Are You Conscious?

[falkowsi]

A couple things:
[2] - Even tho we do not know, in physical terms, what consciousness is as I think that there are certain behaviors that non-conscious agencies cannot reproduce, thus ruling out p-zombies in principle.

By ruling out p-zombies, the presence of consciousness can be determined by analyzing functionality alone, without an a-priori requirement for a certain type of physical substrate.

This means that consciousness can be run on a computer, as long as the physical elements of the brain are all computable.

 

[AkuManiMani]

By ruling out p-zombies, the presence of consciousness can be determined by analyzing functionality alone, without an a-priori requirement for a certain type of physical substrate.

This means that consciousness can be run on a computer, as long as the physical elements of the brain are all computable.

[bolding added]

I.E. the physics of the brain is still relevant. Its one thing to rule out whether a given system is conscious or not, its quite another to know how to reproduce it physically.

 

[Robin]

Yes. What question are you asking?

The question I am asking is "what is the explanatory power of computationalism".

If I had asked a physicist "what is the explanatory power of quantum electro-dynamics" he/she would not have to answer "what question are you asking?"

It is correct. It doesn't need to be impressive.

That is just begging the question - if all that it predicts is that we are conscious then everything is correct.

 

[Robin]

It is based on a perfect understanding of your position - if I had it wrong in any way I gave you more than ample time to correct me. I questioned you quite closely on this.

I have corrected you.

You're welcome.

And yet at the time you repeatedly gave a confident "yes" that I had understood you correctly.

So you are not correcting me.

You are correcting yourself.

You have changed your mind.

You're welcome.

 

[Robin]

I'm having this experience rather a lot with the computationalists. Sometimes the claim is that the same algorithm/Turing Machine will produce an identical experience - sometimes it isn't.

It's quite critical because if this claim is withdrawn, the excesses of the computational approach aren't as egregious.

I am not really sure what computationalism means, it does not seem to have any clear definition.

Brains compute stuff? Yes I agree.

A turing-machine can make any natural number computation that a brain can? Yes I agree.

There is an algorithm equivalent to a human brain that will produce consciousness everytime it is evaluated? I think I need empirical confirmation of that one.

 

[falkowsi]

I.E. the physics of the brain is still relevant. Its one thing to rule out whether a given system is conscious or not, its quite another to know how to reproduce it physically.

Sure, it's important, but there's no reason to only approach it from the bottom up.

Without knowing exactly how consciousness works, you can already try to build computers to emulate it, and judge if they have consciousness based on their behavior.

 

[falkowsi]

Brains compute stuff? Yes I agree.

A turing-machine can make any natural number computation that a brain can? Yes I agree.

There is an algorithm equivalent to a human brain that will produce consciousness everytime it is evaluated? I think I need empirical confirmation of that one.

If the algorithm produces the same output as the brain, by definition you have empirical confirmation.

 

[PixyMisa]

And yet at the time you repeatedly gave a confident "yes" that I had understood you correctly.

You correctly understood a completely different point. You are now asserting a false equivalence between that and a new point, as I have already pointed out.

So you are not correcting me.

Wrong.

You are correcting yourself.

Wrong.

You have changed your mind.

Wrong.

You're welcome.

Fail.

 

[PixyMisa]

It doesn't do what it's supposed to. It doesn't play the music.

Define "play the music", then.

 

[PixyMisa]

It can't be implemented on a Turing machine unless the Turing machine is time dependent. IOW, not a Turing machine.

Wrong. Completely and categorically wrong, as already demonstrated.

A Turing machine is an abstraction. You can abstract any time dependent process to be implemented or simulated on a Turing machine by abstracting the time domain to a computational domain. We do this all the time.

On a physical computer, we can do that, or we can reduce time dependence to order dependence, or we can maintain time dependence directly. And, unless you commit a category error of directly relating the simulation to the real world (and you seem absolutely determined to do that, which makes a complete hash of your aguments), all of these produce identical results.

