Are You Conscious?

[Soapy Sam]

I'm not sure there's so much disagreement here as some appear to think- and what there is has more to do with perception of personality and posting style than to do with the topic under discussion.
Teh Interweb is a narrow band communication channel. Mutual tolerance is helpful.

We know this:- Brains exist. Minds exist. Brains appear to cause minds.

It may be the case that inorganic brains can also cause minds, but that has yet to be proved, except if we accept that all computational systems are minds by definition. Clearly, not everyone does.
(FWIW, I'm personally unconvinced by that argument. I think organic chemistry, embryology and 4 billion years of evolution probably throw an extra ingredient or two in the mix, though I don't doubt such ingredients will be amenable to study and indeed are being studied now. I don't think this is a mystical pov, I think it's just scepticism, but some might disagree).

We all seem to accept that SRIP is involved to some extent in minds. Some think that's basically it, some think it may not be that "simple".
What the second group must show is what, in addition to SRIP is involved. What the AI group must do, is show how, or to what extent, SRIP is adequate as an explanation.

We are arguing in a text-only medium, using words. Words carry meaning which varies from person to person. Unless the overlap is large and we are not arguing about the fringes, misunderstanding will occur. I suspect much of the extreme amazement in either camp at the other's attitude is due to individuals using common words with subtly differing shadings of meaning. (This is an old hobbyhorse of mine).

Example:- Pixy uses "conscious" to describe SRIP systems from "a few NAND gates" to human brains, implying a scale of consciousness related to the complexity of the system. Others (including myself) consider this usage confusing. (Though I find the idea itself perfectly sensible). To me, humans are conscious and so far as I'm aware, nothing else is to anything like the same extent. I think many vertebrates are, to varying degrees. Apes, crows, dogs etc.
I do not accept that "responsive" and " conscious" are the same, though I accept an isomorphism. The most complex supercomputer - driven weapons system in the world may be able to zap me like a bug, but I suspect it does so with no meaningful awareness at all, far less with the simple satisfaction the dimmest human assassin might feel in a job well done. This may be wrong, but I have yet to see it proved right and I feel it's up to the AI proponents to do so, not up to the other camp to prove the negative.

Whether subconscious processes in brains are "conscious" is another matter entirely. We all know at least one brain process is conscious, so it's no great leap to think others might be too. We are unaware of them ourselves, by definition. I find that idea surprising, but acceptable. It hints at an explanation for the way scientists often have a "Eureka" moment after mulling fruitlessly over an intractable problem and abandoning it for a while consciously. To explain this by "The subconscious" has always seemd like a cop-out, to me.

FWIW, I'm not a biologist or a computer programmer. My background is in geology. I work on drilling rigs. I make holes in the ground.

I assume mind is a physical phenomenon, open to study, because I know of no other kind of phenomenon, which , I guess, is Paul's point. I'm not wholly in either camp though. The fact I think it's a physical question doesn't mean I will ever understand it. I don't understand Maxwell's equations or quantum field theory- and these are "physical " phenomena - but in a somewhat abstract sense. Mind may turn out to be an abstraction level further still.
It seems odd- to say the least- that a hundred dollars worth of chemicals should be able to be self aware and even aware of more chemicals in Australia which hold a range of differing opinions about that very oddity.
Odd.
But not, I think, inexplicable.

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixi,

I'm probably going to regret this but I'll try one last time to answer your question, if not for you then for those who've PMed me to say how much they enjoy watching this trainwreck.

This will actually be the first time you've tried to answer the question. Let's see how it goes.

I have been snide and short and rude to you but don't take it personally. It wasn't really intended to hurt you but to amuse myself and add some some provocative passion to the dialogue. And you have been very civil in response which is one of the reasons I'm replying for you potential benefit.

Okay.

