Are You Conscious?

[AkuManiMani]

Let me ask you: If those same delusional people were conducting scientific research would you consider their work reliable?

The only way to remove said bias is by averaging it with observation from several independent sources. I.e. science.

I didn't ask you that. I asked you if science conducted by delusional people is reliable.

Whether or not you think your sensation of hunger is an appropriate response it's still a real sensation and is part of the contents of your awareness.

That wasn't your question. You asked an example of people being wrong abuot their experiences.

Lets go back to what was actually said:

Are you suggesting that people routinely mistake one sensation for another?

It happens.

Sounds like a fairly serious condition. I've never had such a problem. Could you possibly cite some examples?

I asked you to give me an example of a person mistaking one sensation for another. You having the munchies after a workout doesn't cut it.

Being conscious is, for the conscious subject, proof positive that they are conscious regardless of whether or not they can report it to others.

Uh-huh. But that's irrelevant, because no matter how convinced YOU are about you being conscious, it doesn't mean I get to believe you. You need something everyone can verify.

Which is why I'm emphasizing that we must learn what physically constitutes consciousness so that discerning it in others is a matter of scientific rigor and not intuitive guessing.

In the same way that I know a car is not a kind of driving but a device that performs the function of driving

Except you already know that a car is a thing. Since no one here has ever been able to define consciousness as anything but a function, it's a little surprising to read you say you "know" that consciousness is a thing like a car or like legs.

My sensations are physical things produced by physical stimuli. My thoughts are physical things that have physical effects on my physical actions. My emotions are physical things that have physical effects on my physical body. All of these physical sensations, thoughts, and emotions make up my consciousness; ergo consciousness is a physical thing.

However, being as how I know that I am not always conscious, even while my brain/body continue to process information, I think its safe to assume that subjective experience is not a universal property of all systems or even computational artifiacts.

No one says it is. But how would you go about determining what's conscious and what isn't ? You mentionned self-reporting, but we already know it isn't a reliable source.

Via introspection each conscious subject tacitly knows that they are conscious and what they are aware of. Thus, the conscious subject is able to communicate their conscious status to others. However, as we've both pointed out, while self-reporting is a possible indicator than another entity is conscious it is not proof positive. What we need is a the knowledge of what physically constitutes consciousness. Using this knowledge we can discern if a given system is conscious regardless of their ability to self-report. Depending out how advanced our scientific development goes in such an area, it may even become possible to discern what a subject is experiencing at a given time.

I'd say that consciousness is something like "legs" [LOL! ] and experiences are akin to "running"

Unless experiences and consciousness are one and the same.

Interestingly enough, I've already argued that experiences are "made of" consciousness

Oy...Thats not solipsism, Belz. Solipsism is the view that only the solipsist is real and that all observed and observable phenomena [including other people] are just figments of the solipsist's fantastical dream.

Solipsism denies the possibility of knowledge by saying that nothing is certain, except the experience itself.

It doesn't deny the possibility of knowledge. Solipsism just assumes that all that exists is the mind of the experiencer.

Your statement that "observations are subjective experiences produced by stimuli. When scientists observe an empirical result the object of their observation is very real, but they are aware of it's reality via their subjective experiences of it.", that's irrelevant, because the whole point of science is to negate bias resulting from this obvious fact.

Science is the systematic acquisition of empirical knowledge and the field of science involves multiple individuals systematically pooling their knowledge into a collective framework. Even so, its a FACT that every empirical observation is a subjective experience produced by one's senses. Whether you want to make the leap to conclude that this fact necessarily implies solipsism [hint: it doesn't] is your own affair.

[ETA: Keep in mind tho, that any argument for or against solipsism can only be made on philosophical grounds -- something you've expressed an aversion to in the past.]

 

[westprog]

Really, name an uncaused event ? QM doesn't count BTW, it could be causal or not be causal, it is unknown.

It really doesn't matter how carefully I put things, people will read what they want to read.

