Better the illusions that exalt us ......

[rocketdodger]

It is because the harm is not demonstrable in utilitarian terms.

Unless, of course, you simply ask someone "does this cause you harm?"

In which case it becomes immediately and trivially demonstrable.

I think the problem here is that you (and herzblut, although I hate to group you with him) are injecting moral absolutist notions into a characteristically morally subjective system.

The individual gets to define the utility of anything and the happiness or harm caused by anything. There is no universal rule that defines what makes one happy or harmed nor what is useful or not useful.

This implies that the only way to evaluate any level of net happiness or harm is via communication, I.E. asking people if they are happy or harmed.

 

[Herzblut]

1) Observe how happy or harmed a person is.
2) Add the value you come up with to the running total.
3) Repeat with another person.

This is not about the retrospective judgment of a done act, but about estimating the moral worth of an act to be done.

The ignorant idiocy of your bizarre spinnery deserves to rest in a special location: the trash can.

 

[rocketdodger]

This is not about the retrospective judgment of a done act, but about estimating the moral worth of an act to do.

The ignorant idiocy of your bizarre spinnery deserves to rest in a special location: the trash can.

So... change it to read

1) Observe how happy or harmed a person will be.

Why are you incapable making such an inference on your own?

 

[porch]

. . . The individual gets to define the utility of anything and the happiness or harm caused by anything. There is no universal rule that defines what makes one happy or harmed nor what is useful or not useful.

This implies that the only way to evaluate any level of net happiness or harm is via communication, I.E. asking people if they are happy or harmed.

I was having some lunch with a coginitive-behavioural therapist last week, and our conversation turned towards the problems of evaluating therapeutic success when one of the only tools to do so is self-reporting. After a period of treatment, a client may claim that they don't feel any better. With follow-up questions, however, they may also report significant alterations in their behaviour, eg, they're able to be out in public in a large crowd without feeling great anxiety and an intense urge to flee, whereas this would have been impossible a couple of months ago. This led the therapist to tell me one of those whacky CBT jokes:

Two cognitive-behaviouralists lie together in bed, bodies slick in the post-coital glow. One turns to the other and says, "It was good for you, was it good for me?"

I mainly butted into this conversation for the opportunity to tell that joke, but in typing it out, I began to wonder if two deontologists (a term I just learned from this thread, thanks) after having sex would not care in the least whether it was good for either of them, so long as they had done their duty?

 

[Robin]

I do not see the relevance of that, I am afraid. We are talking about the adequacy of Utilitarianism as a moral system. There is no doubt that in Omelas the happiness of the greatest number is achieved: and that the harm is minimised. It follows from Utilitarianism that this is a good society based on excellent moral principles. And for me it serves to demonstrate that Utilitarianism is not good enough.

I will have to go back and re-read. I rather gathered that the populace were not happy - they found a way of living with it, but were not happy. The ones who walked away found it insupportable or who found a better way. Her revolutionary leader Odo is described as "one who walked away from Omelas".

Agreed. But again this has no bearing on whether this is a good thing. And utilitarianism says that it is. I cannot agree

What do you mean? Utilitarianism says what is a good thing?

I agree and that is why I mentioned that the story does not deal with resistance. But this follows from a different moral intuition. Utilitarian has no problem here, so there is no reason to walk away in the first place. Sorry, Robin, but for me your response here demonstrates that you are not in fact a Utilitarian.

Well I am not, as I have stated before. Nevertheless this seems more to demonstrate that you have not understood Utilitarianism:

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

This is circular. He keeps it secret yes. I think he does so because he knows it is morally wrong.

As Herzblut defined it, he kept it a secret as part of a strategy to maximise happiness.

The harm is not demonstrable through a utilitarian approach

Of course it is. I have shown how easily it can be demonstrated right from the start. You would only have to ask, what would the patient feel if she found out? What would her family feel? What would his co-workers and employers feel?