The crux of the problem in my view Pixi isn't essentially our differences on consciousness. In fact, if we really sorted through the definitional problems I think we'd be in over 90% agreement. What has frustrated me about you is not your conclusions but how you got to them and how you argue. You confuse the nature and utility of facts, opinion, hypotheses, proofs, descriptions, theorems in illogical and unsupportable ways and appear to be incapable of recognizing this.

As I keep saying, that's a nice assertion, but you have to actually show this. Instead you've perstistently been attacking strawmen of my views, which may amuse you but doesn't really promote understanding.

Anyway, here are my answers to your questions:

1. What do qualia do?

Honest answer: I'm not sure.

Then why do you think they exist?

What does a rock do?

Lots of things. Do you want a gross physical description, or a chemical analysis? Geological? What sort of rock exactly, and under what circumstances? Limestone in acid behaves differently to shale in oil, but both can be completely quantified.

This is exactly my point. We can define a rock completely by what it does. You don't seem to be able to say anything about what qualia do.

What does my subjective mental perception of blue do?

That's a verb. That is what it does.

If you've read all my posts they may just "be".

And there you fall down a philosophical mineshaft.

No, they can't just "be". If they don't do anything, there is no meaningful way they can be said to exist.

I could give you arguments to tell you about all sorts of things I think they plausibly are including:

- the intrinsic mental perception associated with and/or produced by strange loops

What does this intrinsic mental perception do? What is it intrinsic to?

- self-referential result or residual of data compression

A result or residual? Okay, results and residuals are concepts that certainly map onto reality. But what do these particular results or residuals do?

- a self-reflected process state that is not a process itself

Well, again, states are concepts that map onto reality. But as we've agreed, consciousness is a process, not a state, so I'm not sure how this definition of qualia is useful.

- less likely: and epiphenomenal illusion of awareness of processes that are completely unconscious

For reasons I've already mentioned (but will go into in more depth if you're interested) I don't consider that to be meaningful. Sure, we can treat consciousness as an illusion, but if you have the illusion, you have consciousness.

- some combination of the above

Well, okay.

The problem is that you assert that these things are real, deride me for questioning you on this, and can't come up with a coherent definition, much less an operational one.

I'm sorry, but the failure here is in your embracing such a fuzzy concept. I see no reason to consider the term qualia in any way meaningful.

What all of these hypotheses (we obviously don't know enough to call them definitions of qualia yet) share is they all attempt to explain a purely subjective observable called "qualia" which is merely our subjective sense of conscious experience.

Which you can't define.

I agree with Dennett in that qualia are:

" 1. ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any other means than direct experience.
2. intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3. private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4. directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale."

If you have qualia, then you should know what it means.

As far as I can seem, you have simply defined them out of existence.

How about this: Qualia are aspects of a self-referential information processing system as seen from the perspective of that system.

That avoids all the fluff words like intrinsic and inneffable (which is a ridiculous word to try to introduce into a scientific discussion) or apprehensible or even experience, which is problematic in itself.

How do you feel about my definition? I can change the words aspects, which is the least well-defined term there, to behaviours, for example.

I also believe, by their nature, qualia contain no transmittable information either internally in further neural feedback or externally to the outside world.

And again, I note that you have defined them out of existence.

You don't even believe qualia exist or can be defined.

If you want to use the term in a discussion with others, then you have to be able to meaningfully and objectively define it. This is necessarily possible if brains are material (which they are) and minds come from brains (which they do). Not necessarily easy, but necessarily possible.

I know what I see, in my mind's eye (we agree on the veil of perception don't we?) when I see something blue but that experience, unlike all other forms of observation, is by its nature ineffable.

No. This is directly contrary to your own theory of mind.

What I experience is the qualia of blue.

Which you can't coherently define.

If you read and understood Wittgenstein maybe you would better appreciate the deep aspects of this.

I seriously consider the "deep aspects" of this to be entirely illusory, and the result of failing to properly nail down definitions.

That's why I keep harping on the same point: What do qualia do? If you can't tell me, then I ask that you stop using the word.

