> Linda:
> It may be useful to include details of this information in any subsequent
> articles you write,
> rather than providing this information in bits and pieces after much
> discussion.
>
> Suitbert:
> Sure
>
> Linda:
> I think that you can conclude that when asked to deliberately cheat, and
> when told in advance that they will not suffer consequences from their
> cheating, that they will cheat in ways that may or may not look different
> from less deliberate cheating. Your description does not sound like you
> were blind as to where to look for fraud (something which would be a
> necessary pre-condition in order to draw valid conclusions).
>
> Suitbert:
> I asked these students later to describe in detail how they tried to
> deceive
> me.
How is that relevant to what I said? The issues I raised were, how would
you know that less deliberate deception would look the same as deliberate
cheating, and how would you know that you would discover cheating if you
didn't know in advance which students' data might show signs of cheating?
> Linda:
> Can you provide references for the research, or show me the results of
> your
> own research which shows the extent to which words or small numbers cannot
> be read by the average participant (necessary information before valid
> conclusions can be drawn)?
>
> Suitbert:
> Of all this I will give an account in a future monograph
>
> Linda:
> I hope that you are aware that blind-folds,
> unless applied in a specific manner, do not prevent people from seeing
> (especially at the angle which would be used for the ball-drawing). Did
> you
>
> tightly tape the bottom of the blindfolds around the nose and cheeks?
>
> Suitbert:
> No I did not. So individuals with cheating intentions and pertinent
> training
> might have deceived me. But the question is not whether some individual
> might have cheated me successfully without being detected. The question is
> whether the majority or a considerable minority of participants were
> skilled
> deceivers so that they could raise hit scores of the total sample above
> chance, even despite wearing blindfolds. Don't you think this question
> would
> be answered by the great majority of rational people: Certainly not,
> skilled
> deceivers in such test situations, if existent at all, would be rare
> exceptions.
As I pointed out, you only needed 3 people to be deceivers under
uncontrolled conditions, and none of them needed to be skilled deceivers
since you didn't test any of them (if I interpret your statements correctly)
for deception under controlled conditions. Your data under controlled
conditions showed far fewer hit surpluses and again seemed to come mainly
from a few people who logged the bulk of those hit surpluses. The question
*is* whether or not a few individuals might have cheated you successfully,
because that's all it would take to account for your hit surpluses.
> Linda:
> I attempted the following analysis from the results you have provided. It
> is possible that I misunderstood the information presented in the tables,
> since it was not designed for this type of analysis, so I apologize in
> advance if I am missing some key information.
>
> It seems that the hit surplus (in the uncontrolled setting) is mostly
> accounted for by a small number of people. Using your data from table 1
> (
http://www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/home/ertel/ertel-dir/downloads/ertelchap
> terwithfigurespdf.pdf)
> only 3 people are responsible for almost all of the hit surplus (79% of
> the
> hit surplus). Of those 3, 2 were retested and one was not. .....
>
> Suitbert:
> All 25 participants listed in Table 1 had significant hit surpluses
> individually, 12 hits per run was expected by chance, number 25 of this
> rank
> order of participants (Michael L.) obtained 16 hits on average across four
> runs which is still very significant. So I think your question is no
> longer
> relevant.
But you had 1294 hit surpluses and Michael L. only contributed 16 hits to
that surplus, whereas Barbara F. contributed 423 hits to that surplus. It
doesn't matter whether or not Michael L., or the other 21 people on that
list who contributed only a handful of hits to that surplus, cheated,
because it wouldn't have led to a significant amount of excess hits. It
only really matters if the 3 top contributors cheated, because if you take
away their hit surpluses, you are left with results that aren't particularly
remarkable.
> Linda:
> You don't provide the same sort of details for the results under
> controlled
> conditions, however you do give the details of three people
> (
http://www.parapsych.org/papers/38.pdf). And we can see that 2 of the
> people (Amelie J. and Silk T.) account for almost half (47%) of the hit
> surplus under controlled conditions for one set of experiments. And one
> person (Ahmed K.) accounts for 38% of the hit surplus under controlled
> conditions for the other set of experiments. Again, it looks like the
> bulk
> of your hit surplus is accounted for by a few people, so tests designed to
> look for cheating cannot show a difference if applied to anyone other than
> those few people.
>
> Suitbert:
> The tests designed to look for deliberate secret cheating were conducted
> with participants who obtained hit scores on chance levels under ordinary
> home test conditions.
