Are You Conscious?

[FedUpWithFaith]

Finally! Something we differ on

I disagree with your assessment that consciousness is a "self-perceived abstraction". For one thing, consciousness begins with the perception of any object, whether they be external or one's self. Also, IMO, its not an abstraction any more than the individual firing of brain cells is an abstraction. Its a concrete phenomenon with essential characteristics inherent to it.

I'd say that the only 'illusions' are our individual interpretations and understandings of the objects we perceive, which will always be incomplete and imperfect. The actual process of perception itself is undeniably real and the sine non qua our existence as subjects and our knowledge of the world.

This is something I'd like to argue about with you on several levels because it has deeper philosophical implications as well. You're going to have to convince me that perception itself is not an abstraction process. Actually, since you believe perception is a computational process, as I do, you're going to have to explain to me how computation is not abstraction. It relies completely on mathematics and symbols or signals and nothing more. Yes, the substrate for computation, in this case the brain/neurons, is "real" but its also mutable and irrelevant. I can simulate a computer simulating a computed ad infinitum if I wanted to to serve as brain substrate. I'm not arguing that mind isn't ultimately dependent on the physical.

When we observe something we are not, in philosophical or real terms, experiencing "the thing in itself". We are experiencing a representation or model of that thing computed by our perception. That "thing" is nothing more than equations (that's a simplification but you know what I mean) in your brain and the degree to which those equations "mirror" reality depends on the quality of functioning. We have all been fooled by our senses and there are many optical illusions I could show you to prove this. This is what Kant called "the veil of perception".

Consider a photograph of a tree. I'd consider the picture of the tree to be an "illusion" in the same sense I described consciousness as an illusion, which is basically a representation that can be potentially distorted and to which there is no guarantee or even possibility of capturing everything in the essense of the object being observed/photographed. A photo of a tree is not the tree itself. It could be out of focus or the colors could be off - even inverted on the complementary color wheel (reds to greens etc). Of course, our minds effortlessly and unconsciously recognize the degree of clarity and color integrity assuming they're functioning properly. In the "world" of the photograph (pretend it was conscious), the inverted-color image is how it would naturally experience its qualia and frankly, it would be no better or worse than ours. In that sense the representation has to be like an illusion, otherwise you'd have to prove to me that anything conscious in the universe perceives what you do exactly as you do. You can't even prove I do.

 

[Malerin]

Malerin,

I think we're pretty much on the same page here. But in Z's and other defense, and even my own, I often refer to consciousness in certain senses as illusion which I think is in a similar vein to calling it a "useful fiction".

I don't think illusionary or fictional consciousness makes any sense. If you are conscious, you know it with Cartesian certainty. If you are unconscious, you don't know anything. Illusionary/fictional consciousness is the equivalent of unconscious consciousness.

 

[westprog]

So basically, I can just write any program with "a behavioural modification mechanism", call it pain, and it will -actual be- the sensation of pain?

I think you're missing the point of the behavioural approach. Get a robot to exhibit the appearance of pain, and it doesn't matter whether it feels pain. Indeed, talking about whether it feels pain is entirely meaningless.

You may or may not find this a comfort when you have a toothache.

 

[westprog]

Why wouldn't I be posting here? Haven't you ever seen homeless people talk to themselves? They seem to be having fascinating conversations.

What we believe to be true and what we know to be true are different things. I believe that other conscious minds exist. I know that my own conscious mind exists.

 

[westprog]

Well, for starters, if the field is computer science, a "well educated" individual doesn't make a statement of the form "computers can't do X" when a computer did X ten years ago.

I see. A hypothetical. An actual example might be helpful. But I won't hold my breath. Quoting me as saying "computers can't do X" is easy enough, isn't it? Much easier than actually quoting me.

Here's another quote from Dijkstra - "The question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim." Is Dijkstra somebody who was a significant figure in the field of computer science?

Really, that is my only problem with you, because you don't make strong claims about any other field. If you are going to make strong claims about computer science then you should be current with the research.

And you are not.

The fact that you don't realise when I haven't been making claims about computer science shows how one-dimensional the viewpoint is.

But tell me more about those splash patterns from fire bombs.

 

[westprog]

So just please don't get in a fight!

It's precisely because he knows what he's talking about that his views should be challenged. There's no point in being superficial.

 

[westprog]

RD believes the same thing Pixy does, except his belief seems to spring more out of desperate hope. Hes likely to be shrill and evasive in defense of his beliefs which, IMO, indicates that on some level he has doubts about them. Pixy, on the other hand, is just a blockhead.