Such evidence as there is indicates that QM is acausal, at a fundamental level. There's no disputing this - it's accepted by everyone. There is no evidence that reality at the level of QM operates on a cause and effect basis. Such evidence as we have - and there is a lot of it - indicates that QM operates on a statistical probabilistic basis. So on the basis of pure science, we appear to have an acausal universe - which would of course be non-computable.

Nevertheless, there is the possibility that underlying what appears to be randomness, there is a cause and effect mechanism - let's call it God - invisible, omnipotent and infinite. It will have to operate outside all currently known laws of physics, but it's always possible that new laws will turn up. If those new laws can be confirmed - though at present there isn't even any conceptual basis for guessing what they might be - then the computational cause and effect universe might be rescued.

So bearing this in mind, I specifically stated - because I knew that someone would jump on it - that I was speaking on the basis of current scientific knowledge. So I get told that when discussing the universe, talking about the most successful scientific theory ever is out of bounds. Yeah, that makes sense.

 

[Belz...]

I didn't ask you that. I asked you if science conducted by delusional people is reliable.

If their observations all match then it becomes a whole lot safer. Why ?

I asked you to give me an example of a person mistaking one sensation for another. You having the munchies after a workout doesn't cut it.

Of course it does. Besides, some people have neurological problems that transform some sensation into another (say... "blue" feeling "cold" or something)

Which is why I'm emphasizing that we must learn what physically constitutes consciousness so that discerning it in others is a matter of scientific rigor and not intuitive guessing.

I don't argue that it's a matter of intuitive guessing.

All of these physical sensations, thoughts, and emotions make up my consciousness; ergo consciousness is a physical thing.

Sigh. This is getting tiresome. We all agree that it's a "thing" since the damn word encompasses everything. In fact, there's the word "thing" in "everything". Care to guess why ? What we're arguing here is whether it's a thing like legs or a thing like running.

What we need is a the knowledge of what physically constitutes consciousness.

Yes, indeed. How would you go about discovering that ?

It doesn't deny the possibility of knowledge. Solipsism just assumes that all that exists is the mind of the experiencer.

"Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside the mind is unjustified." I'd say that this means knowledge is impossible.

Science is the systematic acquisition of empirical knowledge and the field of science involves multiple individuals systematically pooling their knowledge into a collective framework. Even so, its a FACT that every empirical observation is a subjective experience produced by one's senses.

As I said, it's an obvious fact, though I fail to see where you're going with this.

[ETA: Keep in mind tho, that any argument for or against solipsism can only be made on philosophical grounds -- something you've expressed an aversion to in the past.]

Oh, I can make an argument against solipsism only because it's 1) stupid and 2) useless. If you want to call that "philosophical", then I won't stop you.

 

[westprog]

Would you mind answering my questions ? It would go a long way toward actually, you know, having a conversation.

Why do you assume that I know the answers to all these things? I'm not the one putting forward fixed assertions about the nature of consciousness.

 

[westprog]

Out of all your arguments from your personal opinion, this one is more interesting than most.
First you agree to the point, then you make an unsupported personal opinion and then you reassert the point in disagreement that you just agreed to.

I see the actual point has been missed. If one acts consciously in real time, then consciousness must be at least able to keep up. If one's consciousness is unable to react to the ball coming towards one, one cannot decide to catch it. A consciousness that operated on a much slower scale could not consciously interact with the world. I suppose that it's theoretically possible to have a consciousness far faster than necessary - that would simply be unlikely from an evolutionary viewpoint.

However, the essential aspect is that there is time dependence implicit in a consciousness that interacts with the world, and there is no reason to suppose that this can necessarily be abstracted away.

 

[westprog]

Aku, if reports were reliable, then all I'd have to do is program a computer to say "I am conscious". Obviously this isn't enough.

