Are You Conscious?

[AkuManiMani]

What we don't get is why you think - contrary to the Church-Turing-Deutsch thesis - that it can possibly be relevant.

The Church-Turing thesis concerns the limits of computation, its not guide on how to produce consciousness. As a matter of fact, the Turning test was not even intended to be a test for consciousness but a test of whether or not a given computer could be classified as "intelligent".

 

[stamenflicker]

The Church-Turing thesis concerns the limits of computation, its not a recipe to produce consciousness. As a matter of fact, the Turning test was not even intended to be a test for consciousness but a test of whether or not a given computer could be classified as "intelligent".

ALL HORSES RUN A LITTLE FASTER FOR THE BUTCHER’S SON. ~ Sananda Maitreya

 

[PixyMisa]

The Church-Turing thesis concerns the limits of computation, its not a recipe to produce consciousness.

Correct.

But it points out that everything you are saying is entirely irrelevant. The brain cannot be doing anything any other computer can't do. Therefore it is necessarily possible to build conscious computer systems. We can state that with absolute authority even if we don't yet know precisely how to do it.

If you are saying that consciousness is not "a computation" (which I wouldn't say either; it's a computational process), then what is it that you think is necessary in addition to computation and why do you think this?

 

[AkuManiMani]

The Church-Turing thesis concerns the limits of computation, its not a recipe to produce consciousness.

Correct.

But it points out that everything you are saying is entirely irrelevant. The brain cannot be doing anything any other computer can't do. Therefore it is necessarily possible to build conscious computer systems. We can state that with absolute authority even if we don't yet know precisely how to do it.

If you are saying that consciousness is not "a computation" (which I wouldn't say either; it's a computational process), then what is it that you think is necessary in addition to computation and why do you think this?

As I've already said -- probably hundreds of times now -- the essential feature of consciousness is subjective experience.

 

[PixyMisa]

As I've already said -- probably hundreds of times now -- the essential feature of consciousness is subjective experience.

Okay. Not particularly well-defined, but okay. But it in no way addresses the point.

What is it that you think is necessary in addition to computation and why do you think this?

 

[AkuManiMani]

As I've already said -- probably hundreds of times now -- the essential feature of consciousness is subjective experience.

Okay. Not particularly well-defined, but okay. But it in no way addresses the point.

What is it that you think is necessary in addition to computation and why do you think this?

You asked me what is required for consciousness and I told you: If one has no subjective experience then they are not conscious. As of now there is no scientific understanding of the sufficient condition(s) for producing subjective experience, so an operational definition is not possible.

 

[PixyMisa]

You asked me what is required for consciousness and I told you: If one has no subjective experience then they are not conscious. As of now there is no scientific understanding of the sufficient condition(s) for producing subjective experience, so an operational definition is not possible.

Well, I disagree with you there of course. But what I am asking is, if you think something more than computation is required, what do you think this is, and why?

Or if you merely think that computation is insufficient, why do you think this, and what else might be required?

Because as far as I can see, the Church-Turing thesis is a mathematical proof that computers can be conscious. The brain is a computer; the brain produces consicousness; no computer is more powerful than a Turing machine. Not complicated, really.

 

[!Kaggen]

What is it that you think is necessary in addition to computation

I will take a stab.

Using the strong interpretations of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants as a starting point.

http://hps.elte.hu/~zemplen/goethemorph.html

By attributing the same lawfulness to the outer world as to the inner and training the faculty for comprehending this relationship we can come to the conclusion that an understanding of how consciousness comes about has as much to do with its effects as to its reason.

Thus the imaginative study of human endeavors will reveal additional requirements for consciousness in addition to computation/reason.

I suggest beginning with song writing

why do you think this?

Experience

 

[PixyMisa]

I will take a stab.

Using the strong interpretations of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants as a starting point.

http://hps.elte.hu/~zemplen/goethemorph.html

What, exactly, does the strong interpretation - or any interpretation - of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants have to do with the subject? What evidence is there that the strong interpretation - or any interpretation - of Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants is in any way valid?

By attributing the same lawfulness to the outer world as to the inner and training the faculty for comprehending this relationship we can come to the conclusion that an understanding of how consciousness comes about has as much to do with its effects as to its reason.

It is true that our understanding of how things come about has much to do with what those things do. Unfortunately, this is in no way a substantive response to the question; it's little more than hand-waving.

Thus the imaginative study of human endeavors will reveal additional requirements for consciousness in addition to computation/reason.

How does this follow from the previous statement?

I suggest beginning with song writing

What evidence do you have that song writing requires more than computation, particularly when we already have song-writing computers?

Experience

What experience? Experience of what? What evidence and reasoned argument can you present to back up this experience?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

double

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That appears to involve a metaphysical assumption - the assumption of dualism.

It appears that way to you because you are a materialist. It does not involve an assumption of dualism. It does entail that materialism is false, but that is not the same thing.

