Are You Conscious?

[Belz...]

I know what "implications" means. What I am rejecting is that there is a burden of proof on me to demonstrate that two entities with completely different definitions and descriptions are in fact the same thing.

No. Please answer the question and tell me what the "implications" are that I'm so "affraid" of admitting to.

If you think consciousness and behaviour are the same thing then it is up to you to explain what on Earth this is supposed to mean.

Well, I could be an ass and simply say that everything is behaviour, and leave it at that.

But if we define "behaviour" as "what something does", and nerves are a "thing", and pain is the action of sending impulses by the nerve, therefore something the nerve "does", then it fits the definition of behaviour, does it not ?

 

[AkuManiMani]

You asked me what is required for consciousness and I told you: If one has no subjective experience then they are not conscious. As of now there is no scientific understanding of the sufficient condition(s) for producing subjective experience, so an operational definition is not possible.

Well, I disagree with you there of course. But what I am asking is, if you think something more than computation is required, what do you think this is, and why?

Or if you merely think that computation is insufficient, why do you think this, and what else might be required?

Because as far as I can see, the Church-Turing thesis is a mathematical proof that computers can be conscious. The brain is a computer; the brain produces consicousness; no computer is more powerful than a Turing machine. Not complicated, really.

Everything inheres information, whether it be weather patterns, plant growth, the formation of solar systems, radioactive decay in rocks, or the activity of a human brain. It's this fact that allows us to describe the world mathematically and simulate it. However, while all things inhere information -they are not themselves information-, and while all processes inhere processing information -they are not themselves computation-. The term "information" simply refers to a knowable feature of some object(s) and "information processing" is just the change of information. In short, information and information processing are just abstractions of physical objects and events.

With that said, consciousness is like every other phenomena in that it processes information. However, consciousness qua consciousness is not itself information processing but a specific class of physical phenomenon. It is not sufficient merely to mimic the information processing of brains in an attempt to conjure consciousness. One must understand the physics that underlies the brain's capacity to generate the phenomenon we call consciousness [i.e. the capacity for subjective experience] before trying to produce it. Any attempt to do so without such an understanding is just cargo cult folly.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No. Please answer the question and tell me what the "implications" are that I'm so "affraid" of admitting to.

That perhaps the whole of religion and paranormalism cannot be dismissed quite as easily as you currently think it is. For somebody coming from where you are coming from, that's a big deal.

Well, I could be an ass and simply say that everything is behaviour, and leave it at that.

That would at least be internally consistent.

But if we define "behaviour" as "what something does", and nerves are a "thing", and pain is the action of sending impulses by the nerve, therefore something the nerve "does", then it fits the definition of behaviour, does it not ?

Fine. So long as you don't start introducing the word "consciousness" into this picture, I don't care.

 

[westprog]

pain is the action of sending impulses by the nerve,?

No, it is not. People understood about pain long before they knew that nerves existed, or what they did. Pain is the sensation caused by a signal in the nerve.

It's strange that someone promoting a non-physical, computational approach should try to tie pain to a specific physical event. If pain is a signal in a nerve, then no computer intelligence could ever feel pain.

 

[westprog]

Why must we understand it at the level of the physics?

Any process that is not understood at the level of the physics is not fully understood. That goes for all biological processes. That we understand respiration in a biological sense in no way mitigates against understanding it in a physical sense.

Is there any biological process where the physics is not relevant?

 

[Belz...]

That perhaps the whole of religion and paranormalism cannot be dismissed quite as easily as you currently think it is. For somebody coming from where you are coming from, that's a big deal.

And AGAIN you assume that you know me. You don't.

The supernatural isn't "dismissed". It's got a burden of proof that it cannot meet, so far. And even if you were right about behaviour and qualia and mind, it wouldn't follow that there's anything supernatural about it. So you fail at everything.

Fine. So long as you don't start introducing the word "consciousness" into this picture, I don't care.

You should, if you're going to participate in a debate, care about it.

"Conscious" means "aware of itself". I don't see a problem, there.

 

[Belz...]