I am afraid it is not clear to me at all.

Are you serious?

You cannot see (even if you think hard on it) how tolerating sexual abuse could ever be considered incompatible with promoting happiness?

As I said, I find that part of your position deeply, unfathomably puzzling, and I wish that you would even attempt to explain it.

It is because the harm is not demonstrable in utilitarian terms. It is morally wrong, we are agreed: but it is not obviously morally wrong because of the harm and this is shown by the fact that to demonstrate the harm you have to cast the net very wide and cast it after the case is presented, not before.

You have lost me there - how do I cast the net wider than it already is? I am saying nothing novel or controversial about the effects of sexual predation.

I am saying nothing about Utilitarianism that would be of any surprise to J.S. Mill.

 

[Piscivore]

I began to wonder if two deontologists (a term I just learned from this thread, thanks) after having sex would not care in the least whether it was good for either of them, so long as they had done their duty?

Wait... is "deontologist" a new word for "British"?

 

[Roboramma]

So an action, a failed attempt, is bad although it does not produce any harm. Such action is even bad if it factually produces happiness, you say.

Hold on, what about utilitarianism makes you think that punishment is based on vengence?
An action need not be "bad" in order to be punished. The punishment need only serve utilitarian ends.

For instance, there are times when I can run a red light, knowing full well that the streets are empty and I'm not putting anyone at risk. Yet, punishing me at that time makes sense from a utilitarian stand-point - I may not have done anything wrong, but distinguishing that case from other red-light-running cases that do put people at risk may not be possible. In order to avert the harm caused by people running red-lights we institute a law (and punishments) against it, and all offenders are, of practical necessity, punished when caught.

 

[articulett]

I was having some lunch with a coginitive-behavioural therapist last week, and our conversation turned towards the problems of evaluating therapeutic success when one of the only tools to do so is self-reporting. After a period of treatment, a client may claim that they don't feel any better. With follow-up questions, however, they may also report significant alterations in their behaviour, eg, they're able to be out in public in a large crowd without feeling great anxiety and an intense urge to flee, whereas this would have been impossible a couple of months ago. This led the therapist to tell me one of those whacky CBT jokes:

Two cognitive-behaviouralists lie together in bed, bodies slick in the post-coital glow. One turns to the other and says, "It was good for you, was it good for me?"

I mainly butted into this conversation for the opportunity to tell that joke, but in typing it out, I began to wonder if two deontologists (a term I just learned from this thread, thanks) after having sex would not care in the least whether it was good for either of them, so long as they had done their duty?

Good Joke...

The thing that bothers me about some arguers on this thread is they don't seem to be aware of the fact that humans have evolved to get happiness from making others happy... seeing happiness in others... most of us feel, to some degree, the feelings of the people we are observing and we hurt when we feel we are a cause of their pain... even if that pain is for their own good (giving an infant vaccinations, for example.) Humans have evolved to feel good when they make others laugh... it enhances their own happiness... and to feel bad about themselves when they treat others in a way they would not want to be treated. Religions, laws, governments, culture, etc. codify and enforce this viewpoint.

But to me, they are so often divisive... they focus these feelings on a specific group, but often encourage members to see others as "outside" the group... evil... "other"-- which allows members and tribes not to worry about the harm they cause others... the harm they cause others is seen as a way of protecting and boosting the happiness of the chosen group.

Of course it is all a derail... the utilitarianism argument, to me, is a straw man, to once again make skeptics, scientists, and rationalists seem immoral or unfeeling while insinuating that more poetic, semantically confused, or religious types have greater morality or more exalted feelings. It isn't true. The derails are an attempt to avoid producing evidence for the stereotype as far as I can tell. Straw men all.

