking for signs of extra terrestrial intelligence for which there is no compelling evidence for the purposes of proving the unfalsifiable hypothesis that intelligent aliens exist, which doesn't explain any known observations. If you disagree please quit playing semantic games and specify why you disagree, please. I'm not trying to trick you into admitting anything -- I'm trying to get you to clearly state your argument.

What do you think I've been doing? I've provided numerous examples that contradict each of your claims in order to specify why I disagree.

I'm glad you've at least agreed that the set of characteristics isn't science. That was like pulling teeth.

See, that's my point. It doesn't even occur to me that it is necessary to agree that that set of characteristics isn't Science. It's clear that it isn't. Which makes it obvious that even though you were pretending that was what you were asking, you were really asking something else - the sine qua non of "begging the question".

Now let's discuss why you feel that SETI doesn't fit the description.

That's what I was discussing all along. What did you think I was discussing?

No, it's practically unfalsifiable if not theoretically so -- it can't be proven false. There is no way to look in every nook and cranny of the galaxy for aliens in order to prove that there are none. Just as it would be impossible to search everywhere around Jupiter for teapots in order to prove that there are none. In the case of aliens, it's possible that they're hiding from us, in which case even searching every nook and cranny wouldn't prove there are none. SETI can keep searching for aliens forever and never disprove the hypothesis that aliens exist.

Really? We'd never ever change our minds about the possibility regardless of how thoroughly we'd searched or how much more information we had about the rarity of the conditions that seem to lead to intelligent life?

So you're going to address the conditions independently after you've already agreed that together the conditions are unscientific. Seems like a straw man to me.

Really? If, as you say, all these conditions should be present in order for something to be considered unscientific, then doesn't the lack of one or more of the conditions mean that the thing isn't unscientific? Doesn't that mean that it is reasonable to address the conditions independently, since they can be excluded independently?

The scientific hypotheses that don't explain observations typically explain known observations and are falsifiable.

Can you give me an example?

That's not what's meant by "explain known observations." Most scientific hypotheses that are presented without evidence are conceived because they explain an existing set of observations, but are also falsifiable so that they can be proven false by further testing.

Can you give me an example?

Sure, there are a lot of people who are curious about things for which there is no compelling evidence -- The Abominable Snowman, Bigfoot, The Loch Ness Monster, faeries, invisible elephants, teapots orbiting Jupiter.

Interesting. I gave a list where people were curious about things for which there was no compelling evidence that led to ground-breaking scientific discoveries. You replied with a list of things that are considered ridiculous. Now why would you do that?

Your examples concerning telescopes and observing devices is a straw man -- the hypotheses they would be tested under wouldn't be unfalsifiable. The hypothesis would be "this telescope will make large distant objects easier to view" or "this microscope will make very small objects easier to view."

Really?

And all this without any compelling evidence that there were any very small objects or any distant moons to view.

What do you mean? A scientist usually has compelling evidence that bones are likely to be found where they are about to search for them. There is no compelling evidence that aliens are likely to exist anywhere. Searching "sun-like stars" is not equivalent to searching for dinosaur bones -- there is no compelling evidence that aliens will likely be found near other sun-like stars.

What is your yield threshold for 'compelling'? Success one time in two? ten? a hundred? a thousand?

The point here is that unlike paleontologists digging up bones, SETI isn't really looking at specific planets where evidence indicates that aliens are likely to be found (they really wouldn't know where they are likely to be found since they don't know the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged here).

Why wouldn't sun-like stars be more likely to have earth-like planets, etc.?

I asked what conditions or events occurred on this planet by which intelligent life emerged. Your list didn't answer the question. All of those things exist on nearly every planet,

Really? Solvents and living organisms exist on nearly every planet? Man, am I way behind on the news.

but we know that not all planets have intelligent life. So what conditions/events led to the emergence of intelligent life on this planet?

The ones I listed. If things are as you say, we should be watching Martian TV sometime within the next century.

They are topics which have to do with our presence here, but they are not the conditions or events by which intelligent life emerged. For example, "energy source" is a pretty general topic, and you didn't specify the energy source(s) required for intelligent life to emerge, the amounts of energy, the events that would be required to produce that energy, the types of energy that would prohibit intelligent life, etc.

I didn't, but then you didn't ask for a dissertation. If that's the sort of information you are looking for, I'd suggest you use a different source.

No, it does provide explanatory power.

How so? All it seems to do is provide an explanation after the fact in the same way that yy2bggggs' slot machine example does. When all outcomes are explained, it means that there is no explanatory power.

