Brexit: Now What? Part III

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It's not a great analogy but:

Political party manifesto and white paper commits to building 1 million houses a year for the life of the Parliament. Year 1 budget agreed by Parliament only has enough money for half that number.
They committed to build a million houses each year, not the total equivalent per year figure over the lifetime of parliament? And they are required to pay for each million each year from the budget for that year? Otherwise they are committing to increase the amount set aside for house building over the lifetime of Parliament, above the present agreed level. Presumably that would entail cuts elsewhere, or increased taxation.
 
You keep making this difference between commitments and binding commitments (or legal obligations). My understanding of the english language is that binding commitment is a tautology. I did look it up to see if there was some nuance I was missing but it doesn't seem so.

Can you explain how a commitment is not binding here?

Think we are just into the vagueries of English now. A commitment could be seen as a promise a bindung commitment a promise which you cannot renege on.

Perhaps enforceable is a better word than binding? Although that gets us into another can of worms potentially.
 
I don't think that's correct but I am ready to stand corrected if you can show the working. The figures I have seen for all GDP losses have always been the annual impact at the end of the period.

I think you are correct. The % loss of GDP after 15 years is:
"Annual impact of leaving the EU on the UK after 15 years (difference from being in the EU)"
This is the heading (I happened to have a treasury pdf open on the page).

GDP level (%):
EEA: –3.4 to –4.3
Negotiated bilateral agreement: –4.6 to –7.8
WTO: –5.4 to –9.5

Assuming the discussion refers to the Exec Summary here:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa...ysis_economic_impact_of_eu_membership_web.pdf
 
It's not a great analogy but:

Political party manifesto and white paper commits to building 1 million houses a year for the life of the Parliament. Year 1 budget agreed by Parliament only has enough money for half that number.

Ok, thanks. I get that. That commitment is not binding because a) it is not made to anyone in particular and b) it seeks to commit a third party (government).

The UK clearly can enter into legally binding contracts about finances with the EU/the other member states. I don't understand how there can be two types of commitments between the same parties about the same thing.
 
Ok, thanks. I get that. That commitment is not binding because a) it is not made to anyone in particular and b) it seeks to commit a third party (government).

The UK clearly can enter into legally binding contracts about finances with the EU/the other member states. I don't understand how there can be two types of commitments between the same parties about the same thing.

Hmm. Are EU budget commitments legally binding commitments between two parties? Or are they internal EU commitments? Or are they 28 way agreements?

At what point do they become commitments? When they are agreed? When the budget is approved?

Let's face it we are in the unknown here. Nobody has ever left the EU before and I doubt it was ever seriously considered when making these budget decisions.
 
The UK clearly can enter into legally binding contracts about finances with the EU/the other member states. I don't understand how there can be two types of commitments between the same parties about the same thing.

Think about EU finances. All of the below is from my general understanding and could well be wrong, so it should only be taken as a starting point for further research.:)

Income from the member states for each year is linked to the current size of their economies, and tariffs; the EU has no direct control on its income.

Expenditure each year is agreed by the member states in an annual budget.

The EU cannot run a budget deficit and cannot print its own currency(as far as I am aware), but the annual payments from member states are legal obligations i.e. The EU can sue the member states to get them paid.

On top of the annual cycle, there is a longer term (6 year?) cycle where multi-year infrastructure programmes are agreed. However payments on these long-term programmes are subject to the annual budget limits, and contributions from the member states where they are being carried out ( EU does not provide 100% funding). Therefore commitments under these longer term programmes are different in nature to the binding commitments in the annual budget. Using the same word in different context leads to confusion, but EU processes are confusing.
 
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Let's face it we are in the unknown here. Nobody has ever left the EU before and I doubt it was ever seriously considered when making these budget decisions.

And a final conundrum.

What do you think the EU position would be if a net recipient state was leaving?

Would they try to reclaim payments already made?;)
 
And a final conundrum.

What do you think the EU position would be if a net recipient state was leaving?

Would they try to reclaim payments already made?;)

Quite possibly. I believe EU investments usually come with a caves that the money has to be repaid if the asset leaves the union in a period.

I believe the UK is also on the hook for this for money spent in the UK potentially.

Of course net recipients still would have contributions to make too.
 
Think about EU finances. All of the below is from my general understanding and could well be wrong, so it should only be taken as a starting point for further research.:)

Income from the member states for each year is linked to the current size of their economies, and tariffs; the EU has no direct control on its income.

Expenditure each year is agreed by the member states in an annual budget.