No, it is not. People understood about pain long before they knew that nerves existed, or what they did.

People understood about gravity before they knew how it worked. It didn't change the way it worked.

Pain is the sensation caused by a signal in the nerve.

1) How do you know that the sensation isn't the signal ?
2) Isn't the sensation a behaviour, too, even if it isn't the signal itself ?

I think you're adding a layer that is not necessary to explain pain.

It's strange that someone promoting a non-physical, computational approach should try to tie pain to a specific physical event. If pain is a signal in a nerve, then no computer intelligence could ever feel pain.

Who ever said computers felt pain ?

 

[AkuManiMani]

OK, but you've provided no argument why that is the case. Why must we understand it at the level of the physics? We understand many other things in biology at the level of systems. That we need to understand the issue intimately is trivial. Of course we need to understand how the brain does it.

As I don't like having to repeat myself, please read post 1162.

I'm afraid I don't follow anyone's posting history and I don't follow the current incarnations of this debate closely. They've been going on sporadically since I got here and undoubtedly before I got here. I entered early into them then, but just don't have the time or patience now.

Thats a bit unfortunate. If the discussion is boring you to the point where you're not motivated to follow it then perhaps its a sign you should be spending your time doing something more stimulating

 

[UndercoverElephant]

"Conscious" means "aware of itself". I don't see a problem, there.

And what does "aware" mean....?

 

[Frank Newgent]

Indeed, to take my thesis to its logical conclusion, those remarks by Kant and Wittgenstein can be found in every copy of every work by those authors. The only distinction is those particular words are not printed, they're p-rinted. P-rinting has all the properties of printing without actually being printing. This means that you can't read it unless you already know it is there. And likewise, any attempt to copy it makes it disappear.

And if you disagree, it's up to you to prove me wrong, and I'm allowed to make up evidence to support my case.

No.

A p-rint is is a hypothetical rounding mode rounded toward negative or positive infinity that is indistinguishable from a normal rounding mode rounded toward negative or positive infinity except that it lacks integers.

 

[westprog]

People understood about gravity before they knew how it worked. It didn't change the way it worked.



1) How do you know that the sensation isn't the signal ?

The sensation is what is produced by the signal. It's possible to describe all the signals in the system, without describing the sensation. They cannot be the same thing.

2) Isn't the sensation a behaviour, too, even if it isn't the signal itself ?

I think you're adding a layer that is not necessary to explain pain.

I think you're removing a layer that is necessary to explain pain.

Who ever said computers felt pain ?

That's implicit in the Extra-Strength AI espoused by Rocketdodger. If we are computer emulations, then the pain is being produced by software.

 

[PixyMisa]

No.

A p-rint is is a hypothetical rounding mode rounded toward negative or positive infinity that is indistinguishable from a normal rounding mode rounded toward negative or positive infinity except that it lacks integers.

That too. I'm just using the term as found in the p-ublishing industry rather than the one derived from the P-eano axioms.

 

[rocketdodger]

Now use that knowledge design a device that experiences the sensation of "cold" when its at room temperature or above.

Ah, yes the argument-from-it-hasn't-been-done-yet-so-it-can't-be-done-ever.

I take it, then, that since you have fallen back on this stupid fallacy (you aren't the first, don't worry) you finally concede my point. Thank you.

 

[Belz...]

And what does "aware" mean....?

–adjective 1. having knowledge; conscious; cognizant: aware of danger.

 

[Belz...]

The sensation is what is produced by the signal. It's possible to describe all the signals in the system, without describing the sensation. They cannot be the same thing.

Again, I don't think this is called for.

How do you know if describing the behaviour of the system when pain is felt doesn't describe pain ?

I think you're removing a layer that is necessary to explain pain.

Then that's fine, as long as we can discuss it.

That's implicit in the Extra-Strength AI espoused by Rocketdodger. If we are computer emulations, then the pain is being produced by software.

In order for a computer to feel pain it would have to at least be aware of damage to itself, and to be able to respond to that damage. Of course unless we make a computer that behaves just like a human there's no reason why such a computer would have pain in the way we have it.

