Automatons

[rocketdodger]

And while I know that Mercutio doesn't believe that experience is something other than behaviour, I still insist that they are two different things.

Yet you and others, over the (hundreds of years) course of the entire history of this issue, have been completely unable to give non-contradictory arguments to back up that assertion.

After hundreds of years spinning on this, we have heard nothing other than the exact same fallacious reasoning that we did when the whole debate started -- "It can't be that simple, because ... it just can't."

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't regard this as behaviour. Nobody is doing anything. There is nothing to be observed. There is only observation.

So you are now claiming that "behavior" is limited to conscious entities?

From http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/behavior (bold mine)

1 a: the manner of conducting oneself b: anything that an organism does involving action and response to stimulation c: the response of an individual, group, or species to its environment
2: the way in which someone behaves; also : an instance of such behavior
3: the way in which something functions or operates

The critical point is not whether we describe this as behaviour or not, but in the recognition that the passive experiencing of something is qualitatively different from doing something, and remains unexplained.

No. It remains unexplained to you.

To others, like myself and the rest of us HPC opponents, the solution is quite clear -- the passive experiencing of something is simply the result of BEING what is DOING the doing.

We have massive amounts of data -- both empirical evidence and mathematical proof -- to back us up. You guys have ... a gut feeling?

 

[westprog]

Yet you and others, over the (hundreds of years) course of the entire history of this issue, have been completely unable to give non-contradictory arguments to back up that assertion.

After hundreds of years spinning on this, we have heard nothing other than the exact same fallacious reasoning that we did when the whole debate started -- "It can't be that simple, because ... it just can't."

My problem with the behavioural explanation - and the emergent property idea - is that it does explain to me anything about what it feels like to be me. It doesn't address subjective experience, per se, at all. At least that's an improvement on the conscious thermostats, which make up a new physics with no experimental grounding whatsoever, but it remains an explanation which explains away, rather than explaining.

I don't think the failure to solve a hard problem means that we have to take the first easy solution that comes along.

 

[westprog]

You guys have ... a gut feeling?

Yes. And for all that mass of data and theory, you have no idea what a gut feeling is, how it arises, how to produce one - indeed, anything about it except that it seems to happen in human beings.

 

[westprog]

One thing is pretty obvious thou: Without certain neuronal behaviours, there will definitely not be any seeing of the colour red.

That's undoubtedly true, but at the moment we're (IMO) at the stage of seeing the clouds gather, and knowing that lightning is on the way, but being entirely unable to know how the lightning comes out of the clouds, and particularly being unable to produce electrical sparks in the lab.

 

[westprog]

So you are now claiming that "behavior" is limited to conscious entities?

No, I'm arguing the exact opposite. Behaviour is observed in everything. The actual observation is not
behaviour.

 

[Nick227]

Actually we don’t have to go down that route at all – and besides, this is better left to people with familiarity with the subject anyway. We know however that without neurons firing, there’s not much happening, especially in terms of seeing or sensing. We also know that just any random firing by any neurons, will not suffice either. I.e. only certain behaviours by the neurons in our brains will make seeing red possible for us. Thus, only certain kinds of behaviours seem to lead to certain kinds of results. You could exchange the term behaviour with process if you like, although I think it’s perfectly valid to speak about behaviour – we’re doing the observation/assessment about what’s happening after all.

Well, I still find the word "behaviour" can cloud the issue here. I like "process" or "activity" more. Why add complicating factors when the subject matter stretches pretty much anyone anyway?

Regarding my earlier q....my point is that we don't know even if there is a place in the brain where things become conscious. It seems to me quite likely there is not, though I claim no vast knowledge here. For sure, without neurons colour is not happening, and one might claim that this is due to certain neurons, but without knowing which it's a bit weak really, I find. Especially when you start calling it "behaviour" as well.

"Without neuronal activity there's no colour" - that sounds good to me. "Without certain, as yet unspecified, neuronal activity there's no colour" - also cool.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Yet you and others, over the (hundreds of years) course of the entire history of this issue, have been completely unable to give non-contradictory arguments to back up that assertion.

After hundreds of years spinning on this, we have heard nothing other than the exact same fallacious reasoning that we did when the whole debate started -- "It can't be that simple, because ... it just can't."

Well, you can put as much emotional spin on it as you wish, as other behaviourists are frequently wont to do when their conclusions are challenged - see the recent long debacle of trying to get behaviourists into Blackmore's "teletransporter" on this forum.

However, just to point out, you have not yet answered the question....do you see colour? And, if so, how is this behaviour?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

So you are now claiming that "behavior" is limited to conscious entities?

