Are You Conscious?

[Frank Newgent]

In its simplest form, yes. But not at the same level as a human, obviously.

In the same way that a running stove is "hot", but not quite like the sun.

Would the sun consider the stove hot?

 

[westprog]

Ah, yes the argument-from-it-hasn't-been-done-yet-so-it-can't-be-done-ever.

I take it, then, that since you have fallen back on this stupid fallacy (you aren't the first, don't worry) you finally concede my point. Thank you.

Aku, no matter how many times you say that you don't-believe-artificial-consciousness-is-impossible, you know that in your secret heart you don't-think-it-can-be-done-ever, don't you? Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men?

 

[westprog]

Again, I don't think this is called for.

How do you know if describing the behaviour of the system when pain is felt doesn't describe pain ?

Because no matter how detailed, no description of the processes involved in producing pain give any idea of what it feels like to have a pain.

 

[!Kaggen]

I will take a stab.

Using the strong interpretations of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants as a starting point.

http://hps.elte.hu/~zemplen/goethemorph.html

What, exactly, does the strong interpretation - or any interpretation - of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants have to do with the subject?

The strong interpretation of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants demonstrates that that the technique of imaginative thinking as a form of introspection can be used to describe objective reality and hypothesize the homologous structures of plant organs. This same technique can be used to study consciousness.

What evidence is there that the strong interpretation - or any interpretation - of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants is in any way valid?

Goethe used the technique developed from his study of plants to discover the homologous nature of plant organs and independently discover the inter- maxillary bone.

By attributing the same lawfulness to the outer world as to the inner and training the faculty for comprehending this relationship we can come to the conclusion that an understanding of how consciousness comes about has as much to do with its effects as to its reason.

It is true that our understanding of how things come about has much to do with what those things do. Unfortunately, this is in no way a substantive response to the question; it's little more than hand-waving.

You asked Aku what else might be necessary for consciousness apart from computation. I have replied that consciousness is not just understood as a result of reasons, but the reason for results. In other words consciousness not only has necessary reasons, but also contingent results.

Thus the imaginative study of human endeavors will reveal additional requirements for consciousness in addition to computation/reason.

How does this follow from the previous statement?

It requires imagination to predict the contingent results of consciousness.

I suggest beginning with song writing

What evidence do you have that song writing requires more than computation, particularly when we already have song-writing computers?

You missed the point.
Song writing develops the imagination.

Experience

What experience? Experience of what? What evidence and reasoned argument can you present to back up this experience?

You can lead a horse to water.....
You really need to pay attention Pixy

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Any process that is not understood at the level of the physics is not fully understood. That goes for all biological processes. That we understand respiration in a biological sense in no way mitigates against understanding it in a physical sense.

Is there any biological process where the physics is not relevant?

Of course not, but that doesn't answer the question. What is so wrong with saying "until we understand the biology"? Understanding biological processes at the level of physics comes much later and is not considered important as far as the biology is concerned in any other area. Why is it so important in this area that we bypass understanding the biology and can't understand consciousness without understanding the physics?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

As I don't like having to repeat myself, please read post 1162.

Yeah, read it. It's the same argument that I've already addressed, so I'm not sure why you are repeating it.

I suppose only you know why you keep repeating the same argument when it has already been addressed, so if you don't want to repeat it why not try understanding what others are telling you?

That information processing -- meaning just any old sort -- is not sufficient to be consciousness, it does not follow that it is not possible for information processing of some type to be consciousness. A critical issue concerns what type of information processing is under discussion.

Sure, lots of examples of information processing are not consciousness. I don't anyone who says that just any old type of IP is consciousness. What we need to understand is the structure of the IP that is consciousness. All the evidence to date suggests that brains process information and there is no significant evidence that other cellular features of brains aside from the fact that they consist of excitable cells with semipermeable membranes is important to the process that we call consciousness (or any other information processing carried out by the brain). Computers are capable of duplicating those IP features of brains, so it is reasonable to believe that computers can do the same thing.

Your argument is simply a waste of time. Why do you keep repeating it?

Thats a bit unfortunate. If the discussion is boring you to the point where you're not motivated to follow it then perhaps its a sign you should be spending your time doing something more stimulating

Who said anything about it being boring? I don't have the time to read all the entries and most of it consists of people sniping at each other for which I have little patience.

 

[PixyMisa]

The strong interpretation of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants demonstrates that that the technique of imaginative thinking as a form of introspection can be used to describe objective reality and hypothesize the homologous structures of plant organs. This same technique can be used to study consciousness.

This same technique can indeed be used to study consciousness. However, it gives answers that are now well established to be wrong.

