Are You Conscious?

[Malerin]

Read the conversation and try again.

OK fine.

This will be my third attempt to double-check your link author's experiment.

C:\Users\Frank\Documents\consoleshrdlu[1]>clisp -M lispinit.mem -i loader
i i i i i i i ooooo o ooooooo ooooo ooooo
I I I I I I I 8 8 8 8 8 o 8 8
I \ `+' / I 8 8 8 8 8 8
\ `-+-' / 8 8 8 ooooo 8oooo
`-__|__-' 8 8 8 8 8
| 8 o 8 8 o 8 8
------+------ ooooo 8oooooo ooo8ooo ooooo 8

Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Michael Stoll 1992, 1993
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Marcus Daniels 1994-1997
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Pierpaolo Bernardi, Sam Steingold 1998
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Sam Steingold 1999

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SHRDLU version UMR-1.0
Loaded 12/31/2009 in CLISP 1999-07-22 (July 1999)


READY
Who's on first?

*YES.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
I mean the fellow's name.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The guy on first.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The first baseman.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The guy playing first.

*WHO IS ON FIRST.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
I'm asking you who's on first.

*THAT IS THE MAN'S NAME.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
That's who's name?

*YES.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Well go ahead and tell me.

*THAT'S IT.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
That's who?

*YES
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Look, do you have a first baseman?

*CERTAINLY.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Who's playing first?

*THAT IS RIGHT.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY

Well Pixy... SHRDLU's answers to my questions can only be interpreted as non-responsive.

ROFL! Nominated.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Frank, using reasoning similar to Pixi's, I'd also like to use your "Who's on First" routine to finally prove that SHRDLU is not conscious.

1. SHRDLU correctly answers responses exactly like Bud Abbott.
2. That means SHRDLU is Bud Abbott.
3. Bud Abbott is dead.
4. Anything dead is not conscious.
5. Therefore, SHRDLU is not conscious.

Q.E.D.

Fixed that for you

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Think you just proved I'm unconscious.

Dead, too... I'm Lou

yes, your're right - I got them backwards. But Abbott is dead too so the argument remains sound as the day is long.

As for you, we always knew you weren't conscious unless you're a toaster.

Just pray Pixi's right and you wake up in the morning.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Depends on what you mean by exist, but yeah. Must we drag this out? I'm really not planning on checking this thread much longer. I was just bored watching college football and chimed in to a few things I don't normally spend that much time on. What's your point?

Ack! Sorry, I wont drag this out then -- I'll get strait to the point >_<

Is this going to be Descartes all over again -- the only thing about which I can be truly aware of is my own mental content/consciousness?

Even Descartes conceded that we cannot be sure of our perceptions, so we can't be sure of qualia. We may be fooled by them; are we always correct about our feelings? They are, after all, constructions, though some emotions appear to be in-built.

What I'm saying follows the same line of reasoning as Descartes -- the whole "I think, therefore I am" rigmarole. We know that we have being and that our thoughts, and other subjective experiences, serve as a priori proof of our existence. The very heart of this discussion comes down to this simple question: What is the "I" thats doing the thinking?

In your thread about awareness I pointed out that, via metabolism, the material composition of our bodies has a turnover. This demonstrates we are not our bodies [literal ships of theseus] but some processes acting upon the transient composition of the body. So as things stand, we know a priori that we are objectively real, and can deduce a posteriori that we are not our brains/bodies. So what are we, then?

I submit that we ARE consciousness and our experiences are made of the "stuff" of consciousness. We are not merely abstractions, but beings that have a concrete existence which, in principle, can be identified and understood scientifically. Find out what consciousness is and you find out what you are.

 

[westprog]

It is expressly the viewpoint of Mercutio and Jeff Corey -- the only two behaviorists I know on this forum. There may be some people who express old behaviorist notions here, I don't really know since I'm not paying that much attention to this thread; but I don't think it fair to make any sort of blanket statement about behaviorists. Not that this is much of a point -- just a gentle reminder.

Your point is taken. I don't accept that some of the outlandish claims made here are representative of the field in general, so I need to be careful about what I attribute to the researchers out in the real world - who tend to be quite restrained in what they claim.

 

[PixyMisa]

OK fine.

This will be my third attempt to double-check your link author's experiment.

Well Pixy... SHRDLU's answers to my questions can only be interpreted as non-responsive.

I really don't see why. It makes more sense than you do...