From http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/behavior (bold mine)

1 a: the manner of conducting oneself b: anything that an organism does involving action and response to stimulation c: the response of an individual, group, or species to its environment
2: the way in which someone behaves; also : an instance of such behavior
3: the way in which something functions or operates

This was discussed in the recent "HPC" thread. IMO behaviour definitely requires human observation. "Behaviour" is an interpretation of the human mind. Of course one could argue that anything is an interpretation of the human mind, but still realistically there are levels in language that denote the difference between say "behaving" and "being." A cat is being a cat whether anyone observes it or not. A cat is only behaving when a human observes it and interprets its actions as "behaviour."

Nick

 

[Nick227]

No. It remains unexplained to you.

To others, like myself and the rest of us HPC opponents, the solution is quite clear -- the passive experiencing of something is simply the result of BEING what is DOING the doing.

We have massive amounts of data -- both empirical evidence and mathematical proof -- to back us up. You guys have ... a gut feeling?

...simply the result of BEING what is DOING the doing!?

Is this the Stoners Against the HPC thread now?

Please give me a little of this "massive amounts of data -- both empirical evidence and mathematical proof" for BEING what is DOING the doing.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Well, I still find the word "behaviour" can cloud the issue here. I like "process" or "activity" more. Why add complicating factors when the subject matter stretches pretty much anyone anyway?

Regarding my earlier q....my point is that we don't know even if there is a place in the brain where things become conscious. It seems to me quite likely there is not, though I claim no vast knowledge here. For sure, without neurons colour is not happening, and one might claim that this is due to certain neurons, but without knowing which it's a bit weak really, I find. Especially when you start calling it "behaviour" as well.

"Without neuronal activity there's no colour" - that sounds good to me. "Without certain, as yet unspecified, neuronal activity there's no colour" - also cool.

Nick

It’s only complicating if you see it as such. I think it is fine, for instance, to say that water molecules behave differently when referring to water being solid rather than liquid. How would you explain the difference using approximately the same explanatory abstraction level? Hence saying water as liquid feels wet is not sufficient here. We only run into trouble when we expect an explanation on a different abstraction level than what’s provided.

When we scientifically try to explain something like consciousness, it is rather meaningfully done from a third person perspective (it just seems to yield more precise results). Thus, when we try to distinguish the process of seeing red from that of seeing blue, we can start from a position where we observe that the whole system under scrutiny behaves slightly differently, depending on what colour is being perceived. From there we can start to pinpoint what the exact difference is… moving towards more precise explanations all the time – and consequently lessening the “behavioural stage” all the time. As of yet, everything we have stumbled upon seems to make behaviour a solid springboard for furthering knowledge about particular observable processes. It just seems to be a useful tool.

Perhaps when we have a solid understanding of a process, we can try to explain it in terms other than behaviour. But we’re not there yet, but rather we’re in the process of distinguishing certain processes from each other, so that we can have a more holistic understanding eventually. It seems we’re at the stage of “when I press this button, the system behaves this way, but when I press that button, it behaves that way…”

 

[rocketdodger]

but it remains an explanation which explains away, rather than explaining.

That is the whole point of the computational model of consciousness!

Your experience can't be explained to you because of the very nature of your experience. If experience is indeed an emergent property of physical processes (which all the evidence supports) then it is mathematically impossible for an entity to understand its own experience. Virtually all of GEB is dedicated to explaining this fact.

 

[Nick227]

It’s only complicating if you see it as such. I think it is fine, for instance, to say that water molecules behave differently when referring to water being solid rather than liquid. How would you explain the difference using approximately the same explanatory abstraction level? Hence saying water as liquid feels wet is not sufficient here. We only run into trouble when we expect an explanation on a different abstraction level than what’s provided.

When we scientifically try to explain something like consciousness, it is rather meaningfully done from a third person perspective (it just seems to yield more precise results). Thus, when we try to distinguish the process of seeing red from that of seeing blue, we can start from a position where we observe that the whole system under scrutiny behaves slightly differently, depending on what colour is being perceived.

This is true. Though what I was actually asking RD was whether he saw colour, and, later, if so did he consider this seeing "behaviour." It's a fair point what you say, thinking about it more. Neuronal behaviour does contribute to colour. Thanks for explaining more.

However, when RD then comes out with a statement like "My consciousness observing a color -- behavior at the cognitive level" he throws it all away again, if you ask me. This is just more closet Cartesian antics. I take a harder materialist stance here personally. No one has a consciousness, and no one is observing anything. All this is is just linguistic construction. The only reality it reflects is a social one.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

you have no idea what a gut feeling is

Wrong

how it arises,

Wrong

how to produce one

Wrong

- indeed, anything about it except that it seems to happen in human beings.