I was with nearly 1000 skeptics this weekend at TAM, and I don't think you could find a more exalted and moral group as defined by any measurement you would wish to employ. The strereotype is a means for people to feel better about themselves and their viewpoints in my opinion... to feel more moral or exalted. It is too bad, because they are using semantics to make themselves feel superior ... to feel above those whom they would be lucky to be more like... in my opinion. They use their imaginations of "bad stuff" in those "others" to feel better about whatever group they align themselves with or their own preferred opinions and viewpoints (as unintelligible as they might be). They imagine themselves as making sense and being diplomatic... but they never check to see if these opinions of themselves are shared by anyone else. They assume they are true.

Thanks for bringing levity, but also for summing up the problem with the quote in the OP in many ways. The statement itself is an "opinion" with multiple interpretations. And many people have a hard time separating opinions from facts, much less thinking of a means by which they might measure their claims. One of the things I have really enjoyed about Randi and skepticism is the brilliant ways people come up with to test and measure claims. Of course, as Randi notes, many people cannot make a coherent claim. A lot of claims are just semantically implied or platitudes tossed off as truths.

I was curious as to whether any illusion was better than any opposing truth... and if so... in what way and to whom via which measurement. The OP states that tons of them are... and yet no one has come up with one. Why is this phrase "meaninful" to people. What are they "hearing" in that poetic platitude? They seem to be extrapolating some support of some viewpoint without realizing that they are not saying anything coherent to anyone else. Instead they change the meaning of words to amplify the truth of their self-important opinion in their own head. It doesn't seem to matter to them that others are not following them. When you try to pin them down, they toss off straw men and move the goal posts. It is the woo technique from people who seem to imagine themselves as woo-free.

Your little joke and short commentary seems much more related to the OP than their words do to me.

I want to add... that I am following Robin's posts and admire him/her for the coherency, clarity, and wisdom. I learn a lot from this forum... but usually not from the people who are so sure they have something to teach me. You are coherent Robin... I don't think anyone is following those whom you are hearing and assuming things from your words that are not there. I am also following rocketdodger and roboramma for the most part. (Does having the first initials "Ro" in a screen name indicate added rationality, I wonder?)

 

[Fiona]

What do you mean? Utilitarianism says what is a good thing?

Omelas

Well I am not, as I have stated before.

Thank you. I was confused as to whether people were claiming it or it was being attributed. I probably missed something important. It is a long thread....

Nevertheless this seems more to demonstrate that you have not understood Utilitarianism:

That is probable. I am trying to think about what is being said here, rather than basing on outside knowledge, for the simple reason I do not have it. But you have said that

Originally Posted by J.S. Mill
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

Now if he really means ALL concerned then I have trouble reconciling this with your earlier statements

But the problem is that we cannot walk away from Omelas, nor can we guarantee that no child will, as a consequence of our society, live in suffering.

and

Finally it is no good walking away from Omelas unless you can walk to some circumstance that would help the child.

That is the messy circumstance we find ourselves in - Omelas everywhere.

This seems to me to demonstrate the force of the formulation "the greatest good of the greatest number" and it is closer to what I understood the position to be. I do not think this is a trivial point. If he really means that we must promote the happiness of ALL concerned then Omelas cannot exist. As you rightly point out this can be disproved by a simple reference to the real world, where Omelas is everywhere.

As Herzblut defined it, he kept it a secret as part of a strategy to maximise happiness.

Well I am not Herzblut But you have not explained why your argument in this part is not circular, as it seems to me to be.

Of course it is. I have shown how easily it can be demonstrated right from the start. You would only have to ask, what would the patient feel if she found out? What would her family feel? What would his co-workers and employers feel?

Are you serious?

Well in a subjective system I do not think we can know the answer to this, before we ask the question, and that is one of the problems. A moral system needs to determine what we "ought" to do. It is certainly true that we can guess how these people might feel based on prior experience of how most of us react in some situations. But in that case why do we need subjectivity rather than a normative system?