 

[westprog]

Aku, Pixy won't read this but here's one obvious question you could ask:

So SHRDLU is conscious when talking about blocks and unconscious if I take the slightest deviation from that? Seems to me I don't cease becoming conscious the minute you ask me about something I have no clue about nor even have any basis in language to understand.

Try using expressions pertaining to blocks (like green) and see if you can get it to recognize the general concept. You can't, it's a look up table in that regard.

It's the ability of humans in conversation to operate outside of a limited context that allows us to detect their consciousness.

 

[PixyMisa]

I see you beat me to it. I predict Pixi will say our consciousness is like a synthesis of millions of SHRDLUs for all sorts of tasks. Ironically, that would be the best definition of a p-zombie I've ever read - and I hate it.

No.

 

[westprog]

OK, but that doesn't really change things, depending on how you define it.

And taken to its logical limit - that implies a non-Turing component of consciousness.

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixi's definition incorporates his conclusions and simplifications and thus can always be expected to give the "correct" answer.

No. This is, once again, a hapless flaming strawman.

As you just pointed out, it's a definition. It doesn't give answers. It's a definition.

You can say that it's overly broad - or overly precise - or specifies properties that are not actually present in the subject of the definition.

In fact, I've asked you to do that. You or anyone else. I've asked a number of times. Instead, you respond with logical fallacies.

Aside from that, the problem is that our consciousness and its properties are the only consciousness we really know anything about.

Really?

Are dolphins not conscious? Gorillas? Chimps? Elephants? Why? What precise behaviours do they fail to exhibit that you assert are necessary for consciousness?

Is SHRDLU not conscious? What precise behaviour does it exhibit or fail to exhibit that leads you to this conclusion, and why?

If you have a definition of consciousness that is consistent and explains lots of stuff but you can't extrapolate it to ours I'd say you've got nothing very useful. You could call it floom and it would do as much explanatory work.

True, but of course irrelevant.

 

[PixyMisa]

And taken to its logical limit - that implies a non-Turing component of consciousness.

Show your work.

 

[PixyMisa]

But I've belabored that point enough. The next big problem I have with Pixi is he actually thinks he's explained consciousness with his definition, at least to his satisfaction.

Have I ever said that I have explained consciousness?

Or have I said repeatedly pointed out that the actual details of how consciousness, on the level of humans or of other animals, arises from brain function are immensely complex and are still being worked out by neuroscientists?

At least enough to say some cars are conscious. That's a huge claim his definition supports that his explanations don't.

Are some cars conscious by my definition? Yes, you say so yourself. So the claim is simply correct.

Pixi's definition is that consciousness is self-referential computation.

Yes.

So let me ask you this, how much more does this really tell us about consciousness than this definition:

Consciousness is computation.

It tells us that self-reference is required.

Not much, all Pixi has done is is slightly qualify computation and since most computations of any complexity utilize some form of self-referentialism (This is the whole raison d'etre of Turing's breakthrough and the nature of recursion that led to digital computers) there really isn't much difference.

I see. So are you asserting that there is no difference between a Turing-equivalent computational device and one that cannot reference its own instructions?

Well, no, obviously you're not.

There's an enormous difference in generality between the two. So why are you trying to ignore it?

With my simplfied definition anything computed is conscious - an even more ridiculous claim.

No, for several reasons. First, while your definition is over-general, it is correct. Consciousness is computation.

Trees are plants. Are plants trees? No, some plants are trees.

So no, your assertion does not follow from your definition.

If and when we do discover everything there is to know about what qualifies computation to be conscious, I'd bet everything I have that toasters and "smart" cars won't meet them.

FUWF, consciousness is a term that we need to define. We can define it such that it includes smart cars, or we can define it so that it doesn't. Either position is valid.

What I'm asking of you is what reasons you have for this position. You'd bet everything you have? Why?

That's what I want to know.

You disagree with my definition? Offer a better one. Or two - you can subdivide the domain and offer separate definitions. Or quantify it. Or whatever.

You already accept my definition as a necessary component. You say it's not sufficient. Fine. What is?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Show your work.

Show yours.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Have I ever said that I have explained consciousness?

Or have I said repeatedly pointed out that the actual details of how consciousness, on the level of humans or of other animals, arises from brain function are immensely complex and are still being worked out by neuroscientists?

Then you've nothing of substance to contribute to this discussion other than the inane platitudes you've been chanting for years.

You already accept my definition as a necessary component. You say it's not sufficient. Fine. What is?