2. Precisely what behaviour is it that we ascribe to consciousness that SHRDLU does not exhibit?

I'm not going to answer this now since we can't get past #1 and because you insist self-referential processing is self-awareness. I would say certain forms of self-referential processing yield self-awareness.

I'm okay with "certain forms", but I still want you to tell me what forms and why.

I'm not so happy with the idea of self-referntial processing yielding self-awareness, though. It's still definitions, but self-awareness is a process, not a result. Are you talking about a sub-process, a secondary process? In what way is it distinct from the primary self-referential process?

The mind is an abstraction layer - in that sense it isn't "real" in a tangible way.

I describe the mind as a process. But again, this is semantics; we see the same things happening, but we're using different words. So if we can match up our words and definitions, we can talk.

Definitions are important.

The best analogy I can give you to try to help you see why you're wrong is the very nature of abstraction itself manifested in symbolism and language which is the ultimate limitation to philosophical discussions like this. I think Wittgenstein might help you with this too.

I very much doubt that.

I ask you to consider the following statement:

1 + 1 = 2

1 = what?
2 = what?
1+ 1 = what?

What is the essence of these numbers?

They're symbols. They represent something. In this case, they represent abstract concepts.

They aren't a thing like a TV screen and they aren't a process like computation. They are mere abstraction (with symbols).

Absolutely.

[quoteYour arguments sometimes equate what are really abstractions to physical things or processes.[/quote]
No. As I keep pointing out, where you believe that you are attributing your own meanings to my terms.

A mental process can produce abstractions

Well, certainly; that's the point.

but abstractions don't create mental processes

Of course. And nothing I ever said suggested that they do. You may have incorrectly inferred this, but I don't know why.

(though they can be used to represent them!)

Yes, certainly, since abstractions are representations.

Ultimately, I believe qualia are like illusions in the sense that they are mentally generated abstractions (via data compression) that feel subjectively tangible.

Now we're almost getting somewhere, but the language is still a mess. "Subjectively tangible"? It seems like an oxymoron to me.

3. Precisely what behaviour is it that you consider (definitively) necessary for consciousness beyond self-referential information processing?

self-awareness (observable) - which I believe can be abstracted to mental tangibility via strange loops (explanation)

Okay, but I want you to clarify the distinction. What is the actual difference?

Unfortunately, the observable of self-awareness is subjective.

No. I disagree completely here, and it goes back to why P-Zombies are conceptually incoherent. A system that is self-aware exhibits public behaviours that cannot be simulated in a non-self-aware system of equivalent complexity, and may not be simulatable in a non-self-aware system at all. That's why I keep saying, if you want to know if something is self-aware, ask it. Hopefully you'll understand that I don't mean this in the trivial sense - Are you self-aware? Yes. But if the system can respond with a discussion of its internal state, then it knows about its internal state, and it's self-aware.

Hence the examble of SHRDLU. Certainly it's not self-aware on the order of a human being, not remotely. But precisely what behaviours are missing? That's the question I keep coming back to.

So I could only prove my own consciousness.

You prove it in essence by asking the same questions of yourself that you would ask of anyone else. It's just that this process is internal.

I could infer yours assuming your brain operates sufficiently like mine and you told me you were aware of yourself.

Well, yes, but why does my brain need to operate like yours? Why not just ask me?

Otherwise, we need to wait for science to discover the fundamentals and processes of our specific neural strange loops and the general abstract hierarchies and feedback that govern them so that we can potentially recognize them in the same or isomorphic forms in other animals, alien beings or AI machines.

Or we could ask them.

The form of the asking would need to vary to cross the language barrier and the different degrees of self-awareness (like the day my infant nephew realised that that was him in the mirror). But we can reliably infer self-awareness from public behaviour without need for structural similarities.

As we do this, in fact in order to do this, hopefully we will be able to use brain scanning techniques to dissect the operation of these strange loops and correlate them in and between subjects to various forms of qualia and thought.