On the other hand, if you are truly saying we must ask the question (which is implicit in a subjective system), then you cannot assume the answer: and so utilitarianism cannot demonstrate the harm on the basis of the system itself

My second problem is the use of the word harm. Let us think about those you mention. Might they be angry? Is anger then harm? Might they be sad? And therefore harm includes sadness? Might they feel vengeful or frightened or indignant or murderous? Are all of these to fall within the definition of harm? Might they be bewildered or feel betrayed? Might they be remorseful that they did not take active steps to prevent it? Might the woman be joyful that the nurse loves her and they will then get married and live happily ever after? If harm is to include all of these possiblities I do not really see it retains any meaning.

And yes, I am quite serious, I assure you

 

[Robin]

Thank you. I was confused as to whether people were claiming it or it was being attributed. I probably missed something important. It is a long thread....

But I would say that I am a fellow traveller. Maximising happiness seems to me a very worthwhile aim.

I was concerned here that the position was not being stated properly.

Now if he really means ALL concerned then I have trouble reconciling this with your earlier statements

There is no contradiction. We should wish happiness to all and work toward that end, even though that work cannot be finished.

Just as you would recognise that we will probably never wipe out poverty and hunger, but we should never stop trying to. We would not reach some point and say "well, that is it, the structural level of poverty, let's start using our money elsewhere".

The difference is with Omelas is that their well-being depends upon the suffering of the child.

Well in a subjective system I do not think we can know the answer to this, before we ask the question, and that is one of the problems. A moral system needs to determine what we "ought" to do. It is certainly true that we can guess how these people might feel based on prior experience of how most of us react in some situations. But in that case why do we need subjectivity rather than a normative system?

On the other hand, if you are truly saying we must ask the question (which is implicit in a subjective system), then you cannot assume the answer: and so utilitarianism cannot demonstrate the harm on the basis of the system itself

The fact that we can never assume is precisely why we need the subjectivity. We cannot know what utility is for another person. We must let them decide, unless of course they are unconcious, in which case we are perfectly capable of making an estimated guess on the basis of what their friends and familes would say.

My second problem is the use of the word harm. Let us think about those you mention. Might they be angry? Is anger then harm? Might they be sad? And therefore harm includes sadness? Might they feel vengeful or frightened or indignant or murderous? Are all of these to fall within the definition of harm?

No, like bruises and blood they are to fall within the definition of the outward signs of harm.

Might they be bewildered or feel betrayed? Might they be remorseful that they did not take active steps to prevent it?

Might the woman take her own life? Might the horror haunt her family and poison any future hope of being happy? Might an otherwise respectable nursing home be closed down and it's director unable to work in his profession again? Might every family feel uneasy about their own instituionalised family members?

Might the woman be joyful that the nurse loves her and they will then get married and live happily ever after?

An unlikely scenario, but one which would equally pose a problem for every system of ethics.

If harm is to include all of these possiblities I do not really see it retains any meaning.

I don't see any problem with the idea of acts that raise tears, anger, depression, murderous rage and so on being classified as harm, that is well within the meaning.

You seem to want to have a definition of harm that only includes things which draw blood or raise weals.

I was once mugged and kicked almost to unconsciousness - I kept the bruises for months, and yet I consider them gentle and solicitous compared to even the mildest of child abusers.

 

[articulett]

The comatose rape scenario has happened...

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE5D6133EF931A15751C0A961958260

Many felt it was wrong to force her to carry the baby of her rapist (which died shortly after it was born)... her family was Catholic... they were against aborting the fetus. It seems to me that religion gets in the way of ethics and morals and humanity more than it provides it.

I think the utilitarian view is supported more by those who felt that the comatose woman should not be forced to carry the infant of her rapist. I think the "religious illusion" generated choice of her parents caused more suffering for all the people involved. I think the rapist was only thinking or caring about his own instincts and feelings-- and not much beyond that.

 

[Sceptic Realist]

It seems to me that religion gets in the way of ethics and morals and humanity more than it provides it.

No, some people who are religious get in the way.