That statement doesn't make any sense. Is there a typo in there? You
aren't worried about cheating in those people who are performing at chance
levels, so of course tests looking for cheating will be negative. Also you
stated earlier that it was high-scorers that you tested with some measures
you guessed would reduce the number of hits if they were cheating.
> Linda:
> Is that the same
> Silke that was unable to perform above chance under the strictly
> controlled
> conditions for the GWUP prize?
>
> Suitbert:
> No, this is a different Silke.
>
> Linda:
> You agree that this is important information if you went to the trouble to
> look for these sorts of things. Therefore, I don't understand why you are
> chastizing me for wasting your time by asking for this same information.
> And I am sorry that I remain unconvinced until I have been provided with
> this information, but would you really be any different? If someone made
> a
> claim that had not been validated independently, would you not also ask
> for
> details and for the answers to critical questions before allowing yourself
> to be persuaded?
>
> Suitbert:
> Please read carefully what I wrote:
> "I am prepared to ask further questions, but I think the time needed for
> refuting unnecessary and
> unsubstantiated claims by true skeptical believers should be diminished."
> What I disapprove of is making unsubstantiated claims without asking
> questions. Unsubstantiated claims are claims like
> " you can't even form a definition of a good miss a priori"
What I said was, "At best, it can form the basis for exploratory research,
but not if you can't even form a definition of a good miss a priori. How are
you supposed to know, in advance, for each number, whether a good miss means the number on each side or the two numbers below or the two numbers above?"
How is that an unsubstantiated claim? Do you not agree that testing
hypotheses depends upon being able to form the hypothesis a priori?
> " The practical problem with your idea is that it has been demonstrated to
> be wrong."
And then I proceeded to give you examples where the idea had been
demonstrated to be wrong. You didn't address my claim. Specifically, you
did not discuss my claim, nor did you discuss whether or not my explanations
and examples substantiated my claim.
> " .. the reason for the increased hit rate is chance and mundane sensory
> input, such as was demonstrated by the Indian boy ..."
What I said was, "If the reason for the increased hit rate is chance and
mundane sensory input, such as was demonstrated by the Indian boy..."
How can you say this is unsubstantiated when you also agreed that it looked
like Kannan could peek into the bag?
> Linda:
> I understand what you mean by a "good miss", but what you have done is
> sometimes counted when the ball was a little too near as a "good miss" and
> the ball was a little too far as an "other miss" and sometimes when the
> ball
>
> was a little too far as a "good miss" and the ball was little too near as
> an
>
> "other miss", and it is this uneven counting that accounts for the
> "significant difference".
>
> Suitbert:
> You apparently misunderstood what I wrote, admittedly I wrote it in a way
> that may be misunderstood without further thought. I wanted to give
> examples
> for "almost hits" in everyday life: one might miss a goal by throwing,
> say,
> a dart, a little too far, a little too near etc. I could have added "a
> little too left, a little too right" etc.
>
> In the ball test situation, " if drawn numbers are "a little too large or
> a
> little too small" they are "almost hits" or "good misses". So for numbers
> 2,
> 3 and 4 this stricter definition applies straightforwardly.
>
> In order to include misses for numbers 1 and 5 in a similar way, I made
> the
> distinction between two "hit-near" misses and two "hit-distant" misses.
> If
> 1 is called then drawn numbers 2 and 3 are nearer to 1 than drawn numbers
> 4
> and 5. If 5 is called, then drawn numbers 4 and 3 are nearer to 5 than
> drawn
> numbers 2 and 1. If a good miss is defined by "the two hit-nearer numbers"
> then neighboring numbers for called 2, 3, and 4 are classified as "good
> misses" as before and "the two "nearer misses" for called 1 and 5 are
> included.
>
> I decided to extend the definition because I did not want to exclude 1 and
> 5
> as calls being afraid that skeptics would take issue with excluding 1 and
> 5,
> and I felt justified to do that because including 1 and 5 did not increase
> the "good misses" effect. So critics could not suspect that I made this
> decision because I wanted to take advantage of a result that I discovered
> post hoc.
I understand why you picked that particular pattern, but what you have not
discussed is whether or not that particular pattern adequately represents
the underlying idea. What you are saying is that #3 is a "good miss" for #1
and for #5, but #1 and #5 are not "good misses" for #3. Regardless of
whether or not your idea about misses is correct, it doesn't look like you
have accurately represented your idea by your choices.