My own view is that I am part of the environment I observe and that it is part of me - that there is no fundamental difference between the inside and the outside. I don't assume the view is true but it is at least plausible and so I cannot accept that "external" is a meaningful way of describing me and not me.

So there's no difference between what you believe about reality and what is actually happening in reality? I don't understand.

So what does it mean in metaphysics?

Metaphysics and religion are a type of art. Correspondence in the arts works differently to science. In science, we have an attempt to accurately correspond to the a subset of reality we call "physical". In most of the arts there are attempt to correspond to various subsets of reality, usually related to humans, but in this case there is not usually any need to try to represent it accurately. At least, not since the invention of photography, anyway. Rather, it is understood that the correspondence will be imperfect and it is the nature of the imperfections which make the difference between one artistic statement and another. Art can also attempt to correspond to noumenal reality as well as physical reality, again usually in ways that are understood to be imperfect. Only during attempts at systematic metaphysics or related religious claims does art try to represent the entire system, and in this case there is once again a need to try to correspond correctly, even though this is impossible, hence "The Tao that can be described is not the eternal Tao", even though the Tao Te Ching then goes on to attempt a description of the Tao that cannot be described. This leads to an additional problem, because the one of the things these forms of art try to correspond to is the thing that words like "Tao" or "God" are supposed to refer to, and this thing is fundamentally paradoxical. That is why mystical texts tend to be full of what I'd call "absolute paradoxes" e.g. Wittgenstein claiming in the Tractatus that absolute solipsism can coincide with absolute realism.

Exactly, so you can't take any one metaphysical view and say that it is the metaphysics of science. Science is metaphysically neutral, even if individual scientists are not.

I am not trying to produce a metaphysics of science. We already have one of those. It's called "materialism". That is not to say that materialism is actually true, but that we must think like materialists when we are playing scientific language games.

So what is your definition of non-physical reality?

I'd define it as neutral, mathematical or informational.

How is something going to help you get at the truth if you don't know whether that thing is real or imaginary?

Coherency can help to inductively establish that it is real, or likely to be real.

so "internal" means your consciousness.

Which would make my consciousness external, wouldn't it?

Your consciousness is external to my consciousness.

But trying to reach correspondence between the model and "metaphysical or noumenal reality" would be a waste of time unless you could show the term to be meaningful.

Why? How can I show any term to be meaningful?

So what kind of an explanation do you think your method would provide of any of these things that would be different to a scientific explanation and by what method would it reach that explanation?

The method is "by hook or by crook", although unlike Feyerabend I can't count such methods as scientific. There are no rules to art or mysticism.

The explanation would be metaphysical, which is to be understood as closely related to artistic and religious. The Tao Te Ching is artistic, metaphysical and religious.

 

[PixyMisa]

Metaphysics and religion are a type of art. Correspondence in the arts works differently to science. In science, we have an attempt to accurately correspond to the a subset of reality we call "physical". In most of the arts there are attempt to correspond to various subsets of reality, usually related to humans, but in this case there is not usually any need to try to represent it accurately. At least, not since the invention of photography, anyway. Rather, it is understood that the correspondence will be imperfect and it is the nature of the imperfections which make the difference between one artistic statement and another. Art can also attempt to correspond to noumenal reality as well as physical reality, again usually in ways that are understood to be imperfect. Only during attempts at systematic metaphysics or related religious claims does art try to represent the entire system, and in this case there is once again a need to try to correspond correctly, even though this is impossible, hence "The Tao that can be described is not the eternal Tao", even though the Tao Te Ching then goes on to attempt a description of the Tao that cannot be described. This leads to an additional problem, because the one of the things these forms of art try to correspond to is the thing that words like "Tao" or "God" are supposed to refer to, and this thing is fundamentally paradoxical. That is why mystical texts tend to be full of what I'd call "absolute paradoxes" e.g. Wittgenstein claiming in the Tractatus that absolute solipsism can coincide with absolute realism.

This is of course where the concept of NOMA ultimately leads us.

On the one side we have science - mathematically defined propositions strictly tested against reality.

On the other side we have stuff you just made up.

Which is precisely how we divide our libraries already: non-fiction, carefully categorised by the Dewey Decimal System, and fiction... sorted by the name of whoever made it up.

I am not trying to produce a metaphysics of science. We already have one of those. It's called "materialism". That is not to say that materialism is actually true, but that we must think like materialists when we are playing scientific language games.

What you call playing scientific language games is what everyone else calls not just making stuff up. You are quite right. In science, you're not allowed to just make stuff up.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and that is also why, to everyone else, your arguments are haphazard collections of logical fallacies, while to you they are marvels of philosophical rigour: You have adopted an epistemology where you are allowed to just make stuff up.

To us, it's a non-sequitur. To you, it's perfectly valid to just make stuff up.