The EU cannot run a budget deficit and cannot print its own currency(as far as I am aware), but the annual payments from member states are legal obligations i.e. The EU can sue the member states to get them paid.

On top of the annual cycle, there is a longer term (6 year?) cycle where multi-year infrastructure programmes are agreed. However payments on these long-term programmes are subject to the annual budget limits, and contributions from the member states where they are being carried out ( EU does not provide 100% funding). Therefore commitments under these longer term programmes are different in nature to the binding commitments in the annual budget. Using the same word in different context leads to confusion, but EU processes are confusing.

That's my understanding as well but it doesn't seem particularly confusing to me. In normal life one will often agree to pay later. That does not make the commitment to pay less legally binding.
If a partnership makes a contract, then the liability exists and all the partners are on the hook. It doesn't matter when or if the partners agree to budget money.
 
And a final conundrum.

What do you think the EU position would be if a net recipient state was leaving?

Would they try to reclaim payments already made?;)

I don't see any basis for asking for money back for the time prior to the exit but obviously it would ask for any expenses incurred as a result of leaving. That would include all payments made after the exit. That's just common sense, isn't it?
 
I don't see any basis for asking for money back for the time prior to the exit but obviously it would ask for any expenses incurred as a result of leaving. That would include all payments made after the exit. That's just common sense, isn't it?

This is one of the reasons that article 50 is so vague about the mechanism for countries leaving, as it should be internally consistent with similar treatment for countries independent of whether they were net contributors or recipients.
 
That's my understanding as well but it doesn't seem particularly confusing to me. In normal life one will often agree to pay later. That does not make the commitment to pay less legally binding.

The key difference for the longer term programmes is the inclusion of several IFs:

IF the programme is within this year's payment budget; and
IF the participating country has provided the matching funds; and
IF we are members of the EU; then
We agree to pay.
 
This is one of the reasons that article 50 is so vague about the mechanism for countries leaving, as it should be internally consistent with similar treatment for countries independent of whether they were net contributors or recipients.
I don't understand. What is a reason? And what is that about internal consistency?

The key difference for the longer term programmes is the inclusion of several IFs:

IF the programme is within this year's payment budget; and
IF the participating country has provided the matching funds; and
IF we are members of the EU; then
We agree to pay.
That's not in the EU treaties, right? It is derived from english law? That's what I'm curious about. It just seems odd to me.
 
EU intends to force relocation of financial clearing houses to Eurozone if UK doesn't accept ECJ jurdistiction and regulation over its' financial markets.

http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/05/investing/london-euro-clearing-brexit-jobs/index.html

Is this little tidbit included in the economic scenarios I wonder?

McHrozni

The argument is over products priced in Euros.

It's not that difficult to produce products priced in £ that behave as if they were priced in Euros.
 
The argument is over products priced in Euros.

It's not that difficult to produce products priced in £ that behave as if they were priced in Euros.

Those are different products. We are not talking about trading regular things. We are talking about various financial instruments that are denominated in particular currency and as a whole are being sold. (Currency is as I understand it part of package)

pretty sure you have missed everything relevant and as such your suggestion is completely wrong and not applicable.
 
We are talking about various financial instruments that are denominated in particular currency and as a whole are being sold. (Currency is as I understand it part of package)

Like exchange traded Euribor futures? Not difficult to produce one priced in £.

FX is different. There is no way that the EU can insist that any FX deal involving Euros must be settled within the EU without imposing currency controls.
 
The argument is over products priced in Euros.

It's not that difficult to produce products priced in £ that behave as if they were priced in Euros.

Maybe, unless of course one of the lawmakers decides to make it difficult, as is the case here.

If Euro-denominated business leaves London that's up to 100,000 London City jobs that will move to the continent. That's quite strong incentive for EU to pursue legislative action that will see those jobs move. UK is lobbying hard against it, but the arguments it puts forward are, well, pathetic to put it mildly: "It will cause disruption to the market and cause it to fragment!!1".

This is true, sure. But if ECJ doesn't have sovereignty over the Euro clearing the potential for disruption is much greater and fragmentation of the market will cause, at worst, some inefficiency.

Should clearing move to Paris EU kills several more birds with one stone - strengthening France at a crucial time when it needs reforms and reinforcing the hand of one of the most pro-EU leaders at again a critical time for the union and the Euro and it wouldn't even fragment the market. Can one of our brave Brexiteers (if we still have any) say what will UK offer in return for not pursuing this goal?

McHrozni
 
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