The entire point of neuroscience is to answer that very question; they're still working on it. Unless you're privy to some knowledge that neuroscientists aren't, you've no grounds to claim that you have a sufficient definition of consciousness.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ack! Sorry, I wont drag this out then -- I'll get strait to the point >_<



What I'm saying follows the same line of reasoning as Descartes -- the whole "I think, therefore I am" rigmarole. We know that we have being and that our thoughts, and other subjective experiences, serve as a priori proof of our existence. The very heart of this discussion comes down to this simple question: What is the "I" thats doing the thinking?

In your thread about awareness I pointed out that, via metabolism, the material composition of our bodies has a turnover. This demonstrates we are not our bodies [literal ships of theseus] but some processes acting upon the transient composition of the body. So as things stand, we know a priori that we are objectively real, and can deduce a posteriori that we are not our brains/bodies. So what are we, then?

I submit that we ARE consciousness and our experiences are made of the "stuff" of consciousness. We are not merely abstractions, but beings that have a concrete existence which, in principle, can be identified and understood scientifically. Find out what consciousness is and you find out what you are.

When someone answers "yes" to the question "Do you exist" that does not imply that the "I" is an unchanging essence. "We" are, in a broad sense, a particular instantiation of certain materials in a particular pattern, both of which change over time -- both material and pattern. Simply because "we" feel that "we" are the same as earlier in life does not mean this is true. It's a feeling after all, a feeling that arises in the present. We cannot compare it to earlier evidence of who or what we were in the past.

Since the pattern that, in part, constitutes what "I" call "me" changes with experience "I" am literally not the same "being" (substitute a verb here, since nouns are not the proper kind of word to convey the idea) "I" was when "I" began this sentence -- since some of the synaptic connections are theoretically changing to account for memory of what "I" am currently writing.

Since consciousness is always a present experience, I would maintain that you have this backward. Any sense of "I" consists primarily of prior memory -- autobiographical memory.

But, look, if you're just going to say David Chalmers got it right and consciousness is some irreducible fundamental component of the cosmos, then just say that. It's fine if you want to believe that, but there is no evidence of it and no logical argument that makes it so.

I am, frankly, a bit put off by folks who want to argue that consciousness is irreducible. The same thing was once said of perception, life, and currently certain biological processes (by at least one biochemistry professor who was disowned by his department). The history of science and discussions on this very forum would tend to argue very strongly against this perspective.

If that is what you want to believe, then that's fine for you. Unless you can show me some sort of demonstration why anyone should believe the same, I would prefer to work toward a useful definition.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

And taken to its logical limit - that implies a non-Turing component of consciousness.

No. I don't think it does. Turing equivalence is not limited to syntax, though people often seem to argue that it is.

Moving beyond this requires a different sort of programming than we typically engage in now, but there is no theoretical limit that ensures that a universal Turing machine cannot produce consciousness. This is precisely why I continue to invoke "what is feeling?" and "what is meaning?". I think both of those questions have definite directions if not precise answers.

 

[westprog]

Show your work.

It's not mine, it's the Wasp's. He said that stimulus-response was insufficient. I'm claiming that a Turing machine is just stimulus-response.

I've a feeling that the Wasp might disagree with my interpretation of his interpretation of what I said, but we can talk about it.

 

[westprog]

I am, frankly, a bit put off by folks who want to argue that consciousness is irreducible.

It may or may not be irreducible. However, it has not been reduced, and we don't know what it will reduce to.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's not mine, it's the Wasp's. He said that stimulus-response was insufficient. I'm claiming that a Turing machine is just stimulus-response.

I've a feeling that the Wasp might disagree with my interpretation of his interpretation of what I said, but we can talk about it.

Yes, I disagree. Stimulus-response in biology means something quite specific. If you want to speak of it in broad terms, then that is fine as long as I know the rules of the game.

Really, though, what a neuron does is stimulus-response (input, summation, output). You are essentially saying that neurons can't account for consciousness if you make this argument.

What is needed is more work on emotion, feelings, semantics - to understand the kinds of neuronal interaction (the stimulus-response) from which can be built experience and meaning.

The essence of the Chinese Room argument, as Searle himself says, is that simple syntactical systems cannot in and of themselves account for semantics. That is entirely correct. That does not mean that there is no way for us to build semantic content into a system that depends ultimately on stimulus-response (as you have defined it).

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It may or may not be irreducible. However, it has not been reduced, and we don't know what it will reduce to.

Really? What is awareness? What is consciousness? There is no way to reduce these complex concepts into simpler processes?