Of course you can add bells and whistles to a Turing machine to make it do useful things. This makes it no longer a Turing machine.

Wrong. It's still computationally equivalent, and the Church-Turing thesis still holds.

It's just an abstraction to think about computing. It's not an actual machine.

Yes, which is just one of three reasons why your argument is absurd: It's factually false, it's a category error, it's a red herring, and the conclusion is a non-sequitur. Four. Four reasons.

 

[Robin]

If the algorithm produces the same output as the brain, by definition you have empirical confirmation.

Does such empirical confirmation exist?

 

[Robin]

You correctly understood a completely different point. You are now asserting a false equivalence between that and a new point, as I have already pointed out.

Oh I am tired of working out what you mean and when you mean it.

Wrong.

Bluster

Wrong.

Bluster

Wrong.

Bluster

Fail.

Yes you did.

 

[falkowsi]

Does such empirical confirmation exist?

Not yet in practice, of course.

The point is that empirical confirmation doesn't add anything if we agree that the brain is computable.

 

[PixyMisa]

I.E. the physics of the brain is still relevant. Its one thing to rule out whether a given system is conscious or not, its quite another to know how to reproduce it physically.

Okay, so are you proposing that non-computable physics - i.e. some sort of physical infinity - is required for consciousness?

Because either you are, or the entire argument is a bust.

And if you are, what, and why?

 

[falkowsi]

It seems to me there are 3 possible positions one can take:

1. Computers can, in principle, achieve consciousness
2. Brains use non-computable physics
3. Some people might be p-zombies.

 

[PixyMisa]

It seems to me there are 3 possible positions one can take:

1. Computers can, in principle, achieve consciousness
2. Brains use non-computable physics
3. Some people might be p-zombies.

Yep, I think that covers it.

I'm not sure that 2 is physically possible - it certainly hasn't been demonstrated.

And as far as I can see, 3 necessarily leads to logical contradictions. So, you have all the behaviours associated with consciousness - such as introspection into your own mental state, the ability to report on your conscious experiences - without being conscious. Uh huh.

 

[Belz...]

Playing an MP3 file. Do it in X seconds and it's fine. Do it in Y and it doesn't work.

How does playing it in Y seconds "doesn't work" ?

And I'll consider your unwillingness to answer my previous question as a concession that you can't.

 

[westprog]

How does playing it in Y seconds "doesn't work" ?

If a track is X seconds long and it takes Y seconds to play, then that is equivalent to "not working". Anyone trying to access multimedia on a slow machine knows exactly what I mean.

The point is that "working" in the Turing sense is irrelevant when dealing with real-time issues. If there is a time constraint, and the program doesn't fit the time constraint, then it doesn't work.

This is relevant to consciousness because the human brain does perform operations with a time constraint.

And I'll consider your unwillingness to answer my previous question as a concession that you can't.

You can consider whatever you like.

 

[westprog]

I am not really sure what computationalism means, it does not seem to have any clear definition.

I think that it comes down to the brain being effectively equivalent to a Turing machine. In the context of consciousness, it means that a Turing machine that emulates the same states as the brain will experience the same consciousness.

Brains compute stuff? Yes I agree.

A turing-machine can make any natural number computation that a brain can? Yes I agree.

There is an algorithm equivalent to a human brain that will produce consciousness everytime it is evaluated? I think I need empirical confirmation of that one.

There's a range of views on this Pixy seems to claim that the Church-Turing thesis proves as a matter of physical fact that an equivalent Turing machine can do whatever a brain does. Other posters are easy-going on the Turing machine side, and basically seem to think that the brain can be emulated by some kind of computer or device, which is effectively agreeing with what the sceptics are saying.

 

[westprog]

lol

That doesn't reduce to order dependence?

No, it doesn't. If you don't collect a typed character before the next character is typed, it is lost. That is not order dependence. That is time dependence.

I don't know why you are pretending that there is no distinction between Turing- and real-time programming.