 

[Fiona]

I am still not getting it, Robin. Omelas shows what is wrong with Utilitarianism in principle. If you accept that we can never get rid of all suffering, then working towards the maximising of happiness results in just such an outcome. In a utilitarian conception Omelas is a good and moral place. The author uses Omelas to explore the consequences which follow from that moral system. The fact that some walk away demonstrates that it is quite possible to be dissatisfied with that: but it does not alter the fact that Utilitarianism would see it as a good society.

Again you say that we need subjectivity. You agree we cannot assume the answer to the question. Where the person cannot respond, as in the unconscious patient, then you must ask her family and friends. So if they answer that they do not see any harm in the abuse that settles the matter? Not for me, I am afraid. I think it would still be wrong. It seems to me that you agree, yet I cannot see how utilitarianism gets you to that conclusion.

The comatose patient who wakes up happy and marries the abuser is the essence of the "sleeping beauty" story. It is a very common theme. We teach it to children, (albeit in bowdlerised form: you may wish to make that an important distinction, but I cannot really see any essential difference if we assume the prince does not stop at a kiss). Or consider the Stockholm syndrome. It is not so unlikely - it happens. Does the fact that the captive reports themselves happy after conversion make the kidnapping right? It seems to me on your argument that it does. So we cannot know, on the basis of utilitarianism, whether any given instance is right or wrong until we see the outcome. That is the essence of subjectivity and I do not think it leads to a moral conclusion. You may argue that the harm done to family and friends and the wider society outweighs the happiness of the kidnappers and their victim but I cannot see how one can measure and count those things in any "subjective" way: what is wrong with it seems to me to be based on some other intuition than arithmetic.

And I do not agree that the "sleeping beauty" outcome is a problem for all ethical systems. Even in that case the nurse's actions would still be wrong within the Kantian model. Please understand I am not arguing that system solves all dilemmas: I am only exploring the limits of subjectivity and I cannot get around the fact that the nurse's actions seem to me to be wrong even if every other person in the scenario does not agree that they are. I am trying to look at what is intrinsic to the model: and it is necessary to divorce that from what you think is "likely", since this is about what "ought" to be and it is predicated on the notion that the matter is settled by counting heads.

 

[blauregen]

An unavoidable part of respect is honesty. Holding an opinion that somebody is in a state of delusion and hiding that opinion from is not respect. It is at best patronising them. At worst it is humouring them.

It may be that the author is operating from a different definition of 'respect' than you. I can imagine an expression of respect that I would call 'warrior-respect' ( I am not saying it is your position). There you would essentially express respect by asserting that a person is strong enough to take anything you would hurl at them, and that you would not insult them by holding back and implying weakness. With this understanding of respect you could easily give honesty and frankness primacy.

Another possible expression of respect, and one I assume to be more prevalent, would be to assert that the person has certain limits that you wont cross without good reasons. For example you would not come into intimate standing distance, without expressed consent, or you would not give unsolicited value judgement of religious beliefs.

An example of this sentiment is given on page 2 of the article: 'As one said, "Atheism is like telling somebody, 'The very thing you hinge your life on, I totally dismiss.'" This is the type of statement she would never want to make.'

Of course. This practically means that you mostly stay non-commital and that you expect the same courtesy regarding your beliefs from the other party. Affirming that you share their beliefs would indeed be lying to them, and asserting the superiority of your belief by calling theirs ridiculous would be condescending.

However the "teensy-weensy problem" I was alluding to was that if he really and honestly wants to keep a secret his opinion that their beliefs are ridiculous then he has made a bad start.

Announcing something on a widely-read internet site does not strike me as a particularly effective method of keeping it secret.

Actually he was pretty unspecific about what he finds or finds not ridiculous. The actual phrasing was 'Even those of us who sympathize intellectually have good reasons to wish that the New Atheists continue to seem absurd. If we reject their polemics, if we continue to have respectful conversations even about things we find ridiculous...'