You asked Aku what else might be necessary for consciousness apart from computation. I have replied that consciousness is not just understood as a result of reasons, but the reason for results. In other words consciousness not only has necessary reasons, but also contingent results.

Evidence?

It requires imagination to predict the contingent results of consciousness.

Evidence?

You missed the point.
Song writing develops the imagination.

In computers?

 

[Frank Newgent]

So your consciousness would be simultaneously internal and external, which demonstrates that it is purely arbitrary distinction.

Please forgive my interruption but how can you make such a nonarbitrary assertion?

If the subject and the object locations you refer to are purely arbitrary... so too are the subject and the object locations in the quote box.

For example: So your distinction would be simultaneously internal and external, which demonstrates that consciousness is purely arbitrary it.

 

[nescafe]

Yeah but you aren't accounting for the fact that certain individuals have a vested interest in woo.

Oh, I am fully cognizant of that.

The only way to maintain such a view, in the face of contrary evidence, is to demand a pefect model and yet more evidence.

Which is exactly why I pointed it out.

 

[annnnoid]

AkuManiMani…..well, of course, introspection is a fine word. I was, though, attempting to exaggerate the point (I guess I succeeded)….which is that we ‘are’ this reality (consciousness) at every moment, so why don’t we know what it is (from the inside, or the outside)? What does this indisputably indisputable fact…say? Something big, I’ll wager (I reference a few areas of the answer in what follows…if you want to risk your sanity and attempt to digest it all).

….and at the beginning of your post, you suggest that we don’t know enough about consciousness to instantiate it artificially (….IMO….what we also don’t realize is just how far under that statement actually is [as in ‘understatement’]). For this (and IMO numerous other reasons) you conclude that our scientific understanding of ‘it’ is extremely primitive (that is at least one variety of explicit evidence to support that position). I’d agree….as, apparently, does Chomsky who I quoted somewhere earlier in relation to this issue (his words describing our understanding were ‘very thin….and likely to remain so’ [never did get around to asking him the reason for the pessimism]).

So does your conclusion that ‘our scientific understanding of…us...is extremely primitive’ imply that our actual experience of ‘us’ is at an equivalently primitive stage? What I’m attempting to do is unravel the psychology here….because later in your post you quite explicitly state that you do, in fact, know what you’re talking about. Are you saying that you know a great deal about the little that you do know about our admittedly primitive understanding (if ‘our’ understanding is primitive, then is yours too?)? Might you not be overestimating your degree of understanding….given how primitive our understanding actually is (I mean, if our understanding is so primitive it’s quite likely that we ain’t gonna be too hot on understanding just how primitive it actually is [in other words, our ability to recognize how primitive our understanding is may be equally primitive {which may imply that we actually understand way less than we think….which is exactly the conclusion I recall coming to somewhere else}])? I know I’m being a bit nit-picky here. Please forgive me….I think I actually agree with many of your positions (and if I don’t I probably don’t know why).

I don’t mean to over analyze but in a way I think this illustrates a point….which is just how dense this subject is, and how easy it is to trip over. Which is why I’d like to add my voice to the regret that FUWF has been suspended. In addition to his knowledge and obvious experience, his was also a voice of clarity (…by that I don’t mean to cast aspersions upon anyone else…in my opinion anyone who even attempts to untangle this Medusa is either a madman or a hero…or some twisted version of both) and god knows that if ever there where an issue that screams for clarity it is this one.

…so I’ll just cut to the chase I think (…anyone who survived that earlier paragraph is likely about ready to bail just now so it would, I think, be wise). Robin asked why our epistemic and ontological systems have a problem with consciousness that they don’t have with everything else. If I were to put it annoyingly simply I’d say that these systems are our consciousness. Quite fundamentally (everything else is....not). These systems spring up out of god-knows-where and god-knows-how and the only way to penetrate that mystery might very well be to….get to know god (...'yo...supreme fascist....wazup'....and the answer arrives....' I am you '...).

I know, hardly a substantive argument but my brain is addled at the moment so rather than spend the next ten years writing a response I’ll just present what I regard as some evidence of an epistemic system that can deal with consciousness.

“Destruction is finding being in matter.”

This, to me, is an example of words spoken from a different epistemology. It quite explicitly describes the human reality from a perspective that can only exist as a result of certain conditions….conditions which are not described with or through our current philosophical, psychological, or scientific paradigms…but which are implicated by all of them. Yeah, I know….that’s a mess of a big thing to ‘submit’….so for now, I’ll just call it an opinion.