Mmph. It's certainly useful in fields like perception, but I'm a little skeptical about the utility of current scanning technology for this question.

Based on such self-reporting combined with correlated and completely understood strange loop architectures I think we'll then have a sound basis to determine if something is really conscious.

And I think (sorry) that this is ridiculous.

If something exhibits complex conscious behaviours, are we to consider them unconscious until we have fully mapped out our brains and compared that with its own computational mechanisms? Or can we simply accept that some behaviours cannot be exhibited by non-conscious systems?

However, even this will not meet the standards of proof that someone like UE can argue is required.

Yes, well.

Thanks for this post, it was much more constructive than the last two or three. While I don't entirely agree with you, I do think we can clarify the points of disagreement - some are semantic, some are philosophical, but it seems we agree on all the scientific points. Of course, once we work out that we agree we'll have a lot less to talk about, but maybe then we discuss digital physics instead.

 

[PixyMisa]

Hey, I like that. I wish I'd picked FatDrollTroll as my screenname.

'Salright. I've gone through your answers post and (I hope) clarified that where we disagree is mostly on certain definitions, and not on any of the science.

I still strongly dislike the word qualia, because it was deliberately invented as a question-begging term. But I can live even with that so long as we nail it down.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Okay, so which magical SRIP constitutes pain and how would I instanitate it on my desktop CPU?

Pain is a behavioural modification mechanism. Instantiate that as you wish. A neural network could be a good place to start, though there are certainly other techniques available.

So basically, I can just write any program with "a behavioural modification mechanism", call it pain, and it will -actual be- the sensation of pain?

I dunno, Pixy. Smacks of sorcery to me

Its not a matter of scoring points. I just get a kick out of mocking you because I think you're willfully self-deceptive and I've no respect for such people.

And as I have noted, you can ascribe motives as you see fit, but you need to actually show me where I am wrong. I'll wait. I've been waiting for some time.

Showing someone they're wrong is not the same as them accepting it. I'm not responsible for your cognitive defects.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Yes.


Now you have Westprog offside. He'll start complaining about virtual oranges in a moment.


Certainly. Some sort of world with which to interact, anyway.


And there goes Malerin.


Precisely the point I've been making. We don't need to know how the brain creates the mind, we just need to get the wiring right. An accurate simulation of the brain will produce a mind.


Yes. It's worth pursuing both approaches.


And there goes AkuManiMani.


Right. Tegmark has a thing or two to say on this question. (In brief, that Penrose and Hammeroff are out by at least ten orders of magnitude in the time domain.)


Yeah. I don't think much of that, because it relies on the assumptions that the Universe is meaningfully continuous (which seems to contradict QM), that this actually produces a more powerful computational engine (not so much an assumption as maths that needs to be rigorously checked; I'm not aware of anyone else in the field who takes this seriously, but I'm not up on all the literature by a long shot), and that this actually makes a difference in the real world.


Yeah; I find it extremely dubious for all the reasons I list above. However, what it does mean is that we can still model brains computationally, we just need a different type of computer.

So, in short, I see that you are all cozy with the people whose views are diametrically opposed to your own, and aggressive and dismissive - and largely non-responsive - to those who agree with you on all but one specific definition. It doesn't hurt to be civil to those with whom you disagree, but I fail to see what is gained by being systematically uncivil with your own side.

You may be well-informed in the field, but your communication skills are somewhat lacking. Try, for once, to understand what people are saying to you rather than constructing strawmen and attacking those. You'll get a lot further.

Have you read the post I wrote to answer your questions yet? I think it already addressed the bolded part. But let me be more explicit because you yourself have just done me a service in laying the groundwork to reaffirm to you that I was sincere - its not about agreement but argument.

You are absolutely right, I have more and deeper disagreements with others on the board than you. In fact, from digital physics to consciousness you might just be the closest to my POV of anyone on the forum I've seen so far. So it irks me all the more that somebody I agree with so much should argue so badly. If I were to welcome you championing my beliefs through the forum I'd have to bury my head in the sand or go away. You see Pixi, it is the way you try to prove your conclusions and not your conclusions themselves that drives me nuts.