As I said before, the primary and only direct evidence of consciousness is introspection. However, human beings are very, very good at spotting consciousness - and they can recognise conscious activity very quickly. That's why the Turing test, although not really scientific, is a good first stab at a consciousness detector.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I didn't ask you that. I asked you if science conducted by delusional people is reliable.

If their observations all match then it becomes a whole lot safer. Why ?

Is science conducted by delusional people reliable? It's a simple yes or no answer, Belz.

I asked you to give me an example of a person mistaking one sensation for another. You having the munchies after a workout doesn't cut it.

Of course it does. Besides, some people have neurological problems that transform some sensation into another (say... "blue" feeling "cold" or something)

Thats not mistaking one sensation for another; thats one sensation being substituted for another. In any case, the fact remains that sensations and other experiences are unequivocally real. Why the hell are we even arguing about this?

Which is why I'm emphasizing that we must learn what physically constitutes consciousness so that discerning it in others is a matter of scientific rigor and not intuitive guessing.

I don't argue that it's a matter of intuitive guessing.

So you have a means of identifying consciousness in others without the need for self-reports?

All of these physical sensations, thoughts, and emotions make up my consciousness; ergo consciousness is a physical thing.

Sigh. This is getting tiresome.

Then stop asking the same question I've already answered. In the mean time you could also stop evading and actually answer the question I've asked you more than once: Is science conducted by delusional people reliable?

What we need is a the knowledge of what physically constitutes consciousness.

Yes, indeed. How would you go about discovering that ?

By studying living brains with the co-operation of a conscious subjects, pursuing an understanding of how the biophysics of the brain produces conscious experience, and using that understanding to identify what it means to be conscious in physical terms.

It doesn't deny the possibility of knowledge. Solipsism just assumes that all that exists is the mind of the experiencer.

"Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside the mind is unjustified." I'd say that this means knowledge is impossible.

You've an extremely bad habit of drawing conclusions that do not at all follow from given premises. Thats called a non sequitur, Belz.

Science is the systematic acquisition of empirical knowledge and the field of science involves multiple individuals systematically pooling their knowledge into a collective framework. Even so, its a FACT that every empirical observation is a subjective experience produced by one's senses.

As I said, it's an obvious fact, though I fail to see where you're going with this.

You're questioning the validity of introspection when science is itself simply extrospection -- introspection inverted. Both extro- and introspection are empirical, except the former is outward observation and the latter is inward observation. In any case, they both have the exact same ontological basis: consciousness.

[ETA: Keep in mind tho, that any argument for or against solipsism can only be made on philosophical grounds -- something you've expressed an aversion to in the past.]

Oh, I can make an argument against solipsism only because it's 1) stupid and 2) useless. If you want to call that "philosophical", then I won't stop you.

Critical thinking is inherently a philosophical exercise. If "its stupid and it's useless" are the best rebuttals you can make against solipsism then your critical thinking skills are extremely lacking.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why does time dependence imply that events can change their order? How can you have "before" without time dependence?

The issue is how a Turing machine can perform the functions that a brain does.

What you are calling time dependence of a physical operation IS THE SAME THING AS ORDER DEPENDENCE.

AND ORDER DEPENDENCE IS IMPLICIT IN COMPUTATION THEORY -- ALL ALGORITHMS ARE BUILT UPON IT.

What I have been arguing for pages, and what you apparently are not capable of understanding, is that the only reason raising one's arm too slowly causes one to miss the catch is because the arm has to get there BEFORE the ball arrives. It doesn't matter -- at all -- how fast or slow the arm moves, as long as it finishes BEFORE the ball arrives. BEFORE the ball arrives. BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE

Say it with me again. BEFORE

And how does a Turing machine work? It reads a certain tape position BEFORE the next one, BEFORE the next one, BEFORE the next one. BEFORE the next one. BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE.

Say it with me again. BEFORE

See the difference in the BEFORE vs. the BEFORE? There is no difference, because order is order any way you slice it.