…as for why I trust a statement like that (besides the rather disturbing fact that it seems to describe the truth….[is there such a thing?])? How about another quote: “When the solution is simple, God is answering”…from Einstein….or “…straight out of the book”…from Erdos. Maybe we mere mortals don’t get it, but I’m pretty sure when the answers are found, they will be simple (not small, just simple).

I think it’s time for some more chicken soup (for those not familiar with the reference and who may be wondering why I mention chicken soup there is an iconic series of books all entitled ‘Chicken Soup for the …………………………[insert your favorite social demographic here][…y’know, like ‘teen’, ‘working mom’, ‘dysfunctional werewolf’…etc. etc.]…..and each book included a couple of dozen anecdotes from people in the target demographic that were intended to be the narrative equivalent of the proverbial chicken soup).

 

[AkuManiMani]

Now use that knowledge design a device that experiences the sensation of "cold" when its at room temperature or above.

Ah, yes the argument-from-it-hasn't-been-done-yet-so-it-can't-be-done-ever.

I take it, then, that since you have fallen back on this stupid fallacy (you aren't the first, don't worry) you finally concede my point. Thank you.

RD, I'm fairly certain that you're a lot sharper than that; you're deliberately being obtuse. You know good & well that I'm not arguing that it can't ever be done. The fact of the matter is that it can't be done with the level of understanding we have at our disposal now, and its most certainly not possible with the descriptive level in your last response. Theres a term for a systematic failure to recognize one's limitations: its called arrogance.

 

[AkuManiMani]

As I don't like having to repeat myself, please read post 1162.

Yeah, read it. It's the same argument that I've already addressed, so I'm not sure why you are repeating it.

I suppose only you know why you keep repeating the same argument when it has already been addressed, so if you don't want to repeat it why not try understanding what others are telling you?

That information processing -- meaning just any old sort -- is not sufficient to be consciousness, it does not follow that it is not possible for information processing of some type to be consciousness. A critical issue concerns what type of information processing is under discussion.

[bolding added]

The fact that you've even made this statement demonstrates that you don't understand what I'm arguing. That consciousness carries out a KIND OF information processing is [forgive the pun] a no brainer. What distinguishes conscious information processing from unconscious processing [in our own brains, mind you] is the physical context of that processing.

Sure, lots of examples of information processing are not consciousness. I don't anyone who says that just any old type of IP is consciousness. What we need to understand is the structure of the IP that is consciousness. All the evidence to date suggests that brains process information and there is no significant evidence that other cellular features of brains aside from the fact that they consist of excitable cells with semipermeable membranes is important to the process that we call consciousness (or any other information processing carried out by the brain).

Those cells still have the same IP features during conscious and unconscious states. The brain does not shut off or cease processing information when the subject is in deep sleep, or otherwise unconscious. What differs between varying states of consciousness and unconsciousness is the energetic state of the brain; Consciousness is a biophysics problem, first and foremost. Trying to re-create consciousness in artificial systems while ignoring the relevant physical states that are correlated with -known- examples of consciousness in actual living brains is -- quite frankly -- unspeakably asinine.

Computers are capable of duplicating those IP features of brains, so it is reasonable to believe that computers can do the same thing.

And computers are capable of duplicating IP features of chemical combustion and fission; that doesn't mean that their processing will produce actual fire or nuclear reactions.

Your argument is simply a waste of time. Why do you keep repeating it?

Because the nature of your attempts at rebuttal indicate that, deliberately or inadvertently, you're misunderstanding what it is I'm actually arguing.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The fact that you've even made this statement demonstrates that you don't understand what I'm arguing. That consciousness carries out a KIND OF information processing is [forgive the pun] a no brainer. What distinguishes conscious information processing from unconscious processing [in our own brains, mind you] is the physical context of that processing.

Physical context of that processing, meaning what? That only brains can do it? You seem to be waving your hands about.

Those cells still have the same IP features during conscious and unconscious states. The brain does not shut off or cease processing information when the subject is in deep sleep, or otherwise unconscious. What differs between varying states of consciousness and unconsciousness is the energetic state of the brain; Consciousness is a biophysics problem, first and foremost. Trying to re-create consciousness in artificial systems while ignoring the relevant physical states that are correlated with -known- examples of consciousness in actual living brains is -- quite frankly -- unspeakably asinine.

That makes no sense whatsoever. You continue to make the same mistake -- saying that information processing does not equal consciousness. No one is saying that any old information processing does. You have yet to provide a single example of what a brain does during consciousness that cannot be recreated in a computer system outside of repeating the vague notion of 'subjective experience' which you refuse to define.

And to refer to a WIki page about EEG when discussing the subject with an EEGer is on of the dumbest moves I've seen by anyone on this board.