If you read my posts to Aku, Flora, and RocketDodger and others you see i don't spare any punches. I'm blunt often bordering on rude. And with you I have been rude too because it took the edge off of banging my head on the wall. I realize it probably diminishes my persuasiveness. Oh well. I came to this forum to learn and be entertained and share in same. When I find my self in a debate where there is no real dialogue and learning I switch to entertainment -sometimes via venting. It might not be admirable but I'm just human.

Actually, FUWF happens to be a deliberate forum persona I created years ago to indulge my unvarnished convictions, ideas, and feelings and impatient curmudgeonly and skeptical nature that normally lies suppressed in the phony euphemisms of everyday civil society. FUWF's owner must suffer fools all the time. FUWF never does. It's liberating. But i don't suspect I'll survive long at JREF considering what I've discovered in the Dr. A banning thread and in only two days here I've already had one post deleted by mods.

The fact that I have and continue to engage in good dialogue with those you quite rightly pointed out I disagree more frequently than you should tell you something, especially since everybody else has apparently been trying to tell you the same thing for a long time.

I hate to sound like Dr. Phil but when you're the only common denominator in problem relationships it's time to take a good long look at yourself.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm not sure there's so much disagreement here as some appear to think- and what there is has more to do with perception of personality and posting style than to do with the topic under discussion.

Yes, and the precise definitions of a small number of words.

Teh Interweb is a narrow band communication channel. Mutual tolerance is helpful.

Yes again. I put people on ignore for two reasons: One is that they never have anything intelligent to say. But the other is that they are irritating me on some point and I need to stop reflexively responding in my usual ascerbic style. FUWF definitely falls into the latter category.

We know this:- Brains exist. Minds exist. Brains appear to cause minds.

Indeed.

It may be the case that inorganic brains can also cause minds, but that has yet to be proved, except if we accept that all computational systems are minds by definition. Clearly, not everyone does.
(FWIW, I'm personally unconvinced by that argument. I think organic chemistry, embryology and 4 billion years of evolution probably throw an extra ingredient or two in the mix, though I don't doubt such ingredients will be amenable to study and indeed are being studied now. I don't think this is a mystical pov, I think it's just scepticism, but some might disagree).

The broader point here is that scientifically and mathematically, everything we know tells us that it must be possible for inorganic brains to cause minds. Even the "field" and "quantum entanglement" speculations allow for this (and of course, both are solidly debunked).

We all seem to accept that SRIP is involved to some extent in minds.

Almost all, yep.

Some think that's basically it, some think it may not be that "simple".
What the second group must show is what, in addition to SRIP is involved.

Well, they don't even have to do that. It's enough for them to show that a definition of consciousness as self-referential information processing plus some other specific requirement is as useful as the definition of consciousness specifically as self-referential information processing.

What the AI group must do, is show how, or to what extent, SRIP is adequate as an explanation.

Well, we've established that it's necessary, almost all of us agree. Until we can show that something else - something specific - is at least plausibly necessary, it stands as a minimal definition.

Example:- Pixy uses "conscious" to describe SRIP systems from "a few NAND gates" to human brains, implying a scale of consciousness related to the complexity of the system. Others (including myself) consider this usage confusing. (Though I find the idea itself perfectly sensible). To me, humans are conscious and so far as I'm aware, nothing else is to anything like the same extent. I think many vertebrates are, to varying degrees. Apes, crows, dogs etc.

Right.

The problem I have - which has landed a number of people on pretty much permanent ignore - is not with those who question this, but with those who ignore my definition after repeated correction solely for the purpose of mockery.

The Hume quote goes both ways. Okay, I altered and refined the definition of consciousness. I am thus required to present my definition. But once I've done that, if someone responds to my points assuming their own definition in place of mine, it's not me that's making the error.