 

[annnnoid]

Sigh. This is getting tiresome. We all agree that it's a "thing" since the damn word encompasses everything. In fact, there's the word "thing" in "everything". Care to guess why ? What we're arguing here is whether it's a thing like legs or a thing like running.


It is a thing like neither. That is exactly the point. It is a thing entirely defined by itself, in itself, and of itself. Aku concludes it to be ‘physical’ in the broad sense of the word, in so far as everything that exists is physical. It is not like legs, it is not like running, it is not like anything….it is itself, and itself exists….and everything that exists in a physical universe is, by definition, physical. The specific characteristics that describe / define it are exactly what is elusive (significantly so, and for very good reason [your difficulty recognizing them is simply evidence of this fact {Dawkins didn’t describe it as the biggest unanswered question in science for nothing}]).

The difference is that you conclude that ‘consciousness’ is not itself a distinct reality, you think it is ‘merely’ a function of the brain (which, by itself, would still make it a reality of truly formidable dimensions)….perhaps because you simply lack the vocabulary to imagine it adequately (this is a fundamentally relevant issue when dealing with ‘consciousness’….our ability to conceptualize what is involved). Aku suggests it is a physical reality in and of itself….and you naturally ask, what kind of physical reality? It is the sum total of something very very significant. Beyond that, we don’t know (scientifically). All we know (or, perhaps more accurately, reasonably speculate) is that it is one, and one of singularly unique and elusive properties and dimensions….most of which get described in weird philosophical ways by weird philosophers (like me).

…in….my…opinion

 

[AlBell]

What you are calling time dependence of a physical operation IS THE SAME THING AS ORDER DEPENDENCE.

AND ORDER DEPENDENCE IS IMPLICIT IN COMPUTATION THEORY -- ALL ALGORITHMS ARE BUILT UPON IT.

What I have been arguing for pages, and what you apparently are not capable of understanding, is that the only reason raising one's arm too slowly causes one to miss the catch is because the arm has to get there BEFORE the ball arrives. It doesn't matter -- at all -- how fast or slow the arm moves, as long as it finishes BEFORE the ball arrives. BEFORE the ball arrives. BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE

Say it with me again. BEFORE

And how does a Turing machine work? It reads a certain tape position BEFORE the next one, BEFORE the next one, BEFORE the next one. BEFORE the next one. BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE BEFORE.

Say it with me again. BEFORE

See the difference in the BEFORE vs. the BEFORE? There is no difference, because order is order any way you slice it.

What don't you understand about the fact that for the purposes here order dependence -- that is, timing -- must take into account wallclock time in the reference frame we consider the real world? If human, or human-like, consciousness is occurring, it certainly works under that timing restriction.

 

[AlBell]

Point one -- none of this has anything to do with my initial reply to Westprog, which I will explain in more detail below.

Point two -- our frame in milliseconds wouldn't matter to any entity that processed information in 10 years. We would simply have very different ways of 'being conscious'. That we would not understand them, nor they us is irrelevant. This part of the timing issue is not relevant really.

Ya think? Here I thought we are discussing human, or at least human-like consciousness.

That we need to be synced to the world to make sense of the world is obvious, but that does not mean that we could not be conscious if we processed information more slowly than we do. We would simply have different types of experiences.

Indeed. And if you can't compute fast enough to react to real world events what are we discussing?

The timing issue with neurons has to do with the way information is dealt with in neurons. Neurons don't just get hit with data and fire. Activated receptors open (or close depending on the type of 'activation') to allow in ions (generally sodium, but some work with chloride and others combinations of sodium and calcium, etc.). The current produced is a graded current that gradually diminishes over time and space. Each post-synaptic current (or potential -- EPSP or IPSP) moves along the cell membrane. Additional EPSPs may add to the synaptic current or IPSPs may diminish it. This is important timing-wise because if additional currents are not added to a sufficient degree, when the potential hits the axon hillock an action potential will not be generated. So, the timing of when and the spatial arrangement of where EPSPs and IPSPs occur is very important to neuron function. That is the ultimate basis for why timing is so important to all brain function.