The best you can conclude from this is that he sees himself as a member of a group who symphatizes intellectually with the 'new atheists'. It doesn't follow that he completely agrees with their stated beliefs, and even then this would be a field of beliefs ranging from deism to the daily worship of Daffy Duck, which he could partially find ridiculous.

Your conversations with your brother probably have a different social dynamic compared to conversations with mere acquaintances. There the mutual respect is likely asserted by other means.

What I do, what Dennett and Dawkins do, what Collins, McGrath and Plantinga do is to engage in open, honest debate.

There is nothing to say against this if it happens in the course of a discussion on this topic or a setting that is prone to philosophical discussions. If the offer to debate is in a neutral setting and unsolicited, I would see it similar to a religious group ( for example jehova's witnesses ) approaching someone to talk about their beliefs.

 

[rocketdodger]

I am still not getting it, Robin. Omelas shows what is wrong with Utilitarianism in principle. If you accept that we can never get rid of all suffering, then working towards the maximising of happiness results in just such an outcome. In a utilitarian conception Omelas is a good and moral place. The author uses Omelas to explore the consequences which follow from that moral system. The fact that some walk away demonstrates that it is quite possible to be dissatisfied with that: but it does not alter the fact that Utilitarianism would see it as a good society.

Unless the metric they use to decide utility places a very high negative weight on the suffering of innocent children -- in which case, the system would likely judge Omelas to be a very bad and evil place.

So no, utilitarianism would not necessarily see it as a good society. You can't make a claim like that without providing a definition of utility to go along with it.

 

[Fiona]

I do not think you can do it that way. Rocketdodger. You have specifically stated that the measure of harm is self report.And Robin has said that harm and happiness are intertwined so that there is no reason to adopt two scales. So what we have here is one very miserable child who will report he is being harmed: and a lot of very happy other people who will report they are happy. Since the formulations is "the greatest good of the greatest number" this seems to settle the matter. Perhaps you have a better formulation?

You introduce the notion of weighting. But again I cannot see how you can do this if you retain the concept of subjectivity. What system can you outline which will allow this kind of weighting and which is also subjective? I can see it in a normative model but both you and Robin insist on subjective measures. So how are we to tell if my suffering outweighs your happiness? I am not really convinced that a scale of 1-10 is going to get us very far. It might work in the extreme case of Omelas but it won't work in anything more subtle. Or at least I cannot see how it will. If you have an idea which is not normative and not universalisable then I will be glad to see it

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Guys, come on. The harm principle is only one means of defining the good. We clearly use at least one other measure, and that is "fairness" or "justice". The Omelas example -- like all scape-goating examples -- shows the missing part of the harm principle/utilitarianism (it's Achilles' heel). It simply doesn't account for issues of fairness. The same can be said of deontology -- it accounts for the fairness/justice/duty principle but does not deal with issues of harm very well. Our brains seem to be structured to think in terms of both.

I would even suggest that is how our brains think about ethics logically when we are confronted with moral issues at a conscious level but is not how we live ethically. I think we live ethical lives based on neither of those principles, but probably something more like virtue ethics acting at a subconscious level.

 

[iamivy]

I used to know nothing about anything, and I thought everything was magic.
I was not skeptical of anything.

When I learned to draw and paint, art was no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned geology, oceans and mountains were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned astronomy, the sun and the moon and the stars were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contary.

When I learned chemistry, materials were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned mechanics, machines were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned electricity, electronics were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned programming, computers were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned biology, living organisms were no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned artificial intelligence and cognitive science, consciousness was no longer the work of gods.
I learned to be skeptical of claims to the contrary.

When I learned to be skeptical of everything, I was no longer the work of gods.
Now that I know what I am, I am free to become anything I want.

Ah, but it's only when you unlearn you'd go beyond emotional boundaries and mental concepts that enclose the sense of who you think you are to be free to become anything you want.