Whether subconscious processes in brains are "conscious" is another matter entirely. We all know at least one brain process is conscious, so it's no great leap to think others might be too. We are unaware of them ourselves, by definition. I find that idea surprising, but acceptable. It hints at an explanation for the way scientists often have a "Eureka" moment after mulling fruitlessly over an intractable problem and abandoning it for a while consciously. To explain this by "The subconscious" has always seemd like a cop-out, to me.

I think the best and clearest example of this is when the synthesis of consciousness breaks down, such as in split-brain patients. You have, in a very significant sense, two separate conscious minds. They're not entirely separate, since the corpus callosum is not the only connection between the hemispheres, and they don't each exhibit all the behaviours of a healthy normal human, but they do each exhibit complex conscious behaviour - distinct and different from one another.

I assume mind is a physical phenomenon, open to study, because I know of no other kind of phenomenon, which , I guess, is Paul's point.

And unfortunately it's a point that keeps needing to be made.

I'm not wholly in either camp though. The fact I think it's a physical question doesn't mean I will ever understand it. I don't understand Maxwell's equations or quantum field theory- and these are "physical " phenomena - but in a somewhat abstract sense. Mind may turn out to be an abstraction level further still.

I keep forgetting how colour CRTs work. Every time I read up on them I think, oh, that's a clever solution to the problem, then I forget again.

It seems odd- to say the least- that a hundred dollars worth of chemicals should be able to be self aware and even aware of more chemicals in Australia which hold a range of differing opinions about that very oddity.
Odd.
But not, I think, inexplicable.

Yep. But nor do I think the answers are going to be simple. It's not going to be "Aha! Quantum entanglement!" or "Aha! Electromagnetic fields!" It's going to be a log hard slog of tracing wires.

 

[PixyMisa]

Have you read the post I wrote to answer your questions yet? I think it already addressed the bolded part. But let me be more explicit because you yourself have just done me a service in laying the groundwork to reaffirm to you that I was sincere - its not about agreement but argument.

Yes, I have now, and you did, I think, address most of the points where we disagree.

You are absolutely right, I have more and deeper disagreements with others on the board than you. In fact, from digital physics to consciousness you might just be the closest to my POV of anyone on the forum I've seen so far. So it irks me all the more that somebody I agree with so much should argue so badly. If I were to welcome you championing my beliefs through the forum I'd have to bury my head in the sand or go away. You see Pixi, it is the way you try to prove your conclusions and not your conclusions themselves that drives me nuts.

My point here is that I am not doing what you think I'm doing. You're just inferring things that aren't there.

Actually, FUWF happens to be a deliberate forum persona I created years ago to indulge my unvarnished convictions, ideas, and feelings and impatient curmudgeonly and skeptical nature that normally lies suppressed in the phony euphemisms of everyday civil society. FUWF's owner must suffer fools all the time. FUWF never does. It's liberating. But i don't suspect I'll survive long at JREF considering what I've discovered in the Dr. A banning thread and in only two days here I've already had one post deleted by mods.

And this is my polite and thoughtful persona. The real me would be much more forthright!

The fact that I have and continue to engage in good dialogue with those you quite rightly pointed out I disagree more frequently than you should tell you something, especially since everybody else has apparently been trying to tell you the same thing for a long time.

No, not at all.

You may notice that there are - very broadly - two camps here. One one side - myself, other computer programmers, behavioural psychologists, and sundry interested laypeeps. On the other side, dualists, idealists, and those looking for simple answers to complex problems.

The former camp don't necessarily use my definition themselves, but that recognise that, given my definition, what I say (usually) makes complete sense. (And either question me or take me to task when I fail at that.)

The latter camp ignore my definition, substitute my own, and completely fail to understand anything I'm saying. And no number of repetitions of the definition changs anything. They are the ones who keep insisting that I'm wrong. They can't actually show this, because they are not arguing against any of the points that I've actually made.