We certainly agree on that anyway.

Syncing with the world is a higher order function that only has to do with the type of experience we have of the world. We simply do not pay attention to things that happen too fast or too slow for our needs as creatures.

Yup. So again, what do you think this thread is discussing?

 

[Belz...]

Why do you assume that I know the answers to all these things? I'm not the one putting forward fixed assertions about the nature of consciousness.

I'm asking you for your educated guess or your opinion.

 

[Belz...]

As I said before, the primary and only direct evidence of consciousness is introspection. However, human beings are very, very good at spotting consciousness - and they can recognise conscious activity very quickly.

You'd like to think that. People are also very good at recalling events and details -- or so they say.

Since no one has proposed a good way to detect consciousness scientifically, I don't see how you can also claim that we're good at spotting it. Are you ? I wouldn't claim to be able to do it, myself.

 

[rocketdodger]

What don't you understand about the fact that for the purposes here order dependence -- that is, timing -- must take into account wallclock time in the reference frame we consider the real world? If human, or human-like, consciousness is occurring, it certainly works under that timing restriction.

I do understand that. It is trivially obvious.

I understand that in physical reality, order dependence is instantiated as time dependence.

What westprog is claiming is that time dependence is not a type of order dependence. He/she is claiming that time dependence is some different creature altogether that is only incidentally related to order dependence. Hence, he/she thinks that the world of abstract computation has no way to emulate time dependence.

I am claiming that time dependence is a type of order dependence and thus can be emulated in the world of abstract computation -- because the world of abstract computation is built upon order dependence.

 

[Belz...]

Is science conducted by delusional people reliable? It's a simple yes or no answer, Belz.

No, it isn't. What do you mean by "delusional" ? If you're asking me if science done by people who have malfunctioning senses or brains is reliable, it'll depend on whether the science is done very, very thoroughly.

Thats not mistaking one sensation for another; thats one sensation being substituted for another.

Huh ? How is that different ?

So you have a means of identifying consciousness in others without the need for self-reports?

Those are two distinct things. Intuitive guessing would be me saying "hey! That guy acts like me, and I'm conscious, so he must be as well!". Basing yourself on other people's reports of being conscious is a different criterion altogether.

Then stop asking the same question I've already answered.

You haven't. You haven't told me if you understand that "legs" and "running" aren't the same thing although they are both things, and why you think consciousness is more akin to the former than to the latter.

By studying living brains with the co-operation of a conscious subjects, pursuing an understanding of how the biophysics of the brain produces conscious experience, and using that understanding to identify what it means to be conscious in physical terms.

Neat. How do you link consciousness to its physical causes ?

You've an extremely bad habit of drawing conclusions that do not at all follow from given premises. Thats called a non sequitur, Belz.

If NOTHING exists outside your own mind and your mind is, obviously, unreliable, then NOTHING can ever be known except that. It's not a non-sequitur. It's an obvious fact.

You're questioning the validity of introspection when science is itself simply extrospection -- introspection inverted. Both extro- and introspection are empirical, except the former is outward observation and the latter is inward observation. In any case, they both have the exact same ontological basis: consciousness.

This comes back to claiming that a non-conscious machine couldn't do science even if it were programmed to. I see no reason why it couldn't. Also, I'm not disagreeing that subjective data is required in science (what you call introspection although I don't think we're talking about the same thing). I'm saying that the point of science is to remove the "subjective" from the "data".

Critical thinking is inherently a philosophical exercise. If "its stupid and it's useless" are the best rebuttals you can make against solipsism then your critical thinking skills are extremely lacking.

Usefulness is not a characteristic of a good hypothesis ? That's new to me.

 

[Belz...]

It is a thing like neither. That is exactly the point. It is a thing entirely defined by itself, in itself, and of itself.