All I can figure is that you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. You keep talking about the biophysics, the energy state, etc. The EEG does not measure some mystical "energy state" of the brain. It measures the difference in potentials between two inputs and provides a graphical representation of those changes.

And computers are capable of duplicating IP features of chemical combustion and fission; that doesn't mean that their processing will produce actual fire or nuclear reactions.

Computers are capable of simulating combustion and fission, not duplicating them. I have no idea what 'duplicating IP features of combustion' even means or what relevance such a statement has to an issue in which no other process than information processing makes any sense.

Because the nature of your attempts at rebuttal indicate that, deliberately or inadvertently, you're misunderstanding what it is I'm actually arguing.

Perhaps so, but what I doubt is that you don't understand what you are saying. You are making no sense whatsoever. You continue to use extremely vague terms to describe issues that are very well known -- EEG -- as though they describe something that you call 'the energy state'. What in the world does that mean?

For goodness sake, give your ego a rest and take a step back. Unless you can define what it is that we are even discussing, because at this point you don't even seem to be talking about anything, only using some weird kind of word salad, then there is really no sense discussing this matter.

ETA:

Or, wait a second, are you honestly trying to tell me that gamma range EEG activity is consciousness? That there is some sort of electrical field that is consciousness? You're not still repeating that same silly idea from a few years ago are you? And if you are, why didn't you say so you haven't) instead of playing games. Your objections have been dealt with. It seems you are left simply with your opinion and with no data to back it up.

EEGs measure what happens in neurons -- a comparison of one area of input vs. another area. That is all. They do not measure an electrical field capable of some other activity.

 

[Belz...]

Would the sun consider the stove hot?

If he's UndercoverSun or WestSun, probably not. If he's PixyMisun or RocketSunner, most assuredly.

 

[Belz...]

Because no matter how detailed, no description of the processes involved in producing pain give any idea of what it feels like to have a pain.

Of course not. But how does that help you ? No one is claiming that.

What I'm saying is that "pain" may be nothing else than the behaviour behind pain itself, that is: the whole process of stimuli-to-reaction. The added layer of "qualia" or whatever, doesn't really explain anything.

You're reporting your "experience of pain" to be something entirely different, and so is UE. But to me the experience IS the pain, and so they are one and the same. As opposed to what UE seems to be thinking, I'm not being argumentative about it. It's my honest opinion.

 

[westprog]

RD, I'm fairly certain that you're a lot sharper than that; you're deliberately being obtuse. You know good & well that I'm not arguing that it can't ever be done.

And no matter how often Westprog and Aku say that, he'll continue to insist that we are saying something else.

The fact of the matter is that it can't be done with the level of understanding we have at our disposal now, and its most certainly not possible with the descriptive level in your last response. Theres a term for a systematic failure to recognize one's limitations: its called arrogance.

 

[westprog]

Again, I don't think this is called for.

How do you know if describing the behaviour of the system when pain is felt doesn't describe pain ?

Because I've had the experience of pain. And I've read about how pain is produced. The description of how pain is produced would not tell us anything useful about what it feels like to experience pain. A description of the behaviour of someone who is experiencing pain will not tell us what it is like to experience pain.

This is such an obvious fact that I find it strange that anyone can seriously put forward a contrary view.

 

[westprog]

Of course not. But how does that help you ? No one is claiming that.

What I'm saying is that "pain" may be nothing else than the behaviour behind pain itself, that is: the whole process of stimuli-to-reaction. The added layer of "qualia" or whatever, doesn't really explain anything.

You're reporting your "experience of pain" to be something entirely different, and so is UE. But to me the experience IS the pain, and so they are one and the same. As opposed to what UE seems to be thinking, I'm not being argumentative about it. It's my honest opinion.

Don't you see that any description of the behaviour is entirely different to a description of the experience - and that it is pretty much impossible to describe the experience of pain except with the assumption that the person to whom you're describing it has had some similar experience?

 

[Darat]

Don't you see that any description of the behaviour is entirely different to a description of the experience - and that it is pretty much impossible to describe the experience of pain except with the assumption that the person to whom you're describing it has had some similar experience?

And how is this different from most behaviours humans exhibit such as say running - or are you saying there really is a "hard problem of running" and every other behaviour we engage in?

 

[westprog]

And how is this different from most behaviours humans exhibit such as say running - or are you saying there really is a "hard problem of running" and every other behaviour we engage in?

The experience of running and the physical act of running are quite distinct - though it simplifies the problem to assume that they are the same thing.

And nobody thinks it's strange or exotic to have a physical understanding of what goes on when running.