I hate to sound like Dr. Phil but when you're the only common denominator in problem relationships it's time to take a good long look at yourself.

Again, you're leaping to conclusions unsupported by - indeed, contrary to - the evidence. The people who have a problem with me have similar problems with a couple of dozen other posters arguing the same general point.

See their responses to Rocketdodger or Mercutio or Darat or Jeff Corey or Paul or Dr - well, a couple of our resident Dr's, but in particular DrKitten - or Hokulele or Paximperium or Belz or Dancing David or Ichneumon Wasp or Darth Rotor or Joe the Juggler or Apathia or Huz or Wudang or Aepervius or a veritable plethora of others in an ever-changing cast. I irritate them more than many because while I strive to remain polite, I give no quarter to nonsense, and because, being deeply intrigued by the question, I tend to post a lot in these threads.

Just be glad you weren't here to meet Franko and his socks, who took panentheism and panpsychism to the literal extreme. He regarded subatomic particles as conscious and the laws of physics as a deity. They don't make 'em like that any more. Can't get the wood, you know.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and apologies to anyone I left out of my little list.

 

[Frank Newgent]

One problem in making a network the subject in a subject-object relationship is... locating the object.

Well this is the nub of the matter.
In Pixy's view, the network is the object- or at least the hardware that generates the object. The object is self-referencing information processing.

So the process of constructing knowledge of the object regulates itself?

That's the paradigm shift that he maybe never went through because he's a creature of the computer age. Dinosaurs like me (and thee by the looks of it) presuppose there must be a something that resides. A watcher in the dark.

Pixy feels the watcher and the watching are one.

Mystical-sounding to me.

Is knowledge of this process constructed or is knowledge of this process a given in the sense of knowledge of this process being empirical?

I've already given my answer above of course.

Seems impossible to know the degree to which this knowledge reflects any external reality.

 

[PixyMisa]

So basically, I can just write any program with "a behavioural modification mechanism", call it pain, and it will -actual be- the sensation of pain?

Define what you mean by sensation of pain. Then define what you mean by actually be.

And then you'll be able to answer the question.

I dunno, Pixy. Smacks of sorcery to me

If you simply bothered to define your terms, you would understand what you are saying. I can't do that for you.

Showing someone they're wrong is not the same as them accepting it.

No, it's not sufficient. But it is necessary. And it's not something you've actually done.

I'm not responsible for your cognitive defects.

Nor I for yours, though I try to allow for them.

 

[PixyMisa]

So the process of constructing knowledge of the object regulates itself?

Sorry, I can't parse that in any way that makes sense. Could you unpack it a bit?

Mystical-sounding to me.

Is knowledge of this process constructed or is knowledge of this process a given in the sense of knowledge of this process being empirical?

What?

Seems impossible to know the degree to which this knowledge reflects any external reality.

Sorry, I still have no idea what you are talking about.

 

[AkuManiMani]

So basically, I can just write any program with "a behavioural modification mechanism", call it pain, and it will -actual be- the sensation of pain?

Define what you mean by sensation of pain. Then define what you mean by actually be.

And then you'll be able to answer the question.

So the answer is no, then. I ask you again:

What magical SRIPs constitutes the sensation of pain and how would one implement it on their desktop computer?

If you simply bothered to define your terms, you would understand what you are saying. I can't do that for you.

I'm just going of the the definition of pain you provided: "a behavioural modification mechanism". The definition you provided is no more useful than defining pain as "something that happens". Have anything better?

Showing someone they're wrong is not the same as them accepting it.

No, it's not sufficient. But it is necessary. And it's not something you've actually done.

I'm not responsible for your cognitive defects.

Nor I for yours, though I try to allow for them.

Case in point.

 

[Soapy Sam]

The problem I have - which has landed a number of people on pretty much permanent ignore - is not with those who question this, but with those who ignore my definition after repeated correction solely for the purpose of mockery.