The who to the what, now ?

Aku concludes it to be ‘physical’ in the broad sense of the word, in so far as everything that exists is physical.

Which tells us nothing.

It is not like legs, it is not like running, it is not like anything….it is itself, and itself exists….and everything that exists in a physical universe is, by definition, physical. The specific characteristics that describe / define it are exactly what is elusive (significantly so, and for very good reason [your difficulty recognizing them is simply evidence of this fact {Dawkins didn’t describe it as the biggest unanswered question in science for nothing}]).

So the fact that I disagree proves that I should agree ? Wow. That's fine debating skills, here. No. No one has ever, other than with philosophical mutterings, managed to put forth a reasonable argument as to why consciousness would be such a special thing that is neither like an object or the actions that an object performs.

The difference is that you conclude that ‘consciousness’ is not itself a distinct reality

It's be hard to conclude such a thing because it wouldn't make much sense.

you think it is ‘merely’ a function of the brain

No. It is a function of a very complex organism.

….perhaps because you simply lack the vocabulary to imagine it adequately

Well, that's fine. I think people who think consciousness is "special" lack the imagination to see it otherwise. Now that we're done with the rhetoric...

Aku suggests it is a physical reality in and of itself….and you naturally ask, what kind of physical reality? It is the sum total of something very very significant. Beyond that, we don’t know (scientifically). All we know (or, perhaps more accurately, reasonably speculate) is that it is one, and one of singularly unique and elusive properties and dimensions….most of which get described in weird philosophical ways by weird philosophers (like me).

Would you like some dressing to go with that word salad ?

 

[Belz...]

I do understand that. It is trivially obvious.

I understand that in physical reality, order dependence is instantiated as time dependence.

What westprog is claiming is that time dependence is not a type of order dependence. He/she is claiming that time dependence is some different creature altogether that is only incidentally related to order dependence. Hence, he/she thinks that the world of abstract computation has no way to emulate time dependence.

I am claiming that time dependence is a type of order dependence and thus can be emulated in the world of abstract computation -- because the world of abstract computation is built upon order dependence.

Not sure I followed your argument with westprog very closely, but is he saying that a simulated consciousness isn't a consciousness because it doesn't do what a consciousness does with the same speed ?

 

[Belz...]

Let me explain that the so-called "hard problem of consciousness", in my view, stems from the following:

1) We don't know exactly how consciousness arises, though we have a few ideas.
2) We have no idea how to identify consciousness in a thing, except through similarity of behaviour. Unfortunately we don't know if all similar behaviours indicate similar consciousness or if all consciousness exhibit similar behaviours. Hell, we can't agree on what kind of thing consciousness is or even on a definition of consciousness itself.

 

[westprog]

What don't you understand about the fact that for the purposes here order dependence -- that is, timing -- must take into account wallclock time in the reference frame we consider the real world? If human, or human-like, consciousness is occurring, it certainly works under that timing restriction.

What RD needs to do - and which he hasn't done, in spite of lapsing into bold - is show how a Turing machine can carry out time dependent functions.

There's always, when discussing Turing machines, the problem of what, say, the tape is, and what the machine is. That's the kind of thing that needs to be nailed down if the claim that the functionality of the brain is equivalent to a TM is to be given consideration.

In the case of the ball catching, if timing does reduce to physical order, it does so on a far smaller scale than that of the supposed TM which runs on the neurons of the brain.

 

[westprog]

Not sure I followed your argument with westprog very closely, but is he saying that a simulated consciousness isn't a consciousness because it doesn't do what a consciousness does with the same speed ?

That might well be what RD says that I say, but it's not what I'm actually saying. I'm saying that because the human mind needs to interact with the world in a time dependent way, human consciousness must be time dependent - unlike a Turing Machine. RD is saying - well, I'm not sure what he's saying, but general relativity and particles apparently disprove this contention.