 

[nescafe]

Any process that is not understood at the level of the physics is not fully understood.

There is not, and arguably cannot be, any sort of "full understanding" of how any process beyond a certain level of complexity operates. Why else do you think we use scientific models that are good enough instead of waiting for perfect models?

Our models (including models of consciousness) have to be good enough -- requiring a "full understanding" is setting the bar too high.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

–adjective 1. having knowledge; conscious; cognizant: aware of danger.

Does it include car alarms?

 

[rocketdodger]

There is not, and arguably cannot be, any sort of "full understanding" of how any process beyond a certain level of complexity operates. Why else do you think we use scientific models that are good enough instead of waiting for perfect models?

Our models (including models of consciousness) have to be good enough -- requiring a "full understanding" is setting the bar too high.

Yeah but you aren't accounting for the fact that certain individuals have a vested interest in woo.

The only way to maintain such a view, in the face of contrary evidence, is to demand a pefect model and yet more evidence.

 

[Belz...]

Does it include car alarms?

In its simplest form, yes. But not at the same level as a human, obviously.

In the same way that a running stove is "hot", but not quite like the sun.

 

[Robin]

It appears that way to you because you are a materialist. It does not involve an assumption of dualism. It does entail that materialism is false, but that is not the same thing.

It is nothing to do with being a Materialist since an Idealist would have precisely the same objection. If "internal/external" is a real rather than an arbitrary distinction then you are making a commitment to a non-monistic ontology.

So there's no difference between what you believe about reality and what is actually happening in reality?

I don't recall saying anything of the sort, unless your "internal" is defined by an individual's particular beliefs about reality, which would still make it an arbitrary (and endlessly tractable) distinction.

I don't understand.

Let me illustrate then:

Your consciousness is external to my consciousness.

And presumably vice versa? So your consciousness would be simultaneously internal and external, which demonstrates that it is purely arbitrary distinction.

Metaphysics and religion are a type of art. Correspondence in the arts works differently to science. In science, we have an attempt to accurately correspond to the a subset of reality we call "physical".

Again, this is purely your own metaphysical assumption.

Only during attempts at systematic metaphysics or related religious claims does art try to represent the entire system, and in this case there is once again a need to try to correspond correctly, even though this is impossible, hence "The Tao that can be described is not the eternal Tao", even though the Tao Te Ching then goes on to attempt a description of the Tao that cannot be described. This leads to an additional problem, because the one of the things these forms of art try to correspond to is the thing that words like "Tao" or "God" are supposed to refer to, and this thing is fundamentally paradoxical. That is why mystical texts tend to be full of what I'd call "absolute paradoxes" e.g. Wittgenstein claiming in the Tractatus that absolute solipsism can coincide with absolute realism.

Even Witty disavowed the Tractatus.

But a claim to describe the indescribable is not strictly speaking a paradox since the falsity of the proposition involves no contradiction.

The phrase "an indescribable entity" has no referent. There is a well-worn Wittgentsteinism that comes to mind.

I am not trying to produce a metaphysics of science. We already have one of those. It's called "materialism". That is not to say that materialism is actually true, but that we must think like materialists when we are playing scientific language games.

Not so. In fact when doing science it is better, if anything, to think like a subjective Idealist. The philosopher who came up with the concept of reductionism was none other than Bishop George Berkeley. The Positivists and Physicalists explicitly recognised the influence.

I'd define it as neutral, mathematical or informational.

Which is merely another metaphysical assumption. Why do you think it a better assumption than those you reject?

Coherency can help to inductively establish that it is real, or likely to be real.

As Father Brown says "ten false theories fit Castle Glengyle".

The method is "by hook or by crook", although unlike Feyerabend I can't count such methods as scientific. There are no rules to art or mysticism.

The explanation would be metaphysical, which is to be understood as closely related to artistic and religious. The Tao Te Ching is artistic, metaphysical and religious.

But here is the thing - how would you be able to tell whether or not you were just talking nonsense?