1. Some (neural) scientists studying consciousness-and-the-brain are not overly defining consciousness at this time. This is one sentence from Crick's paper, where he says "we all have a notion of what consciousness is, but should avoid defining it at this time."
2. Some (other) scientists have added what amounts to a qualification, that this is consciousness as everybody, not just scientists, perceive it.
3. The paper points out that "everybody", i.e. the non-scientists, who have the naive viewpoint, understand some things (pain) happen in the mental state, while others (seeing red) do not because "redness", unlike pain, is a feature "out there" and a property of the rose, not the mental model/perception of the rose in the brain.
Said that way, I think this paper is very straightforward and non-controversial. Of course, the real flaw was step 2, where some scientists took Crick's admonition against defining consciousness at this time and went ahead and defined it, partially, even though they thought they were probably generalizing the definition, rather than restricting it.
Most importantly, in no way, shape, or form does the paper suggest "redness" actually is "out there" somehow, rather than in the mental state, bur merely attacks the idea that "obviously in the mental state to everybody, not just scientists" merits as a good definition.