 

[rocketdodger]

I do not think you can do it that way. Rocketdodger. You have specifically stated that the measure of harm is self report.And Robin has said that harm and happiness are intertwined so that there is no reason to adopt two scales. So what we have here is one very miserable child who will report he is being harmed: and a lot of very happy other people who will report they are happy. Since the formulations is "the greatest good of the greatest number" this seems to settle the matter. Perhaps you have a better formulation?

Would you still be happy if you knew most of your happiness was predicated on the suffering of an innocent child?

So how are we to tell if my suffering outweighs your happiness?

There is no objective way -- that is the essence of suffering and happiness. The best any human individual can do is communicate with others and try to reach an agreement or compromise.

The difference between the subjective systems and the objective ones is that the subjective systems admit this shortcoming and try to deal with it. The objective ones simply pretend to be ... well ... objective ... when in fact they are nothing more than a subjective system that someone thinks should be writ in stone.

 

[Fiona]

Would you still be happy if you knew most of your happiness was predicated on the suffering of an innocent child?

I am tempted to say that of course I am, as a matter of plain fact. As is everyone in the Western world. A lot of our happiness actually does depend on the suffering of poor people at home and abroad. We all know that this is Omelas. The power of the story arises from the personalisation of what is commonly disguised by impersonal language.

But you may see that as a rather callous observation and it may be that you personally make sure that none of the goods you enjoy are predicated on a child's suffering. You may never use the services of people who are paid below a minimum wage and who are made wretched or ill by the effort to feed their families. If so you are rare, and I commend you.

The real objection to what you say is that it smuggles in a concept which is not intrinsic to the system, I think. Let us say that the answer of the majority is yes, as it very well might be: and as it is in Omelas. In that case the city has achieved the greatest good of the greatest number using your own definition of utility. In a subjective system that settles the matter. That is what is wrong with it and is the point I have made from the start. You have not answered it. Do you think there is anything wrong with Omelas, and if you do what is that wrong within the subjective moral system you are proposing?

There is no objective way -- that is the essence of suffering and happiness.

Then why did you bring in the concept of a metric which could include weighting? Surely you contradict yourself?

The best any human individual can do is communicate with others and try to reach an agreement or compromise.

An admirable goal. Unfortunately there are real differences between people. There are people who genuinely find their happiness in serial killing or in rape. To pretend otherwise is to deny the diversity in the real world, I think. For you, the fact that someone really does want those things and is made happy by them gives that person's desires moral weight. For me a preference for murder is not the same kind of thing as preference for dark chocolate, however. I find it really hard to believe you do not agree, but you say you do not and I must accept this.

You can state that the amount of happiness such actions produce is outweighed by the amount of unhappiness it causes in others. And it is perfectly possible to argue that having done the head count a society might decide not to tolerate such behaviour and so sanction it, as Robin has said. It is also perfectly possible to envisage a society in which a great majority of people decide that autonomy is trumps and that serial killers are entitled to their point of view: and in which that majority derive their happiness from their conception of themselves as highly tolerant. They might elevate freedom above security, as I have often seen argued on this board. In that case the serial killer would be free to kill and everybody would agree that utility was served. I still do not think the serial killer is a moral man and I do not think his friends and neighbours are either. But it follows from your position that you do think so. I cannot imagine you and I are going to find "agreement and compromise" about this however .

The difference between the subjective systems and the objective ones is that the subjective systems admit this shortcoming and try to deal with it. The objective ones simply pretend to be ... well ... objective ... when in fact they are nothing more than a subjective system that someone thinks should be writ in stone.

I think this is not true really. I think that morality is a lot more complicated than this. I do not think a subjective idea of morality is sensible because I do not think it describes how people behave: nor how they "should" behave. I do not think there is an objective morality which is set in stone either: in all systems I can think of circumstances alter cases and the facts matter. So to characterise an objective system as set in stone is unfair.