In fact, the argument is that it provides the best explanation for the observation that the universe is fine-tuned. Certainly you can disagree with the premises of the argument as well as the conclusion, but you can't really say that the argument provides no explanatory power.

Really? What wouldn't it be able to explain?

Of course they would. An argument for aliens based on buildings on Jupiter would be that aliens provide the best explanation of the buildings (not the only possible explanation, but arguably the best explanation).

Except 'aliens' wouldn't be the best explanation for 'lakes' on Jupiter.

The fine-tuning argument argues that a god would be the best explanation of a fine-tuned universe (again, not the only possible explanation, but arguably the best explanation).

Except God would be the best explanation for seeing anything the way that we see it.

What does that have to do with whether it's reasonable to assume that a being that can set the universal constants wouldn't be limited to the natural universe?

Why didn't you draw the line for 'natural universe' at 'those things with mass'?

One of the "rules" that applies to the natural universe is that the constants can't be changed.

Why? What if I simply don't feel like agreeing with the idea of rules and instead consider the universe the set of all observable events and their influences?

So if you're able to set the constants, it makes sense that you can't be subject to the rules that apply to the natural universe.

-Bri

That would simply be one of the influences on observable events and therefore part of the universe.

Linda
 
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I asked this question earlier, but it either got missed, or I missed the reply :).

This definition of natural would seem to imply that if the stars were rearranged in the sky to spell out, "Hello, I'm Zeus, I did this", then this would count as natural and science would not be able to speculate that Zeus was responsible.


Sorry! yes that is correct. We could not scientifically assert a supernatural cause, so science would offer

a) the pattern of stars is random, but coincidentally apperas to be like letters, a simulacra, in a similar way to the fact the constellation Taurus i no treally aBull.
b) the pattern of stars is in fact random, but appears to us to have a pattern owing to the way our language perception pattern recognition heuristics work, so it's an artifact of our brains. - pareidolia.
c) the perceived pattern is not random, but determined by constraints of the laws of nature that happen to make it spell out "Hey it's Zeus!" This did not arise however from an intelligent Zeus - in fact the shaping of the stars simply obey natural cycles, and at the moment the configuration happens to be meaningful to us - but in 5 billion years the stars will read "Eat more Fibre!".
d) the stars do indeed spell out "Hey it's Zeus", and this is because worshippers of Zeus took the name from the positions of the stars, which also formed the basis for ancient alphabets, so our langugaes reflect the stars, not vice versa: we evolved to fit the stellar configurationnot the other way round.
e) The stars do spell out the message, because the unknown super-PK powers of Zeus worshiippers were able to effect physics and cause the stellar alignement. Manchester United are nor practicing mass meditation for the fans in the hope of getting some decent advertising, and the Church of England are suing the hellenist pagans over the monoploy in divine flyposting.

All of the above would bizarrely enough be legitimate scientific hypotheses: "Zeusdidit!" would biazzarely enough, not be. This is actually not as tragic as it sounds, as we could just use the theological hypothesis Zeus did it, and test that against the natural data - but it is excluded from science, yes...

cj x
 
Let's be clear, this is what you said. Then you asked me to make a guess about what's in a dark building. I guessed it's not Jupiter, which I am almost certainly right about.

Care to refine your claim?

Okay.

You are placed in front of a brick wall that extends as far as you can see in all four directions. What is on the other side?

Linda
 
And this seems to be the same issue I find with Malerin. Sure, P(5) provides no explanation, other than chance. But that shouldn't in itself matter. P(X) is P(X) regardless of what X is. If P(C)>P(G), and G explains things, P(C) should still be preferred. You're showing a particular bias towards explanation, which I think is undue.

The fine tuning argument is doomed from the get go--it's arguing solely based on how likely P(C) is, but explicitly ignores what this implies for how low P(G) is. They scale, though. Gods are much more specific and special entities than humans, or mere life in the universe. P(G) necessarily requires a god to exist, and P(C) is argued small precisely because of the improbability, by chance, that a much, much less special entity exists than the god in G.

Now, personally, I don't place much stock in C myself... and some of your other options seem much more plausible. But P(G) doesn't come into play until it beats P(C).

Now, you don't need an arbitrary bias in order to get low probabilities to suggest something other than chance, though. Your message across the sky is entirely different. If I is the likelihood that the stars are that way by chance, and Z that Zeus arranged them so, the unlikelihood of P(I) does not suggest more extreme unlikelihood for P(Z).