On the other hand everyone with any experience in any of the many fields involved agrees with Rocketdodger and disagrees with me. That's very impressive 100% support, and I don't think you can dismiss him that easily.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

I don't think illusionary or fictional consciousness makes any sense. If you are conscious, you know it with Cartesian certainty. If you are unconscious, you don't know anything. Illusionary/fictional consciousness is the equivalent of unconscious consciousness.

What I have described as the "Illusion" of consciousness is a paradox relative to your views but not a contradiction. In order to disprove me you're going to have to demonstrate the logical fallacy of my argument, not simply provide an alternative perspective.

Abstraction is our mental reality. All mental computations are abstractions. I'm not saying you know you exist in the abstract. Your consciousness is an abstract entity that perceives its own models of reality and abstract thinking to yield awareness. It's real and illusion at the same time. ..Sort of like light being a particle and a wave. That's the paradox.

 

[westprog]

The first class of poster seems to argue largely from appeals to emotion, arguments from incredulity, strawmen attacks, ad-hominem attacks, and similar fallacies; rarely, if ever, do they invoke an actual thoughtful, rational argument or notion in these discussions. I'm not actually sure how to define the arguments of the second class of poster, simply because I don't know the right terms involved; but, essentially, they argue by defining the terms first, and explaining how things fit into those definitions second; and those things that do not fit the explanations are often discarded as irrelevant or non-existent.

I've found that in discussing subject X that the people who agree with me put forward sound, well founded arguments, expressed concisely and intelligently. OTOH, the people who disagree merely hurl obscenities and insults, gesture obscenely, and scratch themselves. They are also ugly, deformed and smell bad. I was as surprised as anyone to notice this.

EDIT: Does anyone know why the forum keeps logging me out before I can finish typing a response? Thanks

If the forum is conscious why not ask it?

 

[PixyMisa]

On the other hand everyone with any experience in any of the many fields involved agrees with Rocketdodger and disagrees with me. That's very impressive 100% support, and I don't think you can dismiss him that easily.

Perhaps you might consider that this is because he is actually correct.

 

[westprog]

OK fine



It uses the word "word" and says it doesn't know the word "words".

It uses the word "don't" and says it doesn't know the word "don't".

EVIDENCE FAIL

ETA: What is this thing supposed to do Pixy?

It's actually a good example of the limits of "intelligent" computer programs. They don't "know" things except when they are specifically instructed to lookup specific information in response to specific conditions.

Contrary to what Rocketdodger likes to assert, the more one understands about computer programs, the less likely one is to think of them as remotely intelligent, or with a capacity for understanding. Once you look through the code, you realise that not only is there no consciousness involved in what's going on, but that consciousness is as irrelevant as in designing a bridge or a bus. It's mathematics and engineering, simple cause and effect. SHRDLU and ELIZA are just little jokes, entertaining but of no significance in understanding what it is like to be human. They aren't self-referencing in any interesting way - not even as much as a rock is self-referencing.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What I have described as the "Illusion" of consciousness is a paradox relative to your views but not a contradiction. In order to disprove me you're going to have to demonstrate the logical fallacy of my argument, not simply provide an alternative perspective.

Abstraction is our mental reality. All mental computations are abstractions. I'm not saying you know you exist in the abstract. Your consciousness is an abstract entity that perceives its own models of reality and abstract thinking to yield awareness. It's real and illusion at the same time. ..Sort of like light being a particle and a wave. That's the paradox.

I have no real objection to what you are saying here, but I do have a slight problem with the form.

This is not a big point, but one that needs to be often repeated -- you have, yourself, argued earlier that consciousness is not an entity but a process and should be represented by a verb. Processes are fairly easy to view as abstractions; entities are not.

 

[westprog]

Allow me a moment to recompose myself... (snicker snicker)

The point, Franky baby, is if you know its language, you can communicate with it to whatever degree it possesses. I'm not personally familiar with SHRDLU, so I have no idea what language or dialect or whatever it speaks. Meanwhile, any being can have a standard response when it doesn't understand something. I can say "I don't know what ____ means" in six different languages, none of which I speak - which is why I learned that phrase. If someone who only speaks German asked me the same questions, I'd sound to him like the SHRDLU sounds to you. So would that make me non-conscious?

As an 'evidence fail', it falls far short, Frank.

... did you try Esparanto? Just kidding!

SHRDLU, as with any computer program now extant, doesn't "know" the meaning of any words. All any program does is do exactly what the ignorant tourist does - parrot back a phrase in an unknown language.

 

[westprog]

You're still using the reverse perspective from what I was proposing, in order to say this.