Also, what happens if you apply your idea about secondary patterns to other
data? If near misses are more likely, and drawing #3 counts as a near miss
on every draw, shouldn't #3 be drawn the most often on the data you provided
earlier where you asked the participants to draw the balls out in the
following order - 1234512345...? What about the "preference paradox" you
mention whereby you have higher hit proportions with less preferred calls?
The "good miss" data contradicts this secondary pattern. How do you account
for that?
I can find secondary patterns in medical studies as well. One of the more
famous examples is the pattern found in the ISIS-2 trial that while aspirin
improved outcomes in acute heart attacks for most, Geminis and Libras did
worse. The point is not whether you *can* find secondary patterns, the
point is whether or not one can draw valid and reliable conclusions when one
is found.
> Since the "good misses" effect has been replicated by two undergraduate
> students of Professor Chris French (see my earlier message of today), I
> regard this phenomenon as one of the most compelling indications that psi
> processes exist.
I wasn't able to open the file that you sent (my computer is limited in its
capabilities). Can you describe the experiment?
> Objections to my ball test procedure referring to lack of
> precautions, thus to not excluding increased hit probabilities by sensory
> and fraudulent support do not apply at all in this case.
>
>
> Linda:
> My complaint is that there are many possible definitions for a good miss.
> And that not only do you not tell us how to choose between these various
> possibilities *a priori*, your choice isn't even consistent from one
> number
> to the next. How can I tell what is a "good miss" if it can be changed at
> will? Because if I change it, then your idea of "good misses" as a
> secondary effect disappears when it is discovered that a different
> combination of "good misses" does not lead to a statistically significant
> difference (and subsequently, one of your arguments against other
> explanations of the effects - forged data - disappears).
>
> Suitbert:
> How could you believe that I was so inconsistent and stupid. Couldn't you
> rather think that you needed some more information, or reread what I wrote
> on Monday?
My statements are based on what you wrote. As I mentioned above, how is it
consistent to propose that #3 is a "good miss" for #1, but #1 is an "other
miss" for #3? I don't think you did this because you were stupid, but
because it was convenient when your statistical analysis demands the equal
formation of groups. You even admit to me above that your choices were at
least partly based on convenience, rather than adherence to theory.
> Linda:
> Are you serious? Why couldn't Kannan have a dozen tricks at his disposal?
> Why would he palm balls when peeking would do the trick? I've watched
> magicians very carefully up close and not detected palming when it clearly
> had to have happened. How could I detect palming from that video even if
> it
> were present?
>
> Suitbert:
> This reminds me of Lenin's and other authoritarian leaders principle
> "Trust
> is good, control is better" and of their rigorous means of enforcing the
> deemed truth of their ideology. Apparently, you do not only distrust
> Kannan,
> you even do not trust me and my ability and inclination to gather all
> relevant information. Should I give you now a detailed account of my
> experience with Kannan, his enthusiastic wish to have my company, of wish
> to
> show me the temples, of his pious Brahmin family, of the sincerity of his
> father and grandfather who prayed PUJA every day in their home, and much
> more. All such background information about people plays a role for
> developing trust in them - or distrust, it depends, but in this case there
> was no experience leading to distrust. But you, Linda, ignorant of all
> this,
> you apparently blame me for not considering that Kannan might have known a
> number of tricks as practiced by magicians. Are YOU serious, I might ask
> you. Will you not rather try to maintain a little more trust in me as
> scientist? Haven't I provided sufficient background information relevant
> for assessing trustworthiness.
I'm sorry, but your description makes your evaluation even less reliable.
Personal involvement with a participant will influence your judgement. As a
physician, I have to recognize that my personal involvement with a patient
is grounds for severing the patient-physician relationship, because I can no
longer be trusted to provide them with impartial and adequate care.
Physicians have been reprimanded and have lost their license (depending upon
the actual circumstances) for attempting to maintain a professional
relationship in addition to the type of personal relationship you describe.
In particular, you have provided Kannan with what may be an overwhelming
incentive to fudge. Even if it isn't true (and can you guarantee that it
isn't?), the fulfillment of Kannan's enthusiastic wish to have your company,
to show you the temples and his family, depends upon his ability to hold
your attention with his performance. How can that not influence the extent
to which he ensures that his performance is remarkable?
I'm sorry that these things have to be taken into consideration. It would
be nice to think that we can be trusted to act as impartial judges and not
to be fooled by our desires and beliefs, but we already know that it is
foolish to make this assumption.
Linda