To us, it's special pleading. To you, well, that's just your epistemology. Rules don't apply. You can just make stuff up.

You are quite correct that this is how things work in religion, and also to a degree in art. An artist must adopt some common rules in order to communicate with the viewer/reader/listener, but breaking a previously unrecognised rule can also lead to new forms of art.

The problem with this is that there is no reason at all to suppose it leads to a correct model of reality. Science does this. Art doesn't; an individual work of art may model an aspect of reality quite well, but this is not a systematic approach of art as a whole. And of course religion and mysticism are the systematic avoidance of an accurate model of reality. That's why religion is ultimately incompatible with, and in conflict with, science.

 

[PixyMisa]

And the problem with this epistemology is easily demonstrated. As Kant said in his masterpiece, Spektrum der Wissenschaft:

Everything UndercoverElephant says is wrong.

This was expanded on by Wittgenstein in his posthumous work, Einem Augenblick, Bitte:

Sure, this quote is entirely made up. But by the rules you've invoked, I'm allowed to do that. So what Kant said.

 

[Belz...]

That's because the question you are asking us is akin to "How come bananas aren't tectonic plates?"

What are we supposed to say?

Very well, UE. It has become increasingly obvious that you have no intention of answering your question, presumably because you have no idea what you meant by "implications".

 

[Belz...]

It appears that way to you because you are a materialist.

You keep doing this: arguing against your impression of someone's inner thoughts. Why do you do this instead of debating against the argument itself is anybody's guess.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You keep doing this: arguing against your impression of someone's inner thoughts. Why do you do this instead of debating against the argument itself is anybody's guess.

No, that's not what I am doing. Robin is a materialist, and I get continually accused by materialists of being a dualist. I am not a dualist, but many of my arguments appear dualistic to materialists. The reason for this is that many materialists set up a false dichotomy between materialism and dualism.

Right now, Robin and myself are talking about what the word "truth" means. I am defending a pluralist theory of truth which claims that in order to be considered true, a proposition may have to pass the test of both coherency and correspondence, but I cannot explain how I am applying those tests without implicitly denying materialism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Very well, UE. It has become increasingly obvious that you have no intention of answering your question, presumably because you have no idea what you meant by "implications".

I know what "implications" means. What I am rejecting is that there is a burden of proof on me to demonstrate that two entities with completely different definitions and descriptions are in fact the same thing.

If you think consciousness and behaviour are the same thing then it is up to you to explain what on Earth this is supposed to mean. By default, if two things are defined and described differently, we assume they are not the same.

 

[PixyMisa]

Indeed, to take my thesis to its logical conclusion, those remarks by Kant and Wittgenstein can be found in every copy of every work by those authors. The only distinction is those particular words are not printed, they're p-rinted. P-rinting has all the properties of printing without actually being printing. This means that you can't read it unless you already know it is there. And likewise, any attempt to copy it makes it disappear.

And if you disagree, it's up to you to prove me wrong, and I'm allowed to make up evidence to support my case.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You're not understanding. I've never argued that it isn't possible for anything but our brains to produce consciousness. I said that until we understand the physics of how our brains produce consciousness [and the range of subjective experiences that come with it] we cannot design it into any artificial system.

OK, but you've provided no argument why that is the case. Why must we understand it at the level of the physics? We understand many other things in biology at the level of systems. That we need to understand the issue intimately is trivial. Of course we need to understand how the brain does it.

Judging from the many of the posts here I would have to say no. Everyone doesn't "know that".

Well they should. This issue was dealt with years ago.

If you've been following my posting history you would know that I've NEVER argued that it's not possible to create conscious computers; after all, our brains are examples of such computers. My argument is, and always has been, that consciousness qua consciousness is -not- a computation.

I'm afraid I don't follow anyone's posting history and I don't follow the current incarnations of this debate closely. They've been going on sporadically since I got here and undoubtedly before I got here. I entered early into them then, but just don't have the time or patience now.

As to 'consciousness qua consciousness' not being a computation, well nothing in the brain or a computer *is* a computation except final output. But what is going on in them is computational (or information processing); so I would have to disagree with you if you want to argue that consciousness is not an information processing process - a verb.

We have to remember that there is a frame problem when discussing this that throws many people off. Typically, when we discuss computation or information processing we look at these processes from the outside. The frame involving the outside provides a description of a process. A description is not the process itself. When we describe running no movement occurs.

From the inside there is no reason not to think that information processing is not consciousness. A person running does move. Information processing in the system known as a person experiences. With the proper engineering I have no reason to suspect that a computer would not be capable of the same.

The issue is not that consciousness is not information processing, but what structure provides the ability to experience. One key feature, I will repeat, is that we are sensorimotor integrators, and there are good reasons to believe that 'experience' is tightly involved in motor response viewed in a broad way -- as the particular framing of problems, as active involvement in the process of sensing the world, and as behavioral tendencies toward certain types of action.