Interesting. So you deny that your near-entire set of behaviours, much of it being private, is modeled after other people's ?



So have I.

None of my experience of pain is modelled on someone else's experience of pain, because I've never had someone else's experience of pain. My behaviour when I experience pain might well be based, partly, on how other people behave.

That people can behave differently when experiencing the same pain can be readily confirmed. It can also be confirmed that they can behave the same way when experiencing different sensations. We cannot use behaviour as a reliable guide to the experience of pain. We know that it's possible to have no pain at all and to say "ouch!".

(Incidentally, I think it might be simpler to avoid talking about "qualia" and to talk about pain. A lot of nonsense sounds plausible when discussing an esoteric term like "qualia". Say the same thing about "pain" and the nonsense is obvious.)

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think you're missing the point of the behavioural approach. Get a robot to exhibit the appearance of pain, and it doesn't matter whether it feels pain. Indeed, talking about whether it feels pain is entirely meaningless.

You may or may not find this a comfort when you have a toothache.

This is true of behaviorism far in the past but not today. I don't think anyone thinks like that any longer.

The only issue with the behavioral approach is that if we want to have any access on any level to what goes on in someone else's experience, the only approach we have is to examine their behavior.

We postulate other minds and what happens within them. We can't know with absolute confidence anything that happens in other minds as they experience them. I think we all know this.

 

[westprog]

But why does the the first organism experience pain? Why not just mechanically move away, like some creatures do? Surely the answer has something to do with the way in which the reaction evolved.

One could assume that a bubble of steam in a kettle is experiencing pain and moving away from the source of heat, in exactly the same way that I do when I scald myself. If not, why not?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

SHRDLU, as with any computer program now extant, doesn't "know" the meaning of any words. All any program does is do exactly what the ignorant tourist does - parrot back a phrase in an unknown language.

But do you think it's possible to somehow instruct a computer with semantic content?

 

[westprog]

Because without it, your species would not survive.

Really? How does subjective experience figure in the stimulus-response arc? What function does it fulfill?

 

[westprog]

It is self-evident...

Well, that's handy.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

What I have described as the "Illusion" of consciousness is a paradox relative to your views but not a contradiction. In order to disprove me you're going to have to demonstrate the logical fallacy of my argument, not simply provide an alternative perspective.

Abstraction is our mental reality. All mental computations are abstractions. I'm not saying you know you exist in the abstract. Your consciousness is an abstract entity that perceives its own models of reality and abstract thinking to yield awareness. It's real and illusion at the same time. ..Sort of like light being a particle and a wave. That's the paradox.

I have no real objection to what you are saying here, but I do have a slight problem with the form.

This is not a big point, but one that needs to be often repeated -- you have, yourself, argued earlier that consciousness is not an entity but a process and should be represented by a verb. Processes are fairly easy to view as abstractions; entities are not.

Your point is well taken. Sometimes I have been a little sloppy or have not explicitly defined all my terms - more do to laziness and the fact that I'm already spending a lot of time on this.

I think I said consciousness was not a "thing" before but I don't think I used the word "entity". I realize you may disagree but in the way I meant "entity" it has wider meaning and can be a thing or a process. I'm trying to find agnostic words to describe such things wherever I lack certainty and "entity" was at my fingertips. I disagree with you that its harder to think of things (in the sense you thought I meant entity) as abstractions rather than processes. Symbols and equations are abstract things. In fact, the steps and states of a process are all things.

Frankly I have a problem with any definition of consciousness that relies purely on "thing", "process", or "abstraction" and that's why some of my conclusions and speculations, at least those about qualia, may look somewhat self-contradictory at times. The reason for this is because we do not yet know enough about consciousness to know how reductive our definition or explanation can be. In this sense, if you believe that there is only a "whole" to consciousness and that it can have no functional partly-conscious working parts than you have to commit to it being a process or a thing. And in such debate I come down squarely on process. However I do believe consciousness may have pieces. Its like the old argument "when does the chair cease to be a chair".

While SRIPs are processes their individual computing steps are not. Neither is the I/O that is recursively fed through the system. One can dissect many types of processes into states that are really things aren't they? Don't believe me? Dissect running. Define it to me without referring to the relative positions and trajectories (also things) of particular parts (joints, muscles, etc.). And in discussing the physics of running we know we have to leverage many other processes that running utilizes but are not really "running" themselves (like muscle ATP energy usage). Such subprocesses can also be categorized in particular states ("things") that the process of running utilizes. As I argued in a previous posts, there are ways that nouns can become verbs and vice versa depending on you avenue of reductionism.