It's simply the case that to get a god into the equation in the first place, you need to put a god into the equation. Improbability of things existing by chance seems to highly disfavor god, so there should be a different approach--alternate evidence. This approach does you no good--but there's an infinite number to choose from.

However, as I said, I regard probabilistic arguments specifically related to God as unconvincing, in either direction. Probability depends on ignorance. When the truth is known, then something is certain or false.

The only thing I take from the fine-tuning argument is that the question remains open.


Edit: Also, this is the start of page 42. Geesh... how do you guys read this thread through such low posts per page settings? :)

I assume you reread the entire thread daily.
 
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I asked this question earlier, but it either got missed, or I missed the reply :).

This definition of natural would seem to imply that if the stars were rearranged in the sky to spell out, "Hello, I'm Zeus, I did this", then this would count as natural and science would not be able to speculate that Zeus was responsible.

This is why I like my defintion of supernatural much more than the one that people here have tried to use. Because clearly, that should be considered supernatural, right?

Linda
 
Hmm, I don't see Spinoza's God as an extra layer. It's more of a definition of the totality of all that is. I don't have any problem with folks who don't define Being that way, but it really just comes down to a decision about what word to use. There are no extra qualities thrown onto that "God".

I agree that it's simply a redundant label. But why propose a redundant label if there wasn't a thought that the totality did somehow add additional meaning?

Linda
 
I suppose it depends on just what human beings are. If human beings are designed to be able to directly experience god, in addition to their placement in the material world, then they'll be able to do so. In that sense, human beings would be a little bit supernatural as well. But it's fairly obvious that any such ability is not an ever-present, because human beings don't experience god all the time.

Or, it's possible that human beings cannot experience anything outside of the natural, but that a supernatural god exists both in the natural and supernatural universe (the natural is a subset of the supernatural). If that is the case, we could directly experience any interaction the god would have with the natural world. In other words, it's possible for a supernatural being to slap your face and for you to feel it, to talk to you and for you to hear it, or to make a pizza appear before you and for you to see it.

-Bri
 
Sorry! yes that is correct. We could not scientifically assert a supernatural cause, so science would offer

a) the pattern of stars is random, but coincidentally apperas to be like letters, a simulacra, in a similar way to the fact the constellation Taurus i no treally aBull.
b) the pattern of stars is in fact random, but appears to us to have a pattern owing to the way our language perception pattern recognition heuristics work, so it's an artifact of our brains. - pareidolia.
c) the perceived pattern is not random, but determined by constraints of the laws of nature that happen to make it spell out "Hey it's Zeus!" This did not arise however from an intelligent Zeus - in fact the shaping of the stars simply obey natural cycles, and at the moment the configuration happens to be meaningful to us - but in 5 billion years the stars will read "Eat more Fibre!".
d) the stars do indeed spell out "Hey it's Zeus", and this is because worshippers of Zeus took the name from the positions of the stars, which also formed the basis for ancient alphabets, so our langugaes reflect the stars, not vice versa: we evolved to fit the stellar configurationnot the other way round.
e) The stars do spell out the message, because the unknown super-PK powers of Zeus worshiippers were able to effect physics and cause the stellar alignement. Manchester United are nor practicing mass meditation for the fans in the hope of getting some decent advertising, and the Church of England are suing the hellenist pagans over the monoploy in divine flyposting.

All of the above would bizarrely enough be legitimate scientific hypotheses: "Zeusdidit!" would biazzarely enough, not be. This is actually not as tragic as it sounds, as we could just use the theological hypothesis Zeus did it, and test that against the natural data - but it is excluded from science, yes...

cj x

However, there's always (f) Aliens of almost inconceivable power and amazing abilities did it to mess us about in some incomprehensible way.

It's nearly always possible to substitute (f) for (G).
 
Doesn't God 'explain' the actual set of constants (the one that is claimed to be fine tuned) just as well as any set of universal constants (they'd just be as fine tuned as the acutal one)?

I think that "God" is about as good an explanation, and has a similar explanatory power, as "Somehow" does.

I'm not quite sure I understand your question. The argument is based on evidence that the universe is fine-tuned (that with any significant differences in the universal constants life couldn't exist). The fine-tuning argument suggests that the probability of fine-tuning (that the universe supports life) would be higher if a god exists than with any other explanation.

This would be similar to concluding that the likelihood of a building existing on Jupiter would be higher if an alien existed on Jupiter than with any other explanation.

So, I'm not sure that "somehow" there is a building on Jupiter explains the existence of the building better than aliens.

-Bri
 

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