FedUpWithFaith, three quick questions for you:
What do qualia do?
Precisely what behaviour is it that we ascribe to consciousness that SHRDLU does not exhibit?
Precisely what behaviour is it that you consider (definitively) necessary for consciousness beyond self-referential information processing?
Clearly the answers to 2 and 3 might be the same, and both might be connected to the answer to 1, but to have any meaningful discussion you need to answer these, as clearly and precisely as you can, rather than just misconstruing my opinions and arguing against positions I do not hold.
Your argument at the moment appears to boil down to an assertion that while I may be right, I'm definitely wrong, and therefore an idiot. Could you please try for a little more clarity and civility both. I'll be back tomorrow.
Pixi,
I'm probably going to regret this but I'll try one last time to answer your question, if not for you then for those who've PMed me to say how much they enjoy watching this trainwreck. I have been snide and short and rude to you but don't take it personally. It wasn't really intended to hurt you but to amuse myself and add some some provocative passion to the dialogue. And you have been very civil in response which is one of the reasons I'm replying for you potential benefit.
The crux of the problem in my view Pixi isn't essentially our differences on consciousness. In fact, if we really sorted through the definitional problems I think we'd be in over 90% agreement. What has frustrated me about you is not your conclusions but how you got to them and how you argue. You confuse the nature and utility of facts, opinion, hypotheses, proofs, descriptions, theorems in illogical and unsupportable ways and appear to be incapable of recognizing this.
Anyway, here are my answers to your questions:
1. What do qualia do?
Honest answer: I'm not sure. What does a rock do? What does my subjective mental perception of blue do? If you've read all my posts they may just "be". I could give you arguments to tell you about all sorts of things I think they plausibly are including:
- the intrinsic mental perception associated with and/or produced by strange loops
- self-referential result or residual of data compression
- a self-reflected process state that is not a process itself
- less likely: and epiphenomenal illusion of awareness of processes that are completely unconscious
- some combination of the above
What all of these hypotheses (we obviously don't know enough to call them definitions of qualia yet) share is they all attempt to explain a purely subjective observable called "qualia" which is merely our subjective sense of conscious experience. I agree with Dennett in that qualia are:
" 1. ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any other means than direct experience.
2. intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3. private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4. directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale."
If you have qualia, then you should know what it means.
I also believe, by their nature, qualia contain no transmittable information either internally in further neural feedback or externally to the outside world.
You don't even believe qualia exist or can be defined. I know what I see, in my mind's eye (we agree on the veil of perception don't we?) when I see something blue but that experience, unlike all other forms of observation, is by its nature ineffable. What I experience is the qualia of blue. If you read and understood Wittgenstein maybe you would better appreciate the deep aspects of this.
2. Precisely what behaviour is it that we ascribe to consciousness that SHRDLU does not exhibit?
I'm not going to answer this now since we can't get past #1 and because you insist self-referential processing
is self-awareness. I would say
certain forms of self-referential processing
yield self-awareness. The mind is an abstraction layer - in that sense it isn't "real" in a tangible way.
The best analogy I can give you to try to help you see why you're wrong is the very nature of abstraction itself manifested in symbolism and language which is the ultimate limitation to philosophical discussions like this. I think Wittgenstein might help you with this too.
I ask you to consider the following statement:
1 + 1 = 2
1 = what?
2 = what?
1+ 1 = what?
What is the essence of these numbers? They aren't a thing like a TV screen and they aren't a process like computation. They are mere abstraction (with symbols). Your arguments sometimes equate what are really abstractions to physical things or processes. A mental process can produce abstractions but abstractions don't create mental processes (though they can be used to represent them!) Ultimately, I believe qualia are like illusions in the sense that they are mentally generated abstractions (via data compression) that feel subjectively tangible.
3. Precisely what behaviour is it that you consider (definitively) necessary for consciousness beyond self-referential information processing?
self-awareness (observable) - which I believe can be abstracted to mental tangibility via strange loops (explanation)
Unfortunately, the observable of self-awareness is subjective. So I could only prove my own consciousness. I could infer yours assuming your brain operates sufficiently like mine and you told me you were aware of yourself.
Otherwise, we need to wait for science to discover the fundamentals and processes of our specific neural strange loops and the general abstract hierarchies and feedback that govern them so that we can potentially recognize them in the same or isomorphic forms in other animals, alien beings or AI machines. As we do this, in fact in order to do this, hopefully we will be able to use brain scanning techniques to dissect the operation of these strange loops and correlate them in and between subjects to various forms of qualia and thought. Based on such self-reporting combined with correlated and completely understood strange loop architectures I think we'll then have a sound basis to determine if something is really conscious. However, even this will not meet the standards of proof that someone like UE can argue is required.