Ok, lets suppose you are right -- all we know is that we experience it, and we seem to observe it in others.

1) All the available evidence points to us being material.
2) The only properties of gut feelings I seem to observe in others are the behavior of those others.
3) The only difference between my gut feelings and those I seem to observe others is that mine are mine and I am sure of their existence.

What conclusions could a rational being possibly reach, given only this information (and we have only this information)?

a) Gut-feelings are some kind of physical process or aggregation thereof.
b) Humans have gut-feelings.
c) The "experience" of a gut-feeling is nothing more than being the one having the gut-feeling.

 

[Nick227]

That is the whole point of the computational model of consciousness!

Your experience can't be explained to you because of the very nature of your experience. If experience is indeed an emergent property of physical processes (which all the evidence supports) then it is mathematically impossible for an entity to understand its own experience. Virtually all of GEB is dedicated to explaining this fact.

It seems to me that experience is a linguistic construction created through social need. A machine, which is all a human is, is fundamentally a processor. It does not experience anything. Experience is an inherently dualistic term and this duality (experiencer-experience) is merely created by the machine through subsidiary processing.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

No, I'm arguing the exact opposite. Behaviour is observed in everything. The actual observation is not
behaviour.

What you are arguing is that behavior does not exist when nobody is around to observe the behavior, because behavior and observation are inseparable.

Fine. Doesn't change anything. Suppose, in the previous example, that an alien is examining my brain with a super-duper-aweseome-scope and is observing everything down to the quantum level.

I am still experiencing seeing a color, and thinking about that experience. All the alien sees is behavior, on every level. Do you disagree?

 

[rocketdodger]

However, just to point out, you have not yet answered the question....do you see colour? And, if so, how is this behaviour?

Nick

No. I did answer -- you just refuse to accept my answer because it doesn't leave me open to your rebuttal.

I gave you multi-level description of exactly what is going on in my brain when I "see colour," and all of those processes are behavior. Behavior, according to the accepted dictionary definition, I might add, not the redefined-to-suit-my-argument version you seem to be grasping for here.

Of course I "see colour." I have color vision and a brain to process color information.

But why are you beating around the bush, Nick? What you really want me to say is "Even though I assert qualia do not exist I have to admit that I experience qualia."

Well you would be wrong, because I don't assert qualia don't exist -- I assert that qualia are simply the name given to neural processes by the owner of those neural processes.

 

[rocketdodger]

...simply the result of BEING what is DOING the doing!?

Is this the Stoners Against the HPC thread now?

Please give me a little of this "massive amounts of data -- both empirical evidence and mathematical proof" for BEING what is DOING the doing.

Nick

How about the entire history of cognitive science, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, ... etc?

All evidence points to human consciousness being a physical process. All evidence points to humans having experience.

But.. you can only be sure of your own experience. I can only be sure of mine. Any individual can only be sure of theirs. This is what HPC proponents constantly assert, right? That qualia exist, etc? And they do so by asking "haven't you ever seen a colour?"

So yes, experience is a phenomena. But one can only be sure of their own experience. What are the possible reasons for that?

 

[rocketdodger]

It seems to me that experience is a linguistic construction created through social need. A machine, which is all a human is, is fundamentally a processor. It does not experience anything. Experience is an inherently dualistic term and this duality (experiencer-experience) is merely created by the machine through subsidiary processing.

Nick

That is one possible view -- that experience does not exist.

The other view, held by myself and others, is that experience is very real and is simply the subjective act of being. A water molecule experiences being a water molecule. A thermostat experiences being a thermostat. An ipod, an ipod, A dog, a dog, and a human, a human.

Where does my experience come from? Nowhere -- it is simply the act of being the aggregation of molecules I label "me."

 

[rocketdodger]

However, when RD then comes out with a statement like "My consciousness observing a color -- behavior at the cognitive level" he throws it all away again, if you ask me. This is just more closet Cartesian antics. I take a harder materialist stance here personally. No one has a consciousness, and no one is observing anything. All this is is just linguistic construction. The only reality it reflects is a social one.

Nick

Yeah, and actually every word in the human language could instead be replaced with a huge array of grunts and squeaks that mean the same thing.

Why waste time coming up with words when we can convey the same information using thousands of grunts? Oh wait... because using words actually saves time.

Of course "consciousness" is a linguistic construction. So is every sentence we are writing here.

By the way, it is also clear to me now that your posts are a parody of what the materialists here have said and that in fact you are still a closet dualist. You are just trying to show us how "absurd" the materialist stance is by playing devil's advocate.

Guess what? It isn't working because you clearly still don't understand and you can't argue a materialist position without really understanding the position.