The Hume quote goes both ways. Okay, I altered and refined the definition of consciousness. I am thus required to present my definition. But once I've done that, if someone responds to my points assuming their own definition in place of mine, it's not me that's making the error.

A confession. I don't always read every post in a long thread from the start- especially where it's a complex subject. Sometimes, I even respond to the OP without reading anything else at all. I suspect I'm not alone.

We might benefit from some mechanism that (for example ) creates a sticky post- permanently editable- in which non standard definitions for this thread only can be pinned.

A bit OT, but I feel the phenomenon of NODI (Non-overlapping Definitions) is one of the biggest contributors to misunderstanding, annoyance and anger on the forum.

Starting with my definition of "conscious" ie a single instance per person, it was literally impossible for me to grasp your argument that what I would term subconscious mentation could be conscious. It seemed stupid.
Having the advantage of several years observation, I am aware that one thing you're not, is stupid. I therefore realised you had to be using a different definition and I went looking for it in the context of the thread and finally saw what you were getting at.
Not everyone will be motivated to do that.

Likewise you can't understand FUWF's argument about qualia as your definition is "Qualia= NULL" and I'm damned if I can follow his , either.

I consider your usage the more egregious error as
a) Everybody already knows that nobody knows what "qualia" are,
but
b) Everybody thinks (wrongly) that they agree on what "conscious" means.

Well, hell. It got light outside. How was the party?

 

[Malerin]

We know this:- Brains exist. Minds exist. Brains appear to cause minds.

Well, we know minds exist (at least one). The rest is speculation.

 

[Soapy Sam]

So the process of constructing knowledge of the object regulates itself?


Mystical-sounding to me.

Is knowledge of this process constructed or is knowledge of this process a given in the sense of knowledge of this process being empirical?

I've already given my answer above of course.

Seems impossible to know the degree to which this knowledge reflects any external reality.

I too find it hard to understand the question you are asking Frank.
Interpreting when one does not fully understand either party is thin ice, but let me try.

The idea is that consciousness is a property- not of the organism in whose brain it occurs, but of the process of SRIP itself.

If correct, this might imply that consciousness is substrate independent- ie tht it can be exhibited (to varied extents) by any device capable of self referential information processing. This includes computers and the like.
Personally, I'm unhappy with that supposition. I think it's a feature of organic systems only, but that reflects my usage of "conscious" being rather different from Pixy's.

I'm happier with the idea that what I think of as "subconscious" mental processes may be (to an extent) internally conscious, because that appeals to my carbon bigotry.

 

[PixyMisa]

Likewise you can't understand FUWF's argument about qualia as your definition is "Qualia= NULL" and I'm damned if I can follow his , either.

Well, that's why I keep asking him for an operational definition. We don't have one yet, but we may be making progress.

I consider your usage the more egregious error as
a) Everybody already knows that nobody knows what "qualia" are,
but
b) Everybody thinks (wrongly) that they agree on what "conscious" means.

Well, hell. It got light outside. How was the party?

Chocolate was involved.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, we know minds exist (at least one). The rest is speculation.

Properly, it's inference, and it's an inference you accept, or you wouldn't be here.

 

[Malerin]

Properly, it's inference, and it's an inference you accept, or you wouldn't be here.

Not at all. Welcome to the dream!

 

[Soapy Sam]

Well, we know minds exist (at least one). The rest is speculation.

Either I'm so smart I can fool myself into consistently imaging a world in which I'm a great deal less smart than I actually am - and in which you, the internet, this computer and this conversation are figments of my imagination, or I really exist, you really exist and I really am less smart than I'd like to believe.


ps- I'm using a Cyrillic keyboard, with taped on English labels, several missing. I apologise for the many typos.

 

[PixyMisa]

Not at all. Welcome to the dream!

As I said, and as I said to Westprog on a different matter, you don't actually believe the point you are arguing, because if you did, you would not be posting on this forum in the first place.

It's not as if it's even an interesting point.